
Alex Rosenberg on the Nature of Economics 09/26/2011
What this covers
Alex Rosenberg, a philosopher of science at Duke University, sits down with Russ Roberts to examine whether economics qualifies as a science and what separates it—in ambition and achievement—from fields like physics or biology. The conversation ranges across the discipline's evolution over the past quarter-century: the rise of experimental economics and behavioral economics, the formal proofs of general equilibrium from Walras through Debreu and Arrow, and Rosenberg's own shift in thinking about whether economics can move beyond generic predictions into specific quantitative ones. The core tension is that while microeconomics reliably predicts patterns—price controls cause shortages—it has never reliably predicted magnitudes: how large a shortage, when it will clear, what elasticity values will hold across time periods.
Rosenberg traces this predictive failure to intertemporal instability in demand curves, a phenomenon he connects to biological arms-race dynamics. Once one party adapts strategically to another, the selective environment shifts, driving new counter-adaptations. The same mechanism operates in markets: estimated elasticities become stale almost immediately, useless even when correctly calculated. The conversation explores what this means for economics' scientific standing. Rather than an absolute barrier, Rosenberg now suggests the problem may be one of degree—biology is becoming more predictive as computational power outpaces environmental change, but economics has not achieved that same advantage. The two also discuss the limited but genuine value of general equilibrium as a blueprint for institutional design, the role of philosophy of science in recognizing disciplinary anomalies, and Hayek's "The Use of Knowledge in Society" as a foundational argument that some economic knowledge may resist scientific formalization entirely.
Rosenberg argues that mainstream neoclassical economics, while a powerful blueprint for institutional design, has failed to advance from generic to specific quantitative predictions because the underlying relationships are intertemporally unstable—much like biological arms races—and that this predictive limitation may be a matter of degree rather than an absolute in-principle barrier.
- Economic theory has made no progress in moving from generic predictions (price controls cause shortages) to quantified, specific predictions
- Demand curves are intertemporally unstable, making estimated elasticities nearly useless for prediction
- The instability mirrors biological arms races of strategic interaction, but biology's predictive power is improving via computation while economics' is not
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Biological instability is fundamentally the arms-race instability of strategic interaction: in a stable environment, natural selection drives traits toward optimality, but once organisms become parts of each other's environments, each organism's trait becomes part of the selective environment of competitors, inciting variation and counter-adaptation—the same mechanism underlies economic instability.
“it's basically the arms race instability of strategic interaction... once biological phenomena begin to be parts of the environments of one another then each organisms trait becomes part of the environment of the other organisms that it's competing with and the result is that it incites variation”
Adam Smith's invisible hand—that each individual pursuing narrow self-interest produces an outcome beneficial to society—is the foundational idea economists have spent two centuries trying to formally prove, culminating in Walras, then Wald's 1930s proof, and finally Debreu and Arrow's late-1950s formal proof of the Pareto optimality of a unique stable general equilibrium.
“it was only Valle Ross who thought that he had finally proved it... and nothing until the late 50s until debreu and aro produced a formal truth of the Pareto optimality of of the unique and stable equilibrium in all prices that characterized the perfectly free market economy”
The failure of elasticity estimation admits three interpretations: that we need better techniques, that the theory is wrong, or—most radically (the Austrian/Hayekian view from 'The Use of Knowledge in Society')—that no predictively powerful science of human economic behavior is within reach of human beings.
“it might be even more radical conclusion that there is no such theory within reach of human beings that's of course the Austrian”
Those critical claims were accurate as descriptions of economics in the 1970s and mid-80s, but developments since—choice under uncertainty and asymmetric information (Akerlof), experimental economics (Vernon Smith), and the impact of Kahneman and Tversky's cognitive psychology—have made economics less susceptible to that critique.
“increased thought about the nature of choice under uncertainty and asymmetries of information characterized by the work for example of Achor loss most famously Oh interesting experimental economics that secured for Vernon Smith a Nobel Prize and most of all the impact of Kahneman and Tversky”
Thomas Kuhn's 'The Structure of Scientific Revolutions' is the most influential (though not necessarily the most important) work in the philosophy of science; most scientists do not find Kuhn's account of scientific progress persuasive, and the extreme relativist interpretation common in the humanities was one Kuhn himself rejected and was appalled by.
“tune himself rejected that interpretation and was appalled throughout the last 20 years of his life at the way in which his views had come to be interpreted”
A binding price ceiling below the market-clearing price produces a shortage and queues, with time and money jointly allocating the good so the full price (money plus time) actually rises—a robust generic prediction of microeconomics, even though there is not really one price of bread but many kinds with price variation.
