
Gary Greenberg on Depression, Addiction, and the Brain 09/27/2010
What this covers
Gary Greenberg, a psychologist, joins Russ Roberts on EconTalk to examine how addiction and depression came to be classified as biochemical diseases. Greenberg traces the cultural and economic machinery behind these definitions rather than their scientific foundation. The conversation centers on a central tension: whether the disease framework for mental suffering represents genuine medical discovery or a rhetorically convenient—if ultimately harmful—fiction that serves powerful institutional interests. Greenberg draws on his books The Noble Lie and Manufacturing Depression to argue that monetary incentives, professional authority, and the cultural authority of science have reshaped how we understand and treat human distress.
The discussion ranges across several distinct claims. Greenberg documents how the disease label for alcoholism was created by a public relations expert in the 1930s rather than discovered through science, and how diagnostic criteria for depression—applied via symptom checklists with no biological test—deliberately mimic medical objectivity while stripping context and meaning from suffering. He notes that antidepressants produce measurable changes in personality and confidence, yet are studied and marketed only within the narrow frame of "depression" to remain reimbursable medicine. The conversation also explores how the serotonin theory of depression has lost credibility among serious researchers, and how Vietnam veterans with severe heroin addictions largely ceased using when their social context changed—a pattern that challenges purely biochemical models of addiction. Greenberg distinguishes his position from older critiques: rather than drawing a firm line between real diseases and problems of living, he argues disease is better understood as a form of suffering a society decides to relieve. The Unabomber case surfaces as a concrete example of how psychiatric diagnosis can pathologize dissent and avoid moral inquiry. Throughout, the discussion examines whether attributing human suffering to brain chemistry lets people escape taking their unhappiness seriously, and what is lost when medicine consolidates power to settle questions that are ultimately philosophical rather than empirical.
Greenberg argues that mental conditions like addiction and depression have been reclassified as biochemical 'diseases' largely for cultural, economic, and rhetorical convenience rather than proven science, and that this 'noble lie' both enables treatment and dangerously strips human suffering of its meaning and context.
- The disease label for alcoholism was invented by a public relations expert, not discovered by science.
- Depression diagnosis relies on impersonal symptom checklists with no biological test, and antidepressants barely beat placebos on depression itself.
- Calling suffering a disease attributes important human experiences to impersonal brain chemicals and centralizes power and money in medicine.
This asset isn't compiled yet
You're seeing its claims, ranked. Compile it to build the argument threads, weight them, and check each claim against your library — the full view.
Depression is diagnosed not by any blood test or scan but by a maddeningly simplistic 45-minute yes/no questionnaire tied to nine diagnostic criteria, deliberately designed to be as impersonal and objective-seeming as a lab test while ignoring the patient's context and meaning—a design intended to make the condition appear medical.
“the thing is maddeningly simplistic and it functions like the troubleshooting charts as the doctor goes down the list of questions... the diagnosis is made as impersonally and as much like a blood test as possible that's the whole point they want to make this thing seem medical”
Defining depression as a checklist of symptoms produces absurdities such as the recently bereaved scoring as clinically depressed, which led the DSM to carve out a 'bereavement exception'; researchers then showed bereavement is not meaningfully different from divorce or job loss, and rather than broaden the exception the DSM revision proposed removing it entirely so that all such suffering counts as disease regardless of cause.
“a study was done in which it was shown that people who are recently bereaved show up as depressed... so they decided that you were not depressed if your symptoms were the result of a bereavement... What they decided to do was to remove the bereavement exceptions so all depression... you're depressed it doesn't matter why”
Antidepressants are powerful and do plenty—they robustly alter personality, making people more like who they want to be (less rejection-sensitive, more confident, more in control)—but the industry only studies them against the narrow category of 'depression' because that is the only framing that lets them be sold as reimbursable medicine rather than as a paid recreational consciousness-altering drug like scotch.
