
The Avoidable U.S.-China War – A Conversation with Condoleezza Rice and Kevin Rudd
What this covers
This is a Stanford conversation, recorded October 6, 2022, in which Condoleezza Rice questions Kevin Rudd about his book The Avoidable War. It was the fourth event in an Asia Society Northern California series on U.S.-China relations. Rudd's starting diagnosis is that the relationship is currently unmanaged strategic competition. He compares it to a workshop with frayed welding cables on a wet concrete floor, where small incidents could spiral. He rejects the idea that better mutual understanding will fix this. In his account both sides understand each other well enough and dislike what they see, so the problem is conflicting interests. Rice adds a contrast from the early 2000s, when the EP-3 incident was defused through indirect channels, and Rudd credits President Bush with restraining Taiwan's Chen Shui-bian.
A large part of the talk is about Xi Jinping himself. Rudd describes his apparent eidetic memory, his habit of speaking without notes, and his grounding in party orthodoxy and Marxist dialectics. He also covers Xi's wariness of historical nihilism. Rudd argues that Xi's ideological control of the private sector, seen in the treatment of Jack Ma and the forced donations, is "killing the goose that laid the golden egg." He says Xi lacks any grounding in how markets work and that there is little sign of course correction.
The talk then turns to the strategic questions. Rudd lays out five red-line domains for managed strategic competition: Taiwan, the South China Sea, the East China Sea, the Korean Peninsula, and cyber/space. He calls agreement between the sides unlikely but still worth pursuing. He also forecasts that Xi may see the 2030s as a better time to act on Taiwan, which makes the 2020s a window for building deterrence. On the argument that China would invade Taiwan to seize TSMC), he calls the reasoning fallacious. Other topics include the Quad), which he says Chinese pressure has pushed toward cohesion, and Europe's reassessment of China after Ukraine.
Kevin Rudd argues that U.S.-China conflict is avoidable through 'managed strategic competition'—a framework establishing strategic guardrails around five red-line domains (Taiwan, South China Sea, East China Sea, Korean Peninsula, cyber/space) while preserving cooperation on global challenges, though this requires immediate U.S. investment in Taiwan deterrence before the 2030s when Xi Jinping may view military action as more optimal.
- Unmanaged strategic competition creates risks of accidental war; managed frameworks provide stabilizing guardrails
- Xi Jinping's ideological contradictions (wanting economic growth while imposing state control) undermine China's long-term competitiveness
- The 2020s represent a critical window for deterrence-building; by the 2030s, enhanced military capability and credible risk calculus may deter Chinese military action on Taiwan
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Xi Jinping needs to radically invest in the Chinese military and technological self-reliance across all semiconductor categories down to 3-6 nanometers as the second component of his strategy to achieve China's dominance, based on the foundation of continued economic growth.
“and based on that to continue to radically invest in the Chinese military and to radically invest in China's technological self-reliance across all the semiconductor categories down to three and six millimeters nanometers not millimeters now”
Since H.R. McMaster's National Security Strategy in November 2017, the United States signaled it would not remain passive in U.S.-China relations and would actively react to Chinese moves, acquiring bipartisan support for strategic competition (though the two parties may disagree on terminology for this competition).
“since H.R McMaster did the National Security strategy in late I think it's November of 17. the United States symbolized there and then that the United States was not going to be a passive player in this process as Beijing was seeing it and it would begin to react and that acquired bipartisan support one way or the other you know the two political parties in this country May disagree about what you call this thing but basically strategic competition is the the framework as McMaster correctly concluded at the time”
The Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue—U.S., Japan, India, Australia) is not a military alliance but a strategic collaboration framework now embracing technology, semiconductors, secure supply chains, energy, and other domains beyond traditional foreign policy coordination.
“the quad is it's not a military Alliance and the members of the Quad describe it it as a strategic collaboration framework but what's remarkable about the quad as it's unfolded over the last year or two is the range of activities it's now embracing in terms of technology and secure sources of Technology Supply including what we're just talking about as far as semiconductors secondly energy and a whole range of other domains as well quite apart from classic foreign policy coordination”
Jack Ma is iconic in China as a hero to entrepreneurs, rising from poverty and determined effort (lining up at Australian Embassy for visa to language school), embodying aspirational success that Xi's control measures now undermine.
