Jeffrey Wasserstrom
What this covers
Jeffrey Wasserstrom speaks with Lex Fridman about how to read Xi Jinping's rule and the machinery of Chinese state control. Wasserstrom traces how Xi Jinping selectively fuses contradictory intellectual traditions—Mao Zedong's nationalist fervor alongside Confucius's hierarchical order—smoothing over internal tensions to serve a unified nationalist project. The conversation examines Mao Zedong and Xi Jinping in parallel: both cultivate personality cults, yet Xi Jinping inverts Mao Zedong's embrace of chaos with an obsession for stability and control. The practical machinery of this control—how information actually moves and stagnates in China—emerges as central to understanding both the strength and fragility of the system.
The discussion spans how Fear, Friction, Flooding operate as mechanisms of censorship, each working on different audiences and topics. Fear strikes surgically at high-profile dissidents and especially at material touching the private lives and finances of leaders; Gui Minhai's kidnapping exemplifies this. Friction and flooding shape the everyday information environment for ordinary citizens, with the firewall forcing slower access and state narratives drowning out alternatives. The range widens to historical roots: the Mandate of Heaven doctrine in Confucian Reciprocal Hierarchy, the century of national humiliation that legitimates party rule, and how Mao Zedong's peasant-centered model of revolution departed from orthodox Marxism. The conversation also treats protest dynamics across Hong Kong and Tiananmen, arguing that movements sustain when protesters hold Moral High Ground in Protest through restraint and moral clarity, and that Generational Logic of Protest explains why youth militancy intensifies when the future feels foreclosed.
Wasserstrom argues that understanding modern China requires grasping how Xi Jinping selectively fuses contradictory traditions (Maoist nationalism and Confucian order) into a singular nationalist project, while control operates less through pure fear than through friction, flooding, and the strategic suppression of dangerous images.
- Xi Jinping resembles Mao in cultivating a personality cult but inverts Mao's love of chaos with an obsession for order and stability
- Chinese censorship works via fear, friction, and flooding, and is most restrictive about images and material directly about China's leaders
- Protests in Hong Kong and Tiananmen succeed or fail partly on whether protesters hold the moral high ground via the imagery of state overreach
Xi's narrowing of acceptable Chinese identities reverses post-Tiananmen pluralism, demanding singular loyalty and vision.
- Xi Jinping's defining effect on China, per Emily Feng's reporting, is a narrowing of the spaces available for variations of being Chinese — reversing the post-Tiananmen trend toward civil society and plural identities (e.g. Muslims not having to choose between Muslim and Chinese identity), reflecting his discomfort with difference and desire to impose a singular vision of Chinese identity and loyalty.
“there’s a narrowing of spaces available for variations of ways of being Chinese within the country.”
- No Communist Party-run country had ever before had a city within it with as free a press and as much tolerance for protests as Hong Kong had; the leeway given to Hong Kong was extraordinary, and the PRC's crackdown may eventually be seen as a miscalculation given that it sacrificed valuable soft power and creative flourishing (e.g. globally admired Hong Kong films).
“No Communist Party-run country had ever had a city within it that had as free a press as Hong Kong had then, as much tolerance for protests.”
- Per scholar Geremie Barmé, there exists an 'other China' — within physical China or in diaspora — equally attached to Chinese traditions but understanding those traditions as including Taoism alongside Confucianism, openness and cosmopolitanism alongside hierarchy and nationalism; the Hong Kong protests of the 2020s were a last flourishing of this vision, kept alive in diaspora and partly visible in Taiwan.
“talks about the other China, which can exist within China, physical China, or elsewhere. Which is this equally attached to Chinese traditions, but thinking of those traditions as including not just Confucianism but Taoism, not just hierarchy, but also openness to cosmopolitanism.”
- Xi could argue he finished the deal of making Hong Kong fully part of the PRC by doing away with its difference, framing it as a stepping stone toward Taiwan; yet because of what happened to Hong Kong, there is now a fiercer, stronger sense of Taiwan identity, and parties willing to negotiate tighter connection with the PRC are doing badly in elections.
“in part because of what’s happened to places like Hong Kong, there’s a fiercer, a stronger sense of Taiwan identity now than there was at an earlier point.”
Xi blends incompatible traditions—Confucianism and Maoism, hierarchy and revolution—into one nationalist narrative of Chinese power.
- Xi Jinping continually refuses to choose between China's contradictory traditions — venerating both Confucius and Mao, citing the Great Wall and the book-burning first emperor — because as a nationalist above all, he treats anything suggesting Chinese greatness as fusible into a single story of power and greatness, smoothing over internal contradictions.
