
Mike Munger on Microfinance, Savings, and Poverty 04/18/2011
What this covers
Michael Munger of Duke University joins Russ Roberts to challenge the standard narrative about microfinance as a poverty-reduction tool. Rather than accepting that poor households lack access to credit, Munger argues the real constraint is their inability to save—a problem rooted in social obligation rather than financial systems. The conversation builds from controlled studies showing microfinance's modest real-world effects on aggregate poverty, then works through the mechanisms that make saving itself difficult in societies where kinship norms impose sharply negative implicit returns on holding cash. Munger's central claim is that microfinance circles function not primarily as lending mechanisms but as culturally legitimate commitment devices that allow what he calls "saving down"—receiving a small sum, spending it on consumption or small assets, then repaying over time under group pressure and the threat of social shame.
The discussion moves through several reinforcing points: how holding visible cash creates family and community claims that can consume 75–80% of savings in some contexts; why even zero-return savings accounts attract borrowers when the alternative is cash held at home; how the same obligations that constrain individual saving also constrain women's economic autonomy, explaining Grameen's strategic focus on female borrowers; and why the persistence of poverty itself suggests credit is not the binding constraint—if high-return investments were available, lenders would profit serving them. Munger acknowledges a smaller segment of genuine microentrepreneurs earning 15–20% returns on tool purchases, but argues this commercial segment increasingly serves itself through ordinary banking. He also considers emerging alternatives, including mobile-phone-based savings systems and the Gates Foundation's shift toward subsidizing local savings banks. Throughout, the conversation treats poverty as an institutional problem—one where dysfunctional norms can persist because institutions, unlike markets or biological systems, lack the selection pressures that weed out inferior forms.
Microfinance fails as a poverty-escape mechanism because the poor are not credit-constrained but savings-constrained; its real value is that it provides a culturally workable third-best way to save ('saving down') in societies whose insurance norms make ordinary saving carry a negative rate of return.
- Controlled studies show microcredit has no measurable effect on aggregate poverty, only modest quality-of-life gains.
- Social obligations and family claims impose a sharply negative implicit return on holding savings, so the binding constraint is the inability to save, not lack of credit.
- Microfinance circles work because group obligation and shame create a culturally appropriate commitment device for repayment, effectively letting people 'save down.'
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The deeper barrier to escaping poverty is the lack of physical capital: with little capital, the marginal product (and wage) of labor — especially educated women's labor — is low, so educating women has low economic payoff; only capital accumulation raises labor's marginal product enough to make women's education economically inevitable (an Adam Smith point).
“the opportunity cost in terms of forgone labor is not that high because they have so little physical capital... once you start to save and accumulate and you have enough physical capital that raises the marginal product and therefore the wage of labor”
Microfinance functions as 'saving down': the borrower receives $40 up front, spends it on consumption (food, education, medicine), then pays it off over time — reversing the normal 'save up then spend' pattern — and the group obligation and threat of shame/shunning provide the commitment device that makes repayment possible where saving alone is not.
“what people call this now is saving down instead of saving up I'm saving down I get $40 and I spend it on food or on education on clothing... and then I pay it off”
Boudreaux and Cowen argued (in their 2008 Wilson Quarterly article) against the prevailing enthusiasm by claiming microfinance's effects are small and that its most important function is not lending but enabling saving — a view that became conventional wisdom roughly three years later.
“Allen and Carol Boudreau said two things first you're mistaken this is not that wonderful its effects are pretty small and seconds the most important effect is not loans it's saving”
Institutional evolution lacks the selection mechanisms of markets and biology: there is mutation (variety of forms) but no mergers/acquisitions or natural selection pruning inferior institutions, so better institutions displace worse ones only in the very long run — Munger prefers Hume's view of accepted conventions over Hayek's efficiency-tending evolution.
“what's lacking in institutional evolution is the mergers and acquisitions that we see in economics or the nature red in tooth and claw that we see in biology there's no natural selection process”
A discount rate should be constant across equal time intervals; if it appears to vary (preferring money-now in the near comparison but waiting in the far-shifted comparison), that inconsistency reveals present-bias rather than a stable preference.
