
Great Authors - Literature of the Renaissance - Pascal, Pensses
What this covers
Michael Sugrue lectures on the Pensées, the fragmentary notes Pascal left toward a complete apology for Christianity that he never finished. They survive as roughly 700 to 900 scraps of paper with a rough coherence. Sugrue sets the biography beside the text: Pascal's conversion to Jansenism in 1646, a reform movement pushing Catholicism toward rigor and penitence. He also covers the early work on probability, which Pascal later felt guilty about because it served gambling. Then comes the night of fire in November 1654, after which Pascal abandoned science and mathematics.
The middle of the lecture sets Pascal against two rivals. René Descartes and Cartesianism are charged with hubris, replacing revelation with unaided reason. Montaigne's skepticism is gentler but, in Pascal's account, slides into complacency, boredom and self-indulgence. Sugrue calls Pascal an "intellectual terrorist" for trying to jolt such readers into a religious search. He ties the diversions Pascal describes to T.S. Eliot's "Hollow Men" and treats the idea that life is meaningless as a perennial temptation, not a postwar one. He also argues that Pascal would reject the Enlightenment habit of making politics a substitute for theology.
The lecture also gives a good deal of space to argument. Pascal's Wager is described as "theology for accountants," and Sugrue lays out its structure and then raises an objection: it assumes God does not reward intellectual honesty. The Two Kinds of Knowledge distinction gives reason to mathematics and science and authority to theology, history and law. The lecture ends on two readings of Pascal, Søren Kierkegaard's and Nietzsche's, and Sugrue declines to choose between them.
Pascal develops a radical critique of both Cartesian rationalism and Montaignean skepticism, arguing that intellectual despair about the wretchedness of the human condition without God is the necessary first step toward genuine religious faith, and that reason and tradition operate in fundamentally different domains of knowledge.
- Pascal weaponizes descriptions of human misery and meaninglessness to drive readers toward religious despair, rejecting both hubristic reason and complacent skepticism
- Reason governs scientific and mathematical knowledge while tradition governs theology, history, and law—applying reason to authority in these domains corrupts both
- Pascal's Wager demonstrates that betting on God is rationally advantageous precisely because life without divine salvation is demonstrably wretched and meaningless
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Pascal's Wager can be understood as 'theology for accountants'—it is for calculating, self-interested minds that are willing to worship God not because of spiritual illumination but because it looks like a good bet, showing that the smart money is on God.
“What he does in the process of extending the realm of virtue rather than vice is develop what's called Pascal's Wager. Wonderful part. And here's how it works. It You could think of Pascal's Wager as being essentially theology for accountants. Right, in other words, it's for those calculating kind of a How can I put it? A Those good sort of calculating uh self-interested, heteronomous minds that want to worship or that are willing to worship God or willing to accept the existence of God, not because of some tremendous spiritual illumination, not because they they've been inspired by some change in their experience, but rather because it looks like a good bet. What Pascal ultimately shows us is that the smart money is on God.”
Pascal's description of the human condition—'a number of men in chains, all under sentence of death, some of whom each day are butchered in sight of the others, those remaining looking at each other with grief and despair awaiting their turn'—shows that we are either faced with immediate death or postponed death, and ultimately everyone's number comes up.
“Consider this prospect. Here's what what our our lives are like. Imagine a number of men in chains, all under sentence of death, some of whom each day are butchered in sight of the others. Those remaining see their own condition and that of the their fellows and look at each other with grief and despair await their turn. This is an image of the human condition. Well, I think it kind of speaks for itself. We are either faced with immediate death or postponed death. Take your choice. Ultimately, your number comes up.”
Pascal's Pensée 36 argues that anyone who does not see the vanity of the world is very vain themselves; young people whose lives are all noise, diversions, and thoughts for the future will feel bored to extinction if you take away their diversions because they feel their nullity without recognizing it, and being intolerably depressed when reduced to introspection with no means of diversion is an unpleasant possibility.
“He says, 'Anyone who does not see the vanity of the world is very vain himself. So, who does not see it apart from young people whose lives are all noise, diversions, and thoughts for the future? But take away their diversion, and you will see them bored to extinction. They feel their nullity without recognizing it recognizing it. For nothing could be more wretched than to be intolerably depressed as soon as one is reduced to introspection with no means of diversion. There is an unpleasant possibility that that's the case.'”
Descartes attempted to found a philosophy using skepticism as a medium to create certainty and irrefutable knowledge by bootstrapping himself into absolute certainty through unfettered development of human reason, representing the Western tradition derived from Athens, which treats religion as superfluous or irrelevant.
