What this covers

Teresa Bejan, a political theorist at Oxford, traces the tangled history of free speech doctrine to show how modern debates conflate two distinct ancient ideas. She argues that ancient Greek had separate concepts—parrhesia, the license to speak frankly, and isegoria, the equal right to public hearing—that modern English translation has collapsed into a single "free speech." This confusion, she contends, obscures what is actually at stake in contemporary disputes. Beyond recovering this vocabulary, Bejan reframes what tolerance and civility should mean in a functioning pluralist society, turning away from the idea that either can serve as a tool to exclude the intolerable and toward the harder work of sustaining disagreement without demanding mutual respect.

The conversation moves across philosophy, history, and current practice. Bejan distinguishes parrhesia not as a right but as a privilege historically granted by the powerful to the weak, then examines how different traditions—European thinkers like Spinoza, Kant, and Mill emphasizing reasoned speech, versus American evangelicals seeking freedom to proselytize—built free speech on different foundations. On mere civility, she defines it not as politeness or respect but as the willingness to keep engaging those we do not respect, a commitment that can itself become contemptuous if weaponized to silence. She critiques the use of civility talk as a cudgel to expel speakers from respectable debate, and argues that censorship authorities gain dangerous power regardless of intent. The discussion includes Roger Williams and Rhode Island's unusual tolerance, the distinction between whom one voluntarily associates with and who holds political rights, and why some speech harms may be permanent features of plural life rather than problems to transcend.

Sharpest takeaway

Bejan argues that free speech debates conflate two distinct ancient ideas—parrhesia (the license to speak frankly) and isegoria (the equal right of citizens to a public hearing)—and that a genuinely tolerant society must prioritize parrhesia and 'mere civility' (the willingness to keep engaging with those we do not respect) rather than weaponize civility or tolerance to silence the intolerable.

  • The Greek distinction between parrhesia and isegoria is erased in modern English translation, obscuring that two different principles are at stake in free speech disputes.
  • Mere civility is a commitment to share a life with opponents despite disagreement, not politeness or respect.
  • Granting authorities the power to censor hateful speech empowers the very establishments people distrust, and historically does not help the marginalized.

The argument · threads9 threads · 37 claims
0.67

Voluntary association and political voice are distinct; one can exclude speakers while defending their political rights.

4 pointscentrality 5/5
  • There are two distinct lines: whom one chooses to voluntarily engage with (e.g., who to invite to a podcast or a reading group) and who has political rights as a member of society; one can decline to associate with crackpots while still defending their right to vote and be heard in the polity, and recognizing these are two different lines is more than half the battle.

    “I'm not sort of committed to inviting my crackpot conspiracy theorist cousin to my Plato reading group... But I am committed to not saying that he should be sort of stripped of his rights or sent to Canada.”

  • Universities (private ones) legally may exclude speakers, but should tend toward not deplatforming—not because the invited speaker's free speech rights are infringed but because the free speech rights of the students who invited him are infringed, namely their right to hear his argument; universities should aspire to be sites of isegoria where students are trained in listening and responding to views they don't hold.

    “It's not because I'm worried about Charles Murray's free speech rights being infringed. I'm worried about the infringement of the free speech rights of the students who invite him.”

  • There is a clear distinction between a university inviting someone for a sponsored event like a commencement address or honorary degree (which the community may legitimately protest) and a student sub-group inviting a controversial speaker (which should be permitted even if one disagrees); the more worrying campus trend is administrators being pressured to rescind official invitations rather than the headline-grabbing student-invitation controversies.

    “there's a clear distinction between inviting someone to give a commencement address and allowing the college Republicans to invite whomever they'd like”

  • There can be no equal enforceable right to be heard at the level of society as such; such a right to a hearing can only work in well-defined, small-scale deliberative fora (an assembly, a faculty meeting, the Senate floor), and attempting to realize it at societal scale carries unacceptable costs to freedom of speech.

    “I don't think that you can have an equal enforceable right to be heard. I think that's a non-starter on the level of society as such.”

0.64

Free speech rests on respect for individual conscience, not on Mill's truth-discovery rationale.

3 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Beyond Mill's case that hearing contrary views strengthens one's own argument, there is an evangelical impulse missing in Millian accounts: there is little point discoursing only with those who already agree, and on topics where one holds strong views one should want to persuade others rather than enjoy back-slapping agreement—the point of talk is to bring others around.

    “surely I should want to persuade others that I'm right and they're wrong, rather than just having all of those wonderful back-slapping conversations with those people who already agree with me”

  • Speech is not fundamentally about exchanging reasons as Kant supposed; it is about affect, enthusiasm, and much more, so the Christian privileging of the Word—seeing it as powerful and existing apart from those who speak or receive it—better captures what speech is than rationalist accounts.

