What this covers

John Quiggin, an Australian economist, joins Sean Carroll to trace a structural shift in the global economy and its consequences for how governments should handle debt, innovation, and reliable information. The conversation turns on a single diagnosis: that the collapse of real interest rates toward zero over recent decades reflects not merely loose monetary policy but a fundamental transition from manufacturing to an information economy. Where factories require sustained capital investment, information-based firms like Google generate value primarily through first-mover position and network effects rather than physical assets. This transformation has hollowed out private demand for capital, allowing even governments to borrow at negative real rates. Quiggin argues this window opens possibilities for public investment that were previously foreclosed.

The discussion ranges across what opportunity cost really means, how markets function as emergent computational systems nobody could plan centrally, and why bounded rationality sets permanent limits on market efficiency. Quiggin defends Pigouvian Pricing over direct regulation for climate change, explaining carbon pricing lets markets reveal which emissions matter most. He contests the idea that property rights emerge naturally without the state, arguing they are legislated constructs. A recurring theme is information as a public good: because it is infinitely shareable, its market price bears no relation to its true value, so governments should fund research, publish openly, and help citizens develop interpretive skills. He also addresses why cryptocurrency lacks the anchoring to real value that even fiat money possesses, and why labour markets persistently fail standard supply-and-demand stories.

Sharpest takeaway

Quiggin argues that the shift from a manufacturing economy to an information economy explains why real interest rates have fallen to near zero, since information-based firms require little capital investment, and that this makes information itself a public good governments should fund and disseminate.

  • Information-economy giants like Google generate value from market position rather than capital, so private investment demand has collapsed
  • Low/negative real interest rates mean governments can take on far more debt to fund socially productive investment
  • Information is a non-rivalrous public good whose value cannot be captured by opportunity-cost pricing

The argument · threads8 threads · 33 claims
0.85

Capital's return has decoupled from social value in the information economy, suggesting capitalism's explanatory framework no longer applies.

6 pointscentrality 5/5
  • The market answers what to produce and who should consume it as an emergent collective computation that no central planner could perform, because the vast majority of people involved in producing something (like a pencil) have no idea who will consume it or where demand comes from -- they only see orders coming in -- making comprehensive central planning calculationally impossible.

    “The vast majority of people engaged in the process of producing a pencil have no idea about it, certainly have no thought of who will ultimately consume the pencil. If they see a demand for more lumber, they have no idea where that demand is coming from.”

  • Tobin's Q -- the ratio of a company's market value to the money invested in its assets -- was historically close to one because anyone could build a competing factory if it were higher, but it is now around twenty, showing that company value no longer bears much relationship to capital invested, which means in a sense we are already beyond capitalism since the return to capital is near zero and disconnected from how the economy works.

    “roughly speaking that number was close to one... Now it's like 20... It's the ratio of the market value of the company to all the money that's been invested in the assets of the company.”

  • Economists conceive of their field as the study of making choices under scarcity rather than being about money; in the classical view money is merely a 'veil' over the real transactions and a way of keeping score, and the goal is to pierce that veil to see the underlying real exchanges.

    “it is necessary to make the transactions work but it's... As they say, it's a veil and the object is to pierce that veil and see the real transactions going underneath.”

  • In the information economy there is no real return to capital anymore: Google's value lies almost entirely in its first-mover position in search rather than its physical computers, with no relationship between what is produced and the value or the capital invested, meaning private returns to investment no longer have a close link to social utility.

    “Private returns to investment no longer really have any close link to social utility.”

  • A central disputed question is how much scope the market should have -- whether you should be able to sell your kidney, for example -- with propertarians implicitly favoring more commodification of everything and a left critique of decommodification arguing some choices (like whether to have a supermarket or corner store) should not be left to the market.

    “Should you be able to sell your kidney? For example, there's a propiteer, which has a segment saying, 'Markets and everything,' which more or less implicitly takes the view, the more things are subject to the market the better. And very clearly against that... is a left critique of decommodification”

  • Neoliberalism, though a misused term, has a core meaning involving the valorizing of market processes and a strong presumption in favor of them even where there were good past reasons for opposing them, especially in financial markets which are the most abstract and complex -- and which turn out to be distrusted for good reasons.

