
James Otteson on Adam Smith 06/27/2011
What this covers
This is a conversation between Russ Roberts and James Otteson of Yeshiva University. It opens with a short sketch of David Hume's influence on Adam Smith, including Smith's less-read History of Astronomy, whose account of cognition Otteson says "could have been lifted right out of Hume". From there it takes up the Adam Smith problem. Otteson observes as a curiosity that The Wealth of Nations never mentions The Theory of Moral Sentiments or its central concepts, even though Smith wrote only two books. The talk then closes by weighing what Smith got right and wrong.
The middle of the conversation covers Smith's moral psychology. Otteson explains the impartial spectator as a fully informed but disinterested judge, which he contrasts with the veil of ignorance in John Rawls. He also covers the mutual sympathy of sentiments and the solitary-islander thought experiment, in which a person raised without company has tastes but no moral sensibility. Smith's joke-telling example shows how context-sensitive rules arise with no one in charge. Roberts presses on whether the spectator is objective, since the local spectator has endorsed cruelty to out-groups, and since Smith's own circle was unrepresentative. He also notes that emergent orders are not always attractive.
The latter part turns to the economic side and the tensions that remain. Otteson ties the familiarity principle to Hayek's idea of living in two worlds, a small-group one of family and friends and a large-group one of strangers, and discusses the "small group species" framing from Dave Rose. Roberts raises a harder second version of the problem: The Theory of Moral Sentiments mocks the pursuit of wealth, while The Wealth of Nations credits that pursuit with growth. Otteson answers with the parable of the poor man's son and Smith's "deception of nature". They also discuss Smith's radical claim about the small natural difference between a philosopher and a street porter.
James Otteson argues that the so-called 'Adam Smith Problem' is a caricature. The Theory of Moral Sentiments and The Wealth of Nations are unified by a single 'marketplace model' of emergent social order, and the books differ in tone because Smith's 'familiarity principle' shifts motivation from benevolence toward intimates to self-interest bounded by the rules of justice among strangers.
- Both books explain how unintended macro order (moral norms, markets) emerges from individuals pursuing their own desires on local knowledge, with no central designer.
- The familiarity principle explains why benevolence governs intimate relations while self-interest plus justice governs large-scale commerce among strangers.
- Smith erred on happiness-as-tranquility and the labor theory of value, but was vindicated on commercial society and on mutual sympathy of sentiments.
This asset isn't compiled yet
You're seeing its claims, ranked. Compile it to build the argument threads, weight them, and check each claim against your library — the full view.
Economist Dave Rose's framing is that humans are 'a small group species engaged in large group interactions', and that this is one of the central enduring problems of political philosophy. Our deep-seated, perhaps evolutionarily ancient, instincts favor in-group members and distrust outsiders, which may be something we will always have to manage.
“we are a small group species who are engaged in large group interactions and that's really one of the central enduring problems of political philosophy”
Smith's example of rules for joke-telling and laughing (which jokes are appropriate, how long one should laugh) shows that social rules can be exquisitely context-sensitive, universally known, practically impossible to write down, and changeable over time. No individual can change them alone, yet everyone makes them together through interaction. The same mechanism governs things like appropriate dress and much of human life.
“these rules are exquisitely sensitive to context”
Throughout history, the local impartial spectator has endorsed cruelty toward out-groups. A white planter in the 1840s South earned peers' respect by viewing African slaves as subhuman, and in 1930s Germany or Poland people viewed Jews similarly. The current egalitarian disrepute of 'othering' could change, and slavery falls nowhere near the familiarity principle.
“if you're a white person you're in the respect of your fellow planters by looking down on African slaves as subhuman”
Smith's 'mutual sympathy of sentiments' is a descriptive claim about human nature, not a call to pity others. All humans desire to see their own thoughts, feelings and judgments echoed in others they care about; 'sympathy' here means harmony or concord. When views diverge (for example, one finds a lecturer brilliant while the other thinks he's 'full of it'), the resulting 'antipathy' feels uncomfortable.
