
The Man Who Proved Speed Kills Slow Companies | George Stalk Jr.
What this covers
This is a conversation between Shane Parrish and George Stalk Jr., the strategist behind Competing Against Time and, earlier, the "hardball" approach to competition. It begins with how Stalk came to the subject. At BCG he found a Japanese factory one-third the size of Ford's plants, with three times the product variety and twice the productivity, which contradicted the scale-and-focus advice the firm was giving clients. From there the talk covers how Time-Based Competition works, why quality has to come first (rework consumes time), and why a focused factory is easier to speed up. The example for focus is Wausau Paper leaving commodity grades for specialty ones.
A long middle stretch is about ownership and time horizons. Stalk says public-company managers work to a horizon of about three years, and he uses Clayton Christensen's argument that managers serve the shareholders they have. He sets this against Japanese firms that reinvested rather than taking maximum profit, and against family companies. Toyota counts as one even though it is listed, he says, because the family steps in when things go wrong. Shane adds the Carnegie and Rockefeller pattern of holding dry powder for downturns. Stalk also says a crisis must be big enough before people will accept cultural change, and he calls for a culture aimed at beating named rivals, as with Komatsu and Caterpillar. That last position is flagged as contested.
The later sections move to retail, operations and software. They cover Walmart's attack on K-Mart, returns as a brand differentiator, and the Heavy Spender Phenomenon, in which 20% of customers produce 80% of volume and specialty shops keep them away from Amazon. Stalk argues that cost drivers matter more than accounting costs. He treats Variance Management as the companion to speed, citing Southwest Airlines. He reads the Bullwhip Effect in the pandemic supply chain as a system-level problem that can't be fixed at ground level. The closing sections apply small-batch thinking to agile software and discuss where just-in-time and lean manufacturing fit.
Stalk argues that time-based competition—delivering what customers want faster than competitors—is the most powerful and underutilized competitive advantage, with cascading effects on cost, quality, capital efficiency, and organizational culture that reshape entire industries.
- Time as a managed variable reveals hidden waste (95% of process time adds no value) and enables simultaneous cost reduction and quality improvement
- Speed compounds across all dimensions: faster competitors grow faster, are more profitable, require less capital, and create cultural advantages that slow competitors cannot replicate
- Family-owned and private companies structurally outperform public companies not through longer time horizons alone, but through risk-averse positioning enabled by ownership alignment that allows exploitation of disruptions public competitors cannot afford to pursue
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The supply chain crisis is a system-level phenomenon: a complex system was disturbed by lockdowns, causing the bullwhip effect (oscillations throughout the system) where factories over/underproduce and inventories swing between stockouts and overstocks, and these oscillations cannot be fixed from ground level—instead, organizations must 'fight in the air' by minimizing their exposure.
“the supply chain crisis is a system phenomena. We have a very complex system that was working fairly smoothly and then it was disturbed. Uh it was disturbed by government lockdowns... when a system that's complex is disturbed, it has uh a response that's often called the bullwhip effect. But basically, all parts of the system start to oscillate.”
The size of a crisis must be large enough for management to accept organizational and cultural change; without sufficient threat, people prefer certain doom to uncertain survival.
“The size of the crisis has to be big enough for management to be willing to take on the organization, take on the culture. I had the experience of turning around a a client's factory... In the end, uh 80% of management turned over cuz they couldn't handle the changes.”
The biggest challenge for public companies competing against private companies is managing risk in a way that doesn't require explaining every decision to shareholders, something private companies can do without scrutiny.
“I think that's the biggest challenge for a public company against a private company is how can I manage the risk How can I in a public company maintain a risk profile that's easy for a private company to be in take cuz they don't have to explain to anybody.”
When looking at an organization through the lens of time, quality problems become visible because they result in rework, which consumes time; therefore, to be faster than competitors, an organization must be higher quality.
“It's cost, time, and quality, because if one is looking at an organization through the through the lens of time, one will see where the quality problems are. Uh because anytime one has a quality problem, whether it's manufacturing or in a uh an information business, it means rework. Anytime you have rework, it means lost time. And so for people to be faster than competitors at the other they have to be higher quality.”
The relationship between focus and time is direct: a focused factory (10 product lines) is more easily made faster than an unfocused factory (50 product lines) because focused factories have fewer batches, fewer processing steps, and simpler management.