    “a part of that is the notion of valorizing market processes and taking a very strong presumption in favour of them even when there seemed to be good reasons in the past for opposing them.”

0.75

Information goods require fundamentally different incentive mechanisms than physical goods, shifting toward public provision.

4 pointscentrality 5/5
  • There are three ways to incentivize the production of information goods: granting monopoly rights via patents (now looking out of date), paying salaries to put work in the public domain (the university model), or paying directly for solutions to specified problems as prizes -- exemplified by the Trump administration paying for COVID vaccine products rather than granting monopolies.

    “the correct answer, reached by the Trump Administration in fact was prices. That what you say is, 'You give us a product and we'll give you... We'll give you money.'... the third version which goes back to [history] is, 'You answer this problem and we'll give you money.'”

  • In the information economy, one of the most important public services governments can provide is funding the generation of information and spreading it widely and accurately -- treating information as a public good by paying for research, putting public-domain material online, and helping citizens develop the skills to interpret and use it, even when its value cannot easily be captured.

    “what we ideally want, which is gonna be very difficult, is for governments to take responsibility for providing lots of free and reliable information”

  • Because information value is not anchored to physical stuff and information ultimately 'wants to be free', valuations can rise and fall dramatically, making the information economy intrinsically more susceptible to booms and busts -- the bust is always waiting because the underlying good cannot be permanently controlled.

    “because, ultimately, information wants to be free, the bust is always waiting for you.”

  • Information functions like a 'magic pudding' public good: as many people as want can consume a podcast or piece of content without degrading it, making it infinitely useful, so its market price (set by whatever barrier you can erect that monetizes without deterring most users) bears no real relation to its opportunity cost.

    “information is a public good... we have this notion of a magic pudding coming in, as many people as want can listen to the podcast, it doesn't degrade, it's infinitely useful... That doesn't bear any real relation to opportunity cost.”

0.61

Markets are rule-governed institutional orders, not natural emergent phenomena existing outside state authority.

4 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Markets in one form or another have existed for thousands of years; as soon as money appears you have markets in the modern sense, and trade and barter predate even that, so markets are not an invention of modernity but emerged rather than being designed.

    “As soon as you get money, you really have markets in the modern sense and that's thousands and thousands of years ago. And even before that you certainly had trade, barter and so forth.”

  • Markets are not free in the sense of existing without rules; they rely on a whole set of rules and conventions that vary from place to place and determine what you can trade and what you own.

    “They rely on a whole bunch of rules and conventions which vary from place to place which depend on what you can trade. And of course what you own.”

  • The libertarian creation story in which property rights emerge without the state is mistaken: a carbon permit, a car title, and a welfare recipient's right to support were all created by legislation and state authority, so there is no morally privileged 'natural' property right that market correction violates.

    “Where'd your car come from? Well, something more complicated. But back in the day, all those rights were created because Kings and states said you can have this and you can't have that, and in addition, your right to your car is no different from your right to your social security or somebody on welfare's right to government support. They've all been created by the state.”

  • Jacob Hacker's distinction between predistribution (how property rights are set before the market opens, such as union rights obliging employers to bargain) and redistribution (taxing market outcomes afterward to transfer to others) clarifies that policies like union rights operate before the market while taxes and regulations operate after it.

    “a great distinction that Jacob Hacker makes between pre-distribution, how we set the property rights in the first place, and redistribution, which is doing this afterwards.”

0.61

Bounded rationality sets permanent limits on how well markets can perform, making surprise and error unavoidable.

4 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Bounded rationality is not merely about people making silly mistakes; the deeper point is that everyone, including the smartest person in the world, cannot understand all the things relevant to their choices, so we are always being surprised by things we were unaware of, which sets a permanent limit on how well markets can perform.

