305 | Lilliana Mason on Polarization and Political Psychology
What this covers
Lilliana Mason, a political scientist at Johns Hopkins, speaks with Sean Carroll about why American polarization has become structurally dangerous. Mason's central claim is not that citizens hold more extreme policy views than in the past, but that previously independent social divisions—party affiliation, race, religion, geography, and culture—have become tightly bundled into two opposing mega-identities. This alignment transforms electoral losses into threats to racial, religious, and cultural selfhood simultaneously, raising the emotional stakes from disagreement about taxes or spending to something that feels existential. The conversation weaves together historical shifts, psychological mechanisms, and institutional constraints to explain how this realignment happened and why it matters.
The discussion traces how Social Sorting accelerated after the 1960s civil rights legislation, when the Republican Party became associated with white evangelical identity and the Democratic Party with racial diversity, eliminating the Cross-Pressures that once made political opponents also neighbors, congregants, or fellow community members. Mason draws on Social Identity Theory, grounded in Henri Tajfel's work, to explain why group status now shapes political behavior more powerfully than policy knowledge. She examines how Approach vs Avoidance Emotions—anger in particular—are deliberately stoked by elites and media because they drive participation while disabling critical thinking. The structural problem runs deeper: First-Past-the-Post vs Proportional Representation systems entrench zero-sum competition, while geographic sorting and information fragmentation have eroded the everyday human encounters that once checked dehumanization. Mason also addresses why Democratic messaging focused on policy often fails, and how Status Threat becomes a potent political resource in contexts of declining social status.
Mason argues that American polarization has become dangerous not because people hold more extreme policy views, but because previously cross-cutting social identities (party, race, religion, geography, culture) have aligned into two mega-identities, turning political loss into existential identity threat that elites and media exploit through anger and status-threat to gain power.
- Since 1960s civil rights legislation, parties became socially sorted so partisan loss now threatens racial, religious, and cultural identities simultaneously
- Anger and status threat are deliberately stoked because they motivate participation while turning off critical thinking
- The first-past-the-post two-party system structurally entrenches zero-sum us-vs-them thinking that proportional/coalition systems mitigate
Polarization is uniquely potent in America because it stems from enslavement and racism, which became the central political divide after the 1960s civil rights era transformed party identities.
- American polarization is particularly potent because it is rooted in the unique history of enslavement and persistent racism, which has become one of the central divides of American politics and over which the country fought a civil war, though analogous dynamics are emerging in Europe around immigration.
“the American roots in enslavement of black Americans is unique to us. And that racism that exists and has always existed in the United States is increasingly this one of the central divides of our politics”
- When the parties were uncorrelated with racial and religious identities, partisan losses affected only the governmental realm (taxes, spending) where compromise is possible, but as Republicans became associated with white evangelical identities and Democrats with diversity, an election loss now wounds your racial and religious identities too, raising the emotional stakes to feel existential.
“The outcome of an election now doesn't just hurt your partisan identity, it hurts you in all these other ways... It hurts your racial identity and your religious identity”
- Before the 1960s both parties contained white supremacists and misogynists, but the civil rights and gender equality progress of the 1960s created a new opportunity for the parties to disagree precisely on questions of racial and gender equality, which Americans cannot discuss without becoming very angry, and these became the center of American politics.
“there were white supremacists in both the Democratic and the Republican Party... in the 60s, we started seeing this real progress towards racial equality and gender equality. And that created this new opportunity for the parties to disagree on these questions”
- When society's divides cut across each other rather than aligning, no single divide is dangerous because cross-pressures mean your political out-group is simultaneously your in-group along some other dimension (e.g. fellow churchgoers), but these cross-cutting connections have declined over the last 50-60 years.
“we call it cross pressures, which is basically that there's an old sociological understanding that if we have all these divides in society pushing in different directions, none of them is very dangerous”
- The cheering of the United Healthcare CEO's assassination across both parties reflects a rare cross-cutting experience of frustration with health insurance, illustrating a class solidarity that is normally broken between the parties via the old strategy of dividing the working class so they cannot organize against oligarchs.
“it's like you take the working class and then you divide them so that they can't organize against whoever the oligarchs are at the time. And this was a strategy we saw happen during the Jim Crow South”
Democracy depends on universal buy-in and compromise, but voters now reject compromise itself and expect violence, making the system dysfunctional when identity becomes bound to electoral winners.