“If you know the philosophy of Descartes, what Descartes was trying to do is found a philosophy using skepticism as a medium which would be irrefutable and unquestionable. In other words, what Descartes wanted was to create certainty out of skepticism. And if you're familiar with, for example, the Discourse on Method, right? Where he tries to kind of bootstrap himself into absolute certainty, it's clear enough that what he wants to do is allow for unfre- un- the unfettered development of human reason. This represents the tradition in Western culture that is derived from Athens. And it If it doesn't denigrate religion, it treats religion as somehow superfluous or more or less irrelevant to its program of developing free and unfettered human reason.”
Pascal presents a pessimistic Augustinian conception of the human condition in which people are intrinsically depraved: you start out sinful and become more sinful as you live, with sins compounding upon each other until you realize what you are, at which point you have such a length of sins behind you that you almost couldn't possibly atone for them without God's grace.
“He has what I would call a sort of pessimistic Augustinian conception of the human condition. People are intrinsically depraved. You started out sinful and then as you lived your life, you got more sinful and then your sins compounded upon each other and by the time you became you came to the point where you realized what you are and you realized what the world around you was, you had such a a length of sins in behind you that you almost couldn't possibly uh atone for them. Without God's grace, it would certainly be impossible. We are all carrying around Marley's chains of sin.”
Pascal intended to write a complete apology for the Christian religion but never completed it; what survives are the Pensées, a series of fragmentary notes on about 700 to 900 scraps of paper that have a rough coherence.
“His fame nowadays rests on a book that he never managed to complete. And he intended to title the book an apology for the Christian religion, but we have it today in the form of a series of notes towards a book which was called the Pensées. Remember, these were written down incidentally. It's not a a finished organized book. We have a 700 or 900 scraps of paper in which his ideas are written down.”
Pascal's Wager operates on a mathematical structure: Either God exists or he doesn't (law of excluded middle); you have to bet; if you're an atheist and you're right, your life is meaningless and wretched so you get nothing to lose; if you're an atheist and God exists, you get damned for all time and deserve it.
“Start with a nice mathematical proposition. Either God exists or he doesn't. Either A or not A. That's all there is to it. We'll go with the law of the excluded middle. Either exists or he doesn't. It's kind of a mathematical distinction. Now, you have to bet. In other words, you can't not bet. You have to decide whether you believe in God or not. So, let's see what the what the smart bet is and how what sort of stance you should take in a condition of uncertainty. Well, if you're an atheist, suppose you bet that God doesn't exist. Okay. Well, if you're right, well, then your life is meaningless and wretched. And you got nothing to lose cuz your life is meaningless and wretched. And if the world is wretched and it's a moral void and we live in a kind of of a horrifying aimless, meandering towards extinction, hell, why not do it now? What do you got to lose? On the other hand, if you're an atheist and God is really exist really does exist, down to the pit, down to the bottom. You're going to get the damnation you so richly deserve.”
On November 23, 1654, around midnight, Pascal had a two-hour reverie he called the 'night of fire' in which he claims to have had direct and immediate apprehension of the divinity, experiencing what he believed was God's revelation, and this religious experience fundamentally changed the course of his life, causing him to abandon science and mathematics.
“He called this night the night of fire. He's actually good enough to tell us exactly the date that it happened. It was November 23rd, 1654. And around midnight, late in the evening one night, he had a two-hour reverie in which he claims and it's not very clear what he claims except that's something very important and very mystical and very theological happened to him. But what appears to be the case is that he had direct and immediate apprehension of the divinity. At least that's what Pascal thought was going on. Perhaps nowadays we might describe it differently and in a more pejorative way, but then he thought that finally God had revealed himself in that evening.”
Pascal became a Jansenist in 1646, and Jansenism was a reform movement within Catholicism that attempted to move away from worldliness and corruption in the church, emphasized good works (unlike the Protestant tradition), and stressed penitence and recognition of man's sinful nature, attempting to make Catholicism more rigorous.
“In 1646, Pascal became a Jansenist. And for those of you unfamiliar with the the details of 17th century French religious life, Jansenism is is a a sort of heresy of Catholicism which attempts to do many of the things that the Protestant Reformation did, to move away from the worldliness and corruption that had seeped into the church and to try and force people back to an original and kind of primary devotion to God and submission to God's will. It emphasized good works, which is something that for the most part uh the Protestant, particularly Lutheran tradition, did not. On the other hand, it also emphasizes penitent penitence and the recognition of man's sinful nature.”