“If I'm going to speed speed up both factories, if I want to be twice as fast, it's actually more it's more doable in the 10 product line factory than it is in the 50 product line factory. There's more complexity in the two product line factory. There's more batches. There's more distinct processing uh steps.”
Most successful time-based competition situations require starting with focus—deciding which products to emphasize—before pursuing speed, as Wausau did by abandoning commodity papers for specialty papers.
“Most of our our very successful time-based competition situations, one has to start with focusing the organization deciding which products we want to focus on. Wausau, we decided we're going to focus on specialties. Yeah. We could have decided to focus on com- commodities. We would have gotten killed.”
Sears was picked as a preferred shopping destination by women specifically because of its generous return policy, demonstrating that returns can be a brand differentiator in retail.
“I interviewed a bunch of women uh about different kinds of products. And Sears, which I never thought of as a woman's place to shop, was picked out as a place these people like to go to because they had a a great return policy. Made it easy to return products.”
Family companies with involved owners behave differently from family companies with non-involved, absentee owners, requiring different management structures: involved owners provide oversight that prevents agency problems, while non-involved owners must rely on incentive alignment.
“Family companies that bring in professional management fall into two groups. Uh one is uh a uh an involved owner group and one is a non-involved owner group. In the involved owner group, I may bring in non-professional managers, but I'm watching them closely cuz I still own the business. In a non-involved ownership group, I might just be very happy to let turn this whole thing over to to person A and let them run run the business.”
The one-sentence definition of time-based competition is giving your customers what they want when they want it, where they want it, faster than your competitors can do it.
“The one sentence description of time based competition or competing as time is giving your customers what they want when they want it, where they want it, faster than your competitors can do it.”
Know your cost better than your competitors know their costs because most companies only know accounting costs (between revenues and profit) but don't understand the underlying cost drivers; penetrating this knowledge enables cost-based competitive strategies like selective market share gains in high-volume, low-apparent-profit customer segments that actually have superior unit economics.
“the one that always works is know your cost better than your competitors know their cost. Cuz most people don't know their cost... They think they do. They know the cost that gets between the revenues and the profit line. But they don't know what it happens behind and those are all averages and they don't go behind the averages... some customers are more profitable and some are less profitable.”
Japanese companies in the 1960s-1990s chose not to take maximum profits immediately, instead reinvesting to grow the business and increase future profits—a strategy only possible with patient shareholders who accept lower returns now for higher returns later, contrasting with American public companies where shareholders demand profits sooner rather than later.
“what happened in the '60s, '70s, and '80s, and '90s with Japan, is the Japanese didn't want to be profitable right now... they wanted to grow the business, but they didn't want to be profitable at at an obscene level. And you butt that up against a system uh that has public shareholders, they want their profits sooner rather than later... The two systems work perfectly well together. Cuz the Japanese take they get the growth, they invest to get the growth, and they they public usually American companies give it up.”
Toyota is a family company despite being publicly traded because when things go wrong, the family gets involved; a family member (typically with a T in their name) leads the recovery, demonstrating that ownership structure, not public listing, determines company behavior.
“Toyota is a family company. It's also a you know, public company. But when things go wrong at Toyota, the family gets involved. It's not the whole family, but usually it's usually started with a T in the in their name.”
High-end specialty retailers like ski equipment shops, shoe boutiques, and model airplane suppliers capture heavy spenders because they provide selection, expertise, and service that Amazon cannot replicate, and heavy spenders do not buy from Amazon because they need human expertise, niche selection, and direct relationships.
“I don't buy your ski equipment from Amazon. No. No, no. Do you even look at ski equipment on Amazon? No. I don't either... there's only a few places I can find the stuff I want to purchase these airplanes... So, I'm a heavy spender in that category. I can't really use much of my current distribution system cuz it's made up for dealing with large volumes selling large volume stores.”
Southwest Airlines is a company that has taken variance out of its operations—low variance in aircraft type, crew assignments, and schedules—enabling fast recovery from disturbances.
“Southwest Airlines, that's why I mentioned Airlines earlier. Um has very low variance and is performing. Yeah. Low variance in in schedules they have low variance in and the planes they operate they have low variance in the crew assignments. Uh they've taken a lot of the variance out. They recover from disturbances much faster than than the other competitors.”