- In the current high-hatred environment voters do not even want their representatives to compromise, but since democracy is fundamentally about compromise where no one gets everything they want, having two parties and a large portion of the electorate reject compromise altogether makes the system dysfunctional and hard to govern.
“Voters don't even want people to compromise. And democracy is a, the whole game is about compromising”
- Approval of political violence among American partisans was under 10% in 2017 but rose to roughly 20-25% among Republicans by 2021, with Democrats not far behind, and approval tracks who is out of power because violence is an anti-status-quo phenomenon, so people out of power are generally more approving than those in power.
“in '17 we were seeing basically around like it was under 10% of American partisans were willing to say that... violence might be acceptable... by the time we got to 2021, it was closer to like, for Republicans it was closer to like 20, 25%”
- Democracy is the only system humans have created in which diverse societies trade positions of power without fighting, giving every citizen nominal voice and equal rights and dignity, but it is delicate and depends entirely on universal buy-in because it disappears as soon as people stop believing in it.
“democracy is the way that we have diverse societies that don't kill each other... the political scientist Danielle Allen calls it difference without domination”
- Many partisans on both sides feel the other side does not treat them as human or want them to exist, making compromise feel impossible because you cannot reason with people you see as an existential enemy.
“all of us, anyone who's affiliated with the party, is feeling this sense of like, these people are evil and they're a threat to the country and they may even be subhuman”
- The word democracy itself has become partisan and coded as liberal, so when Republicans hear about threats to democracy they dismiss it as a liberal concern, and because democracy means different things to different people and many do not know what it means, pro-democracy messaging is ineffective.
“the word democracy itself has become coded as liberal. So when we talk to Republicans about threats to democracy they literally just blow it off because they're like, that's just a liberal thing to say”
Right-wing media deliberately weaponizes status threat and anger against groups with low self-esteem, while politicians favor anger and transgression because they mobilize participation better than unpopular policies or authentic enthusiasm.
- While both anger and enthusiasm mobilize political participation, it is much easier to make people angry than enthusiastic, so politicians with unpopular platforms can win by making people feel their status is threatened and getting them to fight, rather than by offering popular policies.
“it's a lot easier to make people angry... if you can make people feel angry and remind them that their status is threatened, you can get them to be on your side and to fight for you pretty successfully”
- Right-wing media is very good at taking people who already have low self-esteem and telling them that the one identity group they belong to is superior to everyone else, offering that group status as the thing they can hold onto when the rest of their life feels devoid of status, which makes status threat a potent resource for right-wing provocateurs.
“right wing media is very, very good at stoking these feelings... taking people who have low self esteem already and saying, but look, you're a member of this group that is superior to everyone else”
- Anger and enthusiasm are approach emotions that get people up and doing things (fighting or partying) and turn off the critical-thinking part of the brain, whereas worry is an avoidance emotion that makes us think more analytically; politicians therefore want anger and enthusiasm because they drive participation, voting, volunteering, and donating.
“anger, both anger and enthusiasm actually are approach emotions. It gets us up and doing stuff. It also turns off the critical thinking part of our brains”
- Most of what the Republican Party currently wants to do, including their positions on abortion, gun control, and reducing taxes on billionaires, is opposed by the majority of Americans, so the party relies on anger and status threat rather than policy popularity to win support.
“most of the things that they want to do, the majority of Americans don't want, including abortion and gun control and reducing taxes on billionaires and all of these things are just pretty unpopular”
- Trump emerged at a unique time and, being psychologically incapable of feeling shame, gave people who were already practicing intolerant behavior online a permission slip to behave that way openly, and a political science study showed that the specific groups Trump attacked became more derogated by the entire country while groups he never mentioned did not.
“he emerged as a political figure who I do believe, like, psychologically is incapable of feeling the emotion of shame... That allowed a lot of people who are already kind of practicing this stuff on the Internet to be given a permission slip”
- Because humans evolved to pay attention to conflict and threats rather than nice things, crass, rude, and cruel political behavior gets more attention and media coverage, so in the attention economy the easiest way for political leaders to get attention is to be a jerk, which makes dignified leadership a hard ask.
“we pay attention to conflict, and good, nice things can wait till tomorrow. But if there's a something bad happening, we need to know right now... it works in politics”
- Trump rallies were not merely angry but joyful and thrilling because there is excitement in transgressing norms, like kids taking over the school when the principal is gone, so Trump's rejection of polite politics is fun for people, which is why he will not stop doing it.
