
What this covers
This is a conversation between Meb Faber and Jim Grant, the financial historian who has edited Grant's Interest Rate Observer since 1983. Grant tends to answer present-day questions with historical analogues. The AI buildout is set beside the railroads and the 1990s, and Meb adds the current IPO pipeline of SpaceX, OpenAI, and Anthropic, which he says is as large as all 1990s IPOs combined once adjusted for inflation. The talk then moves to inflation, credit, and the Federal Reserve, and closes on gold and the periods Grant thinks are worth studying.
A large part of the middle is a argument about definitions. Grant separates the falling prices that came with 1870s–80s railroads and the Suez Canal, an instance of creative destruction that raised real wages, from financial deflation, a collapse of prices driven by a collapse in credit. He says Ben Bernanke leaned on 1930s memories to justify intervention, whereas in the 1940s and 50s William McChesney Martin spoke about inflation, and Congress held hearings on it when CPI was near 4%. He also concedes that in a world loaded with cheap debt, falling prices can damage balance sheets.
The credit discussion is the most pointed. Grant ties near-zero rates in 2020–2022 to the heavy leverage in private equity, then to the growth of private credit as a bank substitute. He compares its opacity to CDOs in 2005–2006 and notes that about a third of life insurers' $6 trillion in assets sits in it. Meb raises thin credit spreads and a CAPE ratio of 43. Grant's contested forecast is that the government is nearing Ponzi finance, issuing bills to pay interest on bills.
The later segments cover how to fix the Fed, the case for gold (including central bank buying, especially in Asia), and the 1984 bond market, when long Treasuries briefly yielded 14% against CPI of 4% or less.
Grant argues that current AI investment is the largest bubble of all time, driven by uncalculated demand for data centers and tokens, with the Fed constrained by extreme financial leverage it cannot openly acknowledge, creating a precarious macroeconomic moment that mirrors but exceeds previous speculative episodes.
- AI capital draw rivals railroads but demand calculations are likely wrong, with massive overbuilding and double-ordering as in 1990s bubbles
- Fed suppressed rates created leverage now forcing it to tolerate inflation rather than aggressively fight it due to credit market fragility
- Current valuations (CAPE 43+) and margin debt levels are historically extreme, yet policy prioritizes financial stability over price stability
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Ben Bernanke invoked deflation fears from the 1930s Great Depression frequently during 2007-2013 to justify aggressive Fed intervention, but this memory was not predominant in the 1940s-1950s, when Fed chairs like William McChesney Martin gave speeches on inflation despite CPI showing negative year-over-year values without anyone objecting that deflation was occurring.
“Deflation is a scare word to Ben S. Bernanke, PhD. Invoked it frequently during the 2007, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 for period because he wanted to, of all things, avoid a recurrence of what happened in the 1930s...However, what's interesting about that memory is that it was not the foremost memory in the in the mind of the market in the 1940s and '50s. In 1954, William McChesney Martin, the chairman of the Fed then, gave a talk about inflation. And in that talk, he said you should never regain the purchasing power you have lost to inflation...it was the speech was given in a period of months in which the CPI was actually showing negative year-over-year values. It was either '54 or '55, one of the two. And nobody said to Martin, 'Mr. Chairman, we are having deflation in this country right now. How can you talk about inflation?' No, didn't come up.”
The double liability rule, which held bank stockholders responsible for their bank's solvency through capital calls in case of impairment, was a feature of the gold standard era that reflected wisdom about banks being inherently precarious due to leverage, and it went out the window around 1935.
“the so-called double liability rule that held that the bank stockholders were themselves responsible for the solvency of the bank if it became impaired or insolvent and they would get a capital call, not the people, not the FDIC fund of which there was none. I think that institution which went out the window in 1935 or so, that institution spoke so well of our ancestors in finance. They realized that banks are precarious by their nature of their leverage. They realized that the bank stockholders got the dividends and the upside and they thought that in justice they ought to front the capital to redeem a mismanaged bank on the downside.”
Railroad technology in the 1870s-1880s, through destruction of distance via the Suez Canal opening in 1869, unified world commodity markets and destroyed fixed capital in London warehouses, generating deflation (prices falling 2-3% per year for 20 years) and rising real wages as an example of creative destruction and technological progress.
“what set prices tumbling, what set real wages rising was human progress. Was the uh the positive destruction of time and distance with the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. It destroyed the canal. Destroyed all manner of fixed capital in London warehouses that were in place to accommodate the long, long haul trade around the Cape of Good Hope. Anyway, the southern tip of Africa to India and back. All that was destroyed. Sails out. Steam in. A world commodity markets unified.”
Deflation, as defined by central bankers and economists, is a collapse of the price level due primarily to a collapse in credit—a financial deflation entailing major bank failures and credit destruction—not simply falling prices or technological progress reducing costs.
