
Greg Jensen on the Risks He's Seeing in the Current Environment
What this covers
This is a 23-minute talk by Greg Jensen, co-CIO of Bridgewater, recorded at the SALT New York forum on September 12, 2022. It is a single speaker laying out the risks he sees and how Bridgewater is set up to handle them. He gives a historical frame: a 1982–2008 stretch of falling rates and rising private debt, then a post-2008 period in which quantitative easing moved that debt onto government balance sheets, then a post-COVID mix of fiscal policy and monetary policy that pushed demand past supply. His claim is that policymakers are now boxed in and cannot deliver both low inflation and reasonable growth.
The middle of the talk is regional. Jensen argues Europe is more exposed than the US because of its manufacturing base and energy intensity, and that the energy shock from the Russia-Ukraine conflict is larger and longer-lasting than COVID. Because US companies earn about half their revenue abroad, he says contagion will reach the US. He calls the UK's approach of printing money into rising inflation a dangerous formula that has failed before. On the US, he says post-COVID liquidity stayed there rather than spreading globally. He estimates that roughly 40 percent of the US stock market depends on new money rather than its own cash flow. Some Latin American markets, with more disciplined policy and resources the developed world needs, are cast as relative bright spots.
Several forecasts are contentious. He expects a long, roughly three-year recession rather than a sharp one. He thinks the worst phase comes when earnings fall while rates are still rising, and that the market will only react to Europe once the crisis is close, which he puts within a couple of months. He also says bottoms form when people see the downturn as permanent. The closing portion turns to Bridgewater's method: decades of written game plans turned into decision rules, a fund not dependent on rising markets, and advice to keep strategic allocation separate from tactical timing. He adds that long-horizon investors should be ready for bear markets as long as Japan's.
The speaker argues that markets are significantly mispricing the transition to a deglobalizing, de-financializing world with constrained policy options, making equities most vulnerable in the US as the center of financial liquidity, while opportunities exist in disciplined emerging markets and cash-generative assets.
- Markets are priced for pre-COVID normalization with 2.7% inflation and normal earnings growth, which is impossible given structural deglobalization and energy constraints
- The US equity market sits at the center of the post-COVID liquidity bubble and faces the highest drawdown risk as central banks tighten
- Assets without intrinsic cash flows (40% of US market, cryptocurrencies) require continuous new liquidity to maintain prices and will face the sharpest declines
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Most investors should separate their strategic long-term asset allocation from their tactical timing decisions, allocating to a balanced strategic portfolio (all-weather) while making disciplined deviations from that allocation based on shorter-term forecasts (alpha).
“most investors like what Bridgewater did which is an important thought and now more people agree on but is separating your strategic asset allocation from what we call Alpha from your timing decisions right...all weather reflects a strategic asset allocation or best thinking on that and pure Alpha reflects all of the timing decisions...they're very different most people need a mix they need a good strategic asset allocation and then they need to know how to deviate from that strategic asset allocation in a disciplined way”
The biggest areas of concern for systematic modeling going forward are geopolitical risks and the growing impact of fiscal policy and regulatory policy on economies, requiring new data collection and process building to manage these risks systematically rather than through reactive, spur-of-the-moment decisions.
“I'd say the biggest areas of concern right now are the geopolitical risks are the risks associated with let's say government higher government involvement in economies and how do you build that out those types of things gather the data you need to make wise decisions associated with it put those into processes that you could stress test and then manage so that you're not making spur of the moment decisions”
Long-term investors with a 5-year or longer time horizon need to understand that their assets could experience extended bear markets like Japan's 20-25 year bear market and need to prepare psychologically and strategically for this possibility rather than assuming rapid recovery.
“you got to know that your assets could go down for five years but to have a consistent return stream to make money in Bear markets and bear markets even though there have been so few of them and they've been so short over the last 30 years they can go on for a long time you can be in Japan and you can have a 20 25 year bear Market you have to know that's a possibility and you have to prepare for that”
Bridgewater's advantage is that unlike most funds, it doesn't need to be long-biased or dependent on rising markets—the fund's fate doesn't hinge on equity or bond market direction but rather on its ability to forecast market moves, allowing it to profit equally whether assets rise or fall.
“now of course in Bridgewater shoes one of the reasons I love it is we don't have to be long we don't have to our our Our Fate does not hinge on what the equity Market or the bond market does it hinges on our ability to predict what the next few to drop is we're just as easy for us to make money when assets go up or assets go down”
Markets are currently mispricing the expectation that inflation will fall to under 3 percent within 18 months without a significant recession, and that earnings will continue to grow at a relatively normal rate, when in reality we are still in the early phase of dealing with a radically different world than pre-COVID characterized by rapid deglobalization, de-financialization, and energy constraints.