    “everybody is bounded rational. The smartest person in the world can't understand of the things that are relevant, their choices. And so we're always being surprised by things we're unaware of in the past.”

  • The internet has turned bounded rationality from a theoretical limit into a lived reality: where a child could once read every book in the library and exhaust available information, the internet presents infinite information you cannot possibly process, so the skill of choosing which fields to attend to has become essential and we have yet to learn it well.

    “the internet has made that a reality in a way that just wasn't true in the past. When I was a kid I read every book in the library... So that boundedness has become an absolute reality for everybody in a way that just wasn't true in the past.”

  • The development of game theory has undermined the certainties of economics because its 'dirty secret' -- the folk theorem -- is that when a game is played repeatedly, essentially any outcome can be an equilibrium unless it is so bad a player can simply walk away, making what people expect to happen outside the equilibrium the crucial determinant of which equilibrium occurs.

    “the dirty secret of game theory is anything can happen... In economics, in game theory that's called the folk theorem... if we play a game many times, essentially, anything can happen unless it's so bad for a player that they can walk away from the game”

  • Following Keynes's observation that ideas influence practical men more than they think, the popular view of what economists believe lags decades behind the profession, which has moved away from the Chicago counter-revolution that fueled 1980s neoliberalism toward game theory, bounded rationality, and much less certainty over the last 25 years.

    “the sort of pop view of what economists think is still well behind the way the profession has gone, which is not so much, partly back to the left... but also much less certainty, much less acceptance of, well, this is the story”

0.61

Zero real interest rates reflect information economy's capital-light structure, removing historical constraints on government borrowing.

4 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Long-run real interest rates have fallen to zero or negative because the growing information economy needs almost no capital investment to expand (you fence off a bit of information or attach advertising rather than building factories), while the old manufacturing sector has shrunk and grown more efficient, collapsing the demand for capital and allowing even governments to borrow at negative real rates.

    “the big story is long-run rates of interest have fallen to zero in real terms. So Google can borrow money indefinitely in the future at 2%, which is what we expect inflation to be.”

  • Because real interest rates are zero or negative across 10-30 year horizons, governments no longer need to fear debt as they once did: if they get anywhere near balancing current expenditure and income, the debt stays the same while the economy grows and transforms, undermining the panic projections that government debt will be ruinous, even after pandemic borrowing.

    “because the real rate of interest is low or negative, if governments get anywhere near balancing their current expenditure income, the debt stays the same, then not the... Because the interest is zero, the economy grows and transforms.”

  • The interest rate in the actual capital market is the opportunity cost of time: it is the rate at which someone who has a dollar now and wants to consume in a year can find another party who will turn that dollar into more and return it, with investment being the supply side that has historically been scarce relative to high-returning opportunities.

    “The interest rate is the opportunity cost of time... I've got a dollar now, I'd like to consume something in a year's time, how much can I find somebody who can take my $1, turn it into a $1.05 say, and give me back that $1.05.”

  • The opportunity cost of something is the best available alternative you have to give up to get it; this applies to all choices for both individuals and society, and understanding it properly clarifies most policy issues because you cannot have everything and are always making choices.

    “the opportunity cost of something is what you have to give up to get it, and that applies both for individuals and society.”

0.56

Markets fail to clear and equilibrate as theory predicts; two incompatible frameworks have never been reconciled.

3 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Labour markets fail because workers are not fungible: you typically have only one job that you are tied to, cannot know in advance what it will be like, and the simple story that excess supply of a worker type lowers wages does not hold, as evidenced by the chaotic post-pandemic adjustment where some get raises while many fall behind inflation.

    “labour markets don't work in the way that they're supposed to, for the kinds of reasons that you said with the house, you only have one job, and you have one job you're tied to the job. You can't tell in advance what it's going to be like”

  • Since World War II economics has had two incompatible theories -- an abstract general-equilibrium account of how markets clear, and Keynesian macroeconomics in which they may fail to clear and fall in a heap -- and repeated attempts to integrate them, including New Keynesian economics, have consistently failed, with the global financial crisis blowing up the apparent reconciliation.

