What this covers

Sean Carroll interviews philosopher Tim Maudlin on why quantum mechanics demands we choose among three hard options: the wave function is incomplete, it collapses when measured, or it branches into parallel worlds. Maudlin argues that hidden variables — the pilot wave theory developed by David Bohm in 1952 — is a rigorous, overlooked choice that physicists dismiss without good reason. The conversation moves through the history of the field, the logic of each interpretation, and why foundational questions migrated from physics departments into philosophy. Maudlin is a longtime skeptic of the Everett interpretation, and the episode tracks his case for taking pilot wave theory seriously alongside the recent Nobel Prize for experimental tests of John Bell's theorem.

The substance splits across two main territories. First, the logical terrain: Maudlin shows how accepting both wave function completeness and Schrodinger evolution forces you into the many-worlds view, while rejecting either of those opens doors to other viable theories, including pilot wave theory with its first-order dynamics and guidance equation. He reconstructs how Von Neumann's famous proof against hidden variables rested on a conceptual error (spotted but ignored at the time), and how Bell proved that nonlocality is not a flaw in Bohm's framework but a feature of nature itself — making dismissals of pilot wave theory for being nonlocal logically backwards. Second, the interpretive arena: Maudlin defends spontaneous collapse theories as serious mathematics, challenges the assumption that wave-particle duality is mysterious (arguing it simply means wave and particle), and argues that pilot wave theory with spin may actually make different, testable predictions despite claims of empirical equivalence. He also sketches why time has a genuine direction physics should honor, and why foundational physics became philosophy's refuge when physics departments stopped welcoming these questions.

Sharpest takeaway

Maudlin argues that quantum mechanics forces a real choice — the wave function is either incomplete, collapses, or branches — and that hidden-variable (Bohmian/pilot-wave) approaches are a clear, viable option that physicists wrongly dismiss; he further contends nonlocality is a real feature of the world and that time has an intrinsic direction.

  • Holding both that the wave function is complete and that it always evolves by Schrodinger evolution forces the Many-Worlds outcome; rejecting either opens other serious theories.
  • Bell's theorem shows nonlocality is in the world itself, not just in quantum mechanics, so objecting to Bohmian mechanics for being nonlocal is misguided.
  • Pilot-wave theory with spin may actually make different (testable) predictions about arrival times, contrary to the common claim that it can never differ from standard QM.

The argument · threads10 threads · 37 claims
0.75

Standard quantum mechanics avoids foundational crisis by declaring hard questions illegitimate rather than answering them.

4 pointscentrality 5/5
  • If you hold both that the wave function is a complete description of a system and that it always evolves by linear Schrodinger evolution, then for a setup like Schrodinger's cat the wave function ends up in a superposition that is neither definitely 'cat alive' nor 'cat dead' — which Schrodinger and Einstein regarded as ridiculous; as Bell put it, either the wave function is not everything or it is not correct.

    “if you put those two together and you say, A, the wave function is complete, and B, it always evolves by Schrodinger evolution, then you get into this problem that Schrodinger was pointing out”

  • Physicists who developed quantum mechanics could manipulate the math to get predictions without understanding the underlying physics; a faction led by Bohr and Heisenberg responded to unanswerable foundational questions not by admitting ignorance but by declaring the questions illegitimate, which later degenerated in America into 'shut up and calculate.'

    “early on, the idea of the Copenhagen School was say some incomprehensible stuff and then calculate, and then when it came to America, they cut out the first step.”

  • Young people enter physics caring deeply about understanding the world, but a physics education tends to beat that curiosity out of them, teaching them that 'what is really going on' questions are not worth their time.

    “I think that basic curiosity about the world gets beaten out of them, and I really think it's part of a physics education, unfortunately, to beat it out of you.”

  • If collapse of the wave function must be triggered by 'measurement' or 'observation,' you inherit the unanswerable question of what counts as an observer — can a mouse or amoeba trigger collapse? — which pushes some, like Wigner, toward invoking consciousness and the mind-body problem.

