
Lyn Alden: Is This Another Global Financial Crisis? Credit Market Turmoil, Bailouts & Bitcoin Rally
What this covers
This is a roughly half-hour interview in which Natalie Brunell talks with Lynn Alden, an independent financial analyst, about the March 2023 bank failures. It follows the chronology of the episode: what went wrong at Silicon Valley Bank, how regulators responded, whether the response counts as a bailout, the spillover to Credit Suisse, and what it all means for inflation, Treasury markets and Bitcoin. Alden's account of the mechanics is the backbone. Pandemic stimulus and quantitative easing (QE)) expanded the broad money supply by roughly 40%, most of it landing as deposits. Banks put those deposits into long-dated securities. When rates rose, the mark to market losses became real once depositors left faster than the securities matured.
The middle of the conversation is about who gets protected. Alden points out that the FDIC insures a very small share of roughly $17 trillion in deposits, so confidence does most of the work. She describes the BTFP (Bank Term Funding Program)) as favoring large banks that hold high-quality liquid assets over small banks holding illiquid loans. She also disputes the claim that taxpayers won't pay, arguing that the costs are spread through the banking system instead. The Credit Suisse segment turns to Europe, where she argues the lack of a single government and central bank makes bail-ins more likely and pushes depositors to read bank filings themselves.
The more contested material concerns policy. Alden says the Fed is applying 1970s-style tightening to 1940s-style fiscal inflation, and the episode includes a segment on whether Jay Powell should resign. She calls the crisis one of liquidity rather than solvency, so in principle it could be eased quickly, but 6% inflation makes that politically hard. She describes the 52-week and two-year Treasury yields as signals of where the Fed is heading, and links falling yields to the Bitcoin rally. She ends by saying conditions are not yet at 2008 levels.
Lynn Alden argues that the 2023 banking crisis resulted from a combination of Fed policy errors and bank risk mismanagement—specifically, rapid rate hikes breaking banks holding long-duration assets—rather than a solvency crisis like 2008, but reflects deeper systemic fragility driven by fiscal inflation and monetary policy tools mismatched to the problem.
- Banks bought safe but duration-heavy assets at low yields during stimulus; rapid rate hikes made these underwater, forcing losses when deposits fled
- The crisis is liquidity and duration risk, not credit/solvency; it stems from 1940s-style fiscal inflation being fought with 1970s-style monetary tightening
- The Fed's own boom-bust cycle—stimulus, rate hikes, emergency backstop—is baked into the system; consolidation toward large banks and central control is structural
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Fractional reserve banking is inherently unstable; describing it as 'casually storing money in a highly leveraged bond fund' reveals that normal deposit accounts are systemically fragile and rely entirely on confidence.
“basically like we're all just casually storing our money in leveraged bond funds um and so obviously that's you know if you phrase like that would you say is that a low risk investment people say no of course not but that's we all just casually use for our you know savings uh would just put grandma in a highly leveraged bond fund and and that's where she holds her money that's just that's we kind of normalize that”
A secondary longer-term problem from this crisis is that if deposits flow out of smaller banks toward larger banks or money market funds, smaller banks must raise deposit rates to retain capital, which hurts profitability when they hold low-yielding assets to maturity.
“a secondary longer term problem is that if the if um deposits flow out of smaller Banks and towards the larger Banks or the money market funds then those smaller banks have to raise deposit rates in order to entice Capital to stay there and then the risk there is that they hurt their profitability because they're holding these low yielding assets um you know probably to maturity at the same time as they're paying out higher deposit rates”
The Federal Reserve and Treasury created a liquidity facility (BTFP) that provides below-market credit at above-average terms, which disproportionately benefits larger banks holding high-quality liquid assets while excluding smaller banks holding illiquid loans.
“they've also added this liquidity facility uh it ironically generally benefits the larger Banks because you can only use that facility if you have a lot of high quality liquid assets um and you and whereas if you look at the you know the long tail of smaller Banks they're generally more loan driven they hold illiquid loans that they made and that they're not really easily resellable and so they can't use that particular facility and so I think we're in an environment where the large banks are pretty well protected whereas small Banks probably still face ongoing challenges”
Banks that hold assets to maturity do not have to realize losses, but if deposits withdraw faster than securities mature, banks must sell at losses, converting mark-to-market losses into real losses.
