126 | David Stasavage on the Origin and History of Democracy
What this covers
David Stasavage traces democracy's origins not to ancient Greece but across dozens of early societies—the Huron, pre-colonial Congo, Mesopotamia, ancient India—where roughly half of sampled societies developed independent systems of collective governance. Rather than a radical innovation, early democracy emerges as a pragmatic default when rulers lacked the machinery to govern alone. Autocracy, by contrast, required bureaucratic infrastructure: standing armies, writing systems, census-taking, and tax-collection capacity that let rulers command without consent. The conversation examines how these structural conditions shaped political trajectories across continents and centuries, with particular attention to sequencing—whether a society develops democratic consultation before or after building state apparatus fundamentally alters its political destiny.
The discussion covers a wide range of historical cases and political mechanisms. Stasavage argues that Europe's democratic resurgence was not a sign of advancement but of backwardness: weak medieval states and the absence of prior bureaucratic order forced rulers into representative tax-bargaining with autonomous towns and assemblies. He contrasts this with China, where fertile agriculture and an existing bureaucracy reinforced autocratic consolidation. The Needham Question—why Europe, despite lagging economically, became the first modern industrial and scientific power—finds a partial answer in decentralized governance's capacity for independent thought and experimentation. Other focal points include the role of exit options in early democratic societies, the distinction between mandates and full powers) in representative systems, and how technologies distribute access differently: alphabetic writing enabled mass literacy, while cuneiform remained an elite monopoly. The discussion also addresses modern democratic decline—US institutional changes that reduced direct accountability, and contemporary citizen disengagement—without divorcing present challenges from their deep historical roots.
Stasavage argues that democracy was not invented once in Greece but emerged independently across many early societies as a default mode of governance when rulers lacked the bureaucratic capacity to rule unilaterally; conversely, autocracy flourished where strong states, fertile/legible agriculture, and tax-collection technology existed, which is why democracy re-flourished in Europe precisely because Europe was technologically and administratively backward.
- Early democracy appeared independently in many societies (Huron, pre-colonial Congo, Mesopotamia, ancient India) — about half of sampled societies — long before Athens.
- Autocracy depended on bureaucracy, writing, and surveillance/taxation capacity, which let rulers govern without the people's consent.
- Europe's weak states and the absence of a prior bureaucratic order, combined with commercial wealth in autonomous towns, forced rulers into consensual, representative bargaining over taxes.
Early democracy emerged where rulers needed people's participation because they lacked bureaucratic capacity to govern unilaterally.
- Early democracy is distinct from modern democracy in that rulers were often not elected — they might be chosen consensually or inherit their position — but were constrained to rule jointly with the people through councils and assemblies because they lacked any other means of governing.
“There are a great number of human societies where rulers were not elected. They may have been chosen through some consensual procedure, they may have even inherited their position, but they were constrained to rule together with the people in councils and assemblies because they really didn't have any other means of governing. And so that's what I would call the early democracies.”
- Early democracy existed precisely because there was no state bureaucracy: rulers needed the people to help them rule, whereas autocracy in early ages ruled not through the people but through chosen, remunerated subordinates — a standing army and tax-assessing bureaucrats — which is what gave would-be autocrats their advantage.
“Early democracy existed in lieu of a state bureaucracy. You needed the people to help you rule, whereas autocracy in these early of ages, was really not with the people but through your own subordinates who you had chosen and remunerated.”
- The Greeks gave us the word 'demokratia' (the people have power) and theorized democracy, but they did not invent the practice, because many human societies independently developed systems where the people held power through councils and assemblies over the millennia.
“what the Greeks did is they gave us the word, the best word to describe democracy, "demokratia," which simply means that the people have power. But they didn't invent the practice, because there were a lot of human societies independently over the millennia that had systems of governance where the people had power, via councils, via assemblies.”
- Early democracy was sustained in face-to-face settings where an autonomous community or city was governed by a council; but when someone sought to conquer multiple cities and build a kingdom or empire, the increase in scale of governance veered societies away from democracy and toward autocracy.
“when these societies, when the form of governance increased in scale, that tended to veer things towards autocracy and away from democracy.”
- Based on the standard cross-cultural sample assembled by anthropologists led by George Peter Murdock, early democracy was present in roughly half of the 186 societies considered, indicating it was a common rather than rare form of governance.
“we could refer to some of the data collected by anthropologists, led by George Peter Murdock, back in the '60s and the '70s, where they put together a data set, known as a standard cross-cultural sample. And there you could get an indication that early democracy was present maybe in about half of the 186 societies they consider. So, one out of two maybe based on that.”