    “What do you mean? An observation, who can do the observing? Can a mouse observe? Can a amoeba observe?... If you go that direction in a certain way, you end up with the Wigner who says, Oh, we have to talk about consciousness, and now you're in the mind body problem”

0.75

Pilot-wave theory with deterministic particle positions and wave guidance resolves wave-particle duality and the measurement problem.

4 pointscentrality 5/5
  • The resolution to wave-particle duality is not a mysterious new 'wavicle' concept but simply 'wave and particle': there genuinely is a wave (the quantum state) that obeys a wave equation and produces interference, and there genuinely is a particle that always has a location and produces the localized spots on a detector screen, with the wave guiding the particle.

    “Why didn't it occur to them the simple answer, wave and particle. There is a wave that is a thing that obeys a wave equation, which is why you get interference... and in addition, there is a particle which always has a location.”

  • If you keep Schrodinger evolution and instead deny that the wave function is complete, the minimal addition — proposed by de Broglie in 1926 — is point particles that move around and constitute cats, tables and chairs; telling you where a cat's particles are tells you whether it is alive or dead, so one cat goes in and one cat comes out, and in the non-relativistic theory a simple guidance equation makes everything come out right.

    “What is this magical thing you're gonna add to your physics?" answer, particles, point particles.”

  • Unlike Newtonian mechanics, which is second-order (F=ma) and requires both position and momentum as initial conditions with forces changing momentum, pilot-wave theory is first-order: the only initial condition needed is particle positions, and the wave function guides the particles — like radio-controlling a boat — rather than pushing them with distance-dependent forces, so a signal's strength dropping with distance doesn't change how it guides.

    “in this theory, it's not like that, it's a first order theory, everything is just done with one-time derivative, so the initial condition only has to be the positions, and then what the wave function does is guide the particles, it doesn't push them around by producing Newtonian forces on them”

  • A productive way to evaluate an unfamiliar physical theory like Bohmian mechanics is to grant that it is 'a theory of something' and simply imagine a world as it describes — particles plus a wave function with specified dynamics — and then ask whether that world looks like ours, rather than forcing the theory into one's preexisting conceptual boxes.

    “just in your mind, imagine a world as this theory describes, wouldn't it be interesting if that world looked very much like the world we live in, which turns out to be true.”

0.65

Bell proved the world is fundamentally nonlocal; no local hidden-variable theory can reproduce observed quantum correlations.

2 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Bell set out to remove the manifest nonlocality from Bohm's theory and instead proved, in a few lines of algebra, that no local theory — built from any principles, not just quantum mechanics — can reproduce the observed correlations; quantum mechanics predicts them and, more importantly, experiments (Clauser, Aspect, Zeilinger) confirm the world actually violates Bell's inequality, so nonlocality is a feature of nature itself.

    “You can't get rid of the nonlocality out of any theory... Bell's proof is not about quantum mechanics, it's just about certain experiments and the correlations that you see in the outcomes. You can't have a theory that is local in a well-defined sense that won't predict that.”

  • Bell's correlations require a genuine causal nonlocality — what Alice does actually makes a difference to what Bob sees, beyond the trivial correlations explainable at the source — yet, as Bell himself proved (the 'No-Bell telephone theorem'), under standard idealizations this connection cannot be used to send a signal faster than light.

    “There has to be a sense in which what Alice does actually makes a difference to what Bob sees or the other way around. That's causal nonlocality.”

0.61

Bohmian mechanics deserves serious evaluation on its own merits, not dismissal for making identical predictions to standard quantum mechanics.

4 pointscentrality 4/5
  • The Nobel press release ironically claimed the Bell-test experiments proved Von Neumann right and that hidden variables are impossible, when in fact Bell — prompted by and a strong advocate of Bohm's hidden-variable theory — proved the opposite about locality, making the committee's characterization delicious irony.

    “They said that what they had done was what proved that Von Neumann was right. And you can't have hidden variables. Which is just the irony there is so delicious.”

