66 | Will Wilkinson on Partisan Polarization and the Urban/Rural Divide
What this covers
Sean Carroll interviews policy analyst Will Wilkinson on the origins and mechanics of America's urban-rural political divide. Rather than framing polarization as a clash between geographically separated ideologies, Wilkinson argues that the division is fundamentally a sorting mechanism driven by urbanization itself. The conversation traces how openness to experience—a measurable personality trait—predicts who migrates to cities and who stays put, how economic growth concentrates in urban centers, and how these two forces create a self-reinforcing cycle that leaves rural areas increasingly economically stagnant and culturally isolated. The discussion moves across economics, psychology, and electoral mechanics to explain not just that cities are blue and rural areas are red, but why those gaps keep widening.
Wilkinson draws on several key mechanisms to support this account. Openness to experience is roughly 60 percent heritable but also shaped by education and travel; high-openness people are magnetically drawn to cities while low-openness people tend to stay rooted. Meanwhile, following work by Enrico Moretti, the economy has split into pockets of extreme productivity and everywhere else—a "great divergence" that concentrates high-wage jobs and innovative work in metros. This leaves rural populations not just culturally different but economically deprived, and Wilkinson argues this simultaneity is crucial: economic anxiety and ethnocentrism are not competing explanations for Trumpism but joint products of the same selection versus treatment effects dynamic. The conversation also examines structural disadvantages baked into the U.S. electoral system, the weakening of union identity that once anchored working-class voters, and whether policy can meaningfully redirect development to mid-size cities rather than continue subsidizing hyper-concentration.
Wilkinson argues that partisan polarization is fundamentally a density divide driven by urbanization acting as a sorting mechanism: high-openness, less ethnocentric people self-select into magnetic cities while low-openness people stay in economically stagnating rural areas, so 'economic anxiety' and 'racism/nationalism' are not competing explanations for Trumpism but joint products of the same selection-plus-treatment dynamic.
- Urbanization selects on personality (openness predicts migration), leaving rural areas increasingly low-openness and ethnocentric
- Economic growth is geographically concentrated in cities, so liberalizing 'treatment effects' of prosperity don't reach rural populations
- The same sorting that produces cultural polarization also deprives rural areas of growth, making them receptive to populist nativist narratives
Openness predicts migration to cities and social liberalism while conscientiousness predicts conservatism and preference for sameness.
- Among the Big Five personality traits, only openness to experience and conscientiousness have significant relationships with political views: high openness predicts social liberalism while high conscientiousness (with its aversion to uncertainty and desire for clear effort-reward relationships) predicts social conservatism, and these relate only to social views, not economic ones.
“the trait among the big five that are most politically relevant, are openness to experience and conscientiousness. These predict whether you're more liberal or conservative in your social views.”
- Low openness and high conscientiousness relate to a broad set of traits describable as ethnocentrism or ingroup bias, so lower-openness people have stronger preferences for sameness and are more put off by diversity, making them less attracted to and even averse to places full of people unlike them.
“both openness and... Low openness and high conscientiousness relate to a broad set of traits that you can just call ethnocentrism, or in-group bias”
- Openness is roughly 60% heritable, but this leaves substantial room for environmental change: getting a college degree and traveling when young both reliably increase openness and social liberalism, while at the same time pre-existing openness makes one more likely to go to college, so causation runs in both directions.
“The openness say is about the heritability goes at about 60%... it's very clear that getting a college degree makes you more open, traveling when you're young makes you more open.”
- Because migration is overwhelmingly toward higher density, and openness predicts the inclination to migrate, urbanization acts as a selection filter: high-openness people get drawn into cities while low-openness people stay put, gradually leaving rural populations lower in openness and more ethnocentric.
“lower openness also just predicts your inclination to migrate, at all”
- Conscientiousness is an auxiliary 'workhorse' trait that makes people good at school and predicts career success and salary but doesn't motivate any particular pursuit, whereas openness carries motivational drive: conscientiousness makes you good at school, openness makes you want to learn, and these traits vary independently.