- A core feature of many early democracies, like the Huron, was the 'take your marbles and go home' principle: any individual, village, or tribe unhappy with a decision could simply opt out and leave, which forced governance toward consensus because nothing could be done without broad agreement.
“anyone who wasn't happy with a decision can always just take off. If an individual tribe did not wanna participate in something that Confederation was doing, they could say, "We're just not gonna do it."... And so that system meant you really had to have a consensus of some sort to be able to do anything.”
- The papacy, like European monarchs, lacked a real bureaucracy and had to manage a decentralized system of abbeys, monasteries and orders; to raise money (e.g., for crusades) it had to gain consent, so from the early 13th century the church became an incubator of democratic ideas, exemplified by the principle that 'that which touches all should be discussed and approved by all.'
“from a very early date in the early 13th century, the papacy and the church becomes actually something of an incubator for a lot of these democratic ideas. This Latin phrase... that says, basically that which touches all should be discussed and approved by all, comes by a tacit agreement between the papacy and various other church bodies”
Bureaucratic capacity and sequencing determine whether societies develop as democracies or autocracies, not wealth or cultural inevitability.
- Contrary to the late-1980s expectation that China would become democratic as it grew richer, China has in fact presented a continuous and, by its own criteria, very successful alternative political model to Western democracy, with a deeply ingrained bureaucratic tradition stretching back over two millennia.
“what we've seen, actually, if you look at the history, is that China has presented this continuous alternative political model to our own. And it's a very successful... Depending how you judge success, it's a very successful one.”
- Europe and China experienced commercial revolutions around the same era, but with opposite political consequences: in China a pre-existing state bureaucracy simply taxed the new commercial wealth and was reinforced, whereas in Europe rulers had no bureaucracy to forcibly collect from rich autonomous towns, forcing them into consensual, representative tax-bargaining through assemblies.
“In China, we have a lot of commercial development, cities grow in size, but you already have a state bureaucracy... In Europe, you get the growth of towns and cities, but these are all autonomous because rulers have no bureaucracy... so you're forced to go into this more consensual way of governing where you have an assembly and you have a representative from the town be part of the assembly, and then you have a bargaining interaction about how much can be paid in terms of taxes.”
- It is not that bureaucracy is bad — bureaucracies do many good things — but the sequencing matters: if a society develops an early democratic tradition first and then builds a state bureaucracy controlled by representatives of the people and the ruler, it reaches a more virtuous outcome than if it starts with bureaucratic autocratic rule as the first step.
“what I emphasise is this sequencing question, if you have an early democratic tradition... then eventually you can develop a state bureaucracy. And it's a state bureaucracy that is controlled by representatives of the people and the ruler himself or herself as well, and so you get to a more virtuous outcome than if you start with bureaucratic rule as being the first step.”
- Europe's democratic inheritance is due in significant part to the fact that Europe was technologically and administratively behind — strong state bureaucracies in Europe are a 19th and 20th century phenomenon, whereas they existed much earlier elsewhere — so weak states had to govern more consensually rather than through bureaucratic control.
“our democratic inheritance from Europe is due in large part, or at least in significant part, to the fact that Europe was behind technologically in a lot of different ways, in terms of building states, and that people tend to not realise that strong state bureaucracies in Europe are 19th and 20th century phenomenon. Whereas in other parts of the globe, they existed at a much earlier date.”
- There is no inevitability that China will become democratic; the late-1980s expectations that China either could not keep developing without democratizing or would democratize as it grew richer have not come to pass — China is very rich in 2020 and still very much an autocracy, which would have surprised those earlier theorists.
“what we've seen, actually, if you look at the history, is that China has presented this continuous alternative political model to our own. And it's a very successful... Depending how you judge success, it's a very successful one.”
- Modern PRC governance shows strong continuity with imperial-era practices; for example, the system of household registration used to track and control the population was deeply ingrained from a very early imperial date, which is likely why the PRC could so easily establish its own household registration system.
“one of the big things that the government does to try to control matters is to have household registration and to know where people are... it seems unlikely that the PRC would have had such an easy time setting up a system of household registration if this had not been the practice from... That it was very, very deeply ingrained already.”
Technology's effect on democracy depends on whether access is broad or confined to state elites, and whether democratic traditions can constrain it.
- The surveillance capacity of a modern state is extraordinary and would have been coveted by ancient autocrats, because the ability to surveil and know what is happening in a country enables effective tax collection, which makes a government stronger — historical data show high tax collection went hand in hand with autocracy.
“the surveillance capacity of a modern state is absolutely extraordinary and would have made any ancient autocrat who had surveillance technology for knowing what people could grow or how much they should be taxed, would have loved modern state surveillance”
- Developments like surveillance technology are not necessarily bad for democracy in societies with a long democratic tradition, because rulers and people (via representatives) can debate and place limits on the technology's use; but for autocratic societies the same technology unambiguously strengthens the central state.
