
What this covers
Allan Meltzer of Carnegie Mellon University joins Russ Roberts for a conversation that traces the political and institutional roots of Federal Reserve monetary policy. Rather than focusing on economic theory or the competence of individual chairs, Meltzer argues that political pressure persistently pushes the Fed toward short-term management at the expense of price stability. The discussion ranges across two centuries of U.S. monetary history—from the Fed's creation in 1913 as a political compromise over institutional control, through the Great Inflation era when the Fed accommodated presidential spending demands, to the relative success of Volcker and Greenspan's medium-term focus, and the recent erosion of that discipline.
The conversation unpacks how the Fed actually transmits its decisions through the economy, with Meltzer advocating the classical real-money-balances framework over the more popular interest-rate mechanism. He examines the gold standard's trade-offs—remarkable long-run price stability against procyclical boom-bust cycles—and dissects historical episodes including the 1937-38 recession and the S&L disaster. The discussion turns to immediate pressures facing central banking: how Wall Street lobbies for rate cuts to support asset prices, how complex mortgage instruments obscured credit risk, and why past Fed crisis management (sometimes bailing out failing firms, sometimes letting them fail) has created uncertainty about what rules actually govern intervention. Meltzer and Roberts also address whether temporary stimulus works, how inflation-targeting disciplines thinking about medium-term consequences, and whether the Fed can or should resist the political demands that have historically overwhelmed its independence.
Meltzer argues that the Fed's monetary outcomes are driven less by economic theory or chairman competence than by political pressure that pushes it toward short-term management, and that price stability requires a medium-term inflation-targeting strategy that resists those pressures.
- The Fed controls only one interest rate but the 'classical' real-money-balances view explains its effects better than the popular interest-rate causal chain
- Historically the Fed accommodated fiscal deficits and political demands (e.g., Martin financing Johnson's spending) which produced the Great Inflation
- The Great Moderation came from Volcker/Greenspan adopting a medium-term focus, which political pressure now erodes
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The 1913 debate over creating the Fed had almost nothing to do with the economics of stabilizing output or prices—the gold standard was taken for granted—and was instead a political fight over who would control the central bank, resolved by Wilson's dual structure of a Washington board plus regional banks.
“the discussion about the Fed in 1913 was very little about the economics of what the Fed would do the argument was all about who would control the Fed”
The gold standard inherently forces a procyclical policy: when gold flows in the economy must expand and when gold flows out it must contract, producing bigger swings in employment and output, which is the main reason countries abandoned it.
“when the gold flowed in the economy had to expand when the gold flowed out the economy had to contract so it put bigger cycles into employment and output”
A steady, fully anticipated rate of inflation (e.g., a predictable 3% per year) would be relatively harmless because economic actors would adjust prices and wages to that expectation; the real damage from the Fed comes from the uncertainty and unpredictable swings in inflation, not from inflation per se.
“if inflation were three percent every year and everyone knew it and everyone expected it and those expectations were realized the Fed would be doing a good job because economic actors would respond to that expectation”
A law of regulation is that lawyers make the regulations and markets figure out how to circumvent them when it is in their interest—as when interest-rate caps on S&Ls drove the creation of money market mutual funds that drained deposits, and the Basel capital rules spawned off-balance-sheet instruments.
“one of the laws of regulation is that lawyers make the regulations and markets figure out how to circumvent them when it's in their interest so what did the market do it created the money market mutual fund”
The gold standard delivered remarkable long-run price stability (U.S. prices in 1939 were not very different from 1839), which let savers plan retirement with confidence that a 3% gold-backed bond would deliver 3% real interest—an advantage modern monetary management has lost in exchange for greater short- and medium-term control.
“prices in 1939 were not very different from price levels as near as we can measure them in 1839”
Mild deflations are not more painful than mild inflations; across seven deflations in Fed history the economic recovery looks no different—the sole exception being the Great Depression, which was uniquely damaging because money fell faster than prices, banks were failing without deposit insurance, and people expected deflation to continue indefinitely.
“in writing the history of the Federal Reserve I find seven deflations... you can't see a difference in the recovery of the economy during the period of mild deflation”
Under the prevailing 'coordinated policy' doctrine of the 1950s-60s, when the federal government ran a deficit the Fed would not raise interest rates to finance it—instead expanding the money supply to keep rates down—because raising rates was seen as cutting off the economic expansion the deficit was meant to create.
“it meant that if the government ran a deficit the Fed would not raise interest rates to finance it the deficit was being run to expand the economy and the Fed was not going to cut that off by raising interest rates”
It was rational for borrowers to walk away from mortgages not because they could not afford to pay but because it is not economically rational to keep paying a mortgage on a declining asset—part of why the portfolios became hard to value.