    “we have one theory of how markets worked in this abstract price equilibrium way. And another theory Keynesian macro economics, which said except that they might fall in a heap and fail to clear, and the attempts to integrate those two have consistently failed.”

  • The worst economic crashes historically occur when financial markets are first allowed to overheat and then collapse, as in the Great Depression and the global financial crisis, whereas the milder intervening recessions typically happened when the central bank slightly overdid a correction while trying to prevent overheating.

    “the really bad ones happen when financial markets are let run and then collapse in a heap.”

0.47

Externalities like carbon emissions are classic market failures requiring either pricing or cap-and-auction regulation.

4 pointscentrality 3/5
  • For climate change specifically, economists are uniformly in favor of market-based carbon pricing over outright bans, because emissions arise from nearly every activity at varying intensities, so a price lets the market reveal which carbon uses are most valuable and should be given up last, whereas direct regulation would require infeasibly comprehensive central planning.

    “if it's dumping Cyanide in the river, you just say, no, no Cyanide, don't dump it in the river. But if you're saying every moment that you're doing something... the market solution is the best one.”

  • Beyond self-interest and short-term thinking, climate change involves a third problem: it is genuinely hard to know the right action, because tradeoffs like locally-grown greenhouse tomatoes heated by gas versus tomatoes flown in from sunny Spain are too complex for any central planner, which is precisely why a carbon price embedded in product prices outperforms direct regulation.

    “should you go to the greenhouse and buy the locally grown tomatoes as the food miles people would say, or should you have them flown in from Spain where they just grow... Out in the sun?”

  • In the naturally emergent order of markets you can dump carbon dioxide, sewage, or smoke into shared resources without paying, imposing costs on others; this externality is the classic, well-understood market failure that economists broadly agree should be solved either by pricing emissions or by capping and auctioning permits.

    “in the naturally emergent order of markets, you can dump stuff lots of places, carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, sewage into rivers, smoke, and so forth. And you don't pay for it, other people bear the costs.”

  • A famous economist's argument about the dead-weight loss of Christmas holds that cash gifts are more efficient than physical presents, but does not go the whole hog of having families simply net out who gains and who pays, illustrating that gift-giving involves social and non-rational elements the pure model omits.

    “There's a famous economist who talks about The Dead-weight Loss of Christmas and... it says, you know, well, cash will be better and doesn't go the whole hog”

0.43

Cryptocurrency exemplifies market irrationality by valuing something with no underlying utility except speculative belief.

3 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Unlike gold (which retains industrial and ornamental value) and fiat money (which has value because a government with guns demands taxes payable in it), cryptocurrency has no underlying value -- it merely records that someone performed a complicated calculation of no interest to anyone -- so its value rests entirely on belief and will collapse if belief evaporates.

    “We pay for money, it's very straightforward. There's a government with guns. They say, 'You will pay us taxes'... both so-called fiat money, and gold, have a real underlying value. If you look at crypto, what you see is the answer is somebody performed a very complicated calculation. You can't... You don't even get the answer to that calculation. You can't sell it.”

  • Cryptocurrency is the ultimate refutation of any notion of market efficiency: it rests on the pious hope that a 30-year-old database technology with no actual applications will become valuable simply because vast sums are attached to it, and now that major institutions like Citibank have embraced it rather than dismissing it, this shows financial markets are not rationally efficient.

    “the exertion on crypto is... Has to be the ultimate reputation of any notion of market efficiency that at this point... There's a pious hope that somehow, a database technology that's been around for 30 years and has no use.”

  • Contrary to the standard story that money was invented to make markets work better, the anthropologist David Graeber argued money was originally about debt -- paying taxes to a king or chief -- and only later came to be used in ordinary transactions.

    “there's a standard creation story where we invented money to make markets work better. He argues money was all about debt, about paying your taxes to the king or chief or whatever it was, and then came to be used in transactions as well.”