“it's actually fine if they're able to hold on long enough because those Securities will pay back all their money or at least you know the vast majority of of them the problem is that if they can't hold on long enough if their deposits get pulled out and they have to sell their assets for a loss that's when they you know they basically make those losses real”
During the pandemic, fiscal stimulus and quantitative easing led to a ~40% increase in broad money supply in a short period, most of which became bank deposits, forcing banks to invest in longer-duration treasuries and mortgage-backed securities.
“there's like that 40 percent uh increase in the broad money supply in a very short period of time and most of that broad money supply is Bank deposits so Banks you know even even though those are customer funds those are liabilities for the bank and they're holding them for the the customer so they basically had an influx of deposits and they had to invest them in something um and you know a lot of them put them into relatively safe Securities things like treasuries or or mortgage-backed Securities”
The Federal Reserve reversed monetary policy from record low rates with quantitative easing to the fastest rate hike cycle since the 1970s, causing long-duration assets purchased during stimulus to suffer underwater losses.
“you had this record increase in the broad money supply super low rates and then it led to inflation among other factors and so the Federal Reserve freaked out and completely 180 degree reverse their monetary policy so they started sucking money out of the system and they started hiking rates at the fastest rate since the 1970s um and so all these banks that that bought these longer duration safe assets suddenly found their positions underwater”
Of ~$17 trillion in U.S. bank deposits, the FDIC insures less than 1%, with even full insurance coverage backed by only ~1.3% of total deposits, making systemic confidence the primary protection against bank runs.
“of like the 17 trillion plus deposits uh that are out there you know the the FDIC only has you know less than one percent of those deposits backed up by Insurance even the ratio that is fully covered by insurance they only have something like 1.3 percent uh covered”
European banks face higher failure risk than U.S. banks because Europe lacks a single unified government and central bank; each country has its own central bank, making coordinated bailouts harder and making bail-ins (depositor losses) more likely.
“if you're a European investor it's actually harder to get a bailout in general because there's not one country with with the you know the the government and the Central Bank on the same page instead they have you know a bunch of different governments and then you know at least for most of those countries not not Switzerland but most of the countries they've won Central Bank and so their banks are actually more at risk of uh basically a failure uh more risk of having a bail in rather than a bailout which is basically where the depositors uh bail out the bank”
The Fed's post-dot-com bubble response (cutting rates to 1%) encouraged real estate leverage; rapid subsequent rate hikes contributed to the 2008 financial crisis, establishing a pattern where Fed tightening cycles break the system.
“for example after the.com bubble you know that was a that was a mild recession by most accounts unemployment rate and GDP contraction are pretty mild and yet the Federal Reserve cut interest to one percent which encourage a lot of Real Estate leverage and then they rapidly hiked interest rates and that wasn't the only Factor but that was a contributing factor to the 2008 financial crisis”
Silicon Valley Bank had two critical vulnerabilities: (1) deposits concentrated in tech startups, mostly uninsured (above FDIC limit), making them flight-prone; (2) heavy duration risk from long-term securities, amplifying losses from rate hikes.
“there's two big risk factors that go into why this particular bank had such a big problem one was that their deposits were not very high quality because they were concentrated in one industry uh you know Tech startups and because they're mostly business bank accounts most of them were well above the FDIC limit um and so they had you know you know their risk of loss if there should be a bank failure so they're basically deposits that are very very uh quick to want to move at any sign of a problem which is not the case when you have a very Diversified uh and smaller you know kind of a large number of small accounts so one is their deposit base was at risk and the number two is they they did not manage their duration well”
The Federal Reserve is fighting 1940s-style fiscal-driven inflation with 1970s-style monetary policy designed to curb bank lending, but bank lending is not the primary cause of 2020s inflation.
“the Federal Reserve is kind of fighting 1940 style fiscal driven inflation with 1970 style monetary policy that is mainly meant to occur Bank lending even though Bank lending is not the major cause of inflation uh here in the 2020s”
Liquidity stress is already visible in Europe with Credit Suisse, and rapid repricing of Treasury yields signals market expectations for Fed action; observing the Fed's next moves has become essential to managing assets in the current centralized system.