Historically successful companies (Carnegie, Rockefeller) maintained dry powder, waited for downturns, and deployed capital aggressively during crises to acquire competitors—but this pattern doesn't occur in modern public companies due to structural inability to hold capital and accept short-term performance hits.
“if you look at history, I mean, most of the successful companies, if you go back to Carnegie or Rockefeller, they were always playing offense. So, they always had dry powder... they inevitably waited for downturns, and then took advantage of them.”
Agile software development is a version of time-based competition applied to software: instead of 18-24 month waterfall cycles (large batches), agile uses short iteration cycles (small batches) with frequent releases, reducing time-to-market and improving product-market fit through rapid feedback.
“the whole agile thing that's going on is very much of a version of time-based competition at the factory translated to software... a software development facility at software very much behaves like an operate a people operating system in a factory.”
Returning at Walmart requires standing in line for 45 minutes to an hour, making the time cost of returning items higher than the item's value, so customers give away merchandise instead of returning it.
“Whereas Walmart where you you go and you stand in line for like 45 minutes to an hour. And so, if you if you factor in a cost of time for you to return something, it's I don't return it. I give it away. It's not even worth returning half the time.”
Family-owned businesses, rather than public companies, are the most characteristic ownership model globally—dominant in Brazil, Argentina, Philippines, Indonesia, and Japan—and the oldest surviving companies in the world (e.g., Kikkoman in Japan) are family-owned, suggesting both longevity and survival advantages to the family model.
“the family own ownership profile is the most characteristic ownership around the world. Not public companies... Go to Argentina, which I've done. Very few public companies. They're all private. Go to Asia. The Philippines and Indonesia, there's very, very few public companies. It's all families. The oldest companies in the world are family companies. In Japan, Kikkoman is hundreds of the family-owned companies hundreds of years old.”
The 'heavy spender phenomenon' in retail: 20% of customers account for 80% of volume and have different needs than the 80% of customers accounting for 20% of volume—heavy spenders want more choice, better product understanding, and positive customer experience (e.g., pleasant returns process).
“the heavy spender phenomena is that 20% of the customers at a retail store account for 80% of the volume. And what's so special about those customers? Turns out those customers have a different need than the 80% of the customers that account for 20% of the volume. Those 20% of the customers that account for 80% of the volume want more choice. They want more understanding of the product. Um they want a positive touch feel with the consumer.”
Corporate culture should embody a competitive orientation focused on defeating specific competitors rather than vague customer service, as seen in Komatsu's 'Baru Cat' (encircle Caterpillar) sign at headquarters and Amazon's 'your gross margin is my target' strategy.
“An analog to family is a tribe and people understand what part of it what part of what organization they're a member of. And I can tell you people at Caterpillar know they're competing with Komatsu. Komatsu has a sign that says 'Baru Cat' over its uh headquarters door. Baru Cat means encircle Caterpillar. And that becomes part of the culture.”
Dell's fast supply chain enabled it to offer products with latest technology sooner than HP because faster throughput meant lower tech obsolescence risk (inventory depreciates technologically every day); Dell could update its product line while HP was still moving older-generation inventory, creating a technology perception gap.
“Dell was because it had uh fast throughput times for its equipment, could could offer products with the latest technology um sooner to the end consumer... Dell could be introducing products with more up-to-date technology while uh while HP was still trying to get products from the old through its supply chain.”
Toyota's production system recovers much faster from disturbances (e.g., the J valve factory fire) than traditional manufacturing because of time orientation; Toyota had the J valve factory (95% of brake system supply) back online in 2 weeks despite conventional wisdom that such dependency would be fatal.
“Toyota has a time orientation... They had something called a J valve factory in Japan burn down... it supplied 95% of the J valves... and they couldn't make cars... They this thing up and running again in 2 weeks.”
Software releases involve delayed feedback loops due to device variety and fragmentation; even if developers can ship software instantly, testing across billion device configurations (but only ~10 significant variables) creates delays; incompatibility with older platforms requires maintaining legacy versions in parallel, extending time-to-innovation.
“the variety of devices that it's going to, which is one of the reasons that I think that Apple's has started to sunset some of their their older devices because you can't releasing an update that works across technology that was invented like 12, 15 years ago is really hard.”