  • Von Neumann's widely believed proof that hidden variables were mathematically impossible was not a mathematical mistake but a conceptual one — caught at the time by Grete Hermann but ignored — and Bohm's 1952 theory demonstrated that the supposedly impossible could in fact be done.

    “Von Neumann had made not a mathematical mistake, but a kind of conceptual mistake, which was caught at the time by Grete Hermann.”

  • The objection that Bohmian mechanics deserves no attention because it makes the same predictions as standard quantum mechanics is logically flawed, because if the two theories had been discovered in the opposite order the same reasoning would dismiss standard QM; making identical predictions cannot in itself be a good reason to ignore a theory.

    “if these two theories had been discovered in the opposite orders... You would be going the other way around. So this can't be from a logical point of view, a good objection”

  • David Bohm wrote a respected textbook expounding the Copenhagen view, was praised by Einstein for its clarity but persuaded by Einstein's objections that he didn't understand his own book ('I'm back to square one'), and within a year independently rediscovered de Broglie's hidden-variable theory, publishing it as a two-part paper in 1952.

    “Bohm goes, meets Einstein comes back and he reports when he comes back, "I'm back to square one"... He was convinced by Einstein's objections... And within a year he discovers this other thing, which was the same thing that de Broglie had done”

0.61

Spontaneous collapse theories like GRW make testable predictions and merit consideration despite aesthetic objections to ad hoc structure.

4 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Because spontaneous collapse theories make wave-function evolution differ from pure Schrodinger evolution, they make experimentally distinct predictions; decades of experiments have been progressively ruling the theory out, and although it has not been definitively ruled in or out, no positive signature confirming it has been seen — and ruling it in would falsify rival theories including much of the motivation for Everett.

    “the progress is mostly ruling out the theory. So far, we have not seen a signature that the theory is correct. Okay, we haven't ruled it out, but you could have ruled it in”

  • The Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber (GRW) theory advanced spontaneous collapse beyond hand-waving by putting precise numbers to it — collapses occur randomly at roughly once every 10^15 seconds per particle, implemented by multiplying the wave function by a Gaussian of specified width — turning a vague idea into clean, testable mathematics, which is what impressed John Bell.

    “there are collapses every now and then, how often? Well, once every 10 to 15 seconds per particle, and how does it collapse? Well, there you multiply by a Gaussian of this width and put some math to it. This is what John Bell was so impressed by.”

  • Dismissing spontaneous collapse theories merely because they look ad hoc is 'weak tea' — given how difficult quantum foundational questions are and the extreme commitments other interpretations require, the physical world might simply be more ad hoc than one prefers, so aesthetic distaste is not a strong reason to rule a theory out.

    “when you realize how difficult these questions are and the weird extremes that people have gone to say, "Oh, but I don't like this one, 'cause it's ad hoc," that is such a weak tea. Right? I mean, get over it. The physical world might look a little more ad hoc than you prefer”

  • The Everett (Many-Worlds) interpretation is an honest attempt to keep the wave function both complete and always Schrodinger-evolving, but the price is accepting not just two but infinitely many branching cats; Maudlin regards it as a serious proposal worth confronting even though he is not a fan.

    “There are now, and not just two cats, actually infinitely many cats people don't point this out that there might be only one live cat, but there are gonna be a whole lot of dead cats 'cause the thing could have decayed at all these different times.”

0.53

Foundations of physics requires institutional support and sits at the overlap of physics and metaphysics, currently orphaned between departments.

5 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Foundations of physics is the branch of physics that asks what the most fundamental physical structures and things are — the stuff that doesn't get explained in terms of other stuff — and it overlaps with what philosophers call metaphysics or ontology, the question of what exists at the most generic level.

    “foundations of physics, as the name suggests, is a branch of physics, namely the one that asks, "What are the most fundamental items? How do we understand the most fundamental physical structures and things that there are?"”