“One major source of every deflation as I know of a deflation defined as the collapse of the price level owing principally to a collapse in credit. That is a financial deflation. And by definition that kind of deflation entails a major bank failures and major credit destruction.”
Over 125 years (into the 20th century) the price level was probably unchanged, but over that period there were plenty of ups and downs, showing that stable long-term prices are compatible with cyclical fluctuations
“Price level was probably unchanged over 125 years or so um into the 20th century, but over that period of unchangedness, there were plenty of ups and downs.”
John Kenneth Galbraith's 1955 book 'The Great Crash' was published when stocks were just recovering to their 1929 highs—a cautionary book released at a time when the world was worried about recurrence of 1929, not recognizing that stocks were cheap relative to post-war American strength
“Actually the rails, you know, they're famously infamously the stock market based 1929 high the industrials uh returned to the 1990 29 level 1954. And that incidentally was the year that John Kenneth Galbraith's book The Great Crash came out... why we might ask him in 55 was a cautionary book on the stock market published in the year the Dow re-captured its 25 year highs? Well, because the world was worried about a recurrence of the 1929 experience. Not quite factoring into the extraordinarily cheap level of the stock market as seen in retrospect.”
The book 'The Golden Constant' documented the purchasing power of gold during centuries when it was fixed in value and defined as money, finding that purchasing power remained relatively constant—but now that gold is a speculative asset, this constancy no longer applies
“There was a book called The Golden Constant. It was a very scholarly history of of the purchasing power of gold during those centuries in which it was a fixed rate and defined as money. His title was as said all is the curse of purchasing power is kind of constant. But now that gold is a speculative asset. Uh I think it's pedigree is better than Bitcoin.”
The interest rate level where it was (zero in 2020-2022) is almost as important as the trajectory of rates; near-zero rates enabled private equity to incur massive leverage (6-8 turns) for transactions that depended on perpetually cheap borrowing costs, creating a capital structure that becomes unviable if rates reach 5-6%
“That's why I believe Meb that where rates were is almost as important nowadays as where rates are going. Where rates were is zero, right, in 2020, 2021, and part of 2022, effectively zero and slight exaggeration. But they were low enough so that private equity got in there and did all these transactions that very with a whole lot of debt, very six or eight turns of leverage depending on how you view the ad backs for expected efficiencies, which often did not come to fruition. But lots of leverage and borrowing costs that would never be as low as the time in which those borrowing costs were incurred.”
People's current unhappiness with inflation is not primarily about the rate of change (current 2% inflation) but about the permanent upward repricing of goods (coffee now $10 and never coming back down) resulting from past inflation spikes
“I think what people fail to really grasp is that it's less in many times about the rate of change after a big inflation. It's more that it prices went up and they stay there and so your coffee went to 10 bucks. It doesn't matter if there's only one or two percent inflation now, coffee's still 10 bucks. All right, it never came down.”
Private credit opacity parallels CDO structuring opacity of 2005-2006, when many investors and advisors did not understand what they owned; widespread admission of ignorance about private credit holdings by sophisticated investors (CIOs, financial advisors) suggests similar risks exist
“You know what's funny about the private credit discussion? The amount of people that I've talked to that are really smart, like captains of industry, CIOs, very thoughtful investors, and you look at some of these redemption requests, what's going on in private credit. They're like, "Look, I don't know. I'm not that familiar with private credit. It's like a preface to the statement. You don't hear that almost anywhere else... I don't really know what they're doing. I don't really know what they're investing in.”
Private credit emerged as a banking substitute because regulatory constraints prevented traditional banks from making loans to leveraged private equity borrowers, creating shadow credit markets that are less transparent than banking but attract institutional capital seeking yield
“And private credit was a creature of the regulatory regime in banking. And so people could not go to banks as they had gone to banks for for loans with which to facilitate and finally to close on private equity transactions. So, they went to private credit instead.”
Railroad stocks, the mainstay of the 1929 stock market peak, did not return to their 1929 high until 1954, 25 years later, despite the world's recovery from WWII and strong demographic, industrial, and technological tailwinds for America—yet investors remained fixated on the preceding 1929 crash experience.
“Actually the rails, you know, they're famously infamously the stock market based 1929 high the industrials uh returned to the 1990 29 level 1954. And that incidentally was the year that John Kenneth Galbraith's book The Great Crash came out. And why we might ask him in 55 was a cautionary book on the stock market published in the year the Dow re-captured its 25 year highs? Well, because the world was worried about a recurrence of the 1929 experience. Not quite factoring into the extraordinarily cheap level of the stock market as seen in retrospect. Not factoring in the place of American in the world and leading the um recovery from the Second World War. I mean, it it was it was set up for a demographic, industrial, technological home run of grand slam. But people looking backwards were concerned about the preceding experience.”
