What this covers

Brink Lindsey, a Cato Institute researcher, discusses with host Russ Roberts how twentieth-century material abundance transformed American politics and culture. Lindsey traces a historical arc from the 1950s, when most Americans escaped subsistence-level scarcity for the first time in human experience, through the late twentieth century, showing how this prosperity enabled people to move up Maslow's hierarchy toward self-actualization and personal fulfillment. This shift dissolved the one-size-fits-all moral traditions that had evolved during agrarian scarcity, when conformity and group loyalty were survival necessities. The conversation covers how this liberation produced seemingly opposing political movements that are actually mirror images: a post-sixties left that embraces cultural dynamism while rejecting capitalism, and a contemporary right that defends capitalism while resisting the cultural change capitalism itself unleashes.

The discussion spans economics, politics, and sociology to explain rising inequality after the 1970s not as a deliberate dismantling of a 1950s social contract, but as a consequence of deregulation, immigration, and global competition that increased rewards for top talent. Lindsey argues both left and right are trapped in a "reactionary rut"—the left nostalgic for the 1950s era of income convergence and big labor, the right pining for traditional family structures and moral certainty. He addresses census data on declining outcomes for high school dropouts, the decline of unions as cartels unable to survive competitive markets, and counterintuitive reversals in crime, divorce, and welfare dependency starting in the 1990s. A substantial portion examines how America has shifted toward cultural libertarianism on issues of identity and expression while remaining skeptical of free-market economics, and how the right's narrow focus on cultural hostility cost it the political center.

Sharpest takeaway

Lindsey argues that 20th-century material abundance freed Americans from subsistence-level scarcity, and that this prosperity drove cultural individualism, producing mirror-image left/right movements—one embracing cultural dynamism while rejecting capitalism, the other defending capitalism while resisting cultural change.

  • Mass affluence let people climb Maslow's hierarchy toward self-actualization, dissolving one-size-fits-all traditional morality
  • Rising income inequality after the 1970s reflects increased competition (immigration, deregulation, global markets) rather than a deliberate dismantling of a 1950s social contract
  • Both the post-sixties left and right are stuck in a 'reactionary rut' nostalgic for the 1950s

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0.79

The new right is a mirror image of the new left: it defends capitalism but defends it as one tradition among many it is attached to, leaving it staunchly pro-capitalism yet at least unsettled by and at worst hostile to the cultural dynamism that capitalism unleashes—so the left condemns capitalism while consuming its fruits, and the right defends capitalism while proclaiming its fruits toxic.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 4/4durability 3/4· Brink Lindsey

“people staunchly defending capitalism and yet that because they are generally traditionalist people who are at at least unsettled by and at worst utterly hostile to cultural dynamism that's being unleashed by capitalism”

0.79

Government has grown bigger than ever partly as a perverse testament to getting economic policy right: by unshackling the economy from cartelistic regulation, productivity rose enough that the country could afford a large deadweight loss of wasteful government and still keep chugging along—unlike the 1970s when the system was breaking down under stagflation.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 4/4durability 3/4· Brink Lindsey

“government is bigger than ever and part of that I'm afraid is is a kind of perverse testament to our success in getting the economic policies right that by unshackling our economy... we've allowed our economy to become so productive that we have been able to afford a big deadweight loss of of wasteful government and still keep chugging along”

0.78

Economic deregulation was a fundamentally bipartisan movement, not a conservative imposition: airline and trucking deregulation started under Carter and was authored by Ted Kennedy with Ralph Nader cheering it on, the last three major global trade rounds were concluded by Democratic presidents, and the top tax rate's fall from 70% to 28% included a cut to 28% via a bill sponsored by Democrats Bill Bradley and Dick Gephardt.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Brink Lindsey

“much of it started under Jimmy Carter Ted Kennedy was the author of airline and trucking deregulation and cheering him on as an activist was Ralph Nader”

0.74

Over the course of the 20th century, U.S. per capita income multiplied roughly four times and life expectancy rose from the low 40s in 1900 to well into the 70s by century's end, driven largely by precipitous declines in childhood mortality and the conquest of epidemic diseases.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Brink Lindsey

“per capita income multiplied something like 4 times life expectancy was I can't remember exactly but around 40 years low 40s in 1900 it was up well into the 70s by the end of the century much of that had to do with precipitous declines in childhood mortality with the conquest of various epidemic diseases”

0.73

Both today's left and right are in a 'reactionary rut,' both nostalgic for the 1950s: the right wants to live in the idyll of Ozzie-and-Harriet families, while the left pines for the old big-business/big-government/big-labor triumvirate and the era of income convergence when everyone got richer but the bottom rose faster than the top.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Brink Lindsey