“when price was below the market clearing price that that would result in a shortage and that in turn would usually... result in in lines in queues in waiting and the time would allocate the good along with money and that the full price would actually be higher”
Microeconomic theory has made no advances in the management of economic processes since its current formalism was first elaborated in the 19th century; like Euclidean geometry, calling economics a science does not make it one, and much of its history has consisted of improvements in deductive rigor and axiomatization rather than usefulness of results.
“the fact is that microeconomic Theory has made no advances in the management of economic processes since its current formalism was first elaborated in the 19th century”
The elasticity estimation program failed because demand curves are intertemporally unstable—once you establish an elasticity at a given time for a commodity, its usefulness for predicting consumer behavior in the next period is weak and gets weaker over subsequent periods, compounded by new products, new tastes, and shifting complementarities and substitutabilities, so that even correct calculations had no useful predictive value.
“the demand curves are interred temporarily unstable to the degree that once you establish one with elasticity's at a given time for a given commodity its usefulness in predicting consumer behavior in the next period is relatively weak n gets weaker as subsequent periods occur”
Economics is best understood as analogous to biology: a powerful way of thinking about complex interconnected systems, but one that cannot make precise quantitative predictions—just as we would never ask a biologist to predict the exact beaver population after cutting 20% of trees, we should not ask economics to predict that $820 billion in spending will create exactly 1.74 million jobs, especially since such predictions cannot be confirmed because too many other things change in the interim.
“just as we would never ask a biologist to predict how many beavers would be alive in an ecosystem if we chop down 20% of the trees... similarly we should not ask economics to do something it's incapable of doing which is if the government spends an extra eight hundred and twenty billion dollars it will create 1.7 million jobs”
The general equilibrium proof functions as a blueprint for institution design (in Buchanan and Tullock's sense): it shows the allocative efficiency of perfectly competitive markets, and 20th-century history provides strong empirical evidence that no alternative system of producing and distributing goods comes close to the free market, with some alternatives being catastrophically bad.
“the proof of the allocate of efficiency of perfectly competitive market which that equilibrium approach eventuates in is a blueprint for organizing complex human societies in such a way as to produce the largest quantity of what people really want”
Rosenberg has shifted his view: he used to believe it was impossible to move economics from generic to specific predictions, but now thinks it is merely extremely difficult—the obstacles in macroeconomics are of degree, not kind, with no in-principle philosophical, logical, or causal barrier to predictions analogous to biology's predator-prey relations.
“I used to believe that it was impossible to move economics from generic to specific predictions I'm now inclined to think it's just extremely difficult”
Biology and ecology are becoming increasingly predictive—we can reliably predict weather and population densities over seasons, and even predict likely DNA sequences selected for by a new pharmacology against mutant bacteria—because our calculating devices are improving faster than arms-race environmental changes, whereas none of that is true in economics.
“we can do this increasingly in biology we can even predict in some cases what's a likely DNA sequence that's going to be selected for by way of a a mutant bacterium... because our own calculating devices are improving faster than the arms race environmental changes and none of that is true in economics”
Economics may be approaching a Kuhnian revolutionary period: some economists (Paul Krugman being the best example) are pounding the table insisting there is a major bug in the discipline, and Kuhn's account of how normal science develops into revolution may help economists understand this is such a moment.
“there are some economists whom Paul Krugman is probably the best example who are pounding their hands on the table and insisting there's a big bad bug in our discipline”
The Great Moderation (roughly 1982–2008) was a local equilibrium between competing economic forces that eventually broke down in an arms race; the 2008 subprime crisis resulted from the computational powers of traders exploiting the heuristics of non-financial economic agents (who were seeking safe investments) reaching a point where those agents had to adopt the same tools as the people exploiting them.
“it was a local period of local equilibrium the between competing economic forces which eventually broke down in the arms race and it was the breakdown the breakdown is a subprime mortgage denim all of 19 of 2008 and that is the result of the technological computational powers of traders exploiting the heuristics of non non financial economic agents”
The efficiency framework—that intervention is justified whenever the competitive assumptions (no asymmetric information, no externalities, homogeneous goods) fail to hold—has given government a frequently useful rationalization for intervention that does not move toward efficiency but rather serves the politically powerful, which is the central insight of public choice theory.
“I think that's given government a frequently useful rationalization for intervention that doesn't move us toward efficiency but rather serves the politically powerful”
The equilibrium proof's assumptions (perfect divisibility, no information asymmetries, no externalities, constant returns to scale) provide guidelines for government intervention—breaking up monopolies, prohibiting insider trading, forcing polluters to internalize externalities—to secure greater approximation to allocative efficiency, but this is a limited argument that only underwrites institutional design, not actual prediction of events.
“these assumptions in effect provide guidelines for government intervention in order to secure greater approximation to allocate of efficiency either by breaking up monopolies or prohibiting insider trading or forcing polluters to internalize their externalities”
Government policy that made it harder for people to bear their losses (while keeping their gains) removed the natural market forces that would have made dangerous analytical tools less so; markets have a natural way of punishing exuberance and mistakes, but we have made it harder for markets to do that.