“Jack ma who I've known for a very long time became the hero of this generation and other generations of Chinese entrepreneurs saying I could be like that you know and Jack ma is very poor background Jack ma lined up outside the Australian Embassy in 1985. for four days asking for a tourist visa to travel to Australia to spend a month in a language School uh with a pen pal he'd made in Australia and he'd been learning his English of radio Australia's English language broadcast which is why Jack's English is a bit strange so uh so it's Chinese with an Australian accent think about it the uh so here is a guy who was just so determined to succeed that he did all of that and at the admiration of the world not just Chinese people okay just the admiration of the world”
President George W. Bush successfully reined in Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian (Century Bien) during 2000-2008 when Chen was pursuing a dangerous course toward Taiwanese independence, demonstrating individual leader agency in constraining geopolitical risk.
“President Bush made a difference as we were discussing earlier today candy when he did what he did to reign in the then Taiwanese president Century bien who was taking a very dangerous course in the direction of Taiwanese Independence in that period between 2000 and 2008.”
Chinese tech companies through Alibaba and related digital commerce platforms achieved extraordinary growth and success, representing one of the most remarkable economic achievements of the private sector in China over the past 20 years.
“the private sector in China is not hugely different to the private sector anywhere else like they are phenomenally creative full of entrepreneurs enormous work ethic a savings ethic and that's why they've been so phenomenally successful I mean what's achieved by the private sector in Chinese Tech just look at what's happening with the digital Commerce Revolution through a combination of Alibaba and and financial and all the rest of it was breathtaking you know it's amazing”
The Chinese private sector is inherently entrepreneurial, innovative, and work-ethic driven, producing world-class achievements in digital commerce (Alibaba, financial technologies), but faces ideological suspicion from Xi and party leadership.
“the private sector in China is not hugely different to the private sector anywhere else like they are phenomenally creative full of entrepreneurs enormous work ethic a savings ethic and that's why they've been so phenomenally successful I mean what's achieved by the private sector in Chinese Tech just look at what's happening with the digital Commerce Revolution through a combination of Alibaba and and financial and all the rest of it was breathtaking”
The balance of power has objectively shifted toward China militarily, economically, and technologically compared to the early 2000s, and China's self-perception aligns with this objective reality, making this power disequilibrium itself destabilizing in international relations.
“the change in the balance of power it's an objective fact in international relations that if you no longer have power equilibrium and you have an emerging large disequilibrium that this of itself is destabilizing and China's self-perception plus those of us who objectively measure these things says militarily economically technologically they're much more powerful than they were and their foreign policy influence in the world off the back of the gravitational pull of the Chinese economy and that is really turbocharged ahead”
Xi Jinping faces a fundamental contradiction: he wants to outpace the U.S. economy while simultaneously imposing ideological state controls over the Chinese private sector that are killing economic growth—he is 'killing the goose that laid the golden egg'—because he lacks intrinsic understanding of how financial markets and normal markets function, viewing them through an ideological lens focused on party control rather than economic rationality.
“he's got all that in the back of his head so he thinks he's being a great dialectician by saying I'm going to head this off at the pass make okay I'm ahead of the contradiction right right okay I've spotted where struggle must occur and I've um and I'm ahead of the curve in doing so his failure in doing that is to he has no intrinsic understanding of what a financial Market is what a normal Market in the economy is this is not part of his ideological National Security political training so whereas he thinks he's actually acting dialectically to prevent the private sector from ultimately marginalizing the party he is killing the goose that gold laid the golden egg because he doesn't comprehend it”
China did not use force to prevent the April 2001 EP-3 reconnaissance plane incident from escalating; instead, communication occurred through indirect channels (Argentina brokering contact at a barbecue), demonstrating that even dangerous moments had framework for management in early 2000s, unlike current fragility.
“I am a veteran of the April 2001 incident in which the Chinese downed an American reconnaissance correct ep3 on Hanan Island they kept our crew for seven days for three days we couldn't get them to talk to us and I actually found my counterpart at a barbecue in Argentina and got the argentines to get him to a telephone so that we could talk that's how the communication shut off at that moment it's a good you're a superpower we could track him down through somebody else I think well done yeah yeah well we were very grateful to the argentines”
China (per official dogma) interprets its own rejuvenation (zhonghua minzu weida fuxing) as restoring China to its historical position as the preeminent global power before Western arrival, not simply achieving greater size than the U.S., embodying a nationalist historical narrative.