“the difference is three months so your discount rate should be constant there's nothing that would say your discount rate should vary over time your discount rate is how you value the present over the future”
Jonathan Morduch's survey design — asking people to choose between a smaller sum tomorrow vs a larger sum three months later, and the same comparison shifted a year into the future — reveals three behavioral types, and the microfinance-successful borrowers are disproportionately the 'type 3' who take money now but reveal a low discount rate when the choice is shifted to the future (they want to save but can't).
“microfinance uniquely occupies the third niche and that's someone who when I say today versus three months from now takes four today takes the smaller amount but if I say 250 and a year or two eighty and fifteen months they take the 280 in fifteen months”
Institutions are not necessarily efficient; following Douglass North, institutions can be highly inefficient or even pathological because institutional evolution lacks the selection pressures (mergers, natural selection) that weed out bad forms — so dysfunctional poverty-perpetuating norms can persist for a very long time.
“there's no reason to assume institutions or efficient organizations are efficient but institutions can be highly inefficient even pathological”
Buying an indivisible asset like a cow is a savings strategy precisely because neighbors cannot ask for 10% of a cow, whereas cash savings invite the question 'do you have any money?' — so converting savings into lumpy, non-divisible, hard-to-observe forms protects them from social claims.
“I go buy a cow it's hard for my neighbor to come and get part of the cow... now I have some wealth that's indivisible”
The ideal savings 'bank' in this environment would deliberately be open only briefly and impose high withdrawal costs (draconian anti-consumer rules), because the friction itself is the value — it lets a saver honestly say 'the bank is closed, I can't get my money' to deflect a relative's claim.
“the ideal bank would be open only for a minute or two and... once you you deposited the money you couldn't get it back for a long time... The higher the cost the better”
Microfinance circles provide two kinds of insurance: intertemporal smoothing (a missed payment can be made up later) and cross-sectional risk-pooling (the whole group is jointly responsible for the loan, with explicit reciprocity over time).
“there's pooling both over time where I'm smoothing my income... there's also a cross-sectional insurance though where the six or seven people in our group I may be able to loan you four dollars because you loaned me four dollars seven months ago”
The widely held conventional wisdom — that poor people are credit-constrained, and giving them access to capital lets them invest in small equipment and escape poverty (echoing Hernando de Soto's collateral argument) — turned out to be false: controlled studies show no measurable effect on poverty.
“it just turned out that it's not the case there's no evidence that it has any effect on levels of poverty either of communities or individuals it doesn't help”
Microfinance reduces the price of saving: even though microfinance savings groups yield a negative ~30% return, that is better than the minus-75-to-80% an individual faces alone, so the intervention makes saving cheaper rather than profitable.
“the thing is that without this intervention it would be even worse it might be minus 80 percent so we're allowing people to save at a less the price is less... we're reducing the price of saving”
Even offering a zero rate of return induces saving, because the alternative (holding cash) carries a negative return.
“it turns out that since the rate of return is negative on saving that people will actually save if you offer a zero rate of return”
For some poor people the implicit rate of return on saving is sharply negative — Cowen estimates around minus 75% in central Mexico and an Indian study finds around minus 30% — because holding cash triggers obligations: relatives borrow and don't repay, village festivals demand contributions, or a husband spends it, so one must save nearly four times the target to net it.
“he gets negative seventy five percent that is if I save a dollar then it's understood that I have that in the form of cash people will expect me to pay more for village festivals and rituals they'll come to borrow it not pay it back”
The community-insurance obligation is simultaneously a benefit and a curse: in the absence of formal insurance, mutual obligation insures everyone against bad shocks, but it is precisely that obligation to share that makes individual saving impossible.
“it's both a benefit and a curse in the absence of other kinds of access to savings rainy day funds or actual insurance we have to ensure each other and there's this deeply felt obligation”
A subset of borrowers who take genuine commercial-style loans (e.g., $200 repaid over a year to fund a soldering iron and assemble motherboards) can earn 15-20% returns; these are commercially viable and increasingly served by ordinary commercial banks, so this is not the segment microfinance uniquely addresses.