In Pascal's view, Montaigne's skepticism, while less arrogant than Cartesian rationalism, leads to complacency and self-indulgence: skepticism becomes passivity and complacency, which turns into boredom and then into self-indulgence and various kinds of sin.
“In Pascal's view, Montaigne's skepticism, while it's less arrogant than the Promethean rationalism of Descartes, in fact leads to complacency and complacency leads to self-indulgence. One of the problems with the overeducated, perhaps too sophisticated uh types that drifted into us into Montaigne's skepticism is that skepticism very quickly becomes passivity and complacency, and this passivity and complacency rather quickly turns into boredom, and that turns into self-indulgence and various kinds of sin.”
Pascal can be described as an 'intellectual terrorist' because he wishes to rouse readers to a kind of frenzied despair by making them see the ugliness, depravity, misery, and wretchedness of the human condition, forcing passive and complacent followers of Montaigne to start a religious search by driving them to despair.
“Last night when I had a I had a dinner with Professor Brombert, and he gave me a great idea about this. I'm just going to steal it shamelessly. He called Pascal an intellectual terrorist. Isn't that a great idea? I mean, whether it's true or not, it's just a great idea. I mean, it's a beautiful locution. No, he's a smart man. And it's very true. What Pascal wishes to do to us in the Pensées is to rouse us to a kind of frenzied despair. We are supposed to see the ugliness, the depravity, the misery, the wretchedness of the human condition, and by driving us to despair, he hopes to maintain he hopes to force the passive and complacent followers of Montaigne to start a religious search that otherwise they won't do.”
Enlightenment thinkers following Cartesian rationalism tried to find secular salvation, a this-worldly improvement in the human condition through politics, and this pattern continues today where those who have given up biblical religion try to create pseudo-secular salvation by improving the world through political action—politics has become the new substitute for theology.
“The Enlightenment thinkers who followed the sort of Cartesian plan of emancipated reason generally tried to find some secular salvation, some secular this-worldly improvement in the human condition in the realm of politics. And I think it's not just true in the Enlightenment, that's true today. Those of us who have given up the idea of biblical religion are also the ones who try and create a sort of pseudo secular or partially secular this worldly salvation by improving the world through political action, right? Politics is in some respects the new substitute for theology. That's where we want to get a this worldly salvation. It's not that people stop believing in salvation, just they brought it down here.”
Pascal distinguishes between two kinds of knowledge: knowledge in which antiquity or tradition is absolute (law, theology, history) where reason should not be applied, and knowledge in which reason is absolute (mathematics, natural science) where tradition should not be invoked; any argument from authority is contrary to the nature of mathematical or scientific thinking.
“Pascal makes a distinction between two kinds of knowledge. He says there's a kind of knowledge in which antiquity or tradition is absolute, and there's a kind of knowledge in which reason is absolute. In other words, for those branches of knowledge in which antiquity or tradition is our standard, there's no sense in bringing in reason. On the other hand, for those kinds of knowledge in which our foundation is reasoning, then there's no sense in bringing in tradition. Let me give an example. Think of the development of physical science that we get with the Enlightenment. Well, there pretty clearly we have undermined Aristotelian physics and while the medievals would probably have said, 'Well, look, we don't take your modern science seriously because we have the tradition, the authority of Aristotle.' Pascal would say, 'No, you're making a mistake here, a category mistake. Scientific knowledge is dependent upon reason, not authority. Any argument made from authority is contrary to the nature of mathematical or scientific or physical natural scientific thinking.'”
Pascal's view is that there is no way to fundamentally improve the human condition because death will take us all; he does not support the idea of secularizing salvation, arguing that either we get salvation in heaven or you might as well not waste your time trying to improve things down here.
“He does not like the idea of secularizing salvation. Either we get salvation in heaven or you might as well not waste your time down here. There is no way to fundamentally improve the human condition. Death will take us all. He is in fact an intellectual terrorist.”
A second problem with Pascal's Wager is that it assumes God does not like intellectual integrity; suppose God likes people who are caught up with a naturalistic conception of the world, people who don't lie to themselves, and prefers those who are intellectually honest and make the best rational sense of the world around them—Pascal's Wager doesn't allow for this possibility.
