213 | Timiebi Aganaba on Law and Governance in Space
What this covers
Sean Carroll hosts Timiebi Aganaba, a space lawyer and academic, to discuss how orbital activity should be regulated as the landscape of space actors expands far beyond the Cold War-era two-state system. The conversation ranges across the inadequacy of 1960s–70s space law for today's environment of eighty countries, private companies, and mega-constellations, the legal status of space tourism and private liability, and why space governance must be understood as a sociological challenge shaped by myth and imagination rather than a purely technical or legal one. Aganaba emphasizes that the central problem is not lawlessness—an international system exists, anchored in the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space—but rather whether rules written half a century ago fit current and future uses.
The episode moves through specific tensions in space law and its enforcement. It covers how registration convention obligations contain soft escape clauses that enable noncompliance, how states test legal boundaries through provocative acts and how those tests often go unanswered, and how the Artemis Accords employ ambiguous language around "safety zones" that obscures real territorial claims. Aganaba argues space governance must treat space as a complex adaptive system that can evolve, but warns that adaptiveness without built-in equity becomes a tool for the powerful. The conversation addresses coloniality—the mindset of domination—as a distinct and ongoing risk, the role of moonshot thinking in spurring development in poorer nations, and proposes a benefit-sharing regime modeled on terrestrial precedents like mining royalties to reconcile the tension between space as common heritage and the commercial imperatives that will drive its development.
Aganaba argues that space activity should be governed not just by binding law but by adaptive governance and a deliberately negotiated benefit-sharing regime, treating space as a sociological construct and complex adaptive system rather than merely a technological frontier.
- Existing space law from the 1960s-70s assumed only two state actors and is ill-fit for today's diversified environment of 80 countries, private firms, and mega-constellations
- No regulation in international law leads to over-exploitation, so more law plus equity and benefit-sharing is needed
- Space is a construct shaped by mythology and imagination, making governance a sociological challenge
Space governance institutions exist but were built for a different era and lack rules for new activities.
- Contrary to the common claim that space is like the lawless wild west, there is a whole international system of governance—including the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space where up to 100 states meet annually—though the real question is whether a system built in the 1960s and 70s is fit for today's activities.
“when people say, Space is like the wild, wild west, that's not true. There's a whole system of governance around thinking about this. The question is just, is the existing system that was established in the 60s and 70s fit for the kinds of activities we're seeing today”
- There are no established right-of-way rules for satellites that approach each other in orbit—rules determining who must move—because such rules were never needed when only about 11,000 objects were in space, but increased commercialization will force their creation just as aviation developed rules of the road.
“Like if two satellites are coming close together, who has to move? We don't have things like that because we only had 11,000 satellites in space.”
- Space law pairs strong-sounding obligations with soft escape clauses—the registration convention requires states to register objects 'as soon as practicable'—which means impracticality becomes a license for noncompliance, so that, for example, many spy satellites likely go unregistered.
“the registration convention... says that you have to register as soon as practicable... So you could say probably a lot of spy satellites have not been registered. Because it's not practical.”
- Because satellites have become small and cheap to launch, mega-constellations of thousands of satellites are exploding—SpaceX alone has licenses for 40,000 satellites, more than the roughly 11,000 objects on the entire UN register since the 1950s—making the regulation of low earth orbit congestion and space traffic management the immediate governance priority.
“just SpaceX alone today have licenses for 40,000 satellites. So one company has more licenses to launch satellites than have been on the register of launch space objects in 1950s.”
Developing countries must engage in space now while rules are still forming or face permanent disadvantage.
- Because the space economy is projected to be worth a trillion dollars by 2040 (and resources like the Psyche asteroid potentially $10 trillion), developing countries must engage now while the rules are being developed, or they will be left behind with no recourse and no handouts—making space participation their fight even though no one currently living is harmed by exclusion.
“they've decided that by 2040 space is gonna be worth a trillion dollars... if you are not at the table right now before the rules are being developed you will get left behind and no one's gonna give you nothing.”