“when you look carefully at the texts that's quite clear it's not said in those explicit terms but when you look at the official Dogma which is jonghya means of wedafushing the great Rejuvenation the Chinese people it means bringing it back to China's Global position as it was before we foreign barbarians arrived in the first place and that is as the preeminent power”
European countries, historically saying 'I wish you two guys would just get on so we can get back to making money,' are now reconsidering their China strategy after observing China's tacit support for Putin and Ukraine, recognizing that their assumptions about the China of old no longer apply.
“Europe which is uh historically saying I wish you two guys would just get on so we can just get back to making money uh in the uh The Unofficial European national anthem on China is money money I've got love in my tummy we'll have a seminar on human rights and security that's all you guys over there in Asia is that about it that's been my experience of it anyway but these guys the Europeans interestingly and you would know this from your own extensive experience Conde internationally now and with counterparts is the the Europeans are now looking at China's tacit support for Putin and Ukraine and scratching their heads and saying our assumptions about the China of old probably don't apply anymore”
Xi Jinping's private sector controls send a message of permanent punishment to entrepreneurs: billionaires face public humiliation and sanctions, with rules constantly changing (attacking private monopolies while preserving state monopolies), and forced charitable donations (12 billion dollars)—creating a climate where entrepreneurial animal spirits cannot be easily revived.
“the idea that you can in any political culture or any system anywhere in the world simply say sprinkle fairy dust and say forget about all that stuff forget about the fact that there have been a series of punishments meted out to this group of people forget about the fact that we're now changing the rules about the Chinese Tech sector forget about the fact that we're attacking we're attacking private sector Tech monopolies but we're living public sector monopolies in place and forget about the fact that we've just said that if you're a really successful firm you will now spontaneously donate 12 billion dollars to your local favorite charity forget about all of that because it's all over and we really do love you what do you think the response would be the next morning unlikely to be hugely positive so there is a counter narrative”
Xi Jinping displays extraordinary self-confidence, never using notes in conversations and moving flexibly between subjects unlike his two predecessors Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin, suggesting an eidetic memory or highly developed capacity for absorbing and retaining information through repetition.
“the first thing that strikes you between the eyeballs with Xi Jinping is his enormous level of self-confidence like there is something I never sensed for example in hujinta um reflecting the fact that in every conversation I've ever had with Xi Jinping I never saw him use a note he either has an eidetic memory which is just an ability to absorb the script which have as you know if you've been in the business for a while you can just through repeat but his ability to move flexibly from subject to subject I found unlike his two sets of predecessors dung never used a script but Chung's have been and who Jintao did”
Xi Jinping is deeply steeped in Chinese party history (danglish—the received set of orthodoxies within the Communist Party system) and national history, and while he reflects orthodoxies about party history, he is capable of some honesty about historical failures such as the Cultural Revolution and Great Leap Forward, though he publicly avoids these discussions to prevent 'historical nihilism' that could undermine party legitimacy.
“party history which is its own beast in the Chinese system they call it danglish it's like this received set of orthodoxies like the evolution of cpsu in in the Soviet Union a recently Orthodox reflection within a capacity for some honesty about stuff that went wrong on National History obviously through the prism of party history but still able to deal with challenges and criticism like you know when I'd uh reflect on the excesses of the cultural revolution and and the Great Leap Forward and that sort of stuff like these are not happy episodes in the history of the Communist party and Xi Jinping on the public record on China says we don't discuss these things anymore because they give rise to what he describes as historical nilism”
Xi Jinping has had no expertise or experience with understanding what financial markets or normal market economies are, which is not part of his ideological, national security, or political training.
“he has no intrinsic understanding of what a financial Market is what a normal Market in the economy is this is not part of his ideological National Security political training”
The U.S.-China relationship is currently like an unsafe workshop with uninsulated welding cables frayed for years on a wet concrete floor—it's unmanaged strategic competition where small incidents could spiral into conflict, analogous to children pushing and shoving who may unexpectedly fall over.