“we're seeing we're already seeing a liquidity sponsor in in Europe uh with with Credit Suisse we've seen a liquidity response here in the United States and a rapid repricing of these rates so I'm basically watching to see any more actions by the Federal Reserve which is a sad State of Affairs because you know when you when you look at the financial system you shouldn't have to look at like what one guy is going to decide when he gets out of bed um or like you know one group of you know like people um but that's that's kind of the nature of the system”
The 2023 crisis is more of a liquidity problem than a solvency problem, so it is practically solvable overnight if the Fed cuts rates and injects liquidity, but inflation at 6% makes this politically difficult.
“I would I would hesitate to compare it to 2008 in most ways or or compare it to a similar magnitude because it's more of a liquidity problem than a solvency problem I would say one of the big systemic things to watch is how the Federal Reserve is going to respond to this because you know back in 2008 that was a very hard problem to solve you know the FED can solve this practically overnight if they want to cut rates and put liquidity back into the system but of course with inflation at six percent um that's not something they want to do right”
JP Morgan managed duration risk better than SVB by holding shorter-duration assets, resulting in smaller unrealized losses when interest rates rose.
“a bank like JP Morgan for example uh you know got more into shorter duration types of assets so they had less losses when interest rates increase so much whereas this particular Bank you know basically made a pretty big bet on long duration assets uh you know which is not not the most not like the riskiest thing you could have done but it is risky”
The BTFP liquidity facility is backed by $25 billion in Treasury capital to absorb potential losses, which appears unlikely but represents direct taxpayer exposure if losses do materialize.
“the Federal Reserves uh liquidity facility is backed up by 25 billion in um treasury Capital uh to absorb any any you know losses that they might incur which which seem somewhat unlikely”
European depositors must now become bank experts, analyzing financial filings to assess safety, because partial insurance and risk of bail-ins mean that bank choice has become a critical due-diligence decision rather than a commodity service.
“the challenge there is that every you know suddenly kind of overnight everybody has to be a bank expert and has to look at their Banks you know like uh you know their financial filings and determine whether or not they feel safe holding them you know you know basically if someone invests in a leveraged bond fund you'd expect them to do a lot of due diligence on the risk of that asset whereas that's not of course how most people treat Banks because you know the particles are insured but also partially because they're just supposed to do the services we expect”
The Fed's quantitative tightening in 2018-2019 affected liquidity withdrawal relatively evenly between large and small banks, but in 2023 the liquidity shock disproportionately hit small banks due to system design favoring large institutions.
“when they did quantitative tightening in 2018 and 2019 you know that came out of small Banks and big Banks pretty evenly and anything it came out as large Banks a little bit faster whereas this time around you know they they put so much liquid into the system and sucked it back out but the problem was that it it came disproportionately out of small Banks”
Tighter lending standards from banking stress will increase recession odds, creating another layer of Fed policy dilemma: higher rates + credit contraction = weak growth.
“lending decisions are going to be tighter now which can which can increase the odds of a recession”
The drop in the two-year Treasury yield is a factor benefiting Bitcoin and gold alongside rate-sensitive stocks; if investors believed Powell would maintain positive real rates, the dollar would strengthen and alternative assets would be less attractive.
“I think it's certainly a factor uh basically it's contributing both Bitcoin and gold um and some stocks that are doing pretty well and it's it's it's things that were rate sensitive so you know for example someone believed that Powell was going to keep hiking that it was gonna get the positive real rates and then hold them there for a long period of time then the dollar is super stable and you know it basically makes it attractive and it makes most other assets unattractive right if you can get a positive real yield on you know your your treasuries and your you know things like that uh it makes other assets less urgent on the other hand if they rapidly uh cut interest rates uh and you know they're they're not able to tighten even in the face of of persistent inflation then that makes those those scarce assets more attractive things like Bitcoin things like gold”
Foreign banks with U.S. branches are eligible for the BTFP because they are tied into the dollar-based system; excluding them would cause 'offshore dollars' to flow back and damage the domestic banking system.
“foreign Banks uh some of them have um branches in the United States and they tie into the dollar-based system and so they're they're you know they're uh able to use that facility similar to how domestic Banks can for for similar purposes uh because otherwise you have the long chain of offshore dollars kind of coming back and causing problems in the domestic banking system”
President's statement that 'taxpayers will not be paying for this' is technically accurate at the margin but misleading: people will pay indirectly through reduced cost-effectiveness of banking services and spreads, with losses dispersed across market participants rather than concentrated in the government budget.