    “I don't actually believe that speech is fundamentally about exchanging reasons. I think speech is about a whole lot more than that. It's about affect, it's about enthusiasm, and it's about everything else.”

  • The best justification for free speech is not the Millian case that it produces truth, but an older justification emphasizing the sanctity of individual conscience: all humans have minds and must make them up for themselves, so a system of free speech respects the fact that people equally have minds.

    “I didn't find the kind of Millian case, John Stuart Millian case for free speech persuasive, the idea that free speech is justified as a means to truth production. And so I've been much more drawn to historical justifications of free speech that emphasize the sanctity of individual conscience.”

0.57

Toleration is messy and permanent rather than a problem to be solved; rival establishments need shared principles beyond power conflict.

10 pointscentrality 3/5
  • The contemporary moment features rival establishments—an intellectual, academic and media establishment ranged against the political establishment—so that partisans on every side can perceive themselves as an oppressed minority, and it is undesirable for these rival establishments to simply duke it out as a power conflict rather than be bound by shared principles like free speech.

    “We might think of the intellectual academia and media establishment as being ranged against the political establishment, to take the American case, and I think that that maps well onto the British case as well.”

  • Human brains tend to focus better on the source of threat than on a positive ideal, so people are typically clearest about which individuals or groups they think should NOT have a voice rather than which should.

    “I think our brains tend to focus better on the source of threat.”

  • The human mind is not built to apply values universally or reason in a principled way all the time, which is precisely why we cultivate institutions and liberal individual rights that relieve that pressure and do the judging for us.

    “I just don't think the human mind is really programmed to be able to apply our values universally... we try to cultivate and build institutions that could kind of relieve some of that pressure.”

  • Rather than judging whether all indignations are equally righteous, we should grant that everyone experiences their own indignation equally righteously, and resist the sectarian impulse—endemic to human psychology—to polarize every question of principle into 'which side are you on?'

    “grant that everyone experiences their indignation equally righteously. 'Cause I do very often think... What we really need to resist is this polarization of every question of principle into, 'Are you or are you not on the right side?'”

  • Demanding moral purity in coalitions—wanting only the 'right people' on one's side—undermines the coalition-building that wins elections, and since the point of elections is to win in order to make society more just, nothing better serves the status quo than Puritanism in politics.

    “if we're so worried about having only the right people on our side, we can absolutely be assured that things will continue to go as they are.”

  • Egalitarian politics can take a leveling-up form (everyone treated as an aristocrat) or a leveling-down form (everyone treated as a commoner): Quakers were leveling-down (everyone treated as contemptible), the French Revolution's guillotine was leveling-up (beheading, once reserved for aristocrats, extended to all), and American equality was leveling-down (everyone subjected to corporal punishment as slaves were); contemporary debates over gender-neutral pronouns are not about whether we value equality but about what equality demands.

    “We might distinguish here between leveling up versions of equality where everyone is treated as an aristocrat and leveling down versions where everyone is treated as a commoner”

  • The business of toleration is not pretty—Rhode Island was called 'Rogue's Island' and 'the latrine of New England,' and nobody thought it a nice place to live—because toleration requires managing things that are and will remain disagreeable; contrary to a strand in political philosophy, some of these problems are permanent and cannot be transcended or dissolved, so we must rub along and make the best of it.

    “the business of toleration isn't pretty. It's difficult and it requires the managing of things that are and will remain disagreeable.”

  • Contrary to the common 'just-so' story that natural equality was discovered or invented in the 17th century, the idea that humans are equal by nature was a philosophical and theological commonplace for millennia; what is genuinely interesting is why, around the 17th century, that long-held idea suddenly began to have social and political consequences we recognize as egalitarian.

    “The idea that human beings were equal by nature was a philosophical and a theological commonplace for millennia. It just wasn't seen as having social and political consequences.”

  • On the Hobbesian view, treating people as equals is a pragmatic agreement that enables stable, peaceful society even though humans are not in fact equal; on the Kantian view, equal dignity reflects a basic equality grounded in facts about us as moral persons; Bejan inclines to the Hobbesian view that humans are not equal along any measurable dimension, holding it more pressing to ask what treating people as equals requires than to justify a basic equality.

    “For Hobbes, the idea that people are equal is essentially a pragmatic belief. So we agree to treat others as though they were our equals, even though they are in fact not equal.”

  • Early Quakers saw the rise of the plural 'you' over the singular 'thee/thou' in 17th-century English as a kind of idolatry—a demand that everyone be addressed with elevated, deferential status—and waged a deliberate campaign to address everyone with the singular 'thee,' which contemporaries received as a form of contempt or insult amounting almost to hate speech.

    “Quakers like George Fox, William Penn saw this as basically, as a demand for everyone to have a kind of elevated status, much like the queen refers to herself as 'we,' the royal we.”