- NASA's awarding of one-dollar contracts to companies to collect and transfer lunar soil is designed to establish legal precedent that in-orbit transfer of space resources is not illegal, but this is monopolistic because a company from a developing country could never secure such a contract—lacking the money to build and launch a spacecraft to get there—and so is excluded from shaping the precedent.
“NASA are gonna use that on the international realm to say, This is legal precedent, that it is not... That it can do an in orbit transfer.”
- There is no agreed definition of a 'space-faring nation'—it could mean owning launch capability (very few countries), possessing anti-satellite missile technology (only three or four), or merely using satellite-derived data and applications, which lets countries inflate or deflate their stated space industry size by including or excluding secondary layers like satellite TV and GPS.
“No one can define what is a space... I mean, you can say space-faring nation means I have a rocket and I can launch. Very few countries have that, or space-faring means I can launch anti-satellite missiles”
- Nigeria was China's first international client for satellites, procuring its first satellite from China, after which China rapidly expanded into helping many developing countries build space programs—though that first Nigerian satellite failed in orbit and fueled domestic accusations of a wasteful 'white elephant' project.
“the first satellite was procured from China. Nigeria was actually China's first international client... from there China just went up with respect to the number of developing countries that they helped develop their space programs.”
Commercialization and settlement require property rights that must be reconciled with space benefiting all humanity.
- Commercialization and settlement of space cannot work without property and ownership rights, yet space is supposed to benefit all humanity; the way to reconcile this tension is a negotiated benefit-sharing regime that lets the strong capitalize while requiring them to give back, modeled on terrestrial precedents like mining royalties, corporate social responsibility, and Toronto's Section 37 community-benefit requirements.
“Modern society doesn't work without people being able to say this is mine... So my only answer... is that we should just negotiate a benefit sharing regime. How will we offset this idea, the space is for humanity while allowing people who have the strength and the resources to capitalize”
- Space governance is unique because, unlike every prior governance regime in human history, sustainability can be built in from the very beginning—accounting for human impacts on ecosystems, the people around them, and social justice—making space a potential model for sustainability-first governance if humanity takes it seriously.
“the key issue of governance is sustainability. Because that's the one thing we did not have when we were developing all the other governance regimes in the history of the world.”
- Space should be treated as a complex adaptive system whose governing regime must adapt to new information as actors and activities multiply, but recognizing this also requires building in equity, because adaptiveness—the ability to change the rules whenever you want—is a tool for the powerful and disadvantages the weak.
“we have to look at space... as a complex system that is adaptive... that adaptiveness is kind of a tool for the powerful and the strong... when you're weak, you're like, you don't really wanna hear someone say, Oh, we've set rules for everyone to follow in this game, but we can change it whenever we want.”
States behave inconsistently: denying territorial claims while planting flags and using ambiguous legal gaps.
- States deny claiming territory in space yet plant flags—the very symbol of territorial claim—and the Artemis Accords' 'safety zones' are framed as notification-and-consultation zones rather than keep-out zones, but their ambiguous naming and the choice to let people speculate before clarifying reveals a tension between stated non-appropriation and de facto exclusionary behavior.
“the flag is the symbol of territory and the flag is what they used to say, We are not claiming territory boom flag... they're gonna say something and they're gonna use the very symbol.”
- Actors deliberately test the boundaries of space law through provocative acts—such as the Arch Mission Foundation secretly placing tardigrades on the crashed Beresheet lunar lander, after which NASA said there was no breach of international law—reflecting an innovative break-it-then-find-out spirit where probing the limits often produces no legal consequence.
“that is the thing about the innovative spirit, it's just kind of like break it and then find out what happens later, and nothing happened, there was no implication of that.”
- A peculiar feature of international law is that if you do not object to a claim or assertion, you can become bound by it, so seemingly outlandish provisions—like SpaceX's Starlink terms-of-service clause asserting it would self-regulate Mars—matter because no one knows what will crystallize into binding norms.
“in international law, where if you don't object, you are bound. So people can come up with all kinds of crazy things... The funny thing about law is that you don't know what things are gonna crystallize.”