In 1954, the CAPE ratio for utilities reached approximately 60, then subsequently crashed to multi-year lows; following the 1930s stock crash, utilities declined 80% from peak valuations, illustrating how sectors can move from extreme overvaluation to extreme undervaluation
“Professor Shiller is obviously famous for his 10-year P/E ratio, but less people have read some of his papers that looked at these Cape ratios for the industrials, utilities, railroads. In the 1920s, the utilities hit a Cape ratio, I think darn near 60. But on the aftermath of the, you know, Great Depression period, the railroads got to a Cape ratio of two and change. Where like, granted, a 80% decline will do that in the P/E.”
1984 is a particularly interesting historical period to study because interest rates had peaked at 15% after a 35-year bond bear market (1946-1981), commodity prices collapsed, and a 30-year Treasury briefly traded at 14% in spring 1984 while CPI was at 4% or less, creating a 10-percentage-point real yield opportunity.
“interest rates had peaked in a 35-year bond bear market...They peaked at 15%...in the spring of 1984, the 30-year Treasury non-call for 25 years briefly traded at 14% just for a few minutes. And if I remember correctly, the CPI was printing at about four or less giving that mythical dexterous clever speculator in bonds who bought them at exactly 14 10 percentage points of real yield.”
Corporate and junk bond spreads are razor-thin relative to T-bills historically, reflecting structural demand from price-insensitive buyers (pensions, insurance) who are indifferent to margin of safety because they needed yield after years of zero rates
“corporate and junk spreads pretty razor-thin relative to T-bills historically. And if we know anything about crisis times like you mentioned, those tend to blow out when the VIX or something's going a little haywire, but I wonder how much of it is just price insensitive buyers, whether it's like pensions or insurance companies that hey, I can take my liabilities over here and for a long time I was sitting at zero and now I can buy a corporate bonds at 5%, wash my hands, be done with it. I don't care that there's no no margin of safety on these type of investments.”
Central banks have been the big buyers of gold, with Asian central banks buying more than Western central banks, which is noteworthy because central banks as professional currency printers should understand their line of work better than the general public.
“American individuals really have not cotton to this move in gold. It sits very much a of all things central banks. Isn't it curious that central banks have been the big buyers? Central banks who are by a profession the printers of the redeemable currency. Maybe they know a little bit about their line of work. The rest of the world doesn't appreciate. The central banks have been very much in the forefront of this. Asia much more so than the West.”
Wall Street sold CATS and LIONS (zero coupon bonds) in 1984 with internal rates of return of 12-14%, marketed as instruments with equity returns but no equity risk, appealing to investors because they offered yield without understood risk.
“Wall Street made it easy because they were Wall Street was selling the securities known as cats and lions and tigers. The feline bonds were zero coupon instruments that were came to market around 12 that would mature in 30 years at par. And the internal rate of return was 13% 12% 14% right? Sound attractive? Equity returns no equity risk? Nope. Nope.”
In a highly leveraged world with many debtors financed at very low rates, falling prices create severe damage to balance sheets, making the traditional deflation argument against price declines have merit despite the benefits of falling prices to wage earners
“The people who worry about deflation do have this particular argument on their side, which is that in a very leveraged world, falling prices can do terrific damage to balance sheets that were built only for prosperity and for rising prices. So, we had this whole world of ours is full of private credit, private equity, is full of leveraged sovereigns, it's full of people who have taken out their own personal LBOs to buy a house, you know, and so debt is uh foremost in our world”
Rob Arnott published research on CAPE ratios across inflation regimes showing that when inflation was mellow (<4%), CAPE ratios could be in the low 20s, but when inflation was above 4-5%, average CAPE ratios were in the low teens; current CAPE ratio of 43 suggests the market is undervaluing inflation risk.
“He had published an old paper that looked at CAPE ratios in various inflation regimes and when inflation was mellow, you could have a CAPE ratio on the low kind of '20s. You know, granted we're at 43 today. But when it ticked up above that 4% 5% level, the average CAPE ratio was like low teens on the stocks.”
In 1954-1957, while the CPI was briefly above 3% and knocking on the door of 4%, Congress held hearings on the inflationary threat to the United States, showing that moderate inflation was then taken seriously as a policy concern, unlike modern deflation preoccupation.
“Nor did it come up in '56 and '57 when Congress held hearings on the inflationary threat confronting the United States when the CPI was briefly above three, knocking on the door of four. That was only briefly.”
About 1/3 of the $6 trillion in life insurance company assets is invested in some form of private credit, representing roughly $2 trillion in exposure to an opaque asset class
“There's something like the witnesses consulting as notes. There's a good part of the insurance composite insurance industry investment portfolio that is committed to private credit. And private credit was a creature of the regulatory regime in banking... There's a good part of the insurance composite insurance industry investment portfolio that is committed to private credit... And I've seen now that 1/3 of $6 trillion worth of life insurance company assets are invested in some form of private credit.”