“all of us genuinely desire to see our own sentiments our own thoughts feelings judgments ... echoed in other people”
Smith's 'familiarity principle' holds that the more we know about another person (their hopes, aspirations and peccadilloes), the more likely we are to feel real affection and concern for their welfare, and the less we know, the less we care. It explains why people will die for their children or spouse, sacrifice for friends, risk their lives for country, and rarely sacrifice much for strangers except in extraordinary circumstances.
“the more familiar we are with another person ... the more likely you are to have an actual a natural and actual a real affection for them”
Smith's impartial spectator is a heuristic for judging whether a contemplated action is right. You ask whether a person who knows everything about you and your situation that you know, but has no stake in the outcome, would approve. Unlike Rawls's veil of ignorance, the spectator is fully informed rather than ignorant. Smith also calls it 'the man within the breast' and 'the vicegerent of God upon earth'.
“this is not a Rolls Ian's behind a Rolls II and veil of ignorance ... this is someone who actually knows everything about us that we ourselves know knows our situation fully but has no stake”
Smith would bet that all communities hit upon the central rules of justice, such as 'don't kill innocent people' and 'don't steal' (allowing for disagreement over who counts as innocent). This is not deduced from first principles; it follows from observing what creatures we are, since no community can exist if people don't respect these rules with one another.
“all communities are going to hit upon because you won't be able to have a community if people don't respect those rules”
Not all emergent orders are attractive. Spontaneous emergence does not guarantee moral goodness.
“a simple way to say it's not all emergent orders or attractive”
The invisible hand is what most people remember about Smith, yet it is caricatured as 'greed is good'. Although the phrase appears once in WN, the idea that people create macro order from micro intentions pervades the whole book and is its central scientific insight. That pervasiveness is why WN is justly regarded as a great work of the West.
“it gets caricatured I think by most people as greed is good”
Because people are naturally partial to themselves and to those they love, even in good faith, regular 'intercourse with others' is crucial for healthy moral development. Others will not indulge us as we indulge ourselves, so seeing how disinterested people judge us is a necessary corrective to partiality.
“intercourse with others meaning communication society with other people is absolutely crucial for the proper and healthy development of moral sensibilities”
Among strangers, Smith thinks we follow the simple 'rules of justice' (don't kill, don't steal, honor promises and contracts), and beyond that our interactions rest mainly on individual self-interest. Markets channel that self-interest so that nobody needs to conquer or kill to get what they want. This enables far larger cooperation and satisfaction of human interests than love could, because love extends only to intimates.
“the rules of justice don't kill anybody don't steal from anybody and honor your promises honor your contracts”
Humans are naturally partial to themselves and to their family and friends, even in good faith. Smith therefore holds that 'intercourse with others' is absolutely crucial for healthy moral development: people with no stake in us won't indulge us as we indulge ourselves, so their judgments correct our partiality.
“intercourse with others meaning communication society with other people is absolutely crucial for the proper and healthy development of moral sensibilities”
A genuine curiosity remains: The Wealth of Nations never refers to The Theory of Moral Sentiments, nor to its central concepts such as the impartial spectator, even though Smith wrote only two books.
“in the wealth of nations which is the second one he never refers to his first book”
Smith was remarkably unprejudiced for his day and respected the dignity of individuals regardless of national origin. Near the start of WN he made the radical claim that natural differences between a philosopher and a street porter are far smaller than assumed and owe more to education and training. This was shocking in a class society that believed such distinctions natural or God-given, yet modern readers pass over it.
“the natural differences between the philosopher and the street Porter aren't nearly as great as you might think and much of it is owing more to education and training”
Smith's less-read essay, the History of Astronomy, gives an account of human cognition that 'could have been lifted right out of Hume'. It covers knowledge of causation, the dependence of knowledge on observation, and the impossibility of knowing what we have not previously perceived.
“he gives an account of human cognition that could have been lifted right out of Hume”
Smith's central insight in investigating moral sensibilities was that a system of order (conventions and rules) can emerge from individual behavior even when no individual intends to create any macro order. He then applied this same model to economic institutions such as exchange, property and prices in The Wealth of Nations.
“a system of order that can arise and emerge from individual behavior even if none of the individuals involved intended to create a set or a larger macro order”
Smith moved in rarefied Scottish intellectual circles atypical of humanity, so the impartial spectator he imagined reflected the judgments of decent people. A different community's spectators might approve very different conduct, which raises the question of whether Smith's moral standards are objective.