“A second problem comes in. Suppose God likes the intellectual integrity of people who are caught up with a naturalistic conception of the world. Suppose he likes people that don't lie to themselves and tell themselves pretty stories like, 'Oh yeah, God exists and don't worry about it.' As soon as you have the night of fire, which other people might describe as a psychotic episode, um maybe he likes the idea of people being intellectually honest. Maybe he says, 'Look, people who who make the best rationally of the world around them are the kind of people that God is willing to favor and willing to overlook the smallest of their sins.' Conceivable. Pascal doesn't offer us much room for that.”
There are two approaches to interpreting Pascal: in the spirit of Kierkegaard, seeing Pascal as so morbid and extreme in his religiosity that Kierkegaard might grudgingly admit he's truly religious, willing to give everything as the gospel requires ('It requires not less than everything'); or in the spirit of Nietzsche, who said 'I will never forgive Christianity for what it did to Pascal,' seeing Pascal as a great intellect destroyed by religious fanaticism.
“I think there are two approaches and these different ways of looking at this correspond to the two figures that I've been or two of the figures that I've been comparing Pascal to. And I would call it we can interpret Pascal in the spirit of Nietzsche or we can interpret Pascal in the spirit of Kierkegaard. If we take the spirit of Kierkegaard, I think that Pascal is so morbid and so bizarre and so far out there, so extreme in his religiosity that grudgingly Kierkegaard might have actually liked him. Now, Kierkegaard, who described himself as that individual, who thought that he was blazing religious path, would have to acknowledge that yeah, he's a roughly as morbid as I am and yeah, he's roughly as wild in intellectually as I am and okay, this man is truly religious. Yeah, what is it that that they say in the gospel? Go sell all you have and follow me. Well, there, everything or nothing. Yeah, what T.S. Eliot says, 'It requires not less than everything.' Well, okay. Pascal and Kierkegaard are willing to say, 'Fine, it requires everything. I'm willing to go the whole way.' That's religion. I mean, even if it's wrong, you got to kind of admire it just for the single-minded obsession of it.”
Cartesians, as technological men and engineers, manipulate nature through mathematical formulae, figuring, and calculation, entertaining themselves not through skeptical withdrawal but through dogmatic knowledge and pushing nature around—a strategy that produces unexamined lives contrary to Socratic virtue.
“Cartesians are good scientists and mathematicians whose formulae and whose figuring and whose calculation allow them to push nature around in all kinds of interesting and entertaining ways... they entertain themselves not by withdrawing and not by becoming skeptical, but rather by becoming dogmatic about what they know and then pushing nature around until they die.”
The idea that life is meaningless and wretched is a perennial human temptation and not a contemporary idea generated in the 20th century after the Second World War; it can be traced back to the origins of Western tradition and gets recycled every generation or two when people react to dogmatism.
“I know that it's often it seems a very contemporary-sounding idea, the idea that life is meaningless. Actually, it's a really old idea. It just gets recycled every generation or two when people have a sort of reaction to some sort of dogmatism. So, although it sounds like the idea that it would be generated specifically in the 20th century after the horrors of say the Second World War, in fact, it's a perennial human temptation. The idea that life is wretched and meaningless. We see it in 17th century France. You can see it much earlier than that. You can go all the way back to the origins of the Western tradition. It is not a one-time fact that we happen to drift into in the 20th century. In fact, it is an ever-present possibility for the human condition.”
T.S. Eliot described people in 'The Hollow Men' as 'distracted from distraction by distraction,' which is very much aligned with Pascal's line that to live in a world without God that has no moral order, we move from one whim to another, distracting ourselves from the fact that the human condition is wretched.
“Uh T. S. Eliot once talked about the I think it was the Hollow Men where he where he described them as being distracted from distraction by distraction. What a lovely line. It's a beautiful thought. Uh it's very much along the Pascalian line. To live in a world without God that has no moral order, in which case we move from one whim to another, is just a way of distracting you from the fact that the human condition is wretched.”
The boredom and nothingness that pervades the world is commonly a goad to the kind of deep and profound piety seen in the most extreme Christian apologists, as evidenced in Kierkegaard's 'Either/Or' where he discusses boredom.
“Uh those of you who are familiar with the work of Kierkegaard will notice a certain spiritual resonance here. Uh if you have read Either/Or, where he talks about boredom, um yes, the boredom, the nothingness that pervades the world is commonly a goad to the kind of deep and profound piety that we see in the kind of the most extreme of the Christian apologists.”
Pascal's fourth and final part claims that there is a redeemer and this is proved by scripture, moving from knowledge of the natural world (dependent on reason) to knowledge dependent upon authority and tradition; the proof that there is a redeemer does not come from rational process but from acceptance of scripture.