“the analogy I used recently to describe the U.S China relationship is right now is a bit like this in your mind's eye those of you who have a father or a grandfather and Uncle with a workshop in the backyard and your father and grandfather or Uncle loves welding okay and he's out there and with his uh a neighbor they willed every every afternoon they just love welding there's sparks flying everywhere except when you look closely on the floor it's a concrete floor um there is water all over the floor and you see the cables leading into the welding equipment have no insulation around them at all in fact they've been frayed for some years now and so you ask the question what could possibly go wrong”
Xi Jinping prides himself on being a 'numero uno dialectician' applying Marxist dialectical materialism (intersection of progressive and reactionary forces, resolution through contradiction and struggle) as both a framework for understanding current world events and predicting future advancement to socialism and communism.
“I've got to say wrapping your head around this entirely different systemology and it's not just it's not just a conclusion about the future cause of History which is historical determinism it's also a rolling epistemology for understanding what's happening now right in this world of contradiction and struggle so the irony is yes he sees himself and Prides himself in being a Numero Uno dialectician not something you'd boast about your local football club but a a first-class dialectician the intersection of progressive and reactionary forces contradiction resolution through struggle and you move on to inexual advance to socialism and communism probably by next Thursday night at least here in Stanford that's kind of the world view”
Rudd rejected the 'Scandinavian fairy dust' approach of hoping that better understanding will resolve U.S.-China conflict; both sides believe they understand each other quite well and don't like what they see, making the problem not one of misunderstanding but of genuine conflicting interests.
“one is my first diplomatic person when I was a career Diplomat was stalker so I love the scandies but the idea that you can sprinkle Scandinavian fairy dust over this relationship and only if these two countries really understood each other better it would all be okay tomorrow morning no so the problem is they both think they do understand each other quite well and they don't like what they see so I'm not into the fairy dust business I'm into the realist business”
'Managed strategic competition' framework proposes five 'strategic red lines' (Taiwan, South China Sea, East China Sea, Korean Peninsula, cyber/space) where each side should advance high-level diplomatic understanding of its own bottom lines, enabling establishment of equilibrium points and reducing risk of accidental war, even though agreement between sides is unlikely.
“around many strategic competition the argument is each side advance in high-level diplomatic negotiations with the other side what it perceives to be its own bottom line in each of these five category areas now I know and you know as diplomatic practitioners you'll never get agreement on that because the other side will regard it as irrational but it's useful to know as opposed to presently establishing the equilibrium point through a voyage of discovery”
Rudd believes Xi Jinping regards the 2030s as a more optimal time for military action against Taiwan based on available evidence, making the 2020s a critical window of 6-7 years to invest in credible deterrence that increases the risk calculus against military adventure.
“and people legitimately say yeah but what about Kevin if you believe that Xi Jinping regards the 2030s as a more optimal time for China to take military action to secure Taiwan which is currently my belief based on what the evidence that I see then what's going to stop him then so the answer to that is the second part of the equation which is the U.S and Taiwan and allies have to engage now in a radical investment in believable deterrence over Taiwan”
Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) produces 90% of the world's most advanced semiconductors (3-6 nanometer threshold), creating concern that China might invade to capture this capacity, but this reasoning is fallacious because: (A) control requires more than military arrival; (B) there is strategic planning to diffuse semiconductor supply globally through the U.S. Chips Act.
“you hear arguments that this will either cause China to take Taiwan in order to get a hold of the tsmc gear which is simply in my judgment a fallacious argument and there's a reason for that is that there's multiple contingency planning underway to deal with that in the event of a Chinese action you don't arrive one day with the Chinese equivalent of the 82nd Airborne and then control tsmc's fabrication facility it's not like that and on the reverse logic that China would never do it because it would destroy the world supply of semiconductors I think the similar corrective needs to be in mind that there is a strategy now in the United States and with its major partners and allies over time to achieve a much greater globally diffuse semiconductor source of Supply it'll take some time but already tsmc based on my information is locating fab here and you'll see that with some of the other Advanced chip manufacturers partly off the back of this new Chips act to the United States of Congress”
China initially dismissed the Quad as impossible due to divisions between members (particularly Japan-India tensions), but Chinese assumptions underestimated the extent to which China's own aggressive actions (Sino-Indian border pushes, South/East China Sea actions, trade punishments of Australia) would drive Quad cohesion through shared threat perception.