“he was hanging out with some pretty decent people so to be respected by them you had to be a pretty decent person yourself”
With strangers, the familiarity principle means we do not naturally ask what would benefit them personally. Instead we respect Smith's simple rules of justice (don't kill, don't steal, honor promises and contracts), and beyond those our interactions rest mainly on individual self-interest. Markets channel that self-interest into large-scale cooperation so no one must conquer or kill to get what they want. This explains the differing tones of the two books.
“the rules of justice don't kill anybody don't steal from anybody and honor your promises honor your contracts”
For Smith, morality develops through an evolutionary process within each individual's lifetime. We are born amoral, with only desires and wants, and reach a sophisticated adult moral sensibility through thousands of interactions with others.
“we're not born with Moral Sentiments we're born as a mortal creatures”
Hayek, in The Fatal Conceit, makes the same point without citing Smith: we must live in two worlds. Applying family-and-friends motivations to society at large leads to tyranny and death, and bringing commercial, stranger-style motivations into the family ruins families. Roberts adds that a small-town baker or a brother-in-law butcher blurs the line, changing the relationship (for example, extending credit).
“if we act that way too we'd like to take that motivation to society at large but that leads to tyranny”
There is a harder second version of the Adam Smith Problem. TMS repeatedly calls the pursuit of wealth a fool's game (the beggar sunning himself is as happy as the rich man, anticipating modern happiness literature), while WN praises people's efforts to better themselves as the driver of growth. Smith seems ambivalent about whether the desire for acquisition is healthy.
“in the Theory of Moral Sentiments says in many places that the striving after wealth is a fool's game”
Smith's parable of the poor man's son, 'whom heaven in its anger has visited with ambition', describes a man who toils for years for a mansion and trinkets whose utility almost certainly does not repay his labor. Smith calls this a deception of nature, but says it is a good thing, because that ambition drives the building of temples, bridges, the arts and civilization itself.
“does it actually repay all of the labor he put in to get them and Smith says the answer is almost certainly not”
In Smith's solitary islander thought experiment, a person raised from birth with no human contact would have only likes and dislikes (tastes, preferences for birds or sunsets) but no properly moral sensibilities, because he would lack 'the mirror' society provides of one's own conduct. Interaction with others therefore constitutes moral agency, and isolation diminishes it.
“would such a person have moral properly moral sensibilities and Smith's answer is no”
The desire for mutual sympathy acts as a centripetal force in society. It pulls people toward those with similar sentiments, and so serves as Smith's mechanism for explaining the creation, dissolution, reassociation and overlapping of human communities.
“it acts like a centripetal force in human society it pulls us toward one another”
Smith is acutely aware of self-deception. If we saw ourselves as others see us we 'couldn't live for an instant', and he cites the aphorism of the surgeon whose hand doesn't tremble when operating on himself. So even though we want to be authentic and earn respect, we may stay blind to flaws others see.
“bold as the surgeon whose hand doesn't tremble when he operates on himself”
Smith's woolen coat allegory at the start of WN shows that even an 18th-century day laborer's coat required the cooperation of thousands of people (sheep farmers, wool sorters, dyers, transporters), almost all total strangers to one another. This model of cooperation among strangers captures most of the dynamics of large-scale commercial association under an extensive division of labor.
“we were talking about thousands of people who had some hand in creating bringing together the materials”
Proposals should be compared with the best actually available alternatives, never with perfection, since we are fallen, imperfect creatures. A modern Smithian would say that market and commercial orders, while always imperfect and involving 'rough dealing', provide many incentives that encourage mutually beneficial cooperation and discourage mutually destructive interaction.
“we shouldn't ever compare what we're proposing to perfection because that's impossible you have to think about what's the best among the actually available alternatives”
We disapprove of phonies in others, and we come to feel uncomfortable receiving praise we don't deserve (or blame for things we didn't do). This feedback builds our internal impartial spectator, or conscience, and acts as a subtle incentive to align our behavior with what we would approve of in others.
“we're receiving praise for something we don't really deserve ... we realize that that's an uncomfortable thing and that can act as a subtle ... incentive”
Hume's skepticism concerned the limits of human cognition. When we see X followed by Y, we perceive two events (correlation), not a cause. However many times we observe the pattern, observation cannot establish with certainty that Y must follow X the next time.