“the major effects of antidepressants and the ones that show up robustly aren't on this very circumscribed category of depression they're on personality... the drugs make them more into more like the people that they want to be”
Greenberg distinguishes his view from Thomas Szasz: rather than drawing a firm line between 'real diseases' and 'problems of living,' he argues a disease is better understood as a form of suffering a society decides to devote resources to relieving, since the prevailing definition of disease as a biochemical-pathogen-caused suffering is only about 150 years old and was driven by historical and economic rather than scientific forces.
“what I think is that a disease should be understood better as a form of suffering that a society decides it wants to devote resources to relieving”
Despite decades of searching, no biochemical pathogen or 'cause in the body' for addiction or alcoholism has ever been demonstrated, so the claim that addiction is a disease remains an effective but unproven myth.
“the idea that it's a disease that is originates in the body still hasn't been proved and frankly I'm not sure it's ever gonna be so what you have is a myth the myth that alcoholism and addiction are diseases”
Our modern understanding of depression has the tail wagging the dog: the antidepressant drugs came first, and over the last 50 years the question of who is depressed and why has increasingly been answered by people who have a financial interest in selling those drugs.
“our current understanding of depression in some ways is the tail wagging the dog the drugs came first... what's happened over the last 50 years or so is that the question of who is depressed and exactly why has increasingly been answered by people who have an interest in selling drugs”
In the Kaczynski case, his paranoid-schizophrenia diagnosis was partly justified by the very fact that he refused to submit to psychiatric exams, illustrating how once power is concentrated in psychiatry it can pathologize anything—including dissent—and be used not just against an individual but against all of us.
“in the psychiatric exam he was determined to be as paranoid schizophrenic and some of the evidence for his paranoid schizophrenia was the fact that he wouldn't submit to psychiatric exams in the first place”
Whether one classifies a figure like Kaczynski (or historically John Brown) as evil or as crazy has profound consequences: calling him evil forces society to confront what the good is and the problems he raised, whereas calling him crazy ends the inquiry by reducing him to someone to be drugged.
“if you decide that he's crazy that ends the quest problem right there well he's just crazy you know give him some drugs and stop”
Brain death was not a biological discovery but a redefinition of death created in the late 1960s to facilitate organ transplants, because surgeons needed to remove organs while blood was still circulating without being guilty of murder, so the line between life and death was moved back and then sold as objective biology when it is actually a philosophical question.
“rather than just grapple directly with that idea what they did was they just moved the line between life and death back a little bit so that rather than simply deciding okay we're going to take this person's heart out and they will then die they made it so that the person could die and then they could take their heart out by changing the definition of death”
Calling a behavior or feeling-state a 'disease' lets people bypass the cultural taboo against taking drugs to feel better, because treating a disease is acceptable where merely medicating unhappiness is not.
“in our society to take drugs to feel better is considered a bad thing to do but if you call the feeling bad whatever it is a disease and say you know doctors have found that it's a disease so when I take a drug for it let's say I take Prozac for it then I'm not breaking the cultural taboo”
The idea that alcoholism is a disease was not discovered by medicine but invented at the end of the 1930s by a recovering-alcoholic public relations expert who wrote that doctors could become the primary treaters of alcoholism by convincing the world it was a disease, and this idea converged with the rise of Alcoholics Anonymous to become dominant in America.
“they engaged a public relations expert who was himself an alcoholic a recovering alcoholic to figure out how... doctors could tell themselves as the primary treatment for treaters of alcoholism and this guy came up with a very simple idea... if you convince the world that this is a disease then of course... they will come to you for treatment”
Vietnam veterans with severe addictions to high-quality heroin largely stopped using when they returned home, without methadone or lifelong recovery, simply because their context changed—demonstrating that a purely biochemical model of addiction fails to account for the social context in which drugs are used.
“veterans returning from Vietnam in the 60s and 70s with really really big heroin addictions... stopped using when they got back here they didn't have to think of themselves as lifelong addicts... they just stopped because their contexts changed”
A key consequence of treating depression as biochemical is the attribution of important human experiences to arbitrary and impersonal forces—chemicals in the brain—which lets people avoid taking the meaning of their own unhappiness seriously.