“there's a thrill in transgressing norms... it's like the kids taking over the school, right? The principal's gone and the kids are in charge”
- Contrary to the Democratic Party's belief that voters would support them if only they knew the enacted policies, research shows people do not care much about policies themselves; they want to feel you are fighting for them, on their team, and going to win, so politics is fundamentally about emotion rather than facts, and you cannot argue someone out of anger with sterile policy points.
“The Democratic Party fully believes that if Americans just knew what kind of policies they had enacted, everybody would be rational and would vote for them... people don't care about policies, though”
- Political science studies show empirically that when migration occurs, right-wing media can seize on it to move an entire population or majority toward the right, and the combination of migration and right-wing media is extremely effective at making people more intolerant of outsiders and less curious and tolerant.
“there are some good political science studies that actually show empirically that when migration occurs, right wing media can seize on it and effectively move the entire population of that place... towards the right”
Partisans live geographically sorted and consume entirely different media, creating separate information universes that reinforce tribal identity and erase cross-cutting social connections that once moderated conflict.
- A 2012 TiVo study found that the top-ten TV shows of Democrats and Republicans had not a single show in common, with Republicans watching shows like Duck Dynasty and Democrats watching satirical cartoons like Family Guy, illustrating that partisanship had become broadly cultural and measurable across consumer preferences.
“they did a study of what TV shows Democrats and Republicans watched, and they found that they're on the top 10 list of shows. There was not a single show that was in common across the two parties”
- The sheer amount of choice in information sources means people can choose to expose themselves only to content that feels good but is disconnected from reality, moving themselves entirely into a universe of gratifying but misleading information, which has a huge amount to do with current polarization.
“the amount of choice that we have in terms of our information has a huge amount to do with it”
- People increasingly sort geographically by party not just rural-versus-urban but neighborhood-by-neighborhood within cities, so partisans live near politically congenial grocery stores like Whole Foods or Cracker Barrel and stop encountering each other doing ordinary human things, which erodes belief in the humanity of the other party.
“people want to live next door to somebody who shares their political party”
- Social norms are enforced through feelings like shame and through being around people who tell you to stop, but being connected to people all over the world rather than physically present neighbors removes these enforcement mechanisms, so people can become abusive and intolerant with no one they care about there to make them cut it out.
“norms are enforced through feelings and talking and being around other people who tell you to cut it out... the enforcement mechanisms for norms disappear”
Group identity is psychologically universal and necessary, but applied to politics it raises existential stakes because election losses now wound racial and religious identities, not just policy preferences.
- Marilyn Brewer's optimal distinctiveness theory holds that humans need both to feel unique and to feel part of something larger, and achieving the right balance requires identifying with a group while also having people outside that group, which is what makes group identity universal and unavoidable.
“there's a social psychologist named Marilyn Brewer who she calls this optimal distinctiveness theory. We need to feel unique, but we also need to feel like we're part of something”
- Social identity theory holds that as long as you have a psychological attachment to a relevant competing group, you have a deep-seated need for that group to hold status over an out-group, because group status is crucial to individual self-esteem; thus identifying with a group necessarily means needing an out-group you are better than.
“as long as you have a psychological attachment to a group, you have a deep seated need for that group to have status over some other group”
- Because our identities are part of our self-esteem and the status of our groups matters to us, any psychological identification with a group makes us feel great when the group wins and terrible when it loses, just like a sports team; this is harmless for sports but raises the stakes dramatically when applied to politics, race, and religion which have historically driven war.
“If you think of an identity as a sports team affiliation, right? When they win, you feel great, when they lose, you feel terrible. And that's true of any identity that we have”
- Henri Tajfel, a Polish Jew, survived a Nazi prison camp only because his perfect French accent let guards believe he was a French rather than Polish Jew, and this experience of a mere label saving his life led him to develop social identity theory after the war.
“they thought he was a French Jew and not a Polish Jew, which he realized is the only reason he survived because they hated Polish Jews and they killed Polish Jews”
Moral disengagement emotions like dehumanization and vilification allow partisans to harm others while feeling righteous, particularly among Republicans but also among anti-racist Democrats viewing Republicans as evil.
- Among Republicans, those highest in racial resentment and sexism are the most willing to dehumanize and vilify Democrats, whereas among Democrats it is the opposite: those lowest in racial resentment (the most anti-racist) are the most willing to dehumanize Republicans precisely because they view Republicans as evil for being racist.