0.56

Civility language functions as a cudgel to expel people from debate rather than engage their actual arguments.

5 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Civility talk is often used as a cudgel to shut down debate—accusing someone of incivility places them 'beyond the pale' (a phrase originating in the fence dividing civilized Dublin from the 'barbarous' Catholics outside)—allowing us to avoid arguing why opponents are wrong; both accusing someone of incivility and being uncivil toward them function to expel them from the community of respectable conversationalists.

    “We talk about civility precisely when we don't want to make an argument about why our opponents are wrong. Instead, we want to say, 'Oh, well, they're uncivil and so I don't have to engage with them at all.'”

  • Civility is not reducible to niceness, politeness, or respect; it has three distinguishing features: it is appropriate specifically to disagreement, it has a minimal character (we can be 'merely civil'), and it derives from civitas, so it pertains to disagreements between co-members of a single civil society.

    “civility seems to be appropriate to disagreement in particular... civility has a kind of minimal character, so we can talk about being merely civil... civility comes from the Latin civilitas, which in turn comes from civitas, which means political society or civil society.”

  • Mere civility is a minimal conformity to culturally contingent norms of respectful behavior, performed without actually respecting others; it is the willingness to keep engaging and share a life with those we don't respect—reflecting a commitment to share a life even when we don't share a faith—and can itself become a vehicle for communicating contempt.

    “I define mere civility as a minimal conformity to culturally contingent norms of respectful behavior... not because we actually respect or not because we're sincerely committed to treating others respectfully.”

  • Because everyone who talks about civility implicitly valorizes themselves as an exemplar of it and judges who is worth engaging partially, only Williams adequately accounts for the bias in his own judgments, leading to the seemingly paradoxical but actually coherent conclusion that civility demands we tolerate others' incivility.

    “what that ends up leading to is this sort of seemingly paradoxical, but I think it's not paradoxical conclusion that civility demands that we tolerate others' incivility.”

  • Social media platforms occupy an ambiguous space—functioning simultaneously as platforms (amplifying speech), presses (publishing), approximations of the public sphere, and private associations that can deplatform—and because they are transnational they conflate audiences with different local civility standards, exacerbating the sense of a crisis of civility as people address far larger audiences than they realize.

    “We refer to them quaintly as platforms... but they also function as presses, as publishing... but on the other hand, they're also private companies, but also private associations.”

0.53

Parrhesia and isegoria are historically distinct concepts conflated in modern debates about who should speak.

4 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Parrhesia is best understood not as a right but as a license or privilege—historically granted by the powerful to the weak ('I allow you to speak your mind to me')—and the modern conception of a right to speak freely is a post-First Amendment reinterpretation.

    “the idea that parrhesia is really seen as a license, as a kind of privilege. And it's a license granted by the powerful to the weak. I allow you to speak your mind to me.”

  • Ancient Greek had two distinct concepts both now translated as 'free speech': parrhesia, the practice of speaking one's mind frankly without fear or favor, and isegoria, the equal right of citizens to address the public assembly; modern English erases this distinction, which causes confusion in contemporary free speech debates.

    “in ancient Greek, there's a distinction between parrhesia on the one hand and isegoria on the other... Parrhesia is the idea of free speech in the sense of speaking freely... isegoria... it's an idea of the equal right of citizens to address the public assembly.”

  • Contemporary free speech absolutists are modern proponents of parrhesia who prioritize individuals' frank speech, while those concerned about hate speech defend isegoria, arguing that some parrhesia must be restricted to protect the equal standing of speakers; hate speech is conceived as a 'dignitary harm' assaulting the equal status of minorities.

    “people who are really, really worried about the ways in which exercises of parrhesia can, not just harm others, but cause a specific kind of harm, which is a kind of dignitary harm.”

  • Democracy, from the Greek 'demos kratos' (people power), is fundamentally about empowering the people to speak, so democracy should be understood not merely as voting but as having a say in everyday talk, with institutions arranged to distribute the power of voice as equally as possible.

    “democracy in Greek, it just comes from the idea of 'demos kratos,' so people power. So in a democracy, it's the demos that is empowered to speak”

0.53

Speech burdens fall unequally on marginalized groups, but alternative systems would not distribute them more fairly.

4 pointscentrality 4/5
  • While powerful figures like JK Rowling are not actually at risk of being silenced, there is a genuine cultural problem in which cancel culture chills speech for those without power and privilege, who observe what happens to high-profile people and rightly conclude it is not worth the risk to speak—visible even in students unwilling to voice views their peers might deem unacceptable.

    “those who don't share that power, who don't share that privilege and who nevertheless see what happens to someone like Rowling... conclude quite rightly that it's not worth taking the risk for themselves.”