“people are walking away from those mortgages right literally because not not because they can't afford to pan because it's not economically rational to keep paying your mortgage for a declining asset”
Economists are probably the best forecasters of economic activity that exist, but they are still not very good at it because too many random events occur and there are no reliable methods for forecasting the economy.
“economists are probably the best forecasters of economic activity there are but they're not very good there's just too many random things that happen we don't have very good ways of forecasting”
The core problem freezing financial markets is not merely knowing which loans are good versus bad, but that falling, uncertain housing prices make it impossible to assess risk—compounded by complex pooled instruments mixing performing and non-performing mortgages, so banks will only lend overnight and not for 30 days because they cannot value others' portfolios.
“no one is exactly certain or can be as to how far the housing price is going to fall... once we know where the housing prices are going to settle we'll know what some of the mortgages are worth”
A tax-rate cut not accompanied by a spending cut—or worse, accompanied by spending increases as in recent U.S. years—is effectively a future tax increase, not a tax cut, because the resulting debt must ultimately be serviced by the public.
“if we don't cut spending then all we've done is create more debt that the public ultimately has to service it's a future tax increase”
Temporary tax rebates or stimulus checks do little to stimulate the economy because, per Friedman's permanent income theory, people save temporary windfalls or pay down debt; only permanent changes affect spending—and even a permanent unfunded tax cut fails because people correctly anticipate the money must come from somewhere without spending cuts.
“if you make a temporary... change tax rates or spending people will save it you pay down debt save it if you want to get a permanent stimulus better make a permanent change”
The classical/correct way to understand monetary policy is via real money balances: when the Fed puts out more money than people want to hold, they spend the excess on goods or assets, which moves the economy and ultimately prices—this is a better model than the popular notion that changing the interest rate directly drives aggregate spending.
“it changes the amount of money balances if people have more money balances than they want to hold they spend them either on goods or on assets if they have fewer money balances and they want to hold they stop spending and try to accumulate more money balances and that affects the economy”
A country that won't accept a small recession will end up having a big one, because by repeatedly prioritizing low unemployment and postponing inflation control, the Fed allows inflation to build until a large correction becomes necessary.
“it leads me to say that a country that won't experience a small recession will end up having a big one”
The Fed's unpredictable, case-by-case approach to distressed firms over its history—sometimes bailing out, sometimes intervening, sometimes letting failure happen—creates great uncertainty, and the right principle in a crisis is Bagehot's: lend freely at a penalty rate on good collateral while letting the failing firm fail.
“the Fed in its 98th history has never announced what its policy was going to be as far as lending to distressed... you can't tell from one instance for the other what they're going to do that creates a great deal of uncertainty”
Young MBAs bought and sold paper they knew was nearly worthless because of bad incentives: management pressure to book profits and earn large bonuses for doing so; the harder puzzle is why the Bear Stearns CEO, whose own holdings fell from about a billion to about a hundred million, left those incentives in place—likely because he believed housing prices could never fall as much as they did and over-levered the firm.
“the answer is because of the incentives very bad they make the profit they're under pressure from their management to make the profit and get a bonus”
The shift to a more activist, employment-smoothing monetary regime since the 1950s reflects that the U.S. moved from an agricultural economy (where farmers were buffered against income swings by their land and food) to a service/manufacturing economy where people live paycheck to paycheck and demand political action against any downturn.
“we don't have that country anymore we have people who live many of them who live from day to day and from paycheck to paycheck and so any small loss of income seems to them to be a disaster and they scream politically”
Inflation targeting and the Taylor rule work mainly by forcing policymakers to think about the medium-term consequences of their actions—because monetary policy takes a couple of years to translate into inflation—rather than reacting to every short-term shock; this is what the U.S. is now less willing to do for political reasons.
“by concentrating on inflation and setting an inflation target they force themselves to think about the longer-term consequences of their policy”
Wall Street firms pressure the Fed to cut the federal funds rate because they hold large quantities of bonds and mortgages and believe lower rates will raise the prices of those assets and reduce their losses.
“they own a lot of bonds and mortgages and he they believe that if he lowers the federal funds rate it will lower the price of their mortgages and bonds and they'll have smaller losses and so they are on his back all the time”
The Fed controls only a single interest rate—the rate at which banks lend reserves to each other and some customers—and that one rate then influences other market rates and the pace at which banks expand or contract credit.
“the Fed controls a single interest rate not all interest rates but one interest rate a particular rate the rate at which banks sell reserves to each other”
If the Fed continues cutting interest rates and expanding the money supply to prevent a recession, it risks a steep rise in inflation, which will raise nominal interest rates the Fed does not control, because lenders demand a premium for being repaid in less valuable money.