“those guys can make fifteen or twenty percent per year after repaying the loan so there's a there's numerically a fair number of those if they can just get access to some kind of credit”
The Grameen Bank model has a borrower in a circle of 7-8 receive ~$40, immediately repay $4, then pay $4 weekly for 9-10 weeks, ending at $44 total — roughly 20-24% interest — which is expensive but far cheaper than a moneylender, and the group structure provides culturally appropriate enforcement.
“we'll give you $40 you make an immediate payment back to us of four dollars ten percent of the total and every week for the next nine weeks ten weeks you pay back another four dollars and at the end of the time you've paid back forty four dollars”
Mobile-phone-based payments may leapfrog much of the microfinance apparatus, enabling savings and payment transfers via cell phones within roughly ten years.
“the new kind of work on being able to pay with your cell phone may kind of jump us ahead of all of this you may be able to have to say and to do payment transfers with cellphones in 10 years”
The Gates Foundation redirected $100 million previously pledged to microfinance toward subsidizing the creation of secure local savings banks, but so far that effort has had no measurable aggregate impact.
“the Gates Foundation for example took a hundred million dollars that they had already pledged to microfinance and instead used it to subsidize the creation of local banks that would make saving easier”
Many developing nations are effectively 'disintermediated' — they lack the financial intermediaries (safe savings accounts, payment transfers, credit, insurance) that rich countries take for granted, so people must transact in cash and rely on local moneylenders charging 200% interest.
“these developing nations are completely disintermediated they have some savings services but the banks you can't really trust payment transfers are almost impossible they have to pay in cash and the credit services are very attenuated”
A randomized study ('Are Women More Credit Constrained?') found no measurable difference in rate of return between those given grants and controls, but there was almost certainly a significant quality-of-life difference from modest spending on education, medicine, and small assets — so aggregate poverty measures are not the best test of microfinance's value.
“there was no measurable difference in the rate of return that they were earning but there was almost certainly a significant difference in the quality of life”
The same social-obligation forces that make saving costly also make it hard for women specifically to borrow or hold money, which is why Grameen targeted women — and why the savings constraint and the gender constraint share a common cause.
“all of the things that would explain why it's hard for women to borrow money also explain why it's hard for them to save”
If poverty were truly just credit constraint, the problem would self-correct: people facing 20-30% returns on investment would save, invest, and profit, and lenders would profit serving them — so the persistence of poverty is itself proof the binding constraint is not credit.
“if it were as easy as providing credit somebody would do it and make profits in just the way that you suggest... and that's proof that it's not credit constraint”
The phenomenon resembles professional athletes who sign large contracts yet go bankrupt: coming from poor strata where obligation norms prevail, they feel compelled to buy houses and cars for family and friends, effectively a private rent-seeking tax on sudden wealth.
“they actually just in some cases they come from strata of society... that sort of obligation you have to keep it real you buy your mom a house you buy your your dad a car”
There is a circular trap: loans are unprofitable because there is too little saving, and saving is investment, so there is too little capital to raise wages to the point where investment becomes profitable — breaking this circle is the core development problem.
“the reason that loans are not profitable is there's not enough saving because saving is investment there's not enough capital in these societies to raise wages to the point where it's actually profitable to invest”
Banks add value by aggregating dispersed savings (safer than burying money) and lending it out, profiting from the spread between deposit and loan rates, which is why accumulating money in one secure place is more efficient than mattresses and backyards.
“what bankers do in some ways is they pull together savings that a number of people have... and then they loan it to someone else and the difference between what they pay on savings and what they take in from the loans is how they make their profits”
There is no fourth type of person — someone who would want to save now but spend in the future — they essentially do not exist in the data.
“the fourth type of person would be someone who is the opposite someone who wanted to save now but spend in the future and they're they're basically aren't any of those people”
Microfinance is not a single thing but a bewildering array of at least 20 different mechanisms — some for loans, some to facilitate saving, some to speed payment transfers.
“I tried to make a list I quit at 20 there's at least 20 different kinds of microfinance”
Natalie Portman claimed that with microfinance, eradicating poverty takes just 'a mouse click' — a claim Munger flags as illustrative of the overhyped optimism around microfinance.
“Natalie Portman actually said now that we have microfinance all it takes is a mouse click and we can eradicate property if only it were so”