“the Republicans who are the most willing to dehumanize and vilify Democrats are those who are really high in racial resentment. For Democrats, it's the opposite. The Democrats who dehumanize and vilify Republicans are the ones who are really low in racial resentment”
- Democrats and Republicans feel roughly the same level of animosity toward each other, but moral disengagement emotions (dehumanization, vilification, believing the other side is evil) that allow people to harm others while feeling morally good are about 5-10 points higher among Republicans than Democrats.
“Democrats and Republicans basically feel the same level of animosity towards each other. Although once we start talking about emotions like that, we call moral disengagement emotions”
- A 2024 panel study found that before the election about 70% of super-Trump Republicans expected post-election violence and civil war versus about 30% of everyone else, but after Trump won those super-Trump numbers dropped back down to about 30%, revealing that they had expected to be the ones perpetrating the violence.
“the Super Trump Republicans, 70% of them expected violence to occur and basically expected civil war... in November after the election, those numbers for those Trump Republicans drop back down to 30ish percent”
The first-past-the-post electoral system forces zero-sum two-party competition where winning requires only 51 percent but yields 100 percent of power, making third parties impossible and entrenching polarized binary thinking.
- Starting a third party does not work in a first-past-the-post system because a party that gets less than half the votes wins nothing and cannot incrementally claw into power as it could under proportional representation; building a new party identity is also psychologically very hard since people retain strong loyalties to existing party brands.
“if you start a third party and it gets less than half of the votes, then you have nothing... it's not like you can kind of claw your way incrementally into power like you could in a proportional representation system”
- The US first-past-the-post system, where winning 51% of the vote yields 100% of the power, makes it very difficult or impossible for third parties to emerge because people vote strategically to get their group in power, leaving no compromise group and entrenching zero-sum two-party competition.
“our sort of, our we call it first past the post election system, where if you get 51% of the vote, you get 100 of the power... it is very, very difficult, if not impossible for third parties or multiple parties to emerge”
- Because of US geography and government setup, a minority of people can control all the levers of power, with the Senate electable by as little as 17% of American votes since sparsely populated states get the same number of seats as states the size of other countries, allowing disproportionate power for small groups.
“you can elect a majority of the Senate with 17% of American votes... these states that are so empty, they have very few people in them, they get the same number of seats as states that are the size of other countries”
Realignment happened slowly because the party system's historical legacies are psychologically sticky, and individuals resist shame even when information contradicts their beliefs or group membership.
- Southern white Democrats angry about civil rights legislation could not bring themselves to call themselves Republicans because they still resented Republicans for the Civil War, so realignment took decades and a generational shift: they first voted Republican occasionally, became independents, and only their children comfortably identified as Republican.
“they thought of Republicans as the aggressors in the Civil War, and they would never, ever, ever call them Republicans. You couldn't find a white Republican in the south during this period”
- Group identity and tribalism, far from being purely harmful, are the only reason we have civilization because they organize society and give people a sense that a group has their back; this drives not only voting but also community participation, service work, teaching, and government work, channeling identity into benevolent ends.
“it's the only reason we have civilization... it organizes society and so we have to have identities, we have to feel like there's a group of people who has our back”
- Mason suspects, though without data, that COVID accelerated radicalization because everyone went online while isolated and sought comforting information, and people drawn into spaces claiming COVID was a hoax could then be continually misinformed on other topics, with rage feeling good when one is bored and alone.
“I think that I have a suspicion I don't have data to support this... it's very likely that when Covid happened, first of all, everybody went onto the Internet... we were looking for comforting information”
- The right-wing media ecosystem follows completely different evidentiary standards from traditional media: outlets like OAN do not issue corrections and will show the same garbage can on fire and claim it is in multiple different cities, whereas the Washington Post and New York Times have strict evidence rules, and this breakdown of respect for expertise is how conspiracy theories like QAnon emerge.
“OAN doesn't have those same rules... They're showing the same garbage can on fire in Portland and claiming that it's in Minneapolis and New York and Washington DC and have absolutely no qualms about doing that”
- In 1950 the American Political Science Association issued a report, Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System, pleading for the parties to become more ideologically distinct because in the Eisenhower era it was unclear what either party stood for and citizens felt voting for either would yield the same result.