“he runs the risk of of a steep increase in the rate of inflation which will surely increase nominal interest rates that he does not control that do affect economic activity because as inflation Rises lenders want a premium”
Regulating Savings and Loan interest rates below market levels (to protect housing) wiped out the S&L industry and cost taxpayers about $200 billion—an entirely avoidable disaster that illustrates how regulation creates losses borne by the public.
“we wiped out the Savings and Loan industry we regulated their interest rates we caused them to have massive losses who paid for those losses the public the taxpayers... two hundred billion dollars”
Since the 1930s the Fed has rarely practiced genuine independence; chairs like Volcker were exceptions, while figures like Bernanke yield to congressional and Wall Street pressure, responding to short-term pressures rather than pursuing a long-term balanced growth path with low inflation and unemployment.
“there are very few occasions since the 1930s when the Fed actually practiced independence there was the Volcker era he was certainly an independent set of central bank governor but Bernanke is anything but an independent central bank governor he is being leaned on by the Congress and he exceeds to them”
The 1937-38 recession was largely caused by the Fed's mistake of sterilizing incoming gold (and raising reserve requirements) out of concern about inflation, prematurely ending the recovery that gold inflows had produced by 1936.
“then the Fed made another big mistake and ended that recovery interest into another recession... mainly caused by what they got concerned about inflation they saw the huge accumulation of reserves... then decided to sterilize”
Printing money and handing out $100 bills differs fundamentally from sending equivalent tax rebates: the monetary increase leaves people holding more money balances than they want, so they spend on goods or assets (a temporary stimulus), whereas a debt-financed rebate merely shifts debt from the private to the public sector and people anticipate the future tax liability, blunting the effect.
“in the case of the tax cut the temporary tax all I'm doing is transferring debt to the public sector from the private sector”
The Basel agreement, by requiring banks to hold more capital against risky assets, was bad regulation that caused much of the crisis because banks responded by inventing off-balance-sheet instruments to avoid holding the additional reserves.
“the Basel agreement said to the bank's if you hold risky assets you have to have more capital so what did they do... they invented a bunch of instruments which weren't on their balance sheet... that was bad regulation and that regulation caused a great deal of this problem”
Falling housing prices, far from being a disaster, are necessary to reach a correct new equilibrium, so the faster prices fall the sooner the crisis ends—because the uncertainty paralyzing markets resolves only once prices settle and mortgages can be valued.
“in order to get to a correct new equilibrium they have to fall yeah so the faster they get there the better it's going to be and the quicker the problem will be over”
The good 1950s monetary record under Martin owed largely to President Eisenhower's fiscal conservatism: because Eisenhower ran balanced budgets, the Fed was not pressured to finance deficits, whereas later under Johnson the Great Society and Vietnam created deficits that Martin's Fed accommodated, generating inflation.
“because he had President Eisenhower and President Eisenhower was very much against fiscal deficits he was a fiscal conservative... therefore the Fed was not under pressure to finance”
Holding the federal funds rate too low for too long contributed to the housing bubble by making it very profitable to borrow, and the Fed is again holding rates below where they should be to balance inflation against unemployment.
“the Fed if said healthy interest rate too low too long that isn't the only reason that we got the housing problem but it certainly contributed to it because it made it very profitable to borrow”
The deeper cost of chronic budget deficits is not higher interest rates but that government spending goes increasingly to less productive uses (such as bailing out people who made bad housing decisions), reducing the productivity that private-sector investment would have generated.
“the spending is going to be for almost always nowadays for less productive uses than would be true if we didn't have that deficit... so we lose on the productivity side”
The U.S. and trading partners like China run a sustainable-seeming exchange in which the U.S. produces pieces of paper (debt) sold to China while China produces real goods, with China subsidizing U.S. spending to maintain its super-normal growth and avoid domestic unemployment—but this rests on China's willingness to absorb losses from a depreciating dollar.
“we produce pieces of paper which we sell to them and they produce real goods and services which they sell to us”
The Fed's actual handling of Bear Stearns was largely correct in that the equity was effectively wiped out (shareholders went from over $100 to about $10 per share, management lost jobs), consistent with FDICIA's principle that failed firms' stockholders take the loss—the Fed merely softened the blow rather than truly bailing them out.
“they don't literally bail them out they just soften the blow a little bit they just they actually wiped them out... the fact that they got and $10 a share when the shares have been selling for well over $100”
We are not anywhere near a depression; we may be in a recession but the data so far does not support even that, with the housing and automobile sectors in trouble but the rest of the economy holding up moderately well.
“we're not anywhere near a depression we may be in a recession but so far the data doesn't support that”
The Fed controls money supply via open market operations—buying and selling Treasury bonds.
“the Fed Federal Reserve in the United States controls the money supply via open market operations the buying and selling of Treasury bonds”