The current IPO cycle involving SpaceX, OpenAI, and Anthropic, when inflation-adjusted and combined, represents IPO volumes as large as all IPOs in the 1990s combined, marking an extreme concentration of new capital into speculative high-growth ventures.
“We heard a stat recently that if you combine SpaceX, OpenAI, Anthropic potential IPOs, inflation-adjusted, these are so large, they are as big as all the IPOs in the '90s combined.”
The government is approaching a Ponzi finance situation where it would be issuing Treasury bills to service pre-existing Treasury bills, borrowing money to meet interest expense on existing debt, if current trends continue.
“you can imagine very easily a situation in which the government would be issuing Treasury bills with which to service the pre-existing stock of Treasury bills when we'd be borrowing money with which to meet interest expense on the extent debt. That is around the corner if things continue as they are. And that's called Ponzi finance.”
Richard Russell's investing maxim that 'Markets can do anything' is useful to remember—just as soon as you think you've figured things out, markets surprise you.
“Markets can do anything. Doesn't that good to remember? Just as soon as you think you've got it all figured out, markets can do anything.”
The 2008-2009 banking crisis represented the greatest failure of ratings and risk management in the city of New York and elsewhere in America, with every major financial institution facing insolvency requiring government rescue.
“the banking system was in trouble, and if the the government had not come in and salvaged the chestnuts from the fire, every single financial institution of any size and consequence in the city of New York would have been toast, which is a pretty shocking thing to realize because as a friend of mine said at the time the greatest failure of ratings and risk management ever in 2008 and 9 this in this city and elsewhere in America.”
Silver demonetization in the 1870s was blamed as the cause of deflation by contemporary politicians and financiers, but the real cause was technological progress that reduced the price of goods; the political scapegoating of monetary metals parallels modern misunderstandings of inflation and deflation
“And says, "Oh, that's conspiracy talk about chatter." But this seems to me that this is apropos of AI. That what set prices tumbling, what set real wages rising was human progress... So, what happened was it was wonderful and quite shocking. Which was great display of the power of creative destruction.”
By 1986 bonds had become 'the thing' and by 1987 they were back to 10% yields, demonstrating how quickly market psychology can reverse from fear to enthusiasm.
“But that was then. And pretty soon, of course, uh bonds were the thing and by 1986 everyone had to have them. They were yielding 6%. They got back to 10% in '87.”
The United States has gone from a $1 trillion gross public debt in 1980 when Reagan announced it on television to $39 trillion today, and from paying $45 billion in interest 45 years ago to paying $1 trillion in interest in the current fiscal year.
“This deficit is trillion and a half dollar debt trillion dollar debt. So that's that's normal now. You have a 39 39 trillion gross public debt...This country is paying a trillion dollars in interest this fiscal year and it was about 45 years ago the Reagan got on television and said the public debt has just hit $1 trillion. So we've gone from $1 trillion in principle to $1 trillion of interest expense in a lifetime certainly in a Wall Street career.”
There is a great deal of overbuilding, double ordering, and speculative excess in AI-related infrastructure investment, despite the organized information now available, because the human speculative spirit is wild and not necessarily grounded by better technology—sometimes technology only incites it further.
“I think there's a great deal of overbuilding. Uh double ordering, just like you know, there was in the late 1990s. People thought, well, such is the high degree of organization of all the information relevant to the marketplace that there will be nothing like the macro miscalculations of yesteryear, but it turns out that the human speculative spirit is a pretty wild thing and is not necessarily grounded by better technology. On the contrary, sometimes that can only incite it.”
In a paper money regime without the discipline of convertibility into something at a fixed rate, there is a permanent element of helium (upward buoyancy) in prices, meaning things naturally want to go up absent deflationary shocks.
“There's no There's no uh in a paper money regime without um the discipline of convertibility of that paper into something or other at a fixed rate. There's a kind of a permanent element of uh of helium in things, is there? You know, that things want to go up.”
The 1990s appeared to have low measured inflation despite being a paper money regime because outsourcing labor to India, China's entry into the WTO, and material goods becoming cheap countered monetary expansion, creating the illusion that the Fed was in a genius phase.
“In the 1990s, when everyone was outsourcing labor to India and China was entering the WTO, when material goods were cheap and getting cheaper, and the Fed seemed to be embarking at a genius phase, all that was There was There was a paper money regime, and there was very little measured inflation. There came to be a lot of inflation at the corner of Broad and Wall.”