“conscientiousness is the trait that makes you good at school, openness is the trait that makes you want to learn”
- Although openness is socially valued, low openness is not a failing: lower-openness people are better friends in the sense of being more rooted and loyal—the ones who will bail you out of jail at three in the morning or call you when you're old—whereas higher-openness people are more likely to move away.
“lower openness people are just better friends... Your low openness friend is the guy who's gonna show up at three in the morning and bail you out of jail.”
- Although conscientiousness predicts individual career success and income, higher conscientiousness at the population level does not predict higher productivity or faster recovery; UK data show higher-openness places bounced back from recession faster than higher-conscientiousness places because openness brings the flexibility to adapt when the rules change, while conscientious people struggle when rules change.
“the higher conscientiousness places didn't bounce back from the recession as fast as the higher openness places. And that seems to be because higher openness people are more flexible”
Cities concentrate high-wage jobs and idea production through agglomeration, creating rising education premiums that filter educated workers cityward.
- Following Moretti's 'great divergence,' the economy is splitting between a handful of extremely high-productivity cities and everywhere else, with almost all upswing places being urban and almost the entire lower-density part of the country either stagnating or declining economically, because the rising wage bonus to education and concentration of high-wage jobs in cities has filtered the highly educated population out of the rest of the country.
“there is this real divergence in our economy between a handful of extremely high productivity cities, and everywhere else”
- Growth is increasingly a function of producing new ideas (per Romer), and idea production is markedly higher when many very smart people are concentrated together; while individual productivity gains from proximity exist (like learning from better coders), most growth comes from bigger ideas that scale across the population, which is why economic production increasingly concentrates in cities.
“growth is increasingly a function of just coming up with new ideas. The ideas drive growth, and that idea production really seems to be higher when you concentrate a lot of really, really smart people together”
- Cities function like electromagnets whose pull keeps intensifying: rising wage bonuses to education and agglomeration efficiencies make cities increasingly magnetic, so the whole population filters toward them unless a person is, metaphorically, made of non-magnetic material (low-openness, rooted types).
“cities are like magnets, and the incentives to urbanization are like the level of magnetic attraction. And it's like an electro-magnet, you keep turning it up”
- Despite the technologies that increased the density wage bonus also seeming to enable working from anywhere, physical co-presence remains hard to replace because humans are hyper-social mammals: remote work produces loneliness and disconnection while being physically close generates camaraderie and team feeling, so the tech sector's tendency to treat people as abstract and disembodied leads to serious mistakes about how economies work.
“there's a real effect of getting mammals physically close to each other and being like, 'We're a team, we're doing something.' And I just don't think you can replicate it.”
Urbanization creates a selection mechanism leaving rural populations lower in openness and more ethnocentric as high-openness people migrate out.
- There is a tight, almost linear relationship between population density and party vote share: the densest parts of any town are the most Democratic and become progressively more Republican as density falls, such that there are effectively no Republican cities anymore.
“there's this very tight, almost linear relationship between higher density, higher Democratic vote share, lower density, higher Republican vote share”
- Almost the entire non-white population has sorted into cities not because minorities have stronger ingroup bias than whites, but because, being fewer in number, the only way to satisfy even a weak preference for being near similar people is to concentrate in the same place, whereas the white majority can satisfy that preference almost anywhere.
“it's not that African-Americans or Hispanics or Asians have more ingroup bias than anybody else, it's that they're the same on average. But in order to satisfy even a weak preference for being around people like them, they're all gonna have to basically go to the same place.”
- Schelling's segregation model demonstrates that even a mild preference for having a minority of neighbors be the same group (homophily) produces sharply demarcated, radically segregated population clusters as an aggregate emergent outcome of individual relocation choices.
“even this mild preference for homophily... that seems to be a pretty deep feature of human psychology... over time those populations segregate fairly cleanly, not just in half, but you'll get these very clear clusters”
Economic growth increasingly benefits only cities, leaving rural areas stagnating while prosperity drives cultural liberalism in urban areas alone.