Public company managers have a time horizon of approximately 3 years, with average CEO tenure less than 5 years, driving investment decisions focused on producing returns within this window, which frequently means trading long-term value for short-term performance and creating vulnerability to private competitors with longer investment horizons.
“public companies, I would say with with only a few exceptions, people's time horizon is about 3 years. Manager's time horizon is helping. The average CEO tenure is less than 5 years right now. And so, they're looking for their investments to produce rewards that they can be compensated for in a shorter time horizon. Which increasingly puts them trading tomorrow for today.”
Clayton Christensen (deceased Harvard professor) argued that managers perform to satisfy the shareholders they want to satisfy; if shareholders trade shares frequently, managers must have short-term performance orientation; if shareholders buy-and-hold, managers can have longer-term orientation.
“Clayton Christensen is who was a professor at Harvard. He's dead now, unfortunately. Made some really strong arguments that you perform to the shareholders you want to satisfy... If they're going to, you know, buy and hold, uh I'm I need to understand that, so I can have a longer-term view of the business.”
BCG was advising clients that competitive advantage came from scale and focus (larger scale = lower variable costs; focus = lower complexity and overhead), but found a counterexample where a Japanese factory was one-third the size, had three times the product variety, and was twice as productive as Ford factories, contradicting the scale-and-focus theory.
“we were telling clients there's two things you need to go for. You need to go for scale... and you need to stay focused... the focus factory that's big was the winning factory. And in this example we had a Japanese company a factory that was not as focused as the American factory, didn't have the volume of the American factory, and was twice as productive.”
Walmart's competitive advantage over Kmart was not primarily about low prices or in-store displays (the visible elements), but rather a logistics-based model focused on velocity of product movement: own trucking, weekly supplier deliveries on strict schedules, faster payments to suppliers, and flat distribution with store managers making localized decisions weekly, allowing product mix adjustment faster than Kmart's hierarchical approval process.
“Walmart was actually a logistics company. They concentrated on how fast can we move product from when our supplier gets it to us to when it leaves our store... They did that by having their own trucking, not outsourcing it. They did that by scheduling deliveries once a week instead of once every 2 weeks or once a month... they did that by incenting their suppliers to deliver to a very strict owner's schedule by paying the suppliers faster than their competitors paid them... Walmart was able to change its mix of product much more quickly to local market conditions than Kmart cuz at Kmart, you had to go up the hierarchy, get some decisions, come back down the hierarchy.”
Variance in supply chains comes from two sources: external disturbances (weather, closures) and self-generated turbulence from the system itself (bullwhip oscillations); fast supply chains (2-week cycles) have approximately 1/8 the variance of slow supply chains (8-week cycles) even without external disruption.
“variance comes from two sources. Uh it comes from changes in the out outer world, outside world... Or it could be self-generated... if you take two supply chains, uh one that has an 8-week time and one that has a 2-week time, uh the variability of the output at the one that's 2 weeks will be about 1/8 the variability of the other.”
Lean manufacturing and just-in-time (JIT) inventory are essentially the same phenomenon: small-batch, minimum material handling, self-scheduling manufacturing process pioneered by Toyota in the 1950s to compete with larger Nissan despite Toyota's lack of scale and product breadth.
“Lean manufacturing and just-in-time are from my experience are described in the same phenomena. The small batch uh minimum material handling self-scheduling uh manufacturing process that Toyota pioneered in the '50s. And interestingly enough, it was a solution that Toyota had to come up with to compete with Nissan. Cuz in the '50s Nissan was Japan's largest car company. And Toyota was just getting into cars.”
Managing supply chain variance is a mindset shift, not yet mainstream management practice; Canadian Tire uses 'flow casting'—daily monitoring of each supply chain element to identify and fix variances—but most managers haven't adopted this approach yet because it requires prior adoption of the time mindset.
“most people don't think they can manage the variance of the supply chain... Canadian Tire is a perfect example. They use something called flow casting... they're looking at each element of their supply chain and trying to figure out how it's doing, where where the variances are, and then where they have problems, they throw people at it and get it fixed.”
Private companies outperform public companies not because they have longer time horizons, but because their performance curve over business cycles (upturns and downturns) is less volatile—they don't spike as high in booms or crash as low in downturns—and the area under the performance curve is greater over a full cycle, making private companies more profitable on a cycle-averaged basis.