- When powerful states like the US call for banning anti-satellite tests after spending years developing the technology, the move is self-serving and incomplete—no one proposes an outright ban, only pledges not to be the first to destroy a satellite or not to create debris, preserving the Article 51 right to self-defense because a trillion-dollar space economy will not rely on goodwill alone.
“it's just interesting when countries say things like this when they've already spent years developing that technology and like years doing what they like and now 'cause other countries wanna do it too, they're like, This is bad.”
- After China's 2008 anti-satellite test created a large debris field, the US shortly after destroyed its own satellite—claimed to be tumbling out of control—without creating space debris, which can be read not merely as a debris-conscious act but as a signal that the US can match such capability while avoiding diplomatic fallout.
“the US blew up its satellite that they said, Oh, look, it's tumbling out of control... But look, we blew it up and there was no space debris caused... Others could look at it and be like, They were making a signal on a statement.”
Space is fundamentally a sociological and governance challenge shaped by imagination, not merely a technical one.
- Space law refers to binding instruments with accountability for breaches, whereas space governance encompasses everything else that shapes how and why actors behave—norms, guidelines, and incentives that people follow because it's in their interest even when nothing forces them to.
“law has a defined meaning, like its instruments that are binding, that people agree to, that if you breach them, there's some kind of accountability... But governance is everything else that deals with how people operate and why they do what they do.”
- Unlike most areas of international law, space activities of private companies are directly attributable to the state, so states—not the private companies—are responsible and liable for any damage caused by space activities under the liability convention.
“unlike areas of international law, generally space activities of private companies are directly attributable to the state. So, states are responsible for any activity.”
- Space is not a void but a construct and product of imagination with no single concrete meaning—an aerospace engineer, a data specialist, and an indigenous person each define it differently—so the questions of policy, politics, and logistics are merely scaffolding for deeper questions of who we are and want to become, making space fundamentally a sociological rather than a technological challenge.
“Space is a construct. Space is a product of the imagination... If you say to an aerospace engineer, What is space? They might tell you about rockets... If you talk to an indigenous person, they will tell you space is about the stars... I look at space as really... Not really a technological challenge, but a sociological one.”
- A non-binding UN declaration can grow into a substantial institution, as shown by the 1999 declaration that created World Space Week (which Aganaba ran with ~90 national coordinators) and the same declaration's Space Generation Advisory Council, now an incorporated nonprofit with thousands of members that received $1 million from Blue Origin—suggesting a similar simple declaration could establish a benefit-sharing organization.
“this small thing that wasn't a law, that was just a declaration that we should have this youth organization became an incorporated non-profit organization... and got $1 million from one company. Why not do that for a Space Benefit Organization?”
- Lex lata is what the law currently is, while lex ferenda is what the law should be; people frequently confuse and merge these two, but in practice one can only rely on existing law while merely dreaming about what the law ought to become.
“Lex lata is what the law is. Lex ferenda is what the law should be... there's a lot of confusion about these two principles because people merge the two and at the end of the day, you can only rely on what law is and you can dream about what law should be.”
- Most people have no idea that everyday services depend on satellites—that GPS comes from satellites or that ATM transactions are enabled by them—which means space advocates living in their own echo chamber badly overestimate public awareness of space's relevance.
“no one has even got a clue that GPS is from satellites, and that's one of the number one applications of space, or that if you use the ATM machine, your transactions happen because of satellites. People don't know these things.”
- Labeling a venture a 'space company' confers an outsized competitive advantage by signaling innovation, which during COVID drove a flood of investment into space firms regardless of returns or what they actually did, even though the actual profit margins in space are pretty small.
“if you say you're a space company people think that's innovative... During Covid it was crazy with all the specs right?... no one cares about the returns. What are you actually doing?”
- Space tourists hold the legal status of 'space flight participants,' and the experimental licenses states give tourism companies are built on an informed-consent standard—companies are not liable if a participant dies because the participant must understand and accept the risk—with a set number of years of this protection before the situation is reassessed and insurance markets develop from accumulated data.