“our Chinese friends have been shocked that this thing came into being because their assumption was look at Delhi and look at Tokyo for example where is the natural worldview or commonality of interest between the two of course there's an answer to that it's called China um but the Chinese historical assumption has been that the divisions between the quad countries for such an order of magnitude that if this thing could only ever exist on paper and not in reality but I think China radically underestimated the extent to which its own actions in pushing the Strategic envelope on the Sono Indian Border in the South China Sea in the East China Sea uh punitive trade actions against Australia because an Australian prime minister uh one of the conservative Australian prime ministers called for a global independent inquiry into the origins of covert 19. put all that together you create sufficient momentum out of Chinese wolfhari diplomacy writ large and Military strategy writ large to cause otherwise disparate actors to coalesce”
There is little evidence of course correction in Xi's leftward shift on economic policy over the past five years since the 19th Party Congress despite slowing growth; some experimentation with exiting 'zero-COVID' policy based on the Hong Kong model might occur after the Congress and before the March National People's Congress, but this is a separate matter from ideological shifts toward state control.
“the evidence to date is there's been in this shift to the left on economic policy which has now been underway for five years since the 19th party Congress in all the areas that you listed before and a few others the evidence to date is there's been precious little course correction despite the slowing of growth I think they may find by the way there's a footnote to that answer they may find a way after the Congress and before the next national people's Congress in March to begin to experiment with the current Hong Kong model of exiting zero covered but that's quite a separate matter to the other ideological shifts to the left between private sector and public sector which I think have been much bigger forces and slowing the economy”
Rudd's judgment is that neither the United States nor China wants war over Taiwan during the rest of this decade because both have 'looked into that abyss' and seen 'a long way down' containing 'a whole bunch of unknowable risks'.
“secondly my judgment at least for the rest of this decade is that neither the United States nor China want a war over Taiwan because they have both looked into that Abyss they've stayed over the edge and said that's a long way down and it contains within a whole bunch of unknowable risks”
Xi Jinping intends to remain in power until the late 2030s (realistically until his death in his 80s), given that he has purged many potential rivals and cannot safely leave office without facing retribution—a pattern inherent to authoritarian systems where leaders fear prosecution after losing power.
“barring an act of God this guy is going to be general secretary or chairman of the Communist Party one formulation or another at least until the late 2030s he's now 69. by the time you finish the 23rd party Congress in 2037 he'll be a tender age of 84”
Xi Jinping sees the party as literally in the veins of Chinese leadership ('the party is in our veins'), meaning there is no pathway to pluralism—Xi fundamentally will not compromise on party control or allow political system transformation.
“his view as reflected in a conversation which he had with a friend of mine once which was pointed to his veins and said done they warmed the schweiger the party is in our veins so anyone who's got a view that there is a a nice transition to a happier form of political pluralism I think they need to get real”
Xi Jinping is a different type of leader than his predecessors (Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao) with significant personal agency in adjusting the status quo toward China's strategic goals, as evidenced by his campaign of island reclamation in the South China Sea and other destabilizing initiatives.
“Xi Jinping is a different leader I I'm from an old-fashioned School of international relations Theory which says that leaders have agency leaders actually make a difference President Bush made a difference as we were discussing earlier today candy when he did what he did to reign in the then Taiwanese president Century bien who was taking a very dangerous course in the direction of Taiwanese Independence in that period between 2000 and 2008. so leaders make a difference you can make a difference now Xi Jinping is in his own worldview there to make a difference to adjust the status quo to move China towards the status that we just referred to before and if you want um and if you want an example of how how he's just doing that look at this campaign of Island Reclamation in South China Sea remarkable but that's just one of a dozen illustrations”
Graham Allison's 'Destined for War' (2015) framed U.S.-China competition through Thucydides Trap, suggesting historical inevitability of conflict between competing powers, influencing both Chinese and American policy elites; Rudd titled his book 'The Avoidable War' in response to counter this determinism.
“my good friend and colleague from Harvard Graham Allison wrote destined for war in 2015. which is all about thucydides trap you know there's a big academic debate about that it really has had an effect I think on the way in both which Chinese and American policy Elites think about the trajectory on which they can be on which they are possibly on which is we are destined for war competing ideological systems one power seeking to replace each other Athens Sparta you know all the analogies in history Etc and so I felt some frankly necessary burden to say to my friend and colleague Graham here is a response which is we ain't destined for anything I'm not a historical determinist I believe in agency”
Xi Jinping believes in 'state capitalism' (increasingly Marxist state capitalism) as an alternative development model superior to Western capitalism, viewing the United States and West as structurally in decline due to systemic divisions preventing effective global action, based on consistent language in CCP ideological literature about 'the rise of the East and decline of the West' and 'irresolvable problems in American democracy.'