“the family companies were not as high-performing on profitability in the upturns of the market, but nor were they as poor-performing as public companies in the downturns... if you take those two curves, you take one curve which is the public company's goes up really high and it goes out really low... the area under the private company's performance is greater than the public company's. So, my answer in that respect is the private companies are more profitable.”
The number of public companies traded on US stock exchanges has been cut in half due to leveraged buyout (LBO) firms taking companies private, indicating a structural shift where the private company model is becoming the predominant ownership model in the US, while globally the family-owned business model is already dominant.
“the number of companies traded on the US stock exchanges that are public are down by half. Half of these companies are gone in numbers. They've been taken private by the LBO firms... the private model of ownership is becoming the predominant model of ownership... the family own ownership profile is the most characteristic ownership around the world. Not public companies.”
Batching (processing work in large groups rather than continuously) accounts for roughly one-third of the 95% wasted time in organizations, with another third going to batches queued and waiting to be processed, and the final third going to managing the batch flow.
“of that 95% of the time that's wasted, about a third of it goes to being in a batch. About a third of it goes into being in a batch that isn't being worked on yet, but it's been scheduled. And a third of it goes into managing all the batches.”
Families grow exponentially while businesses usually don't, creating a structural problem: the pie can get larger but per-person family wealth shrinks in absolute terms if business growth is slower than family growth, creating challenges for distributing inherited ownership across generations.
“families grow exponentially. Businesses don't grow usually exponentially. And so there's many cases where the pie gets bigger, but but but the per-person share of the pie actually in absolute terms goes down. Cuz the business isn't isn't growing fast enough to take care of the family.”
Private company managers receive compensation on current performance but also have deferred compensation waiting to be taken through inheritance or company sale, creating fundamentally different time-horizon incentives compared to public company managers who receive all compensation from current performance.
“the managers of a private public companies are being compensated on current performance. Sometimes they're compensated on multi-year performance, but not very often. Uh where the family companies are compensated on current performance, uh but there's a big chunk of compensation waiting to be taken in the future uh through inheritance or or sale of the company.”
A company with significant capital on the balance sheet is considered 'bloated' in public markets but represents 'positioning for multiple possible futures' in private markets—the ability to move when conditions change rather than being forced into reactive positions.
“if you're uh if your company has a lot of capital, in the public market that might be considered like a bloated balance sheet, but in the private market, that's positioning for multiple possible futures. If we have a lot of cash on the balance sheet, we can go where the wind's going, instead of be forced into positions.”
Anomalies in business (unusual patterns that deviate from normal behavior) are opportunities to discover new competitive strategies, but most management teams don't investigate them—they simply explain them away, missing chances to identify emerging threats or growth models.
“anomaly is always a great opportunity to find a new way of doing business, but most management teams don't take the time to understand anomalies. They just explain them away.”
Zappos turned returns into a marketing advantage by making the process simple and low-friction (prepaid return labels, no restocking fees), positioning returns as customer risk-reduction rather than cost-center—in contrast to Walmart's complex return policy that discouraged returns through friction.
“Zappos is one of the first companies I ran across where they use returns as a marketing opportunity... Zappos was buy what you think you need and send the rest back... Walmart... their return policies... was astoundingly complex... And Zappos was buy what you think you need and send the rest back.”
Working capital productivity (accounts receivable + inventory - accounts payable) is a useful metric to identify where time-based improvements can be made; when working capital is high, it often indicates time problems (inability to ship on schedule, incomplete orders delaying shipment) that can be addressed by improving operational speed.
“it turns out if you take a look at an organization's working capital productivity and find out where it's being dragged down, almost always it has something to do with time... Why can't they ship the product on time? Uh cuz it's not All parts of the product order aren't available.”
Family-involved business ownership (where owners directly manage) expects the business to last more than one generation (40+ years) and potentially through third or fourth generation (60-80 years), which shapes investment decisions toward long-lived assets and businesses that will retain value across extended timeframes.
“a family involved business expects to see them last more than one generation. Expects the next generation to take over the business... If you expect it to go a third or fourth generation, we're saying, 'How do we keep this thing going for 60 to 80 years?' And what that does translate into is a is I may want to get that investment in certain type of business or asset um because it will have that longevity.”