Inflation is not a matter of 'too much money chasing too few goods' but simply 'too much money,' with the specific manifestations and locations of that excess varying by context and time—sometimes appearing in cappuccino prices, real estate, stocks, or farmland depending on where capital flows.
“A lot of economists says it's too much money chasing too few goods, but you say, 'No, it's just simply too much money.' And sometimes where the money chases is variable. Sometimes it comes up in your cappuccino. Sometimes it's in real estate in New York. Sometimes it's in stonks like now.”
A currency ought to be redeemable as a marker of the government's commitment to fiscal probity and monetary stability, not simply a 2% annual tax on cash balances, and people should be able to hold money and say 'This is money.'
“They thought that the currency ought to be redeemable as a marker of the government's own commitment to fiscal probity and to monetary stability. Not 2% a year tax on your cash balances, but actual stable prices in a money that we can hold in our hands and say, 'This is money.'”
Modern economists and Fed policymakers, relying on quantification and econometric models, have become less willing to take qualitative, broader views of inflation, which means they miss asset inflation signals that were visible to prior Fed chairs like William McChesney Martin who identified stock market excess as inflation.
“people today are maybe because of the quantification of economics, the reign of the econometricians, the all these brainiacs at the Fed and elsewhere who see economics purely in quantitative terms. There is much less willingness to take a broader view of things, a kind of a qualitative view of things. Maybe it's because I am not such a quantitative person that take that opinion, take that approach. But it seems to me that when you look at um the state of the IPO market, when you look at the margin debt has doubled in the past year, I think up 50 up anyway, a lot.”
The perversity and irony built into human interactions with markets is exemplified by 1984: what is so compellingly a bargain in retrospect was rejected by investors at the time.
“that episode was the the the greatest single the clearest example of the perversity of markets of the of the irony built into human interactions with markets, you know. What is so compellingly a bargain in retrospect at the time is to say yeah yeah not for me. No.”
The Federal Reserve, if it kept its books according to GAAP accounting rather than its own custom accounting system, would be substantially insolvent, existing only by courtesy of being able to define what solvency means.
“Tell me, Kevin, does it bother you that the Federal Reserve, if it were keeping its books according to GAAP and not by this DIY system the Fed has introduced to make itself look solvent? So, what is solvent by courtesy? Does it strike you odd and perhaps worrisome that Fed is actually substantially broke.”
Trillions of leveraged dollars are riding on indefensible, factually indefensible convictions—ideas that may be true or false but are certainly not certainly true.
“there are trillions of leveraged dollars riding on indefensible, factually indefensible convictions. Convictions that may be true, may not be true, but are certainly not certainly true.”
In today's highly leveraged environment, the Fed is constrained against aggressive attack on inflation due to concerns about credit market stability and financial leverage, which the Fed does not openly acknowledge as a constraint on policy.
“I think the Fed is constrained in ways that it does not acknowledge. It's constrained against the aggressive attack on inflation at a time of extreme financial leverage. And that extreme financial leverage also is beginning to apply as a description to the public credit, to the federal finances.”
The Fed's role in this AI bubble cycle is more intrusive and problematic than it was during the 1990s internet bubble, and a great deal depends on whether the world has correctly calculated the demand for tokens, data centers, and capital inputs for AI infrastructure.
“I think that the role of the Fed is uh more intrusive, more problematical than it was then. And I think that a great deal is riding on the efficacy of the technology on which the world's hopes are hanging. And a great deal is also contingent on whether we collectively have correctly calculated or miscalculated the demand for tokens, for data centers, and for the rest of the capital that goes into artificial intelligence.”
AI can perform wonders by solving ancient mathematical formulas but simultaneously can fail to count milk cartons or expedite pizza delivery speeds, as evidenced by an Uber executive saying AI is a wondrous technology but they can't see it in their P&L and can't rationalize the expense.
“We know that it can perform wonders, right? All these cracking all these ancient inexplicably difficult to mathematical formula. Yeah, it's great. It can also fail to count milk cartons or hasten the speed of pizza deliveries depending on the vendors you're talking to. A guy from Uber, COO of Uber, CFO, was called the other day and saying, 'Well, it's it's certainly a wondrous technology, but we don't see it in our P&L. We can't really rationalize the expense just now.'”
Jay Powell shifted from his early 2010-2011 critique of financial leverage on the Board of Governors to becoming complacent about leverage, and he adopted the idea that the Fed owes the world a 2% inflation rate as 'price stability,' which Grant calls Kafkaesque because a 2% annual tax on cash holdings is not actually stable prices.
“He came from private equity. If you go back and read the transcripts, uh of the discussions that the FOMC was having about the financial leverage in the economy, Jay Powell was forthright and was, to my mind, on point in in knowing in his critique of the abuse of financial leverage and its risks to the macroeconomy. That was Jay Powell then. And years passed and I think in all these institutions you tend to get absorbed into the world view of the institution in which you are serving and he became rather a little more complacent concerning financial leverage, in fact, a great deal more complacent. And he also came to buy into the new age thought that the Fed owed the world a rate of inflation that we would call price stability. Now, that is Kafka-esque.”