“our politics today... is in a reactionary rut and you can tell us in a reactionary rut because both sides are pining for the past and both sides are... nostalgic for the 1950s the only difference is the right wants to live there and the left wants to work there”

0.73

Mass immigration is a major statistical driver of measured inequality: immigration was nearly shut down from the mid-1920s to mid-1960s (foreign-born share falling from ~13% in 1920 to ~5% in 1970), then post-1965 law changes brought it back to ~12%, adding a huge wave of low-skilled workers from Mexico and Central America—but these immigrants are far better off than in their home countries, so global inequality is falling; if you re-baseline immigrants at their native-country wages, the measured inequality trend actually falls.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Brink Lindsey

“we had a pretty much complete shutdown of immigration from the mid 1920s to the mid 1960s such that the percentage of foreign-born Americans slipped from about 13% in 1920 to about 5% in 1970 then with the changes in immigration law in 1965 we've seen a new wave of mass emigration and foreign-born population has gone up to 12%”

0.73

The economist's point that scarcity is permanent (people always want more, with trade-offs at the margin) is true but misses the bigger sociological picture: what changed is that most people are no longer close to the margin of subsistence with it staring them in the face.

definitionhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Brink Lindsey

“in the economic perspective security is in a radical people always want more there's always trade-offs at the margins... but in a sociological sense what I refer to as scarcity is is being close to that margin of subsistence and and having it stare you in the face whereas that's just not the case anymore”

0.73

Traditional absolutist morality evolved during the agrarian era because when people lived close to subsistence with no margin for error, group loyalty and conformity were survival necessities; the material conditions for individuals to 'go their own way' simply did not exist.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Brink Lindsey

“when there's no margin for error you can't have a lot of freelancing and and so that's our traditional morality that evolved over the civilized era during the agrarian era were tended to be sort of absolutist”

0.73

The 1960s left was at war with itself: the vanguard exploring new values made possible by mass affluence was hostile to the very institutions of capitalism and middle-class bourgeois morality that had created the affluence enabling their adventurousness.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Brink Lindsey

“the people who were on the Vanguard... tended to be on the left and therefore tended to be extremely hostile to the institutions of capitalism and middle-class bourgeois morality that had created the affluence that made their new adventurousness possible”

0.73

The red state/blue state divide is the most recent continuation of ideological categories that grew out of the 1960s: red Americans tend to fight the fact that the sixties happened and sympathize with narratives of moral and cultural decline, while blue Americans are averse to the economic dynamism unleashed since the 1980s Reagan Revolution and think in terms of economic decline, fixating on inequality and happiness literature.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Brink Lindsey

“the red Americans tend to think tend to fight the fact that the sixties happened... and they tend to to be sympathetic to accounts of of moral and cultural decline meanwhile on the left you have people who are averse to the great continuing economic dynamism that's occurred since the sixties”

0.73

Both the new left and the new right had at their core a spiritual movement that proceeded in parallel during the 1960s—the counterculture on the left and the unexpectedly influential rise of theologically and socially conservative evangelical Protestantism on the right—which gave impetus to the larger political movements of left and right.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Brink Lindsey

“both sides have at their core I think a kind of our team both the new left and the new right had at their core what I think have to be described as a spiritual movement”

0.73

Increased competition raises the rewards to top talent: when industries were cartelized (e.g., not a single airline went out of business between 1938 and 1978 deregulation), the stakes of having the best managers were low, but rising competitive pressure makes the very best people far more valuable, driving up rewards at the top while raising rewards for everybody.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Brink Lindsey

“not a single airline ever went out of business between 1938 and deregulation 1978 so what how intensely are people are going to compete for the best managers if the stakes are so low”

0.73

Census snapshots of declining outcomes for non-high-school-graduates are misleading: they do not track the same people over time but compare the 1970 group of dropouts to the 2006 group, many of whom are recent low-education immigrants from foreign countries who drag down the average—so the data does not mean a given person without a diploma is doing worse.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Brink Lindsey

“those snapshots from census date or not this looking at the same people over time literally mean that a person without a high school diploma is going worse it means that the group of people who don't have high school diplomas in 2006... aren't doing as well as the people in 1970”

0.73

Declining unionization is a casualty of economic progress, not labor law: the PATCO firing was trivial; unions are labor-market cartels that thrived only in uncompetitive environments where inflated costs could be passed to consumers, and global plus interregional competition (manufacturing migrating from the unionized Northeast/Midwest to the South) shrank unionized workplaces ~2% a year while non-union workplaces grew ~2% a year, with new-industry organization peaking in the 1950s.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Brink Lindsey