Management teams rarely embrace variance management even when presented with evidence, as shown when the head of Grainger Canada said 'I like what you're saying. I know it's right. I can't do it,' indicating it will take 10+ years for variance management to become mainstream.
“So so at some point somebody will say, 'I like what you're saying. I know it's right. And I'm going to do it.' Southwest Airlines, that's why I mentioned Airlines earlier... So they're they're on the way. They'll figure it out. Uh but I don't think I'll in my lifetime I'm going to see a company step back and say, 'Okay, now I got cost, quality, time, and variance under under control.'”
Introducing phantom stock plans (internal equity compensation without voting rights) to non-family management in family companies converts them into quarterly-performance-focused behavior similar to public companies, potentially destroying the family company's risk-averse culture that has enabled its superior long-term performance.
“we had a case where they decided to put the 99% on a phantom stock performance plan, which converted them into a quarterly business behavior to meet their own internal goals to get their stock price up. So, you can actually wreck a family company's orientation by making it behave like a public company.”
Culture alone is not the starting point for competitive advantage, but rather a necessary condition to cement the outcome of a transformation; if an organization is losing due to uncompetitive culture, changing culture is extremely difficult, and the decision to sell may be preferable to attempting cultural transformation without underlying operational and strategic clarity.
“Do you think that cultures are the ultimate source of competitive advantage? I would say yes and no. On the yes part, it's hard if one's losing in part because one's culture is not competitive to an opponent's. Trying to make the culture competitive is really difficult... In that situation we the CEO decided to sell it. But it's not the starting point. I think it's necessary to bring in bring culture into the equation if there's a transformation process going on that one needs to cement the outcome.”
Value is only being added between 0.5% and 5% of the time in most organizations; the remaining 95%+ of time is wasted on non-value-adding activities, and this waste becomes visible only when organizations begin measuring and managing time as an explicit variable.
“most organizations if you if we look at at the time required to produce an output, either an insurance policy or or a manufactured product, if they're not looking at time as a management variable, value is only being added between a half a percent and 5% of the time. 95% of the time and more is wasted.”
In the Wausau Paper case, they discovered a high concentration of share in Chicago with a single distributor, which seemed anomalous; investigating revealed the distributor's real need: next-day delivery that reduced their working capital requirements ('if the truck's here tomorrow, we're friends; if not, we're not').
“the anomaly in Wausau's case was uh Wausau had a fairly high share of its paper business in Chicago... we went and visited the merchant. And the guy says... 'if there's a truck at my dock tomorrow morning, we're friends. If the truck isn't at the dock, we're not friends.'”
If a factory quadruples its speed (running at 25% of original cycle time), productivity typically improves by about 20% in cost terms, because the speed improvement comes from eliminating overhead (not direct labor), and the overhead savings approximate the cost reduction achieved.
“most often, what we see is that if you could speed up a factory or any kind of process by a factor four, in other words, it take 20% of the time, 25% of the time it used to take, productivity is about cost position is about uh 20% lower.”
To manage supply chain crisis exposure, companies can: order more frequently (even with premium cost), accept non-full containers, pay for priority unloading, pay for non-stop freight (e.g., train without stops)—all strategies that increase short-term logistics cost but reduce exposure to oscillations, providing competitive advantage if competitors don't adopt them.
“I can order more frequently. And pay whatever penalty it takes to get that... I can arrange containers that aren't full... I can pay a premium when it arrives to get off the ship first... I can pay a premium to put the the the box onto a train that doesn't stop.”
Most family companies Stalk works with take very little capital out of the business, retaining capital for growth and compounding; the wealth exhibited by family members often doesn't match dividend flows because they're not sustaining lifestyle on dividends but capturing wealth creation through business appreciation and reinvestment.
“I would say half of the family companies I work with uh take a very little out of the business. They keep a lot in. In fact, I'm always amazed to look at it at at some of these companies that the level of the wealth exhibited by the the family members doesn't match the dividend flows. So, they're not sustaining a lifestyle on dividends. What they're really doing is is taking advantage of the wealth creation that will happen over over time.”
The phrase 'keep your powder dry' (maintain cash reserves for contingencies, positive and negative) is frequently heard in family companies but rarely in public companies, indicating fundamentally different approaches to capital strategy and risk management.