“I think the biggest mistake price data markets right now is the belief that we're going to return to essentially pricing similar to pre-covet that inflation is expected in markets to come down to a little under three percent over the next 18 months or so and that um that'll happen without much of a recession so earnings are priced to continue to grow at a relatively normal rate from here so I think that is probably the biggest mistake being priced in”
US corporations have 50 percent of their revenues outside the US, so European problems will spill directly into the United States, making it impossible for the US to avoid European contagion.
“directly the problems of Europe will spill in because U.S corporations need Europe you have a shrinking World in a sense of Russia's offline China is less online et cetera Europe's obviously critical to U.S corporations 50 of which revenues are outside of the U.S so a of course the U.S can't avoid that”
In an inflationary environment, typical downturns are much longer than sharp ones because policy makers can't respond as they normally would, suggesting a likely three-year recession rather than a sharp fast downturn.
“a typical cycle though in an inflationary environment is much longer downturns because policy makers can't respond as they normally would to a downturn so if you look at history this would normally be something like a three-year recession rather than a sharp fast one because the policy response will be slower to the downturn that's emerging”
Europe's economy is much more so than the US based on manufacturing and relative energy intensity, and the current energy crisis from the Russia-Ukraine conflict is a bigger and more lasting shock than COVID was.
“Europe's economy is much more so than the U.S based on manufacturing and Rel and having access to the energy particularly in Germany that they had this is a big jolting shock like in the end bigger or more lasting than covid was for sure”
The UK government's experiment of printing money into a rising inflation environment to offset negative household effects has been tried before and failed historically, and the formula is quite dangerous.
“the idea that that the UK kind of experiment here which is all right we're going to fund the households on their electricity and we're going to do this that experiment's been tried that you can print money into a rising inflation environment to offset the negative effects and odds are it fails”
It gets scarier when everybody thinks the downturn is not a temporary blip but a more permanent phenomenon; that's when the bottom starts to come in.
“it'll get scared when scary when everybody thinks it's not a temporary blip but a more permanent phenomenon that's when the bottom will start to come in”
A 30-year phase from 1982 to 2008 was characterized by lower interest rates and higher private sector debt, followed by 2008 to COVID where private sector debt shifted onto government balance sheets through quantitative easing, and then fiscal and monetary policy created an explosive mix of demand outstripping supply post-COVID that generated inflation—meaning policy makers are now constrained and cannot achieve both low inflation and reasonable growth simultaneously.
“just like the phase you have a 30-year phase from 1982 to 2008 of lower interest rates and higher private sector debt you had a fees from 2008 basically up to covid of the shift of private sector debt onto the government balance sheets through quantitative easing and then you have fiscal policy and monetary policy come together and to create an explosive mix of demand outstripping Supply post covid that led into this inflationary environment which is a challenge for policy makers where they no longer can get what they want which is essentially low inflation and reasonable growth”
The UK and Europe face a structural policy dilemma where they must either crush demand through higher interest rates and lower asset prices or ration demand through a very strong government hand—both politically very difficult—while simultaneously battling currency weakness, economic weakness, and inflation problems, which the markets are still looking past.
“Balance payments challenges that face and Europe also faces these terrible choices in the end to handle a crisis like this you either have to crush demand through higher interest rates and lower asset prices or ration demand through a very strong government hand both of those are politically very difficult things to do so they face this incredibly bad dilemma that the markets are still kind of looking past”
US assets are the most elevated in valuation in part because US companies have been the best performing, but also critically because the liquidity post-COVID got stuck in the United States rather than distributed globally as it did post-financial crisis, making the US the center of the financial bubble.
“the U.S assets are the most elevated in part because the companies have been best performing but but also because the liquidity postcovid got stuck in the United States so much money was printed it didn't go all over the world the way it did post-financial Crisis for reasons I won't take the time to get into now but the U.S is the center of the bubble of the financial bubble and it is um the most at risk of the pulling of liquidity that's happening now at an increasing pace”
Approximately 40 percent of the US stock market does not generate cash flows sufficient to support its own asset price appreciation and instead requires new liquidity from new investors, so without new liquidity these assets' prices will fall, creating a bifurcation between self-sustaining assets and liquidity-dependent assets.
“something like 40 percent of the U.S stock market require new liquidity in order to drive up their prices without new liquidity their prices fall”
Places in Latin America have pursued more disciplined monetary and fiscal policy than the US, have significant opportunities, have many of the resources the developed world needs, and have been held back by underinvestment due to COVID and other factors, making them relatively attractive opportunities in a tightening world.