“The final part, after he shows us that nature is corrupt, he's going to say, 'There is a redeemer, and this is proved by scripture.' You see, we've moved now from the kinds of knowledge knowledge of the natural world, which is dependent upon reason, to a different kind of knowledge, which is dependent upon authority and tradition. So, the proof that there is a redeemer doesn't come from any rational process. It's not that kind of knowledge. The proof that there is a redeemer comes from your acceptance of scripture.”
The speaker cannot decide between the Kierkegaardian and Nietzschean interpretations of Pascal, saying 'I just work here,' and suggests that either is a worthwhile way of looking at the problem; it ultimately leads to the problem of how to interpret religious experience when we reach the boundaries of language and thought that Wittgenstein described.
“Now, how am I going to how are we going to decide between these two? Well, look, I just work here. All right, I don't know how to decide between them. Flip the coin, adopt whatever stance you want, come out of Athens, come out of Jerusalem, follow Job, follow Prometheus, however you want to do it. Either I think is a worthwhile way of looking at this problem. Um it leads us to the problem of what we're supposed to do with in the interpretation of religious experience. We come up with what Nietzsche described as the boundaries of what with what with what Wittgenstein described as the boundaries of language and the boundaries of thought and experience. We can't go beyond those boundaries, but the journey to the edge is well worth the trip.”
Pascal worked out the theory of probability as a young man during a brief wild period of his life—contributions that enabled gambling—which he later felt guilty about and believed he had to atone for by using his mathematical gifts to develop the Wager, redirecting his gifts toward virtue rather than vice.
“When he was a young man, he had a brief wild period, and of course he felt morbidly guilty about that all for the rest of his life... Among the things he did, he worked out the theory of probability... the best application, or at least the most immediate application of the theory of probability is gambling. So the fact that he furthered the gambling advice of the world was one more sin that he had to throw upon the heap of sins he had developed.”
Pascal's problem with Cartesianism is that it is hubristic—it tries to usurp God's place by replacing knowledge of scripture and divinity through revelation with unaided human reason, and Pascal argues you cannot find out about God and things divine by reasoning alone; reasoning by itself is not sufficient.
“The problem in Pascal's view with Cartesianism, and his father was involved in intellectual circles that discussed Cartesianism thoroughly, that elaborated the ideas of Descartes, well, the problem from Pascal's view with Cartesianism is that it is essentially hubristic. In other words, it tries to usurp God's place by replacing knowledge of scripture and knowledge of divinity through revelation with unaided human reason. And the problem is that you can't find out a go- about God and about things divine by reasoning. Reasoning by itself is not sufficient.”
Pascal is a brilliant thinker but was also a profoundly disturbed individual; gifted people at the level of one in a hundred thousand or million often have a certain degree of imbalance in their psyche, and reading the Pensées reveals that Pascal was half crazy as well as a great thinker, so one must take the good with the bad or the incoherent with the lucid.
“However brilliant Pascal was, he was a profoundly disturbed individual, a kind of a gifted cook. I mean, there's a certain connection. I mean, you'll often find the people that are gifted at that level. I mean, it I mean, truly outstanding within a you know, a hundred thousand or a million people often have a certain degree of imbalance in their psyche. And when I read passages from the Pensées, you will certainly come away with the conclusion that this guy is half crazy. Also, one of the great thinkers of of his age, we have to kind of take the good with the bad or the incoherent with the lucid.”
Pascal's intended apology for Christian religion had four parts: Part One would discuss the wretchedness of man without God; Pascal takes as fundamental that man without God is in a wretched state, making this the foundation on which all his thinking depends—if human life without deity is happy and good, then Pascal's entire argument is irrelevant.
“He says, 'Part one will be a discussion of the wretchedness of man without God.' Now, all of his thinking depends on that. If human life without the deity and without salvation and without heaven and hell, without moral order that's divinely sanctioned, if that's happy and if that's good, then all of Pascal is irrelevant and this is a really stupid argument. Pascal takes as a dogma, as a kind of a fundamental psychological fact, the idea that man without God is in a wretched state.”
Pascal's third part claims that nature is corrupt and this can be proved by reason; he intends to investigate nature to show that nature in the physical sense is corrupt and that rational and reasonable inquiry into nature will reveal the moral vacuum of the physical world.