“I think government policy that made it harder for people to bear their losses and keep their gains particularly bear their losses remove the natural forces that would have made those analytical tools that were dangerous less so”
Economics has never moved from generic predictions (price controls produce queues and shortages) to specific quantitative predictions—how much of a shortage, when it will occur, how long until it is remediated, whether a surplus follows—a movement that is characteristic of meteorology, agriculture, and biology but has never been achieved in economics.
“the next natural step in the process of science is to quantify the prediction exactly much... how much of a shortage and when will the shortage obtain and how long will it take for the shortage to be remediated”
Mainstream neoclassical economics remains committed to general equilibrium as a touchstone, treating the dynamic economy as a series of price-quantity vectors constantly adjusting toward an equilibrium that never actually obtains—requiring a kind of intellectual schizophrenia.
“economics of mainstream neoclassical economics continues to be invested in the intellectual importance the explanatory role of general equilibrium even though it recognizes that that equilibrium never actually obtains awkward isn't it it's a it's a certain requires a certain intellectual schizophrenia”
No economist has ever successfully established the values of demand-curve parameters (elasticities, cross-elasticities, income elasticities) for a reasonable range of commodities over a reasonable time period, and we could have known in the 1940s why such projects cannot be accomplished.
“no economist has ever successfully established the values of those variables for a a reasonable range of commodities over a reasonable time period and that we now know indeed we could have known back in the 40s”
The philosophy of science's function is not to tell physicists or biologists what to do, but conceptual problems (best exemplified in biology, and in physics through the interpretation of relativity and quantum mechanics, influenced by Leibniz and Berkeley) attract philosophers who make real contributions; philosophers can help economists recognize they have an anomaly and identify blind alleys, but cannot supply the solution.
“it's not the function of the philosophy of science to tell physicists what to do... but there are problems in these disciplines and biology is probably the best example there are conceptual and that have attracted the interest of philosophers and in which philosophers have made considerable contributions”
Hayek's 'The Use of Knowledge in Society' (1945) is the single most important paper in the Austrian tradition and more important than The Road to Serfdom; Hayek deserves celebration as a great economist rather than the silly claims made on his behalf by conservatives and Republicans to sandbag economic responses to the current downturn.
“the reason that hike should be celebrated as a great economist and not silly claims made on his behalf by conservatives and Republicans to try to sandbag economic responses to our current political economic downturn”
The mainstream defense of equilibrium is that markets exhibit stability—a change in one price almost never produces a catastrophic explosion of all prices into chaos (the only known cases being hyperinflations like Weimar Germany)—so the assumption of stability is so well established that no serious theory can lack it as an implication.
“almost never will a change in one price result in a catastrophic explosion of all prices so as to produce chaos there's only time that we know of that this happens is in the hyperinflations of Weimar Germany”
Behavioral economics has made the discipline less axiomatic, but it has not made economics any more scientific in its ability to predict and measure; the discipline is only now trying to reshape its theory to take account of behavioral factors.
“that behavioral literature I don't see how it's made economics any more scientific in its ability to predict and measure”
In financial economics, the traditional Walrasian/neoclassical paradigm still dominates—figures like Eugene Fama and the Chicago freshwater school retain intellectual cachet, and equilibrium thinking remains central—even though the neoclassical approach is now more defensive than it was in the 1980s.
“in areas like financial economics the traditional ball rezian Postville regime neoclassical paradigm continues to be the dominant force if you look at the kind of intellectual cachet that people like Eugene fama have”
The Nobel Prize in economics was created for purely rhetorical reasons—it is economics inheriting science's prestige—but economics nonetheless remains an important arena of intellectual achievement where great genius has been labored.
“I'm not impressed by the fact that there's a Nobel Prize for it I know exactly why the Nobel Prize for it was created it is inherited Sciences pardoning it... there's a purely rhetorical role that it plays”
Adam Smith was not the first to have the insight that good things can come from self-interested motives—it appears in Mandeville and others—but he stated it in a way that resonated and understood it more deeply than his predecessors.
“he wasn't the first person to have that insight it it's a version of its in in Mandeville and other right but he said it in a way that resonated and stuck”
Ricardo Reis, a neo-Keynesian at Columbia and prior guest, claimed that economists have mastered monetary theory and need more time for fiscal theory and will eventually get there—a claim Roberts disagrees with, doubting that economics will reach that predictive capability.
“Ricardo rice guest on this program neo-keynesian at Columbia a first-rate scholar said we've mastered monetary theory we need more time for fiscal theory and what we'll get there eventually I think I disagree I don't think we'll get there”