61 | Quassim Cassam on Intellectual Vices and What to Do About Them
What this covers
Quassim Cassam, a philosopher from the University of Warwick, joins Sean Carroll to examine intellectual vices—personal qualities such as closed-mindedness, wishful thinking, and overconfidence that systematically obstruct knowledge and for which people can legitimately be blamed. The conversation distinguishes vices from automatic cognitive biases: while biases operate universally at the level of brain processing, vices are individual character traits, thinking styles, and attitudes that vary between people and remain open to moral criticism. Cassam argues that knowing requires not just true belief but justified belief—conviction grounded in evidence and sound reasoning—so a belief sustained only by bias remains epistemically defective even if accidentally true. This distinction carries weight because vices demonstrably shape real outcomes: the 1973 Yom Kippur surprise attack, the Iraq War planning failures, and political dysfunction all turn on documented cases of intellectual vice doing explanatory work.
The discussion ranges from political psychology to epistemology to practical ethics. Cassam addresses stealthy vices—qualities that block their own detection, like the Dunning-Kruger effect—explaining why people spot others' closed-mindedness readily but miss their own. He engages the paradox of open-mindedness: treating settled questions as closed (the Holocaust, evidence-based medicine) does not constitute vice, yet genuine openness requires engaging well-founded alternatives. Drawing on Aristotle's framework, he locates intellectual virtues between excess and deficiency with no rigid formula—much like practical wisdom, which resists reduction to rule. On remedy, Cassam takes a moderately optimistic middle ground: though vices are partly stealthy and control is partial, people retain some power to self-correct. The episode also touches on Harry Frankfurt's distinction between lying and bullshitting, and how indifference to truth has become politically normalized—itself an emergent intellectual vice with democratic consequences.
Cassam argues that intellectual vices are blameworthy personal qualities (character traits, thinking styles, attitudes) that systematically obstruct knowledge, are distinct from automatic cognitive biases, and—despite being partly stealthy and hard to control—can be recognized and improved, which matters because they shape real political and military outcomes.
- Vices are personal qualities open to praise/blame, unlike universal brain-level cognitive biases
- Knowledge requires justified belief, so even true beliefs sustained by vice are defective
- Real-world cases (Iraq War, Yom Kippur, Brexit) show vices doing genuine explanatory work
Intellectual vices are personal character traits and attitudes systematically blocking knowledge for which people bear legitimate blame.
- Intellectual vices are personal qualities—taking the form of character traits, ways of thinking, or attitudes—that are bad for us intellectually because they systematically get in the way of knowledge and understanding, and crucially are qualities for which a person can legitimately be blamed or criticized.
“there are personal intellectual qualities that are in some sense bad for us, intellectually speaking. And lastly, there are personal qualities for which we can be blamed or criticized. So that's the basic notion of an intellectual vice.”
- Intellectual vices differ from cognitive biases in that vices are personal characteristics that vary between individuals and carry praise/blame, whereas cognitive biases tend to be treated as universal and operate at the level of the brain's information processing rather than the person, though the distinction is not sharp and the two shade into one another.
“when people talk about cognitive biases, I think they tend to think of them as universal more or less, and in many cases is operating not at the level of the person, but at the level of their brains and the way their brains process information”
- Beyond a certain point it is difficult to sustain a distinction between criticizing a person's attitudes and criticizing the person, because a person is in some sense made up of their attitudes and character traits; so even where blame seems harsh (as with someone raised into prejudice), criticism of the bad attitudes remains appropriate.
“beyond a certain point is quite hard to sustain the distinction between a person's attitudes and the person because you might think a person is in some sense made up of his attitudes and character traits”
- Many intellectual vices are 'stealthy vices' that obstruct or block their own detection by the person who has them—analogous to the Dunning-Kruger effect where stupidity blocks recognition of one's own stupidity—which is why people readily spot others' vices but not their own, and why self-correction first requires recognizing the vice.
“many of our intellectual vices are what I call stealthy vices. They're vices that actually obstruct or block their own detection.”
Real-world cases of military intelligence failure, war planning disasters, and political propaganda demonstrate how intellectual vices damage consequential decisions.
- The 1973 Yom Kippur surprise attack on Israel is explained by the closed-mindedness of Israel's director of military intelligence, who had 'frozen' on the conviction that the Arabs would not attack and therefore dismissed all intelligence pointing to an imminent attack, preventing him from knowing what the available evidence would otherwise have let him know.
“Having fixed on that idea, his mind was really closed to all alternative perspectives. So, that's really close-mindedness where you are simply not willing to give serious consideration to other points of view”
- Big-ticket conspiracy theories are fundamentally forms of political propaganda whose real role is to advance a political agenda; they are often deployed self-consciously to deflect criticism (e.g., calling mass shootings false flags to resist gun control), and neither their promoters nor their consumers necessarily believe them.
“the function of conspiracy theories is they're fundamentally forms of propaganda”
- Making beliefs transparent or having people bet on them does not resolve epistemic disputes, because what matters is not the strength of conviction (which both sides may share equally) but whether the belief is held on good grounds; in the Iraq troop-number debate, the side favoring a small force was unjustified because it ignored expert military advice in favor of politicians' opinions.
“that's not a question about the strength of your belief or the strength of your conviction. It's a question about whether you actually have good grounds for your beliefs.”