“when the president went on camera and said that taxpayers will not be paying for this is that disingenuous um you know it's one of those things around the margins it's different than if they just outright gave the money um I would say that that people are going to pay for it not necessarily through through you know the government budget they're going to pay through it by their their you know their overall cost Effectiveness when using banks in general”
The government's decision to cover uninsured SVB depositors represents a partial bailout that socializes losses across the wider banking system, requiring other banks to absorb the cost of making uninsured depositors whole.
“the non-insured depositors uh you know they would have gotten most of their money back uh but you know based on the on the losses that the bank had they would not have likely gotten 100 of the money back uh so that was a you know that's basically socializing losses basically um other banks are going to absorb that cost over a wider base uh to get those uninsured depositors whole”
The two-year Treasury yield and 52-week Treasury yield movement are key indicators of forward Fed policy expectations; a rapid drop below the federal funds rate historically signals the Fed is done hiking rates.
“right now I'm looking at the two-year treasury yield uh the 52-week treasury yield um Mark of expectations of forward-fed policy um because we you know we just saw one of the biggest uh repricings of short-term uh treasure yields on record we have to go back to the 1980s to see a similar uh rapid move and historically when you see um you know the two-year plunge below the federal funds rate but that speed and at that magnitude that's kind of a signal that the FED funds rate is probably done”
Market inflation break-evens currently price low long-term inflation, suggesting confidence in Fed control; if this is mispriced and inflation remains elevated, recurring banking losses and confidence erosion will result.
“if you look at at inflation break evens right now the market as it is expecting low long-term inflation right so it if someone thinks that's correct then you know the fed's fine they can hold interest rates you know here they can lower them a little bit and things will be fine on the other hand if they if they view that that's mispriced and inflation is going to be a recurring problem this decade um then I do think you're going to get recurring losses of confidence in the overall banking system and some are more vulnerable than others”
When SVB tried to raise equity to cover losses, it failed to find investors, triggering the decision to mark securities to market and realize losses, which directly caused the bank's collapse.
“when svb had to go some all those long duration bonds they had to Mark to Market so they were at a loss they tried to raise equity and they couldn't so is that essentially how they collapsed that weekend and then the government stepped in yeah that's basically what happened”
Short-term asset price moves (including Bitcoin rallies) can reverse within multi-week or multi-month periods, so caution is warranted about chasing recent gains despite Bitcoin showing resilience.
“now I'd be careful about chasing things in the near term I mean you know short-term moves can always reverse themselves over any multi-week or multi-month period uh but I do think that Bitcoin is showing a lot of resilience in the recent months and especially with this particular event”
The 2023 banking crisis is a combination of Federal Reserve policy error and individual bank risk management failures rather than either exclusively.
“combination of fed policy error uh and individual Bank risk management failures so I see a lot of people blaming you know either the banks or blaming the FED exclusively uh whereas like like most things it's a mix”
The current crisis is different from 2008 in both type and magnitude; people should ensure their deposits are below FDIC insurance limits and not assume all deposits are covered.
“I would just make sure you know people should make sure that their bank is safe that they're you know making use of FDIC Insurance limits don't assume that all deposits are covered just yet uh you know take take prudence”
The core problem is fiscal (massive deficits causing inflation), not monetary; monetary policy tools (interest rates, bank lending) cannot address fiscal dominance, so the Fed is structurally unable to solve the underlying inflation regardless of its policy choices.
“when you have massive fiscal deficits that are causing the underlying inflation combined with uh supply side problems and and you know energy and labor and things like that it's kind of rolling problems there monetary policy tools are not really the right tools to address that um you know basically it's more of a fiscal type of challenge”
Credit Suisse has been a 'slow-motion train wreck' of recurring deposit losses, becoming increasingly risky; it is a systemically important bank but everyone assumes it will eventually fail.
“credit Suites for example has just been this ongoing slow-motion train wreck of losing deposits and you know basically it's becoming risky and riskier losing as major investors uh and so that that's been kind of an ongoing you know everyone kind of assumes that's eventually going to fail even though it's a systemically important Bank”
The Federal Reserve will face very big decisions later in 2023, and the system structure itself makes recurring crises and intervention cycles inevitable.