“the firing of the PATCO workers was you know a trivial incident what mattered was that unions which our labor market cartels could only thrive in a relatively uncompetitive environment”

0.72

After the 1960s, social conservatives appeared correct as crime, divorce, welfare dependency, single parenthood, and abortion all soared through the 70s and into the 80s, but starting in the 1990s nearly every one of these indicators reversed direction—reflecting people learning to deal with their freedom and developing new, more tolerant and less dogmatic moral rules that kicked in because people could tell they worked and were needed.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 2/4· Brink Lindsey

“we had crime rates soaring divorce rates soaring welfare dependency soaring single parenthood soaring abortions storing all of these sort of indicators of social breakdown... but then starting in the 1990s we saw just about every one of these things start going in the other direction”

0.69

The U.S. genuinely shifted from an era of income convergence (everyone getting richer, the bottom faster than the top) to one of income divergence (everyone richer, but the top fastest of all, with some downward mobility at the bottom and middle), so the left is correct that inequality trends changed even if their explanation is wrong.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Brink Lindsey

“we've gone from an era of income convergence to one of income divergence and as you know economic egalitarians that paints them”

0.69

America's increasing libertarianism is much more cultural/social than economic: because most Americans are economically illiterate and prone to economic demagoguery (everybody likes 'free ice cream' when spending is disconnected from taxation), big government spending is frequently popular, but on cultural questions—women's roles, cultural expression, religion in public life, conceptions of American identity—Americans have become far more socially liberal and culturally libertarian.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 2/4· Brink Lindsey

“it's much more that I think as as your Mason colleague Brian Kaplan has as depressingly documented most Americans are economically illiterate”

0.69

The right ran out of gas because what began as a broad-based appeal to 'silent majority' middle America became increasingly sectarian, narrow, and nasty toward everyone else, losing touch with the center of American public opinion; that ideology of hostility to cultural dynamism paid a heavy price as the center moved to the Democrats.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 2/4· Brink Lindsey

“what started out as a kind of a broad-based appeal to middle America... the silent majority became as they kept clinging to this sort of traditional way of looking at things became more and more sectarian more and more narrow and more and more nasty about everybody else and so finally I think they lost touch with the center”

0.68

Negative liberty (freedom from government) matters chiefly because it is so conducive to positive liberty (the effective power to do what you want); limited government and free markets produce prosperity and human flourishing, and by that ultimate measure of available choices and options, people are freer today than ever before.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Brink Lindsey

“negative Liberty is so conducive to positive Liberty that we think that limited government and free markets produces prosperity and human flourishing... that's the ultimate ball game is how much positive Liberty we have”

0.68

By the 1950s America represented something fundamentally new: the vast majority of people were insulated from the margin of subsistence where most humans had lived for all of history, and were also insulated from nature itself by living in cities and human-created institutional worlds rather than as farmers exposed to nature's vagaries.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Brink Lindsey

“by the 50s you could say that this was a country where the vast majority of people were well insulated from from the from the edge of subsistence where most human beings had lived for all of history”

0.68

Material abundance is incredibly unnatural, artificial, and novel; because we take it for granted like fish in water, we fail to appreciate that we live in a situation radically different from how humans lived for over a hundred thousand years.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Brink Lindsey

“it's fundamentally not natural law is incredibly unnatural is incredibly artificial was incredibly novel”

0.68

Our economic success and productivity stem from the same insatiability that prevents us from appreciating how good we have it: we immediately equilibrate to a new situation and want more, which drives invention and progress but obscures our affluence.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Brink Lindsey

“the reason we're so successful and so rich and so productive is that we immediately equilibrate to the new situation and then want more right we want things to be even better and we take for granted where we are”

0.68

Compared to the immediate post-war decades, the U.S. economy is much freer to entrepreneurship and competition: the post-war era featured wholesale suppression of competition via price and entry controls industry after industry, indirect suppression through high progressive tax rates, high trade barriers, and little foreign competition—most of which was dismantled by the deregulation wave of the 1970s-80s that almost no one wants to reverse.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Brink Lindsey

“compared to the immediate post-war decades I think our economy is much freer to entrepreneurship and competition than it was before we had wholesale suppression of market competition and industry after industry with price and entry controls”

0.68

For the least-skilled, the genuine (non-artifact) part of their material problems traces largely to a failing education system, especially for poor people in bad urban neighborhoods, so the right response is to liberate the school system rather than return to 1950s cultural norms.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Russ Roberts

“part of it is real and part of it is the fact that our education system stinks especially for poor people and people in bad urban neighborhoods and if we want to do something about this... we got to liberate our school system”