“the consistency and the Resonance of the language about the rise of the East and decline of the West and about the world's growing multi-polarity and about the irresolvable problems in the American democracy the systemic divisions which now prevent the Americans from acting on the global stage effectively A House Divided unto itself cannot stand to paraphrase that great American president um the conclusion in this system is that structurally the United States and the West is in structural decline and that an alternative development model his form of what I call State capitalism increasingly however a Marxist form of State capitalism is the alternative model development model not just for China but for the world”
The rest of the world (outside U.S. and China) perceives U.S.-China conflict as more anxiety-inducing than Americans or Chinese perceive it, fearing: (A) massive global recession/depression from supply chain disruption; (B) uncertainty about what allies will be asked to do and whether U.S. strategy is winnable; (C) return to binary Cold War order despite not wanting to choose sides.
“the rest of the world feels even more anxious than Americans and I think the Chinese feel because we're smaller okay and even though the rest of the world may think they would not necessarily be direct combatants in a U.S China military uh Campaign which is Means War and killing by the way let's just be very clear about this these are not clinical terms it's a lot of death um the rest of the world sees a the uh a massive Global recession borderline depression because if you start to do the maths on this the two the world's two largest economies which between them represent about 35 percent of global GDP domestically kind of shutting down global trade shutting down as everything goes onto a war footing”
Chinese regulators argue there are tens of thousands of millionaires who want to earn tens or hundreds of millions of renminbi but not become world's biggest billionaires, suggesting sufficient entrepreneurial ambition will persist within controlled bounds; however, this is a qualitative judgment without data and its validity depends on post-Congress evidence.
“they say yeah but for every one of those billionaires who who they say to me are unhappy with us there are literally tens of thousands of Chinese millionaires who want to earn tens or hundreds of millions of Renminbi but not become the world's biggest billionaires in other words there's plenty of others in the system wanting to do the same we're just not going to allow them to become that big I'm not sure that works it's a qualitative judgment I don't have a database for it but the proof will be in the pudding”
Xi Jinping sees himself as a man of history pushing the country forward against a defined plan for the future, with no sense of humor and a defined sense of absolute mission, based on multiple personal conversations between Rudd and Xi including over glasses of Australian red wine.
“certainly what I don't think I'm imposing this as a post-facto memory but you know when you meet folks in political life and National political life who you know have a defined sense of absolute Mission he's one of them I'm reluctant to use the term man of History because we know what that refers to in the current International political environment who's a man whose initials are V and P um and but this guy sees himself as a man of History pushing the country forward against a defined plan for the future no sense of humor um and despite my best efforts over multiple glasses of Australian red wine all sorts of things which I found enormously amusing that I was saying but but didn't Melissa Day from the general secretary the Chinese Communist party”
It is highly improbable that Russia will use tactical nuclear weapons because: (A) China has communicated military-to-military that this is unacceptable; (B) U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan has spoken publicly about American retaliatory response; (C) Russian military fears the nature of U.S./NATO response; (D) operational factors (wind direction, whether weapons work after long storage).
“there is no way in the world that Xi Jinping within the Chinese political system domestically let alone internationally could justify XI Jin as justify of Vladimir Putin using a tactical nuclear weapon secondly it is my view in the absence of any evidence available to me but it's my view that the Chinese will have communicated this military to military to the Russians in the course of the last several months not just the last several weeks and thirdly my conclusion is it is highly improbable as a result uh quite apart from other factors pertaining to the use of tactical nuclear weapons like which way is the wind blowing do they work because they've been in storage since you know since the Battle of Trafalgar I mean they've been around for a long time dust them off you know and see if it's still operational and and thirdly what will actually be the nature of the American retaliatory response which the National Security advisor Jake Sullivan has already spoken about and in my judgment effectively and publicly so put all that together I think a combination of a genuine fear in the Russian system about the nature of the response from the United States and NATO plus the Chinese saying no way Jose in Chinese not in Spanish that I reckon uh I'm on the skeptical side”
The 'muddling through' outcome will not restore six percent growth; it might reach four percent, which is insufficient for Xi to achieve his goal of making China a larger economy than the United States.