“I think basically the Federal Reserve is going to have really big decisions later this year um and it's certainly not a position I'd ever want to be in”
It is a sad state of affairs that financial system stability depends on watching what one person (the Fed chair) decides when he gets out of bed each morning, indicating the system is over-consolidated.
“I'm basically watching to see any more actions by the Federal Reserve which is a sad State of Affairs because you know when you when you look at the financial system you shouldn't have to look at like what one guy is going to decide when he gets out of bed um or like you know one group of you know like people um but that's that's kind of the nature of the system it's kind of designed you know almost like it just it just consolidates towards like the center over time”
The entire financial system is artificial and one giant ongoing bailout because the Federal Reserve actively manages it as a centralized entity, so any intervention is just part of the normal functioning of the system.
“when all these banks are building their system on top fed and the Federal is actively managed by a central entity you know it's like both sides are bailout the whole system is kind of one giant ongoing bailout”
Debt ceiling impasse and Treasury cash account refilling could be a source of liquidity withdrawal from markets later in 2023, creating another potential systemic stress point.
“going forward there's even risks later this year because you still have the debt ceiling impasse um and you know if the treasury tries to you know after that's resolved if they try to refill their cash account that could be another source of liquidity coming out of the market”
Powell's willingness to seek re-appointment as Fed chair raises questions about whether he understands the structural nature of the problem, given that the role has no good solutions.
“it's easy to play like Central Bank you know like everything what they could you know could have done should have done um and that that's why I'm hesitant to blame him other than pointing out that there's really no good Solutions here and it's really the the underlying structure of the system that's the problem well then honestly it does feel a little bit like wash rinse repeat uh you blow up one bubble pop it and then you have to taper it over and hit the money printer again lower interest rates we already went to zero I mean where does it go from here how many more times can they pivot again in lower interest rates before at some point we lose all credibility”
Bitcoin's resilience during the 2023 banking crisis is 'good advertisement' for Bitcoin as a hedge against monetary credibility loss and banking system fragility.
“but I do think that Bitcoin is showing a lot of resilience in the recent months and especially with this particular event and that it's you know it's it's this is a good advertisement for Bitcoin”
If Lynn Alden were Fed chair, she would resign and nominate Caitlyn Long instead, because anyone who understands central banking wouldn't want the job due to the fundamental design of the system.
“I'd probably resign and ask Caitlyn long to take it over um I think another test is you know Powell had an exit I mean you know he could have left before and he he wanted to be you know basically re-put into that into that position I think basically any any anyone who runs a central bank or is knows how to run it wouldn't want the job”
The Federal Reserve chair and Treasury secretary should have foreseen the banking crisis, given that depositors can be expected to examine bank financial statements, and institutional leaders have even more obligation to do so.
“how did Jay Powell how did the treasury secretary how did they not see this coming because if you can't expect that a you know a depositor is going to be looking at all these financial statements so you'd certainly hope that the CEO and the FED chairman know this”
Lynn Alden's insights and forecasts have historically proven correct, particularly her identification of 1940s-style fiscal inflation and smaller cycles of disinflation interrupting the broader trend.
“well in your insights and forecasts have always been really spot on you called the fact that this is a more structurally inflationary period that could have some you know smaller cycles of disinflation where we could maybe see the interest rates go down”
Bitcoin's long-term thesis is that the dollar will continue losing purchasing power even accounting for interest rates, making Bitcoin a superior long-term store of value and alternative money to hold alongside other properties (censorship resistance, global access).
“it's kind of always been part of thesis I mean if someone believes that the dollar is going to get back on track and it's going to stop losing value uh then you know people can hold dollars whereas if you know Bitcoin is kind of the thesis that that's not going to happen that I was going to keep devaluing and purchasing power uh even when taking account interest rates and therefore you know that Bitcoin is a better long-term uh money to hold in addition to being sensitive resistant and Global and all the other properties that it has”
The current fire being put out is partially caused by a fire the Fed lit a couple years ago, raising the question of whether they will light another fire and extinguish it again, creating a perpetual cycle.
“this fire was was partially caused by the you know they're putting out a fire that they lit a couple years ago and so now the question is are they going to light another fire and then put that out again or how are they going to deal with this”
Predicting how many more times the Fed can pivot toward lower rates before losing inflation credibility is ultimately a prediction of human behavior, which is inherently uncertain.
“that's mostly it that's predicting that is basically predicting human uh Behavior Uh which is challenging”