0.66

Material prosperity pushes society toward cultural individualism because poverty constrains choice (in consumption, location, occupation) and produces uniformity across people and generations, whereas abundance multiplies choices and experiences, producing divergent values that make one-size-fits-all traditional absolutist morality feel confining.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Brink Lindsey

“this abundance material prosperity the the end of security in the sense I use it pushes us towards cultural individualism when people are poor they don't have a lot of choices”

0.66

The cultural shift toward self-expression extended into the economic realm: just as people sought self-expression culturally, they came to want it economically too—less the loyal 'organization man' and more interested in testing the market for their highest rewards—which contributed to greater rewards at the top, as seen not only in CEOs but in athletes and entertainers where no boardroom conspiracy exists.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Brink Lindsey

“just as people are much more into a self expression in the cultural realm they're into self expression in the economic realm too and they want to be all they can be they want to test the market get their highest rewards”

0.66

Libertarians are vulnerable to 'Golden Age thinking'—the belief that America was near-perfect at the Constitution's signing and has declined ever since—which is false because Jefferson owned and raped enslaved people, women had no legal identity after marriage and could be raped by husbands legally until the 1960s-70s, immigrants faced ferocious hostility, and censorship and intolerance were endemic; today offers far greater latitude across the full range of Americans.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Brink Lindsey

“I think libertarians are vulnerable to Golden Age thinking that the was darn near perfect at the signing of the Constitution and it's been all downhill ever since”

0.66

Income divergence has three contributing causes—skill-biased technological change (boosting demand for highly skilled workers), changes in economic policy (deregulation), and changes in social norms—not just the technology factor; Krugman is selective about which changes he cites and wrong-headed about what they mean, reducing it to a morality tale in which evil right-wingers tricked everyone via racism into ripping up the post-war social contract.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Brink Lindsey

“all of these technological changes have added up to greater relative demand for highly skilled workers which means that their pay gets boosted relative to less skilled workers... you've got to look also it changes in any comic policies and changes in social norms”

0.66

One of the great exercises of freedom is the ability to make commitments—committing oneself means living within chosen limits, and society rediscovered that a work ethic and devotion to family are not part of an oppressive system as 1960s counterculture radicals claimed, but constituent elements of a well-lived life.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Brink Lindsey

“to have a sector freedom you have to be able to make commitments that's one of the great exercises of freedom is to commit yourself which means then living within limits but living within chosen limits”

0.62

Maslow's hierarchy of needs applies not just to individual psychology but to the social psychology of post-war America: having won survival (WWII) and security (escaping the Depression), the baby boomers became the first generation to take basic material needs for granted, and so climbed Maslow's pyramid toward self-actualization more committedly than ever before.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 2/4· Brink Lindsey

“he's talking about individual psychology but but I think it applies very nicely to the social psychology or culture of post-war America”

0.61

Modern abundance produces more of everything—both more trash and more superlative greatness than ever before—so the opportunity to live a phenomenally well-lived life has never been more within our grasp, even though people will predictably misuse some of their freedom; this rests on the libertarian faith that predictable misuse is more than compensated by unpredictable miracles when people are free to be creative.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Brink Lindsey

“we just have more of everything now we have more trash and we have more superlative greatness than ever before so the opportunities to live you know a phenomenally well lived life have never been more within our grasp”

0.56

The internet and modern proliferation of subcultures enable self-realization rather than isolation: where an oddball kid in 1950s small-town America was a lonely weirdo with no one to share interests with, today people can connect with fellow enthusiasts of any niche interest, feel validated, and construct a custom-made life fitting their needs and values.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Brink Lindsey

“if you had oddball non mainstream tastes when you're a kid growing up in 50 small town America you're just out of luck... these days you can you know hook up through the internet and find fellow enthusiasts”

0.45

The current anti-market, anti-entrepreneur, anti-success big-government instinct getting a workout in the crisis will lead to bad policies and bad results, ultimately discrediting itself—but only after a fairly nasty learning process.

forecasthigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 1/4· Brink Lindsey

“this big government instinct auntie market instinct auntie entrepreneur instinct an anti success instinct is going to is going to discredit itself as well because it's going to lead to bad policies and the bad policies are going to lead to bad results but we're going to have to go through a fairly nasty learning process”

0.12

The economy shrank only 2% last year, which means we are still just as rich as the year before and remain among the very richest people in all of history.

factual· Brink Lindsey

“our economy is shrank 2% last year and so that means that we're still just as rich as we were the year before”

0.12

I'm one of the few Americans with a 27-inch television and don't have cable, which I do to protect my children from watching sports.

factual· Russ Roberts

“I'm still one of the few Americans with the 27-inch television and life is you know it's tough... I don't have cable but that's for really non-material reasons that's to protect my children and myself from watching sports”