“there are places in the world that are having very different Cycles than the US the UK Europe are and I think that it's interesting actually a lot of police in Latin America where they've had much more disciplined monetary and fiscal policy than the US have a lot of opportunities have a lot of what the develop world needs have been held back by the lack of investment due to covet and other things that made it more difficult”
In a tightening world with rising risk premiums and declining liquidity, it's difficult everywhere, but there's a big difference between equities that generate cash to support their asset values and equities that require ongoing liquidity.
“it's difficult into a tightening world and a world of rising risk premiums and declining liquidity it's going to be difficult everywhere but I think there's areas there there's certainly areas in commodity assets that particularly that have been under invested in that are less growth sensitive that are also reasonable Longs as well and just coming back to the thing I was saying before there's a big difference between equities that generate the cash to support their asset values and the equities that require the ongoing liquidity so the first category we think you could still own a reasonably attractive prices”
The private sector-focused world hit its limits in terms of corporate power and wealth distribution, leading to a transition to a more government-controlled economy and government-controlled world.
“we've we've pushed the world we had such a private sector focused world that hit its limits in terms of corporate power wealth distribution Etc and that you've moved to a more government-controlled economy in a more government-controlled World these things happen in phases”
The Fed currently has an easy time talking tough about inflation because unemployment is at 3.7%, but inflation will stay stubbornly higher than markets expect as growth turns down, and that's when things get really tricky—the more risky part of the downturn is when earnings are falling and rates are still rising.
“you have a 3.7 unemployment rate it's easy for the FED to talk tough about inflation what I think will happen um going forward is you're going to have inflation staying stubbornly higher than than markets are expecting as growth starts to turn down that's when it gets really tricky and that's what's going to create in our view sort of the the more risky part of the downturn when it becomes clear that earnings are falling and rates are still not falling and rates are rising”
The worst part of the market downturn is still ahead, occurring when earnings clearly fall while interest rates continue rising rather than falling—a scenario that resembles stagflation and is historically very damaging for equities.
“that's the period if you look at history or whatever that when you when you can't get what you want you face that...the more risky part of the downturn when it becomes clear that earnings are falling and rates are still not falling and rates are rising”
Markets, despite widespread discussion of European crisis risks, are not pricing them in because many asset holders are so permanent and index-based that they don't react to even changing conditions happening in real time.
“if you look at the market pricing the market pricing hasn't adjusted mainly because so many of the holders of assets are so permanent they're so index based they're not reacting to even changing conditions that are right in our phase”
Markets didn't react to COVID impacts until the crisis landed in the US, and similarly the market won't react to the European crisis until it's deeply upon us, which the speaker expects to occur within a couple of months.
“if you take last year where the problems of inflation and everything were so obviously building and the markets didn't react until this year it does seem like there's a decent chance that the Market's not going to react to the European crisis until it's deeply upon us which I think is the next couple months”
Asset prices are still quite high relative to historical standards and the recent decline is quite small relative to the change in underlying fundamental conditions, so there is significantly more downside to come.
“in historical standards asset prices are still quite high that decline is quite small and relative to the change in the underlying fundamental conditions in our view there's a lot more to come”
Big trends include monetary and fiscal easiness (printing money, fiscal spending) leading to higher inflation, occurring simultaneously with de-globalization and countries like Russia coming offline and China becoming isolated from Western countries.
“those big trends of monetary and monetary easiness printing of money fiscal spending increasing leading to a higher inflation and at the same time those big trends include the de-globalization after a 40-year globalization wave going through deglobalization Russia coming offline China more and more becoming isolated at least from the Western countries”
Bridgewater has spent 42 years writing down game plans for every conceivable event (war, inflation changes, growth scenarios, etc.) and translating those into decision rules and algorithms, allowing the investment team to focus all effort on what they might be missing rather than on basic decision frameworks.
“we haven't been for 42 years at the hard work of writing down a game plan for every event of thinking through what are the how would you want to react if there's a war if inflation Rises to this if growth does this if gold does that how do you react to all of those things right and and having you translated that into decision rules that we use to trademark the markets the great benefit is we could spend all our effort on what are we missing right”
Systemization in investment process does not mean starting with available data and asking what can be systematized, but rather starting with what problem needs to be solved and then gathering the relevant data necessary to make good quality decisions about that problem.
“we don't start with well what data can we get now with systemize we start with what problem do we face how do we get the relevant data so that we can make good quality decisions about that problem”
Bridgewater maintains a weekly 600-page research document ('what's going on the world packet') that identifies things the firm might be wrong about, called 'blips on the radar' that could pose existential risks to their performance, which drives real-time learning and process improvement.
“if you talk about the what's going on the world packet that we do every every Monday in 600 pages is everything that we're thinking we might be wrong about it we call it our radar because it's like blips on the Radar Radar that could sink the ship”