- Rising economic prosperity reliably makes populations more culturally liberal through a transition from survival values to self-expression values (per Inglehart), but because growth is now geographically concentrated in cities, only already-liberal urban populations receive this liberalizing treatment effect, further polarizing them from rural areas that don't experience the prosperity.
“the further you get from a sense of economic insecurity, basically the more tolerant and open you are to difference and change, and this is really, really well confirmed”
- Only very recently has the economics profession recognized that inequality is increasingly regional, with a large geographic aspect to how the economy is changing; the trends of urban concentration cannot be reversed, but the damage to declining areas can be mitigated through social assistance and policies to improve development in struggling regions.
“it's only until very, very recently that even the economics profession has got its head around the fact that inequality is increasingly a regional thing”
- Current policy effectively subsidizes hyper-concentration in a few big cities while mid-size cities like Des Moines and Ames have a genuine economic function and could be built up; high housing costs in mega-cities inadvertently redirect people to smaller cities, but deliberately building up secondary hubs would shrink the productivity gap and give people more urbanization options.
“we are effectively subsidizing the trend of hyper-concentration in a few big cities, and we don't need to be subsidizing that in the way that we have been”
- Urbanization is the most momentous transformation in human social life over the past 200 years: the human population has filtered from being diffusely spread across the territory under agricultural economies into concentrated hubs of commerce, and the scale of this concentration (from New York's 33,000 in 1790 to scores of million-plus metros) must have major effects on how people relate to one another.
“urbanization is clearly the most momentous thing that's happened in human social life over the past 200 years. It's this just absolutely immense transformative force.”
Trump's appeal reflects simultaneous economic decline and rising ethnocentrism in rural areas, not a false choice between the two causes.
- Falling union membership has weakened the reflexive identity-based ties that locked working-class people into the Democratic Party; as the union culture fades, those people start sorting on other identities such as race and antipathy to urban liberals, making them susceptible to a candidate who activates ethnocentric impulses.
“falling rates of union membership, have weakened those ties... then those people tend to start sorting more on these other identities”
- Because most people pay little attention to politics and align by salient social identity rather than by issue checklists, having a black Democratic president provided a clear enough cue that the Democrats are the party for black people and civil rights, causing a large shift of lower-education whites toward the Republican Party generated simply by the clarity of the signal Obama's blackness sent.
“a big part of the flight of working class whites toward the Republican party really does seem to have been caused by Barack Obama being President”
- The debate over whether Trump's victory was caused by economic anxiety or by racism/nationalism poses a false choice: urbanization simultaneously leaves lower-density populations more socially conservative and deprives them of the benefits of economic growth, so economic stagnation and ethnocentric receptiveness are different aspects of the same underlying causal dynamic.
“These things are all different aspects of the same underlying causation.”
- After the 2012 GOP autopsy recommended expanding non-white vote share, Trump instead picked up a metaphorical $20 bill by doubling down on nativism that appealed to an increasingly ethnocentric, economically stagnant low-density population, shrinking the Republican base to almost exclusively white, exurban and rural voters with whom the party cannot keep winning, leaving only two options: genuine outreach or cheating.
“there was a $20 bill laying on the ground that Trump picked up that this increasingly ethnocentric lower density population... they don't want more immigration and so he just doubled down on this kind of nativism which has shrunk the GOP's electoral base”
Low-density areas are systematically advantaged in electoral rules yet locked into Republican ideology unable to address their own economic decline.
- The huge majority of US counties that are deeply economically underwater are staunchly Republican low-density areas, yet the GOP's free-market, anti-welfare-state ideology prevents it from doing anything to mitigate its own voters' economic decline, creating an opening for populist Democrats like Sanders and Warren to address that need.
“the huge majority of counties in the United States that are way under water in terms of economic vitality are staunchly Republican places”
- There is a baked-in low-density bias in the entire US electoral system (Senate, Electoral College, Supreme Court), so the less-dense side of the density divide is systematically advantaged; Republicans do not need majorities to win and could sustain power indefinitely by chipping away at Democratic non-white vote share by even a point or two per cycle.