“perhaps most disturbingly the attribution of important human experiences to arbitrary and impersonal forces like the chemicals rocketing around in your brain”
The deep issue is whether unhappiness from loss or failure is an opportunity for human growth or a problem to medicate away; the harm lies not in the drugs themselves but in the meaning attached to them—taking a drug to recharge during a crisis is different from taking it to fix a biochemical imbalance, which lets one avoid taking one's unhappiness seriously, and drug effects themselves change with what patients are told to expect.
“it isn't so much the drug as the meaning of the drug and there's plenty of evidence that drug effects change with what we're told to expect from them”
The fact that roughly 30% of Americans can test positive for depression means something real—not that there is an epidemic of brain-chemical problems, but something about how we live—and social and healthcare resources should be devoted to that problem, though perhaps beyond pills.
“the fact that even if there's stupid criteria that 30% of the American people can show up positive honest test for depression I think that means something I don't think it means that they've got an epidemic a brain chemical problems I think that it means something about how we live”
There is a strong momentum for medicine to acquire ever more power to settle our moral disputes, but the emerging complexity of these conditions will make medicine's answers increasingly unsatisfying, and the coming DSM revision will force a reckoning that psychiatry still cannot even define what a mental illness is.
“there's a huge amount of momentum and that we will continue to turn to science and medicine to do that I also think that the emerging complexity of these things is going to make that the answers become less and less satisfying... psychiatrists still don't even know what a mental illness is”
The word 'addictive' conflates two distinct meanings—a chemical dependency that makes it physically harder to abstain, versus simply liking something a lot—and it is doubtful that biology can establish a scientific distinction between compulsion and addiction.
“the word addictive obviously can mean reduces a chemical thing in your body that makes it harder and harder to do without it it can also mean something you like a lot and what I want to know is do we have any evidence for a scientific distinction between those two things”
There is genuine but inconclusive evidence that depression is biochemical—brain defects in suicides, imaging showing severely depressed brains functioning differently, smaller hippocampus, and differential steroid metabolism in a subgroup—but all such evidence suffers from a chicken-and-egg problem: a biochemical signature does not prove the depression arises arbitrarily from biochemistry rather than from life.
“the hippocampus for instance is smaller than... in people who aren't depressed there's a subgroup of depressed people who are... if you give them a particular steroid they metabolize it differently... but they all suffer from the same problem which is basically a chicken and egg problem”
The noble lie is dangerous because it begins with the assumption that people cannot handle the truth, which both enables manipulation and the accumulation of power and is fundamentally inauthentic about the human enterprise.
“it starts with the assumption that we can't handle the truth which I always find to be a dangerous assumption”
In a post-religion age, science has become our most reliable source of truth, and because truth underlies our determinations of value, scientific claims have enormous compelling power to settle moral disputes that are actually philosophical rather than empirical.
“science especially in the post religion age science has become our most reliable source of truth and truth underlies our determinations of value”
Labeling addiction a disease has a downside: it opens the possibility that people stop taking responsibility for their behavior, including using the disease as a legal defense in the forensic realm.
“to call something a disease is also to open up the possibility that people will... there's a certain kind of responsibility that people won't take for their behavior it also has implications in the forensic realm we see this over and over again where people are using as legal defenses the fact that they have a disease”
Doctors have steadily expanded their cultural and professional purview, now asking patients about and claiming authority over much of their lives in ways they did not decades ago, functioning partly as shamans to whom people turn for comfort and truth.
“what doctors ask us as patients now is not what they asked people thirty and forty and fifty years ago... they view much of my life as their purview in ways that I don't they have a shamanism about them”
The serotonin theory of depression is dead among knowledgeable researchers; serotonin is now treated not as the cause but as 'the finger pointing to the end,' since tweaking serotonin changes things only as a means to some other, unknown end.