“one of the phrases I I hear a lot in family companies, but rarely hear in public companies, is we got to keep our powder dry. And when I hear that phrase, what they're really saying is, 'I got to keep money in reserve for contingencies.' Both positive and negative contingencies.”
Competitors didn't understand what Wausau was doing (took 10 years) because they were inwardly focused and dismissed Wausau's success as a side show rather than a fundamental competitive threat, illustrating how anomalies in competitors' performance are often explained away rather than analyzed.
“it took I I saw it happen. It took 10 years for the leaders of the paper company paper industry to understand what Wausau was doing. In part this as you mentioned earlier, they they were too inwardly focused. They really didn't see what was happening. Or they dismissed it as a as a side show.”
Modern subscription services (New York Times) make cancellation harder than signup (easy 3-second online purchase, but cancellation requires week-long wait or hours on hold), missing opportunity to use one-click cancellation as a marketing advantage by reducing customer switching friction.
“you can buy a New York Times subscription in like 3 seconds online. But if you want to cancel it, which is effectively like a form of return, it'll take a week or like 2 hours on hold with customer service. Like it should be a click of a button.”
Implementing the Wausau Paper strategy required 80% management turnover because existing managers could not adapt to smaller batch processing, more frequent scheduling, and flexible manufacturing—they simply did not believe the new model would work, illustrating that cultural change in manufacturing requires either replacement of operators or deep belief change.
“it took a new CEO, took a new sales manager, took a new logistics guy... 80% of management turned over cuz they couldn't handle the changes. They couldn't run smaller batches. They couldn't more frequently schedule a facility. They just didn't believe it would work.”
Winners in business play rough and don't apologize for it, driven by the reality that all clients are either trying to preserve winning positions or survive, creating continuous battle conditions rather than opportunities for relaxation or cooperation.
“You said that winners in business play rough and don't apologize for it... all my clients were either winning and trying to preserve their winning position or they were having trouble, maybe even losing and trying to survive. So, that was a very very much a survival mode whether they were winners or losers.”
Women's lingerie manufacturer switched from ocean freight (1.5% of cost, weeks-long delivery) to air freight (4% of cost) when the gross margins were 90-95%, because avoiding stockouts/overstocks (which would destroy margin) was worth the 2.5% logistics premium, and they moved from 20% air freight to 90% air freight due to the margin protection benefits.
“if I'm willing to it accept almost a factor of three increase in my shipping costs to avoid a 95% cost of a stockout, I end up being a more profitable chain... They went from being... 20% oh I got to have it right away Yeah. to put it on a plane to 90% always on a plane now.”
Caterpillar's biggest current problem is dealership succession: most Caterpillar dealerships are family-owned, but children of owners often pursue other careers (law, etc.) rather than continue family businesses, creating a dealership availability crisis as family-owned dealers retire and cannot be easily replaced.
“Caterpillar's biggest problems right now? Is most Caterpillar dealerships are family owned... if your father is a Caterpillar dealer and you want to be a lawyer, the last thing you want to do is stop being a lawyer and go be a Caterpillar dealer... the families grow out of the business.”
Only three companies (Amazon, Walmart, and Toyota) are close to simultaneously managing cost, quality, time, and variance, and it may take another 10 years for variance management to become a mainstream management theory.
“At this point I said that's only maybe Amazon, Walmart, and Toyota are three companies I can imagine that are even close to that being able to do that. But it's the next big To me, it's the next big wave is variance, but it's so far out. I think the Grainger guy said, 'Come back in 10 years'”
Stanley Black & Decker made an early decision to stock up on raw materials during COVID lockdowns, which paid off immensely because they had inventory when supply was scarce and competitors couldn't produce; this was a bet that required visibility into the crisis and willingness to hold inventory that would appear 'bloated' on the balance sheet.
“Stanley Black & Decker was one of the companies that early on in COVID lockdowns that got put together as lockdowns that produced the problem of COVID... decided they were going to stock up. And it paid off immensely, but it's a it's a bet.”
Amazon has not entered the ticketing business (like Ticketmaster's) despite it being amenable to internet distribution with huge margins, suggesting either a strategic blind spot or a self-imposed boundary in business model expansion.
“What's surprising about Amazon though is they haven't gotten into the Ticketmaster's business. I still don't understand that. Cuz the margin at Ticketmaster's are huge and the business is amenable to the internet.”