“Hume thought no we don't perceive a cause what we perceive is two events one happens at another happens what we now call correlation”
Otteson's thesis is that Smith's two books are united at a deep level as attempts to understand human sociality. Humans are intensely social creatures whose instinct to form society shows up most clearly in moral communities and in commercial exchange communities, and Smith analyzes both with one 'marketplace model'.
“the two books are actually united on a very deep level because what he what Smith is trying to do is to understand human sociality”
The first edition of The Theory of Moral Sentiments contained much stronger religious language, including a Calvin-like atonement passage about humans being worms before God. Smith removed or softened such language in later editions, plausibly because of Hume's influence, though this is a matter of scholarly dispute.
“in the first edition there's a passage on atonement that sounds very much like something you might get from Calvin”
The familiarity principle resolves the Adam Smith Problem. WN focuses on self-interest because it studies large-scale cooperation among strangers, where self-interest bounded by justice naturally predominates (primarily, not exclusively). TMS studies the full range of relations, including intimate ones. The books differ in tone, not in theory of human nature.
“I think that really explains the difference in the the different tones of end discussions of motivations in the two books”
A legitimate criticism of Smith is that TMS equates happiness with tranquility, serenity and contentment, a stoic-like non-striving. This makes ambition look foolish, and the beggar-in-the-sun passage reflects a youthful romanticism about poverty; most actual beggars would have wanted what others have.
“here's one place where I will raise a criticism of Smith ... he seems to equate happiness with a kind of tranquility serenity”
Smith's list of errors is much shorter than his list of correct ideas. One error, on which there is now consensus, is his labor theory of value: the idea that labor is universally quantifiable and determines value, which modern economics has completely discarded and which Marx took from Smith. Smith may have held a more subtle 'subjective labor theory of value', but the project was a wild goose chase.
“his notion of the dependence of value on labor”
Institutions should never be compared to perfection, which is impossible. The right comparison is the best among the actually available alternatives.
“we shouldn't ever compare what we're proposing to perfection because that's impossible you have to think about what's the best among the actually available alternatives”
The caricature that TMS says humans are altruistic and WN says they are selfish is easily dismissed. WN analyzes the dynamics of specific human relations in market settings with strangers. TMS covers a much broader range of behavior, including relations with friends and family, which involve different motivations and different standards of proper sentiment.
“the Theory of Moral Sentiments does not say that human beings are altruistic and the wealth of nations says they're selfish”
For Smith, the mutual adjustment of moral sentiments is a completely bottom-up, emergent process with no designer or great moral lawgiver. It arises from common features of human nature (scarce resources, limited knowledge, the desire for mutual sympathy), which make the kinds of associations people form somewhat predictable without any central design. This insight influenced Hayek's views on traditions and social norms.
“it's not designed there is no person who is saying here's how you should behave ... this is a completely bottom-up emergent process”
Because evolution operates over thousands of years, human nature is essentially the same in the 18th and 21st centuries. A few Smithian premises explain much of social life in both eras: scarce resources, desire for mutual sympathy, greater concern for those we know, limited benevolence, and generally self-interested action. Since these premises hold everywhere regardless of geography or climate, they also explain substantial overlap in different communities' moral codes.
“for all intents and purposes human nature is probably pretty much the same in the 18th century as it is in the 21st century”
Smith uses 'invisible hand' only once in each book. In WN, investors prefer domestic investment because of greater certainty, which unintentionally supports local capital. In TMS, the rich, whose 'eyes are bigger than their stomachs', unintentionally create employment for others. The common thread is unintended benefit to others, but Roberts argues the richer meaning is the whole emergent web of commercial, moral, spiritual and social interactions.
“Smith's explicit use of the term which he only does once in each book really doesn't capture anything close to the richness”
The best way to channel us-versus-them divisions into productive rather than destructive forms is to encourage more interaction, on more levels, with people different from us. That is what the commercial order does: it makes people deeply interdependent, so even those who dislike each other come to see that they serve and depend on one another. This will not eliminate animosity, but commerce creates incentives that soften those edges.