  • There are concrete signs that the status of foundations of physics within physics is improving, such as a physics department chair unexpectedly emailing Maudlin for advice on introducing foundations of physics into their program.

    “I actually got an email kind of out of the blue from a chair of a physics department who said, "We're thinking of trying to introduce foundations of physics into our program. Can you give me advice..."”

  • Philosophy has served as a refuge for the foundational questions of physics that physics departments stopped welcoming, much as Aristotle was preserved in the Islamic world before returning to Europe; figures like David Albert, trained in theoretical physics, ended up in philosophy departments because these questions were welcomed there and not in physics.

    “philosophy has been a refuge... David Albert got his degree in theoretical physics at Rockefeller, his background was not in philosophy, but he's in a philosophy department because these questions were welcomed in philosophy departments and not welcomed in physics departments.”

  • Philosophers doing metaphysics fall into three camps: analytic metaphysicians who ask science-indifferent questions (e.g. universals vs tropes), philosophers of physics who learn substantial math and physics to do scientific metaphysics rigorously, and a third group who acknowledge science's relevance but defer to experts rather than mastering the technical material themselves.

    “There's a camp that's sometimes is called analytic metaphysics... Then there's another camp that goes by the name Scientific Metaphysics... that group kind of subdivides into two.”

  • Foundations of physics is an academic orphan that fits poorly in both physics and philosophy departments, so for the field to survive a place must be deliberately made for it — which is the motivation for institutions like the John Bell Institute.

    “this field is an academic orphan. Foundations of physics doesn't fit. It's kind of doesn't fit in physics departments and it doesn't really fit in philosophy departments. And so if it's gonna live, a place has to be made for it.”

0.44

Time has fundamental directionality; causation requires temporal asymmetry and classical behavior emerges from fundamentally non-classical physics.

6 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Founding relativity's core postulate on the impossibility of signaling faster than light is a mistake, because signaling — like 'measurement' and 'observation' — is not the right kind of fundamental concept for a physical theory; once there is real nonlocal causation, the live question is why one cannot exploit it to signal.

    “signaling isn't even the right kind of concept that should be in the foundations of any theory, just as measurement shouldn't and just as observation shouldn't.”

  • Much explanation is causal, and causes typically precede their effects; running a process backward in time reverses all the causal structure so what were causes become effects, which is why an explanation that looks good in one time-direction becomes a mere coincidence or teleology in the reverse — and getting rid of teleology was a great discovery of the scientific revolution.

    “you might have a very good... statistical explanation of something as seen as it were in one direction of time. And if you look at the other direction, you say, "Wait, there's no explanation at all."... All I can say is a massive coincidence, or else to be teleological”

  • A direction of time provides a structural resource that an undirected geometry lacks: on an undirected grid there are infinitely many paths between two points, but adding one-way 'arrows' (directionality) can tightly constrain or finitize the number of allowed paths, which Maudlin argues is important for his 'fully discrete geometry' approach to fundamental physics.

    “suppose I put some arrows on that grid, so they're one-way streets. Now it's not at all clear that this number will always be infinite... The directionality gives me a resource there that a lack of directionality doesn't have.”

  • Time is fundamentally different from space: spatial structure has no intrinsic directionality (space does not go more 'north to south' than the reverse), whereas temporal structure has a fundamental directionality — time genuinely goes from past to future — a minority but defensible view among philosophers and physicists.

    “I think time is fundamentally different from space, temporal structure is fundamentally different from spatial structure and that temporal structure does have a fundamental directionality to it. And spatial structure doesn't.”

  • There will be no master principle that proves the world had to be quantum mechanical; foundations bottom out somewhere, and the right skill is a connoisseur's sense for where to stop digging — too easily satisfied and you miss deeper structure, too pigheaded and you bang your head against a contingent bottom that has nothing underneath it.

    “I don't think you're gonna be stopped by some master principle that says, it could only have been this way. How could you expect that? The world is kind of contingent?”