“He says that nature is corrupt, and this is proved by nature. In other words, think about what we're talking when I made the decision between the knowledges that are dependent up- and contingent upon reason and those that are contingent upon authority. Well, what he's going to do or what he claims to intend to do is to investigate nature to show that nature in the physical sense is corrupt and that just the rational and reasonable inquiry into nature will show us that. Will show us the moral vacuum of the physical world.”
Pascal did not write the Pensées for peasants or illiterate people; he believed religious truth was accessible to people regardless of education but had a particular audience in mind: first, the Cartesian rationalists, and second, the followers of Montaigne's skepticism.
“He didn't write this book for peasants, for the average illiterate or quasi-literate person. He thought that religious truth was accessible to people regardless of their level of education, but he has a particular audience in mind with these kind of striking and rather uh uh rather pithy and kind of somewhat unpleasant descriptions of the human condition. In the first place, he wants to argue against Cartesianism and the entire tradition of Promethean rationalism that comes from Descartes.”
Blaise Pascal died young, before reaching his 40th birthday, which makes his intellectual achievements in 17th century French intellectual life remarkable given the extraordinarily dynamic milieu of the age with figures like Molière and Racine.
“Blaise Pascal was one of the greatest figures in 17th century French intellectual life. And this is a remarkable achievement, first because of the fact that he died young. He didn't live to reach his 40th birthday.”
Montaigne was an urbane, witty, skeptical fellow who withdrew from active public and political life to engage in contemplation with his books and essays in his tower, maintaining a minimum amount of engagement with the world.
“Montaigne was a kind of urbane, witty, skeptical fellow who decided to withdraw from active public and political life and engage in a contemplative around with his books, write his essays in his tower, and have a minimum amount of bother with the world around him.”
Pascal was a mathematical prodigy as a boy, educated by his father who had considerable competence in mathematics, and at age 17 he wrote a book on conic sections, which was a remarkable achievement for a teenager.
“He was a mathematical prodigy as a boy. He had been educated by his father. His father had considerable competence in mathematics, and the kid was remarkable. Everyone said, 'He's going to be our next great mathematical figure, perhaps one of the great in the West.' When he was in his teens, people used to compare him with Pythagoras, which is great praise without a doubt. Uh at the age of 17, he designed a he wrote a book on conic sections, which is a remarkable achievement for a teenager.”
Pascal made original contributions to the theory of the vacuum and the idea of air pressure, doing important experiments on the nature of the barometer and air pressure.
“He made original contributions to things like the theory of the vacuum and the idea of air pressure. He did a number of important experiments on the nature of the barometer and the nature of air's pressure, things like that.”
Pascal wrote the Provincial Letters, in which he attacked the lies and hypocrisy entailed in the Jesuit defense of things within the church that are obviously evil and corrupt, winning wide applause and praise but making him a persona non grata within church circles.
“One of the most first important religious text that Pascal wrote was called the Provincial Letters. The Provincial Letters, he attacks the lies and the hypocrisy that are entailed in the Jesuit defensive things within the church that are obviously evil, that are obviously corrupt. And it wins wide applause and wide praise which made the anonymous author of the Provincial Letters uh a persona non grata within church circles.”
17th century France is an intellectually dynamic period with advances in science, mathematics, engineering, and literature (Molière, Racine, classical French drama), representing the crest of the Enlightenment.
“17th century France is a happening place. All kinds of interesting intellectual stuff is going on there. Science is moving forward a pace. Mathematics is doing nicely. Engineering is advancing. Literature, we get Molière and Racine, classical French drama. There's a a great many advances that are being made. We're at the We're riding the crest of the Enlightenment here.”
Pascal reminds the speaker of Nietzsche in certain respects: not in tone or relationship to religion (they are completely opposite), but in that both write beautiful epigrammatic writings and hopscotch from one idea to the next without necessary coherence between them.
“This is in some respects Pascal reminds me of Nietzsche. Not necessarily Well, first of all, completely opposite in tone and opposite in their relationship to religion and theology, but the fact that they both write beautiful epigrammatic writings and that they kind of hopscotch from one idea to the next without any necessary coherence between them.”
The speaker thinks Pascal is on thin ice with his claim about nature's corruption and that this sounds like an arbitrary distinction on Pascal's part, but decides to 'play along' with it because it is fruitful to see what comes from it.
“Maybe so. I mean, here I I think he's on kind of thin ice. I think it's a Sounds to me like more or less an arbitrary distinction on his part. But let's play along with these with his neuroses because it's very fruitful to see what comes of it.”