“one way is to allow and even encourage more and more interaction on more and more levels with people who are different from us and that's the commercial order”
If contemporary happiness research has shown anything reliable, it is that tranquility, leisure and doing nothing are 'poisonous' to human happiness. People need to be doing purposeful things whose purpose they can see and believe in, and at which they are good.
“tranquility and leisure and doing nothing is not it those are poisonous to human happiness”
WN contains far fewer religious references than TMS, and some unflattering remarks about organized religion. Whether or not one ascribes the invisible hand to God, Smith clearly believed that the conventions and associations people generate on their own are beneficial in many more cases than we appreciate, often in ways we never notice. This gives emergent order an overall 'beneficent tendency', even though Smith knew human history is no cakewalk.
“in many more cases than we appreciate the kinds of conventions and associations and communities we generate all on our own are actually beneficial to us”
Modern researchers have rediscovered Smith's idea of mutual sympathy of sentiments and think he may have been right that seeking concord with others' sentiments is a fundamental feature of human nature, and an important explanation of the kinds of society we have.
“modern researchers have rediscovered this idea and think he might well have been right about that”
The Adam Smith Problem cannot be a genuine contradiction. Smith published only two books and revised both side by side throughout his life: six editions of TMS (1759–1790) and three of WN (1776–1789). Attributing a contradictory account of human nature to him is therefore uncharitable and implausible.
“if they were contradictory boy that doesn't speak well for Smith”
The apparent inconsistency can be read this way: an iPad is less important than an artificial heart, but the urge to make both comes from the same human striving. So one cannot condemn trinket-seeking without undermining the drive behind valuable innovation.
“there's a difference between a artificial heart and a iPad ... but the urge to make both is coming from the same human place”
The desire for mutual sympathy of sentiments acts as a centripetal force in society. It pulls people toward those with similar sentiments, and this mechanism explains the creation, dissolution, reassociation and overlap of human communities, with each person belonging to dozens of communities.
“it acts like a centripetal force in human society it pulls us toward one another”
The 'marketplace model' (not a literal farmers' market) has several elements. Individuals have their own desires, with no collective desires. They act on local knowledge of their skills, opportunities and values. They pursue interests that include love, happiness, friendship and beauty, not just money. They coordinate with others and so hit upon conventions and methods of cooperation that satisfy mutual interests, without central direction and without any single collective purpose.
“we don't have collective motivations or collective desires you have yours I have mine”
Smith rightly held an optimistic conviction that free trade, respect for everyone's property (even the lowest's), and wide latitude for people to use their labor, talents and possessions as they see fit would produce good outcomes better than empowering a 'man of system' or central planner. History has vindicated this 'in spades', and commercial society with limited but powerful government has lifted hundreds of millions out of desperate poverty, which alone justifies Smith's place in the canon.
“probably better than they would have worked out if we empowered a man of system as he calls it or some central planner”
Although Hume was the most famous intellectual in Scotland, he never held an academic post. He was denied the moral philosophy chair at the University of Glasgow because his skepticism about knowledge of God was thought incompatible with 'professing' morality, which required being a certain kind of Christian.
“he was denied the job because he was a skeptic”
Smith holds that 'man wants to be loved and to be lovely'. We want the affection and respect of peers and want it to be earned, which draws us toward others' judgments.
“man wants to be loved and to be lovely”
Smith was witnessing a transition from small localized communities to large-scale communities interacting with strangers across the world, strangers who might be seen as having the wrong religion or color. This posed the challenge of how to cooperate with people for whom we feel no natural affection.
“what he's witnessing is a transition from very small localized communities to larger scale communities”
Despite describing an emergent, bottom-up mechanism, Smith attributes a divine source to it: the 'all-wise author of nature' put into us the urges to be liked and respected.
“Smith finds a divine source for the mechanism he says the all-wise author of nature”
An irony of WN is that Smith wrote on the cusp of the greatest explosion of wealth in human history, yet he was analyzing only modest growth, 'a small little incline' before an enormous mountain.
“he's on the cusp of the greatest explosion of the wealth of nations that we've ever known”
The Adam Smith problem was first identified by 19th-century German scholars as 'das Adam Smith Problem'. English-speaking scholars took it up in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
“initially German scholars who claimed to have found this problem and you know being a very imaginative with with their terms they called it das Adam Smith problem”
Hume's insights into where rules of contract, property and exchange come from were less systematic than later thinkers' work, but they visibly influenced Smith's own account of these institutions.