  • Speech is not something that floats in the air separate from the levers of power; who speaks and who gets listened to is part of the structure of power in society, and civil libertarians are sensitive to power dynamics, worried about granting arbitrary power to whoever happens to decide who speaks.

    “speech is a form of power, that speech is not just something that floats out there in the air, separate from the levers of power in our society”

  • The burdens of putting up with unpleasant, uncivil, or hateful speech are unequally and unjustly distributed, falling more on racial and gender minorities and other marginalized groups; recognizing this is not a refutation of free speech, because historical data suggests an alternative system would not distribute the burdens more equally, so the task is to make the best of the system through cultural institutions, associational freedom, and a culture of both speaking and listening.

    “the burdens of putting up with unpleasant, uncivil, or even hateful speech, are unequally distributed... It's the members of racial minorities, gender minorities... are called upon to tolerate more.”

  • The current perception that free speech is a right-wing cause is a polar reversal of recent history, when free speech was the ideal of the left—the free speech movement began at Berkeley—demonstrating there is no natural connection between the principle and either side of the political spectrum.

    “free speech was really the ideal of the left. The whole free speech movement got its start at Berkeley, the idea that suddenly, it's the right wing that cares about free speech is pretty historically curious.”

0.50

American free speech tradition derives from evangelical Christianity's drive to proselytize, not European rationalist philosophy.

3 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Free speech developed differently in America and Europe: European arguments (Spinoza's freedom to philosophize, Kant's public reason, Mill's liberty of thought and discussion) framed it as reasoned speech, building in exclusions, while the American tradition was driven by evangelical Christians and prophets seeking freedom to proselytize—the freedom to spread the Word—which explains America's greater tolerance for both pornography and prophecy.

    “in the American case, it's not philosophers who are worried about this... It's a bunch of evangelical Christians, a lot of self-styled prophets, and so what they're worried about is how to build an institutional system that protects the right to spread the Word, sort of the freedom to proselytize as opposed to the freedom to philosophize.”

  • Roger Williams' theory and practice of civility and tolerance in early Rhode Island is both a good model for civility and free speech today and historically important, since that brand of Protestant evangelicalism helps explain American exceptionalism in free speech and why the American approach is more parrhesiastic than other modern democracies.

    “Roger Williams, not only his theory, but actually more importantly his practice of civility and tolerance, was not only a good model... but also historically important in that, that sort of brand of Protestant evangelicalism helps explain American exceptionalism when it comes to freedom of speech”

  • Rhode Island was for a long time the most tolerant society in the world and, uniquely in Western Christendom and beyond, had no established church; Williams differed importantly from Locke in arguing that tolerance required there be no established church at all, whereas Locke accepted establishment as long as attendance wasn't mandatory.

    “it was at the time, and for a long time, the most tolerant society in the world. It was the only society, to my knowledge, without an... certainly in the world of western Christendom, but also beyond, without an established church.”

0.34

Empowering authorities to censor hateful speech grants dangerous power to those already in power.

2 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Calls to suppress hateful or denigrating views require empowering some authority to censor, and that power will always fall to the powers-that-be; it is incoherent to simultaneously believe our governors are incompetent or evil yet propose to empower them further to suppress views they dislike.

    “Who are you proposing to have that power to censor, and it's always going to be the powers-that-be, and there's this faith, it's a very strange faith, on the one hand that our governors are incompetent, evil, etcetera, but on the other hand, that we should empower them even further to suppress views they don't like.”

  • Tolerance means putting up with something we acknowledge to be an evil, so a society that as a matter of principle refuses to tolerate the intolerant is not actually tolerant; 'militant tolerance' is incoherent even though militant democracy (banning anti-democratic parties) can be coherent.

    “in my view, a tolerant society that as a matter of principle doesn't tolerate the intolerant is not a tolerant society.”

0.34

Individuals speak, not identities; identity reification obscures variation within groups and risks speaking for others.

2 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Identities don't speak, individuals do—one's ascriptive characteristics don't determine what one thinks or says—so the reification of gender and racial identities, while sometimes politically necessary, should not be the end goal; not all trans women are equally aggrieved by Rowling, and that variation should itself be part of the discussion, and people should reflect hard before claiming to speak on behalf of others.

    “identities don't speak, individuals do. My ascriptive characteristics don't determine what I'm going to think or say on any given issue.”

  • Bejan rejects the claim that anything JK Rowling might say about trans women denies their right to exist; even uttering 'trans women don't have the right to exist' would not deny that right because no individual's speech is authoritative in that way, precisely because we live in a society where no one person's speech is granted such authority.

    “even my uttering that precise phrase would not deny them the right to exist precisely because my speech isn't authoritative in that way. And it's not authoritative precisely because we live in a society wherein no one person's speech is given that authority.”