The Apollo Atheme model of life insurance investing and management has taken over much of the insurance industry, pushing companies to minimize equity capital (surplus) and maximize spread income through heavy investments in speculative-grade and near-speculative-grade securities, particularly private credit
“There's something else which is the Apollo Atheme model of life insurance company investing and a management style and reinsurance protocols that have taken over a good part of the insurance industry. And by that I mean a management style that is determined to minimize the size of the equity portion of the portfolio or surplus as it's known in the insurance world, to minimize that and to maximize spread income in part by investing heavily in securities that are either speculative grade or are close to speculative grade, floating rate for the most part in the case of private credit.”
Bernard Baruch, the great speculator, said 'I have lost money enough that would make the average married man go out and shoot himself,' teaching the importance of sucking it up, bearing losses, and resolving to make different mistakes next time.
“My first book was was uh book for Bernard Baruch, a great speculator of yesteryear...Baruch said the following, he said, 'I have lost money enough money I've lost money enough that would make the average married man go out and shoot himself.' And this was from a guy who um was in on the ground floor of what uh used to be a famous stock, Texas Gulf Sulphur...But Baruch taught me the importance of sucking it up, of bearing your losses, of not overly blaming yourself, but uh resolving to make a different mistake next time.”
Powell's 2020 decision to target higher inflation than 2% (through makeup inflation to offset prior undershoots) was made on the eve of inflation reaching 7-9% during the stimulus spike, making it a terrible and misconceived policy call at the wrong time.
“He bought into the idea that in 2020 of all times to make this call, he bought into the idea that if the Fed should deliver less than 2%, the Fed owed it to us, the American people, to produce a rate of inflation higher than 2% such that over time it would average 2%. This is on the eve of inflation going What is it came finally go to nine or seven 9% or something in the during the spike of the stimulus strike spike. So, it was a terrible terrible time call, but it was also a terribly misconceived call.”
Humility is the number one trait Grant would seek in an investor to give money to, because everyone makes millions of mistakes, and acknowledging this is the foundation of good decision-making.
“I think the number one trait would be humility cuz we all make a million mistakes”
What makes investing fascinating is the utter unpredictability of human animal behavior in the face of large sums of money—we are not at our best or most rational in such situations.
“one of the things that makes all of this so interesting is the utter unpredictability of a human animal in the face of large sums of money. We are not at our best, not our most rational, so not our best subject.”
An AI data center buyer paid $300,000 per acre for farmland in Ohio, representing a major capital reallocation driven by AI companies being less price-sensitive than traditional commodity farmers.
“I was just in Columbus, Ohio, sitting down with some financial advisors, one of which who said, 'My client just sold some farmland for $300,000 an acre.' And as a former farmer myself, I said, 'That sounds like a lot.' And he said, 'Well, the buyer was a AI data center.' And I said, 'Oh, well, they're less price sensitive than the corn farmer down the street.'”
Grant faults Powell on grounds of institutional morality for actively resisting Judy Shelton's candidacy for the Board of Governors, as she represented different thinking about monetary affairs and gold's role, which Powell should not have opposed.
“That is his I think that he got behind the powers that were intent on barring Judy Shelton from a place in the Board of Governors. She was the person who wanted to have a different way of thinking of things. She likes gold. She likes the gold standard ways in some form...I believe that J. Powell actively resisted her candidacy as she should not have done. That's a political political malpractice, if you ask me, which he did.”
The Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago's financial conditions index says easy money, yet serious economists make the case for rate cuts, which Grant sarcastically attributes to someone (Trump) saying so rather than to actual economic conditions.
“If you want to look at indices, look at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago's financial conditions index. It says easy money. So why would you want to cut rates? Well, because um somebody says so. That was a dig at Donald Trump.”
Air conditioning stocks in the 1950s traded at 4-8 times earnings despite air conditioning being as transformative as railroads, having changed human migration patterns by making the Sun Belt habitable and enabling year-round Congress.
“air conditioning is as transformative in its way as a you know, it's it changed human migration patterns, right? It made habitable the great Sun Belt. It gave us the year-round Congress. Isn't that great? Yeah, so well But you know, you look back at these air conditioning stocks in the 50s, they were you know, four and five, six times, eight times earnings when we carried our corp.”
Grant has owned gold for 40 years and bought his first gold coins near the $850 an ounce peak in early 1980, when CPI was running 13% year-over-year and 20% mortgage rates were available, representing the most extreme monetary moment.