“similarities we'll say between Humes views on on what gives rise to things like rules about contract rules about property rules about exchange”
Hume wrote A Treatise of Human Nature as a young man; it 'fell dead-born from the press', so he later broke it into smaller, more palatable works. He also wrote numerous essays and a still-influential multi-volume History of England.
“a treatise of human nature as he says it fell dead born from the presses”
Hume tempered his skepticism with practical life ('amidst all your philosophy, be still a man'): metaphysical doubt about the limits of knowledge should not displace ordinary human living.
“amidst all your philosophy be still a man”
Hume and Smith got to know each other when Smith returned to Edinburgh in the 1750s and lectured on material that became The Theory of Moral Sentiments (first published 1759). They remained close friends for the rest of their lives, including while Smith wrote The Wealth of Nations.
“he came to know Smith when Smith came to Edinburgh in the 1750s”
Hume is generally regarded as a skeptic, but more precisely he explored the limits of human cognition. He held that people often believe they can know things they in fact cannot know, and he pursued this insight across many works.
“he thought that it was often the case that people believed they were able to know things that they in fact weren't able to know”
The 'Adam Smith Problem' is the apparent contradiction that The Wealth of Nations praises self-interest while The Theory of Moral Sentiments praises benevolence and altruism, as if the books were written by two different people. German scholars first identified it in the 19th century as 'das Adam Smith Problem'.
“The Wealth of Nations is about the virtues of being self-interested and the Thira moral sentiments is about the virtues of being altruistic”
People often delude themselves into thinking they have advanced morally beyond those of the 1770s. The current egalitarian disrepute of 'othering' could always change.
“we often delude ourselves into thinking we somehow advanced”
The 18th-century Scottish Enlightenment was an astonishing period in which the people at the forefront of almost every discipline of human inquiry were in Scotland.
“the people who were at the forefront of almost every discipline of human inquiry we're in Scotland err in the 18th century”
The invisible hand is the one thing most people remember about Smith, yet it is commonly caricatured as 'greed is good', which matches neither Smith's explicit uses nor the implicit idea.
“it gets caricatured I think by most people as greed is good”
David Hume, a central figure of the 18th-century Scottish Enlightenment, is arguably the greatest and most brilliant philosopher ever to write in the English language, surpassing even John Locke.
“he's the greatest and most brilliant philosopher ever in English language and that's saying a lot and this of course was that includes people like John Locke”
If a person's moral sentiments have developed normally (allowing for exceptions at the extremes), the impartial spectator gives pretty good advice. That does not mean people always follow it, or even always consult it.
“if you're Moral Sentiments have developed in a normal way ... then the impartial spectator will give you pretty good advice now that doesn't mean you'll always follow it”
In the parable of the king's favorite, the king plans conquests only so that he can eventually sit with friends over wine, and the favorite asks what stops him from doing that now. The real answer is that humans like to do things. Otteson thinks Smith came to understand later in life that humans need activity and will never reach a point of having 'enough', so tranquility is not the important part of happiness.
“that's something that I think Smith came to understand more than he did earlier on in his life”
Smith's passage about the beggar sunning himself enjoying the security kings fight for reflects a romanticism about poor people's lives, forgivable in a young author. Most such beggars, if asked, would not have said they preferred their lot.
“there's a certain romanticism is going on there about about what the life of a poor person really is like”
Smith was not the first to write about many of his concepts, but his treatment survives and thrives partly because he was such a great stylist of English prose.
“his treatment survives and thrives partly because I think is such a great stylist as a writer of English”
There is a perhaps apocryphal story that Hume proposed to a woman who refused him because he was too fat. The ladies of France loved having him over, and he reportedly said that everyone loved him but no one loved him.
“perhaps apocryphal story about him having proposed to a woman who said no because he was too fat”
The list of things Smith got wrong is much shorter than the list he got right, which helps justify his place in the canon. One error was his conception of happiness as tranquility.
“there's a long list of things myth got right I think I've been a much shorter list of things he got wrong”