“The report was called Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System. And the plea was basically nobody knows what the two parties stand for”
- Government is invisible when it works, so people only notice it when it stops them from doing something rather than when it helps them, which is why they hate it; potentially this administration could break government so badly that its essential functions become visible to everyone, creating an opportunity to rebuild it.
“the state itself is invisible to people, and nobody understands what the government is doing for them, and therefore they hate government... they only see government when it's stopping them from doing something. They don't see it when it's helping”
- Enthusiasm mobilizes people the same way anger does and Obama bottled it, but it is much harder to generate than anger because it requires real authenticity and careful, honest, open communication of the AOC type, which creates the happiness that makes people want to participate, so a politics built around hope is possible but difficult.
“anger is easy. Anger always works. Enthusiasm is not as easy, but it does work... maybe to focus on a politics that is built around hope”
Religious institutions shifted dramatically from mainline Protestant churches to evangelical mega-churches, which the Republican Party deliberately politicized to create a theocratic element in its platform.
- From the 1970s-80s mainline Protestant churches emptied out while evangelical and charismatic mega-churches surged, and the Republican Party intentionally seized on the religious right as an opportunity to politicize what evangelicals had considered the secular world, creating a theocratic element in the party's platform.
“mainline Christian churches... basically emptied out, and evangelical and more kind of charismatic type of Christian churches became much, much more popular. And that's when we saw the emergence of mega churches”
- The most fervent Trump supporters are self-identified evangelicals who actually know very little about the religion, while evangelicals well-versed in theology are less approving of Trump because they recognize he constantly breaks Christianity's rules; for the fervent group, evangelical identity functions as a loyalty pledge to the Christian-right movement rather than a religious commitment.
“the most fervent Trump supporters are the evangelicals who don't, the self identified evangelicals who don't actually know very much about the religion”
Repairing democracy requires re-establishing social norms through collective enforcement and admitting wrongdoing, which is psychologically painful and rare because it resembles existential shame akin to group banishment.
- Some self-identified liberals or centrists become irrational when told to be less racist or to support trans people because being told by your own in-group that you did something wrong induces shame, which from an evolutionary perspective resembles banishment akin to death, so rather than fall in line they detach from the group and create a new norm for themselves.
“from a deep evolutionary perspective, like getting banished from your own group is basically death... being told by your own in group that you've done something bad makes you feel ashamed”
- Repairing democracy requires re-establishing democratic norms, which are enforced socially rather than by any single leader, so everyone must push back when people tear apart democracy or marginalized people; this is hard because, like leaving a cult, returning to mainstream norms requires admitting one did bad things, which is painful and rare.
“we have to re-establish democratic norms... Norms are enforced socially... it's up to everybody to do that”
Trump uniquely enabled normalization of intolerance by modeling shamelessness, giving people permission to express dehumanizing behavior openly and sparking violence against election officials and marginalized groups.
- After Trump's presidency, violent threats against local election officials surged, including Republicans who certified elections for Biden in swing states, and these anonymous threats disproportionately targeted women and people of color with racist and sexist content, frightening some officials into moving homes and out of their jobs.
“the number of threats to local elected officials who, especially election officials, people who ran the elections in 2020. Violent threats to them increased substantially”
American exceptionalism is false; democratic decline parallels Rome's because humans everywhere succumb to polarization, mob politics, and zero-sum competition regardless of constitutional design.
- The idea of American exceptionalism that the US is uniquely immune to basic human political flaws is false; democratic decline like the Roman Republic's, where failing politicians raised mobs to threaten the Senate in a race to the bottom, can happen in the United States too because we are human as well.
“It definitely can happen here, we're human too... the general story of American exceptionalism is that somehow we're uniquely immune to all of these basic human flaws. And we're not”
- In multiparty European systems where no party gets 50% and coalitions are required, the other parties are sometimes your out-group but sometimes your coalition in-group, which breaks the black-and-white zero-sum us-them thinking that traps American partisans and makes politics less polarizing.
“When you have a party that's in coalition with other parties, sometimes the other parties are them, but sometimes they're us... If you can think of the other party as sometimes being on your side, then it's much less polarizing”
- Contrary to the idea that democracy requires homogeneity, a pluralistic society with many competing interests pushing in different directions is actually stabilizing, because it prevents any single faction from reaching totalitarian extremes as there is always something pushing back.
“we flourish if we have a number of different ideas and a number of different interests all kind of pushing in different directions. Ideally, according to a lot of theory, that keeps us stable as a democracy”