“there's this class of people called space flight participants, that is the legal status of these space tourists... the standard was basically informed consent. So it was basically saying to the people like, These companies will not be liable in the event of if you die.”
- The commercial value of satellite data has shifted over the last 10-20 years from selling raw imagery to data analytics, because customers couldn't interpret data like RADAR and only care about actionable information—enabling new business models such as estimating a competitor's revenue by counting cars in parking lots from orbit.
“now you have analytics people are like okay I don't care that it's satellite I care that I have the information... we can tell you how much revenue your competitor is making by watching the car parks.”
Unregulated space activity mirrors other domains where absence of rules leads to over-exploitation and harm.
- Across every area of international law, the absence of regulation leads to over-exploitation, so the capitalist view that actors should be free to do what they want in space does not make sense in the long term—just as the high-seas analogy fails because there are in fact extensive regulations on fish stocks.
“no regulation in every other area of international law pretty much leads to exploitation. Over exploitation, so we like to say, Well, space is like the high seas, anyone can go and fish and the fish doesn't belong to anyone. But there are so many regulations about fish stocks.”
- Although the US justified its Space Force as a response to adversaries' actions, the high-profile act of declaring a Space Force itself compelled other countries to establish their own space forces, illustrating how a defensive declaration can drive escalation.
“by them declaring a space force, and it being the most biggest news is them making... They actually made everyone else have to have a space force.”
- There is no colonialism in space because there are no indigenous people there, but coloniality—the mindset of manifest destiny and domination—still exists and is just as dangerous, because a mindset of domination is harmful even without colonial practices.
“there's no colonialism in space, but coloniality exists... colonialism is the practices whereas coloniality is the mindset... A mindset of manifest destiny and domination even without practices is harmful.”
- Even countries that begin space programs for sustainable development purposes—as India did, framing space for monitoring fisheries and helping fishermen—eventually use it for prestige and power demonstrations, as shown by India progressing to a lunar mission and then an anti-satellite test, indicating space is still seen by most as a form of flexing.
“when India started, it was the model for space for earth, space for sustainable development... And then last year they had an anti-satellite test... So all that to say is that space is still seen by most people as flexing.”
Space value for developing nations lies in inspiration and spillover capacity-building rather than direct profit.
- The clearest value of space spending for developing countries is its marketing and inspirational potential as a 'moonshot'—setting an audacious goal mobilizes the best talent and forces the build-out of foundational capacities like aerospace engineering programs and primary-school astronomy, which spill over into other sectors, rather than spending money on space for its own sake.
“if Nigeria said we wanna go to the moon, I don't particularly care about the moon, but I know the first thing you need, Aerospace Engineering Programs in universities. Primary school students that have even heard of astronomy.”
- The inspirational power of the historical space program depended on the specific context of the cold war and a race for the hearts and minds of the world, drawing on mythology, ego, and mythical concepts that are not real—qualities that worked then but that Aganaba argues do not work today, where the narrative must instead center on what space can do to solve our biggest problems.
“a lot of the inspiration with space comes from mythology, things that... Concepts that are not even real. And so it's that mythical nature of space and ego and all these things that made it successful.”
Prioritizing escape to other planets as catastrophe backup is misguided; focus should be preventing Earth disasters.
- Realistically, near-term human presence in space will not be imagined cities but scientific outposts resembling Antarctica, where no one lives permanently and territories host only research stations—though programs like Artemis aim for permanent presence and the US reportedly envisions on the order of 1,000 people a year living in space.
“if you look at Antarctica where people have that, no one has decided to live in Antarctica permanently... So the question is, is space just gonna be like that, where it's like a bunch of people have scientific outposts.”
- Spreading human life to other planets as a backup safety mechanism is the wrong priority because Earth is very resilient; the energy spent on escape should instead go to ensuring whatever catastrophe you fear doesn't happen on Earth in the first place, even while exploration for its own sake remains valuable.
“I think earth is very resilient and I think that that energy should be placed on making sure whatever it is you're trying to avoid by going out doesn't happen... On earth.”