“I can tell you about my gold origin story. I was standing in line. Oh, mistake number one. Never queue up for an investment. Right? Bad, bad beginning. But I remember it was a very chilly day early in 1980. And if it wasn't at the very peak, it was close to the peak of $850 an ounce...in 1980, the CPI was at like 13% year-over-year. In 1981, some people were paying 20% for a mortgage.”
Gold is a non-regenerative investment that pays nothing and earns nothing, making it conceptually a bad investment by conventional standards, yet Grant views it as a conceptual investment in deterioration—specifically the willful, orchestrated, managed decline of America's dollar.
“It pays nothing. It earns nothing. It is uh it is non-regenerative. It is the uh what above us idea of a bad investment...It's a conceptual investment in deterioration, the willful orchestrated, managed decline of America's dollar.”
Kevin Warsh does want some monetary reform—specifically a smaller Fed balance sheet and a less obtrusive central bank—and would likely agree that central bankers have become celebrities, which is a sign of deterioration in monetary affairs.
“But he does want to go back a little bit. He wants a smaller Fed balance. He wants a less obtrusive central bank. I think he would not disagree with my observation that we know too well the name of the Fed chairman. If the Fed were doing its job properly, and the monetary affairs of the world were properly structured, we would not know the names these people as we know the names of the leading OPS champions in the National League. But the central bankers have become the celebrities, which is a sign of the deterioration in our monetary affairs, if you ask me.”
The excitement surrounding the potentialities of artificial intelligence dwarfs the excitement generated by the worldwide web, internet, and fiber optic cables, and the dollars involved are larger even when adjusted for inflation.
“I think that the excitement surrounding the potentialities of artificial intelligence dwarf the excitement generated by the worldwide web and by the internet and by um fiber optic cables. And I think that the dollars, of course, even when adjusted for inflation are larger today.”
Today in 2026, with expensive stocks, risky bonds, Grant and his colleagues find pockets of value despite elevated CAPE ratios, including some obscure European banks trading at low multiples of book and earnings, a UK used-car transaction platform that markets believe will be disrupted by AI but Grant thinks is compelling, and oil due to favorable supply-demand balance.
“there are some more or less obscure banks in the continent of Europe that are trading at astonishingly low multiples of book and earnings. We just wrote about a company in the UK that is also in the bargain bin. It It is a platform for used car transactions. And the market is quite sure it will be disrupted and canceled by AI, but we think there are reasons to doubt that...We also have taken a shine to oil believing that whatever happens next couple of weeks or months in Iran that the supply demand balance is going to favor the long side of the hydrocarbon markets.”
The market incorrectly believes war is bearish for gold, but war is actually bullish for gold and all the other horsemen of the apocalypse, showing the market regularly misunderstands asset dynamics.
“the world has got into its mind that war is bearish for gold. No, war is bullish for gold and all the other horsemen of the apocalypse. Idiots. Why are you doing this? So, you can talk to the market. You can explain to the market why it's wrong.”
Murray Stahl of Horizon Kinetics was an unconventional thinker who believed diversification virtues were overdone and that concentrated positions (up to 60% of AUM) worked out when based on deep knowledge.
“Murray was such an interesting character...He was not the kind of guy who said um 'Just because everyone's carrying an umbrella, doesn't mean it's not going to rain.' There's an element of contrarianism but he was not that kind of contrarian. He was a thinker. And what he thought was that the virtues of diversification were way overdone because what it meant was you didn't know enough about what you're investing in. So, one of the funds that Horizon Kinetics uh managed...its biggest position was like 60% of AUM.”
Today is one of the greatest bubbles of all time.
“So, I think that today is one of the greatest bubbles of all time.”
In 2009 during the financial crisis, Grant bought small S&P 500 stocks trading below $10, which turned out to be a genius-phase trade with some positions up 20-fold, illustrating the extraordinary depths and heights markets can reach.
“The year is 2009. And markets Mr. Market's not feeling well. And I recalled Sir John Templeton...went and bought um shares of everything below two quid...I called up the broker and said uh put like about about $5. It wasn't a very big in all the S&P stocks that are trading below $10. That was during the genius phase of Grant's by the way. That ended shortly thereafter after that phone call. But, I got to tell you that some of these things were up 20-fold.”
Gold's pedigree as a monetary hedge is better than Bitcoin's, it is altogether preferable to Bitcoin, but it yields exactly as much as Bitcoin and now exhibits speculative bounceiness similar to the crypto world, which Grant finds undignified for an ancient monetary metal.
“I think it's pedigree is better than Bitcoin. I think it's altogether preferable to Bitcoin, but it yields exactly as much as Bitcoin does and it's speculative is less volatile than Bitcoin cuz Bitcoin trades 7 days a week, but gold has exhibited some of the speculative bounce-iness of the crypto world, which I must say I find undignified for the ancient monetary metal.”