  • Deriving a quantum theory by starting with a classical theory and 'quantizing' it (turning variables into operators) and treating nature as a classical theory plus quantum corrections gets the conceptual direction backwards: classical behavior emerges from fundamentally non-classical physics, so the right approach is to start from the fundamental physics and explain why the classical approximations work, not the reverse.

    “the world behaves pretty well the way classical theory predicts at a certain scale, but that's because something emerging out of a very non-classical physics, and there's no reason to think that the right way into that physics is to start with the approximation, and then twiddle with it, it's gotta go the other way around”

0.43

Pilot-wave theory generates novel predictions in quantum field theory and spin arrival times that standard mechanics cannot address.

3 pointscentrality 3/5
  • In the pilot-wave theory with spin, work by Siddhant Das suggests there is a spin-dependence of particle arrival times — something standard quantum mechanics has no Hermitian operator to even define — and if real, a quick argument shows Alice could orient a magnet to shift Bob's distribution of arrival times, transmitting Shannon information faster than light; this is testable in the lab but not yet settled.

    “It looks like in the Bohmian theory with spin, there's reasons to believe you could signal faster than light.”

  • Extending pilot-wave theory to quantum field theory is challenging because particle number changes (creation and annihilation); the pilot-wave framework is not tied to particles — one camp replaces particles with fields, while another keeps particles but lets their number change by working in Fock space with indeterministic jumps up and down, out of which the mathematics of standard quantum field theory falls.

    “the pilot wave picture is not tied to particles, it just says there's something that the wave function is guiding, it could be particles, it could be a more field-like thing.”

  • There is no agreed way in standard quantum mechanics to predict arrival-time distributions because no Hermitian operator corresponds to arrival times; the roughly twenty proposed approaches in the literature converge in the far field but disagree in the midfield, whereas pilot-wave theory makes a clean prediction simply by computing how long a particle takes to travel — making it arguably a different theory.

    “if you go into the standard physics literature about arrival times, you'll find 20 different suggestions about how to do it. They tend to agree with each other in the far field... But in the midfield there are places where they will not converge.”

0.38

Extending pilot-wave theory to quantum field theory faces challenges but remains viable through field or Fock-space formulations.

2 pointscentrality 3/5
  • It is unfair to hold Bohmian quantum field theory to a higher standard of mathematical precision than standard quantum field theory, which is itself plagued by run-away singularities and calculations that come out infinite — it is not all 'conceptual lightness and clarity' on the standard side.

    “Standard quantum field theory has been plagued by mathematical problems and run away singularities numbers you try to calculate and they all come out infinity, it's not as if it's all conceptual lightness and clarity in the so-called standard picture”

  • The objection that pilot-wave theory violates a 'generalized Newton's third law' because the wave guides the particles but the particles don't influence the wave is special pleading — even in Newtonian gravity the law of gravity affects particles without the particles changing the law, so it is not a general truth that if A affects B, B must reciprocally affect A.

    “we don't usually think that if A affects B, B has to have a reciprocal back effect on A. Lots of cases where even in physics we wouldn't say that at all. So this seems to me to be a bit special pleading of trying to find something to complain about.”

0.24

Virtual particles and quantization-first approaches misrepresent quantum mechanics as mathematical devices rather than literal physics.

2 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Feynman diagrams are best understood as a mnemonic device for remembering the infinitely many terms in a sum that must be added up, not as literal pictures of a 'booming buzzing confusion' of virtual particles running around — that virtual-particle talk does not make sense on any view, just as the volume of a simple sphere can be computed by an infinite sum of cubes even though the sphere is simple.

    “One way to think about Feynman diagrams... is that they were just a mnemonic device... the diagrams were just easy ways to kind of remember what the different terms looked like”

  • The 1935 Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paper, titled around whether the quantum-mechanical description of reality is complete, argued that there is more to the world than wave functions — prompting Schrodinger's cat paper the same year as a reaction.

    “this was when Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen wrote in 1935, and this is the same year as the cat paper... they were arguing in that paper, "No, there's more to the world than wave functions."”