“I actually think that the serotonin through your depression is dead... at this point I think that they've stopped looking at serotonin as the end and looking at it as the finger pointing to the end”
Third-party subsidy of medical care—through tax deductions and government programs—made indulging the chemical-imbalance myth cheap and effectively funneled money from taxpayers to drug companies, even though that was never the explicit plan.
“there's a third piece to it which is the increasing subsidy of medical care by third parties either government aided through tax deductions or outright government programs which made the price of indulging in this myth cheap and funneled money from taxpayers to drug companies”
The belief that brain chemistry determines our moods originated from a convergence of accidental 1950s discoveries in which people taking drugs unexpectedly felt better, after which pharmaceutical companies had an interest in medicalizing the discovery by convincing doctors and consumers that ordinary troubles constituted a disease.
“there was a series of accidental discoveries in the 1950s... which ultimately resulted in a belief that brain chemistry determined our moods... once the pharmaceutical companies were in possession of these drugs that they knew made people feel better they had a real interest in figuring out how to medicalize that discovery”
Genome-wide association studies have largely failed to find one-to-one genetic causes for alcoholism as exist for Huntington's disease; the best they find is a small percentage of cases accounted for by a particular variant, so while alcoholism runs in families we are a long way from establishing genetic causes.
“the best you're going to do is a very small percentage of cases accounted for by a particular genetic variant so I think it's clear that alcoholism is in families and that points to the possibility of genetic causes but I think that we're a long way from finding those”
Because the brain is immensely complex with on the order of a hundred trillion connections, there is almost certainly no single brain pathway to depression but many, so a targeted-molecule drug approach is unlikely ever to pay off in big ways for depression.
“there are undoubtedly is not only one brain pathway to get there... I'm not sure that the targeted molecule drug approach is ever going to pay off in big ways for people who are depressed”
The economy, like the body, is a complex system about which we have some real insights but mostly tell comforting stories; much of what passes for economic understanding is 'scientism'—the illusion of science—that supports the biases or power of economists and policymakers.
“a lot of times it's scientism a theme that definitely runs through your books which is what you might call fake science the illusion of science... mainly we're telling stories that comfort us or support our views or our biases or our power as either doctors or economists or policy makers”
Doctors privately admit among themselves that they do not know the biochemical cause of addiction, but tell patients it is a disease, whereas Keynesian economists who say similar uncertain things at least genuinely believe what they are saying—suggesting the medical case involves telling patients something the doctor knows or ought to know isn't established.
“if a doctor... tells you you have a chemical imbalance that's causing your depression he's telling you something he knows isn't true or you ought to know it isn't true”
For mild to moderate depression it is very difficult to find any advantage of antidepressants over placebos in populations, and even in severely depressed people antidepressants do only slightly better than placebos, with cure rates only in the 40-60% range.
“if you have a sort of mild to moderate depression it's very difficult in populations to find an advantage of antidepressants over placebos... in the more severely depressed people... the antidepressants do slightly better than the placebos”
If antidepressants' real effect is to make people feel more powerful or confident rather than to cure a disease, the logically consistent policy would be to make them available like other consciousness-altering drugs—either over-the-counter or sold like alcohol—rather than reimbursed as disease treatment.
“this actually is an argument for making prozac over-the-counter... or turning it into a you know the way we deal with consciousness altering drugs we making me illegal yeah and then we let there be a black market”
Water quality and the hardness of life were the two main reasons colonial Americans drank so much alcohol—beer and rum provided a safe source of hydration and relief from hardship.
“water wasn't so good was one reasons but life was the other reason... the first reason was it was a safe source of hydration but the second reason was life was sometimes not so easy”
Older antidepressants like imipramine and Elavil from the early 1960s do just as well against severe depression as Prozac, so the newer drugs offer no greater efficacy on depression itself.
“when it comes to severe depression the old antidepressants do just as well as Prozac does”
Today is September 16, 2010, and the guest is Gary Greenberg, psychologist and author of The Noble Lie and Manufacturing Depression.
“today is September 16 2010 and my guest is Gary Greenberg psychologist and author”