- The disastrous military preparations for the 2003 Iraq War can be substantially explained by intellectual arrogance and overconfidence among senior Bush administration officials, who assumed they knew best and dismissed the advice of professional military planners.
“one thing that I think you can see fairly clearly is considerable intellectual arrogance, the assumption by senior people in the then administration that they knew best”
We retain partial control over intellectual vices despite their difficulty, enabling self-correction through deliberate questioning and effort.
- Cassam endorses a 'moderately optimistic' view: against the pessimist who says we are simply stuck with our intellectual vices and against the assumption of full control, we have partial control over our vices, so although tackling them is difficult and not always effective, we can exercise whatever control we have—for instance by asking ourselves 'is this just wishful thinking?'
“the choice isn't between being completely in control and having no control. I think we're somewhere in the middle. We have some degree of control”
- We have differing degrees of control over different kinds of vice: attitudes and thinking styles can be altered to at least some extent, while character traits are the hardest case and most tempting to treat as fixed—though Cassam denies we are complete victims of our character and holds some revision is possible.
“The hardest case is character traits where it's much more tempting to think of them as completely fixed and unalterable. I'm not sure I really buy that”
Genuine knowledge requires justified true belief grounded in evidence; closed-mindedness obstructs this while reasonable belief closure on settled questions preserves epistemic function.
- Knowing is not merely a matter of having true beliefs; it requires having beliefs that are justified—based on evidence, good reasoning, or solid information—so a belief sustained only by a cognitive bias remains epistemically defective even if it happens to be true.
“knowing isn't just a matter of having beliefs that are true, knowing also involves having beliefs which you are justified in having”
- Believing that certain questions—such as the reality of the Holocaust—have been settled by overwhelming evidence does not by itself constitute closed-mindedness; genuine open-mindedness requires taking seriously well-founded alternatives, but to function as a knower one must at some point treat sufficiently established questions as closed and need not re-engage refuted claims.
“it's a mistake to think that just because you think that certain questions have been settled, just because you think that the evidence does indeed point in one direction rather than another, that in itself makes you closed-minded”
Well-functioning democracy requires voters know policies and avoid identity-driven voting; intellectual vice in leaders and citizens prevents this essential condition.
- Rather than abstract truth, what humans actually need is knowledge and understanding of the world in order to survive and make consequential decisions (such as whether to vaccinate a child), so the claim that no one cares about knowledge is not something anyone seriously believes when facing real practical stakes.
“what we want and need as human beings is knowledge of the world around us that's something we actually need just to survive and just to get by”
- A well-functioning democracy requires that voters actually know about parties' policies and take the trouble to find them out; when people instead vote on identity-politics grounds ('he's one of us'), and when massive intellectual vices affect both leaders and the led, democracy cannot function well.
“you can't really have a well-functioning democracy along with massive intellectual vices affecting both leaders and the led. That's just not going to end well.”
Open-mindedness as Aristotelian virtue sits between closed-mindedness and gullibility with no formulaic measure; practical wisdom similarly resists rigid rules.
- Much of good judgment in life and ethics resists reduction to a formula; like a skilled cook who works by feel rather than recipe, or knowing the right time to leave a party, people with practical wisdom rely on an instinctive sense of the right amount, and the search for rigid formulae for how to act is misguided because life mostly is not like that.
“people with practical wisdom are people who just have just a kind of... I don't know what to call it, a kind of instinctive sense of just what's right and what's wrong”
- Following Aristotle, every intellectual quality admits of excess, deficiency, and a virtuous middle: closed-mindedness is the deficiency of openness while gullibility is its excess, and the virtue of open-mindedness lies in between, with no mathematical formula specifying exactly where it sits.
“it's possible to have too much of something and it's possible to have too little of something and it's possible to have just the right amount of it. So the virtuous person who has neither too much nor too little.”
People admit to intellectual vices like racial prejudice more readily than theory predicts, and conspiracy theory belief has actually declined rather than risen.
- Contrary to the claim that people never recognize their own intellectual vices, opinion survey evidence shows a substantial minority will admit to being racially prejudiced, suggesting we need a more nuanced view of which truths about themselves people are and are not willing to acknowledge.
“I've seen an opinion survey of people in the UK asking them, "Would you say that you are racially prejudiced?" And something like a quarter or a third of people said yes”
- Contrary to the widespread assumption that we live in an unprecedented age of conspiracy, good empirical research on the United States indicates that belief in conspiracy theories has actually been declining rather than rising.
“the empirical evidence is that belief in conspiracy theories has actually been going down in the US, not going up”
Contemporary indifference to truth—bullshitting without concern for accuracy—has shifted from fatal defect to politically acceptable vice.
- Epistemology, the philosophical study of knowledge, is often a very dry field that asks abstract high-level questions and relies on contrived made-up examples rather than real-world problems.
“epistemology, I think, can often be a very dry field... the examples they use tend to be rather kind contrived made-up examples”
- Drawing on Harry Frankfurt's distinction, a bullshitter (unlike a liar) simply has no concern for whether what he says is true; in recent politics making false and unfounded claims has shifted from being a fatal defect to being politically acceptable and even effective, and the underlying indifference to truth is itself a powerful and increasingly common intellectual vice.
“the bullshitter, Frankfurt says, is someone who just doesn't care whether the things he says are true or false. They just have no concern with truth at all.”