“if you have a country like the US, if we continue to keep ourselves a democracy, where if there's some development in surveillance technology... it's possible for ruler and people, people indirectly via their representatives, to discuss what sort of limit should be placed on the use of that technology. But for autocratic societies, you would think, yes, this unambiguously strengthens the power of the central state.”
- Technologies are not uniformly good or bad for democracy; what matters is whether a technology gives broad access to ordinary people or reinforces the power of the state bureaucracy — for example, complex pre-alphabetic writing (cuneiform, Linear B) was confined to a state elite, whereas alphabetic writing provided broad access to anyone who could learn it.
“you can think then about different types of technologies and how the technology... what types of technologies gave access to the state bureaucracy, and which types of technologies gave access to ordinary people... Pre-alphabetic forms of writing... are much more complicated to learn... But if you get the alphabetic forms of writing, then that's a technology that provides much broader access to anyone who can learn it.”
- The term autocracy is something of a misnomer because autocrats do not truly govern on their own; in anything larger than the smallest-scale society, a ruler needs subordinates — a standing army and bureaucrats to assess and collect taxes — to govern, making it an autocratic/bureaucratic order rather than rule by one person.
“autocracy itself is a misnomer because, of course, autocrats don't truly govern on their own. In almost anything, apart from the smallest scale society, an autocrat would need subordinates to govern through. And so it's an autocratic/bureaucratic order, I would say.”
Scale of governance determines political form; face-to-face communities sustained democracy while empire-building required shift toward autocracy.
- China's fertile loess soil near the Yellow River allowed easy farming, high yields, and concentrated, settled populations, producing a regular, predictable, and 'legible' society that a bureaucracy could easily organize — tilting the scales toward autocracy — in contrast to Europe's spread-out, mobile, uncertain extensive agriculture that made rulers harder to rule over.
“the Chinese pattern, where the first few dynasties arose on this plane near the Yellow River... where there's a certain type of soil that was very easily farmed even with easy, with primitive tools, and it allowed for higher yields and a concentration of people and also a certain regularity that you can imagine a bureaucracy would have found it easier to organise... that type of system... did lend itself, a little bit tilted the scales in favour of autocracy.”
- The shift to autocracy in the early Islamic world was due to the nature of the Arab conquest, not to Islam as a religion: by conquering the Sassanid Empire with its fertile irrigated agriculture and sophisticated tax bureaucracy, the Arab conquerors inherited a ready-made autocratic-bureaucratic state, which let them quickly abandon the early consensual principle of shura in favor of inheritance and autocracy.
“It was due to the nature of the Islamic conquest that we got a shift to autocracy, but it had nothing to do with Islam as a religion itself... inheriting a state, inheriting a bureaucratic state allowed the Islamic conquerors to shift over to a more autocratic form of rule. And so while these traditions say that the first few caliphs were chosen through shura... after a brief amount of period of time, all that goes out the window”
- In colonial America, tremendous land abundance after conquest and population collapse meant colonizers had to attract British settlers by offering them the vote and the option to leave for the woods if ruled autocratically (producing liberty), while the same land abundance and resulting labor scarcity led Africans to be forcibly brought over without exit options or the vote (producing slavery) — the same structural feature generated opposite outcomes.
“this was a story with what was happening for free white males. Whereas for Africans who were brought over, the story was the absolute flip side in terms of they were being brought over forcibly to try to solve a problem of land abundance and labour scarcity, but they didn't have the same exit options... It's the same feature of land abundance that leads to liberty for some and to slavery for others.”
Modern democracy suffers from citizen disconnection and distrust that undermines healthy democratic function and requires renewed engagement.
- A weak point of modern democracy is citizen disconnection, disengagement, and distrust; in the US trust in the federal government to do the right thing most of the time fell from about three-quarters in the 1960s to about 20% today (across both Obama and Trump administrations), and rebuilding political engagement is critical because if the people don't try to influence things, a democracy becomes unhealthy.
“you went from a situation where in the 1960s, about three-quarters of people said that they trusted the government in Washington to do the right thing most of the time, and now only about 20% say that... if the people aren't bothered by trying to have any influence on things, then your democracy is gonna be pretty unhealthy.”
- While colonial assemblies, especially in New England, revived earlier democratic features like binding mandates, impeachable representatives, and frequent (often annual) elections, the US Constitution swept these away — eliminating mandates and making elections less frequent — producing a more distant form of democracy, motivated by founders who feared cantankerous direct democracy and, being richer, worried about expropriation.