Gold can go to sleep for 15-20 years, leaving investors feeling very foolish, as happened to Grant when his Krugerrand investment dropped from $850 to $500, forcing him to sell at a loss to pay for his children's private school tuition.
“the thing to know about gold as an investment as opposed to a monetary asset that is not meant to be traded is that it can go to sleep for 15 or 20 years, leaving you feeling very foolish...trying to figure out how to pay the tuitions in New York City public school private school. And uh I was forced, much to my mortification, to confess that the uh Krugerrand or two or three that I had uh uh wasted the family cash balance on some of the years or as I had actually gone from like 850 to about uh $500”
Over roughly picked 20-year intervals by gold advocates, gold has outperformed stocks, but this involves many years of feeling foolish for owning it, as performance varies significantly year to year.
“if you look at the right interval of years roughly picked by the gold guys of whom I am one it's outperformed stocks. The 20 years around great. Except not every year and except you often felt rather foolish for owning it.”
The Fed has only been around for a little over a century, with the modern fiat era beginning in 1914, meaning the entire lifetime experience of people born in the late 1970s is only fiat currency, though this represents a short experiment relative to the history of economics and financial markets.
“The Fed's only been around what little over a century. Is that about right? The modern fiat era. Yeah, 1914.”
Meb Faber is co-founder and chief investment officer of Cambria Investment Management and cannot discuss Cambria funds on this podcast due to industry regulations, and all opinions expressed are solely of participants and do not reflect Cambria's views.
“Meb Faber is the co-founder and chief investment officer of Cambria Investment Management. Due to industry regulations, he will not discuss any of Cambria's funds on this podcast. All opinions expressed by podcast participants are solely their own opinions and do not reflect the opinion of Cambria Investment Management or its affiliates.”
Private credit promoters claim they are making good loans that banks are prohibited from making and that private credit will disrupt and supplant the banking industry; this prediction has not yet materialized despite years of such claims.
“They say, "We are doing nothing more than making good loans that banks are now not allowed to make. We're making them to private equity borrowers, for example, that are nominally rated speculative grade, but we know the managements. We know the credit, and we know that, as usual, the arbiters of these things are behind the curve, and we think that the world is changing, and that before very long private credit will disrupt and supplant the banking industry." I heard that myself with my very own ears only a couple years ago. Just predictions that the credit private credit would replace banks, which has not yet happened.”
Kevin Warsh said 'You can't go back' in response to Grant's suggestion about restoring gold's role in monetary affairs, indicating Warsh's skepticism about returning to gold-based monetary standards.
“But as we left the stage together, cuz I'd put in a word for my hobbyhorse, something to do with gold. And Kevin said to me, 'You know, Jim, you can't go back.'”
The Iran-Israel conflict is beginning to feel like a scripted grudge match in professional wrestling—the violence is certainly felt by those in the way, but the violence appears performative and scripted in an odd way.
“does this strike you as it does me that the war in Iran is beginning to take on the feel of kind of a grudge match in professional wrestling? The violence is certainly felt keenly by those who are in the way of the so-called kinetic rounds. But the violence it seems performative and scripted and in some manner seems an odd conflict. Odd war.”
Economists argue that inflation is not a big deal and that a productivity boom is coming that will make inflation wishes look bad, representing an opposite case to inflation hawks.
“serious economists can make the case that inflation is not such a big deal and that they say wait for the productivity boom that is around the corner. We will wish that we had some inflation, which we will not then have.”
In a relatively brief period (a Wall Street career or a lifetime), there has been a steep decline in the conditions that would define sound finance in both money and public credit.
“Not very many years there has been a a steep the swoop down in the conditions that would define sound finance whether it be in money or in public credit.”
Gold mining stocks have been sparse in ownership, and from 2011-2016 many miners declined 80-90%, showing brutal volatility that discouraged public participation in gold equities.
“the ownership of gold mining stocks is very sparse...from 2011 and 2016, these miners were down like 80 and 90%. Many of them. It's brutal.”
Meb Faber operates the Meb Faber Show podcast and has written a coffee table book titled 'Investing in America: The Rise of a 250-Year Bull Market' releasing July 4th, which covers U.S. financial history.
“I'm sitting down with some of the most notable historians, thinkers, and investors in US financial history, all tied to my new coffee table book, Investing in America, The Rise of a 250-Year Bull Market, out July 4th.”
Gold went from $2,800 to $5,600 in 18 months to 2 years, then dropped to $4,400, showing unpredictable volatility and demonstrating that 'you never know' and markets can behave unexpectedly.
“Why did it go from 2800 to 5600 in about 18 months or 2 years? Well, because I don't know. I mean, the conditions were there for it to That was So, you never know. And So, now it's 4400 down in the percentage.”