“there is this baked in low-density bias in our entire electoral system... they don't need majorities to win, they just need to keep just chipping away at democratic non-white vote share”
- What parties do is determined by the 'policy demanders' in their coalition; Trump has strengthened the nativist, nationalist wing so much that keeping the party white and rural has become a core demand, which locks the GOP out of broadening its coalition because admitting non-white and higher-education voters would empower competing demands that conflict with shutting down immigration.
“What parties do is determined by, political scientists call it the policy demanders in the coalition. And at this point, he's so strengthened the nativist, nationalist wing of the party”
- A functioning two-party system requires a responsible governing right because power inevitably changes hands; when one party tries to destroy the system to retain power rather than govern, that is how democracies collapse into Banana Republics, so a catastrophic electoral defeat is needed to force the GOP back toward moderation.
“you need two parties in a two-party system that will actually try to govern instead of what the GOP under Trump is trying to do, which is basically destroy the system to keep itself in power. That's how places collapse into Banana Republics.”
Rural economies lack function beyond agriculture and require life support while mid-size cities offer viable alternatives to hyper-concentration.
- People change their minds gradually through an iterative process of defending and shoring up positions until they have given up the original ground, often resisting acknowledgment of the change to preserve self-identity; this resembles a phase transition where percolating facts suddenly produce a large shift, with the original impetus possibly forgotten.
“as you iterate that process, you just actually end up with a pretty comprehensively different set of views over time. But because it seems gradual you don't really notice it”
- Many small towns exist only because agricultural employment once required dispersing people across fields, but with agricultural employment collapsed and automated, these towns have no remaining economic function; for their aging populations we must essentially provide life support and ease their decline comfortably while promoting growth in the mid-size cities people are moving to.
“a lot of small towns have no function, they don't have a reason to be... agricultural employment has collapsed. And these little towns were hubs... but nobody needs jobs in those places anymore.”
Economic anxiety in declining communities manifests as opioid epidemics and cultural disengagement while religious institutions increasingly serve national identity over faith content.
- Going to college is itself a form of migration that is uncomfortable for rooted, socially conservative types because it means moving away from family and friends to a more diverse environment, which produces high attrition; as rural areas become more conservative, parents also find it less attractive to send their children, fearing the separation and the liberalizing effect.
“going to college is a form of migration that is uncomfortable to really rooted socially, temperamentally, socially conservative types. Going to college means moving away from your family.”
- While conscientiousness generally predicts academic performance, it fails to do so for lower socioeconomic status students; for them it is openness that predicts academic success, suggesting that for disadvantaged students facing a stacked deck, the desire to learn (motivation) is what pulls them through rather than diligence.
“generally, conscientiousness predicts academic performance, but it actually doesn't for lower socioeconomic status students... But, it turns out that openness does”
- Religious participation tends to fall as GDP per capita increases, because rising wealth drives a shift toward self-expression values that emphasize finding the thing that fits oneself, which runs counter to the demands of traditional religion.
“religious participation tends to fall as GDP per capita increases, as people get more and more wealthy”
- The opioid epidemic reflects self-medication around the anxiety of job loss and economic decline in places where people live, with the US being one of the few countries where a major population—lower-density whites—has declining life expectancy amid genuine, desperate economic insecurity.
“The opioid epidemic, I think, reflects a lot of the self-medication around the anxiety of the loss of jobs, the loss of economic vitality in a lot of places where people live.”
- The US maintains higher religious participation than European countries partly because of entrepreneurial religious activity like prosperity-gospel megachurches, which customize their message to what people want to hear and thereby keep attendance high, but in doing so rinse out the actual religious content; Evangelical support for Trump reflects an Evangelicalism that is more Americanism with a light Christian gloss than a practice of Christ's teachings.
“Evangelicalism is basically Americanism with a light Christian gloss on it... it's more about being against abortion and being in favor of American exceptionalism than it really is about exemplifying the lessons of Christ”