“what happens with the Constitution is the Constitution sort of sweeps a lot of those things out, so there is no possibility of mandates... And elections become less frequent, and so there was a shift away towards a somewhat more distant view where citizens only were able to express their views every few years instead of every year.”
Representative systems vary in how directly they bind officials to constituents, affecting both decisiveness and democratic responsiveness.
- The Dutch Republic — often called the first modern economy and the richest society on Earth in the 17th century — retained a pre-modern form of representation in which binding mandates persisted until the late 18th century, so individual cities could effectively 'take their marbles and go home' and refuse to fund, for example, naval engagements against England.
“The Dutch Republic is often called the first modern economy, so it really was the richest society on earth in the 17th century, yet they had this very pre-modern form of representation where mandates continued as a means of binding representatives right up until the 18th century... sometimes they just couldn't get the money because an individual city would say, "Well, sorry, I'm not paying this time."”
- The Chinese imperial examination system functioned as an alternative to representative assemblies: rather than having localities choose representatives, the state chose officials based on exam performance, ideally making them less beholden to localized interests — a meritocratic mechanism for staffing the bureaucracy without popular consent.
“the examination system does is it's almost like an alternative way of organising things rather than having a representative assembly. Rather than having the people in localities choose representatives... you choose who you're gonna have, and you choose that based on performance in an exam, which ideally would make you less beholden to localised interests”
- England's key innovation was not having a parliament — assemblies existed across medieval Europe — but that from the mid-14th century representatives came with 'full powers' and could no longer be bound by mandates from their constituencies, making the British parliament far more decisive than the clumsy mandate-based systems elsewhere, though arguably also slightly less democratic.
“What was different about England was a new type of... It was the mother of a new type of parliament... in England, from the middle of the 14th century onwards, representatives could no longer be bound by mandates given by their constituencies... that made suddenly the British parliament a much more decisive type of organisation. In a way, perhaps also a little bit less democratic.”
Decentralized democratic governance enables independent thinking and free inquiry, likely explaining Europe's scientific and industrial advancement.
- Because democracy — early or modern — is a more disorganized and decentralized affair than autocracy, it gives people the margin to experiment and think independently; this democratic spirit goes hand in hand with the spirit of free inquiry, which may help explain why Europe, despite being technologically behind, became the first modern scientific and industrial society (the Needham Question).
“by the very nature of democracy, early or modern, being a somewhat more disorganised and decentralised affair than autocracy, it gave people the margin to experiment and to think about what they would like to do on their own.”
- Europe's fragmentation and interstate competition drove remarkable progress in firearms technology; measured by how many rounds a musketeer could fire, the annual rate of technological progress in European firearms resembled fast-growing industrial societies rather than a typical pre-industrial society, helping explain how Europe came to dominate the world despite not being economically ahead.
“Phil Hoffman's "Why Did Europeans Conquer the World" is excellent at showing that Europeans may not have been ahead of other societies in terms of most economic technologies, but it was interstate competition that drove this remarkable progress in terms of firearms technology... you get an astounding rate of technological progress, and more like what we're used to seeing in industrial societies”
Democracy's rhetorical victory is now universal, yet contemporary democracies have progressed substantially despite ongoing challenges and risks.
- Athens innovated not just in giving us the word 'demokratia' but in the principles of equal laws for all and the breadth of participation, though that participation was limited to males and excluded women and a significant slave population.
“it was innovative in terms of the breadth of participation. In a lot of early democracies, there would have been wide-scale participation, but there wasn't the same principle we have today of every adult should be able to... we mean for, first of all, for males, because Athenian women were notoriously excluded from any political role really. And, of course, there was a significant slave population in Athens as well.”
- Despite contemporary worries about populism, democracy has made extraordinary progress: around 1900 roughly 10% of the Earth's population lived in a country reasonably called a democracy, whereas today that figure is around 60% — and even if the US shifted to authoritarianism that would be only about 4% of the world's population, so the bigger picture is that democracy has been doing well.
“Circa 1900, about 10% of the Earth's population was in a country that could reasonably called a democracy. Today, depending upon which measure by political scientists you adopt, that number is something more like 60%. That's an extraordinary change and an extraordinary progress for democracy in 120 years.”
- Since 1945, almost everyone claims to be a democracy — even North Korea and China (with Mao's 'people's democracy' and the Chinese term 'minzhu' for a very different sort of democracy) — meaning no one in the modern world openly praises the virtues of autocracy; the rhetorical victory of democracy as a value is near-universal.
“since 1945, most everyone has said that they're a democracy. North Korea, democratic supposedly. Mao emphasised the idea of a people's democracy... No one is running around praising the virtues of autocracy. In the modern world, you've gotta claim that you're truly democratic.”