“so it's not going to be a return to maoism but it's not going to be returned to dungism either it in my judgment we'll be muddling through but that doesn't restore six percent growth might get you to four percent growth but doesn't get you to six”
The Quad provides strategic robustness to Southeast Asian nations, giving them greater freedom of maneuver by counterbalancing Chinese gravitational pull, preventing them from feeling entirely drawn into China's sphere (cyanosphere).
“what it does as a question of strategic reality is that it provides the countries of Southeast Asia in particular with greater freedom of strategic maneuver because there's almost like a band of strategic robustness now surrounding them geopolitically and geographically and so therefore rather than feeling that you're just being sucked into the cyanosphere you actually have a countervailing force and against the overall logic of the balance of power”
It is too early to say that China has reached 'Peak China' or that the development model is permanently broken, though it is clearly under great duress from ideological constraints on growth.
“it's too early to say that we've reached Peak China and that therefore the model is broken but I think the model now is under great duress”
Putin's forced resignation or physical removal from power would have reverberating effects in the Chinese political system, disempowering Xi's ability to comfortably discharge leadership without rolling correction from colleagues, though not sufficient to cause Xi's political fall.
“if Putin is forced to resign or is actually physically taken out this would have a reverberating effect back into the Chinese political system that's the simple point I wanted to leave with you not sufficient to cause Xi Jinping to fall politically but it would be disempowering and I think the fact is um ability comfortably to discharge leadership as he currently sees it without uh rolling correction from his colleagues it would be such a dramatic event”
China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi adopted Rudd's welding workshop analogy in a recent speech at the Asia Society, indicating Chinese receptiveness to Rudd's framework for managed strategic competition.
“interestingly China his foreign minister Wang Yi picked up that analogy and used it back at me the other day in the age of society in a speech the other day so my problem with unmanaged strategic competition is that's what where it's happening”
The early 2000s 'responsible stakeholder' speech by Robert Zoellick was misunderstood by China in translation, creating diplomatic complications despite good intentions in the integrationist narrative framework.
“I remember Bob zellick my Deputy giving the responsible stakeholder speech which apparently the Chinese couldn't translate and spent a lot of time trying to figure out what the heck that was but not us that's what we medium rare is the way it came in is that right”
Russia's military situation in Ukraine is deteriorating, conscription is causing domestic problems, and oligarchs are 'falling out of windows regularly,' creating pressure that could force Putin from power.
“things are not going well in the Ukraine from a Russian perspective secondly the conscription Mass conscription of Russian men is not going well thirdly oligarchs tend to be falling out of Windows regularly yes they're quite clumsy aren't they falling out of those windows”
In the early 2000s, the U.S. requested China chair the six-party talks with North Korea, which China handled reasonably well, exemplifying the more manageable integrationist era of U.S.-China relations.
“I remember very well asking the Chinese to chair the six party talks with North Korea and to be fair they they did a reasonably good job of doing so”
Rudd's framework of managed strategic competition is not perfect and he acknowledges holes in it, but he challenges others to come up with something better and claims he hasn't heard an alternative framework.
“as I say in the book it's not perfect I can poke holes in it myself but I my challenge is for someone to come up with something better and I haven't heard one yet”
Jack Ma went missing after giving a speech critical of China's economic system, prompting questions about whether Xi Jinping became more adamant about controlling billionaires after this public display of economic heterodoxy.
“last year uh Jack ma went missing after he gave a speech that as I remember it was fragrantly against China's current economic system do you think xuxing ping is more adamant on reeling and billionaires after this very public display of infidelity towards China's economic system”
The semiconductor landscape will look significantly different in 10 years, potentially making the TSMC concentration issue less relevant to deterrence calculations by the 2030s.
“if and if Kevin if you're right about the timeline here of the 20s the the semiconductor landscape could look quite different in 10 years than it looks looks now”
Xi Jinping's mother is 96 years old; his father died at 89 and was a Politburo member—suggesting Xi may believe he can have a long political lifespan similar to his parents' longevity.
“his mother is 96 his father died when he was 89 and his father was a member of the polypyria and I think Xi Jinping uh having put the pork dumplings down has decided that he probably can live quite a while”