“Xi Jinping is a supporter of the party and single-party rule. That’s something he clearly believes in, and he’s a nationalist, he wants to see China be great and acknowledge this great on the world stage.”
- Confucianism is conservative and backward-looking, arguing for reclaiming a pure golden age of the past rather than progress, which makes it irreconcilable with Marxism and communism's view of history as struggle moving progressively from one stage to the next — yet Xi Jinping venerates both Confucius and Mao as symbols of Chinese greatness.
“in all kinds of ways, it’s irreconcilable to many things about Marxism and communism, which is all about struggle and all about actually a progressive view of history moving from one stage to the next.”
- Where the early 1980s official verdict assessed Mao as 70% right and 30% wrong (mirroring Mao's own verdict on Stalin), Xi Jinping reframes the question by speaking of the first 30 years and second 30 years of the PRC and insisting neither period's successes should be used to criticize the other — implicitly positioning himself as inheritor of the nation-strengthening Mao, not the chaos-stirring Mao, and suggesting a third, post-reform era.
“he’s talked about the first 30 years of the People’s Republic of China and the second 30 years and says that we should not use the successes of one to criticize the other”
Protest growth depends on moral high ground and perceived government brutality; earlier failures seed later larger movements.
- Protests grow and sustain when participants are seen to hold the moral high ground; in both Tiananmen 1989 and Hong Kong 2019, what kept protests growing was that they became a referendum on the right to protest itself — protesters confined violence largely to property and apologized for violence against people, while the government never apologized for or distanced itself from aggressive police, bringing fence-sitters into the streets.
“if people feel that the protesters have the moral high ground in one way or another, and what tipped it that way in Hong Kong, I think, was really that the police were using really strong arm methods and the government was never apologizing”
- Protests that seem to come out of nowhere are usually preceded by earlier protests that may look like dead ends but actually provide skills, scripts, and repertoires for later larger-scale action; the 1986 protests laid groundwork for 1989, and Hong Kong's 2012 and 2014 movements prepared 2019, with failures over a long horizon sometimes later seen as part of eventual success.
“protests are often preceded by other protests that may seem like dead ends, but actually provide people with the skills and scripts and repertoires to then carry out things on a larger scale after that.”
- Generation is a crucial and underrated factor in protest movements: younger people are more militant because they will live more of their lives under the projected bad future — if Hong Kong's freedoms were to vanish by 2047 or sooner, a 17-year-old in 2019 faces most of their life in a Hong Kong they don't love, whereas an 80-year-old counsels patience; the same logic drives youth climate activism.
“there’s a rationality toward younger people being more militant about certain kinds of things. I think we see the same thing with climate change, with climate activism.”
- Drawing on activists who lived through cycles of failed and successful uprisings (a Burmese exile who said 'I feel helpless but not hopeless'), Wasserstrom argues that even seemingly quixotic struggles are worthwhile because history shows the seemingly impossible can happen — though successes can later be rolled back — so the value lies in steady resistance combined with shifts in the world, and in incremental local gains.
“He said, “I feel helpless but not hopeless.””
- Mencius's interpretation of Confucianism holds that although the emperor rules at the will of heaven, if he fails to behave as a morally upstanding true emperor, heaven removes its mandate, ending the obligation of deference and justifying rebellion — and the success or failure of a rebellion itself reveals whether heaven's support has been withdrawn, giving the universe a moral dimension revealed through events.
“even though the emperor rules at the will of heaven, if he doesn’t act like a true emperor, if he’s not morally upstanding, then heaven will remove its mandate to him.”
- Confucianism is built on stable, unequal hierarchical relationships (father-son, husband-wife, emperor-minister) in which both parties owe each other something — the superior owes care and benevolence, the inferior owes deference — and society functions well only when both sides hold up their end; it contains no egalitarian relationships.
“He thought that hierarchical relationships were a good thing, and that the trick was that both sides in a hierarchical relationship owed something to the other.”
- Reflecting a Confucian-rooted optimism about human changeability through education, China was one of the few places that did not kill its last emperor — the idea being that anyone could be remolded into a good subject of the polity through (often forceful) education.
“China was one of the few places where they didn’t kill the last emperor... anybody could be kind of turned into a citizen... through the kind of education”
- Both the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party predicated their right to rule on the same nationalistic story: that from the mid-19th to mid-20th century China was bullied and nibbled away at by foreign powers, and that the ruling party deserves power because it can reassert China's place in the world and prevent that humiliation from recurring.
“both the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party predicated themselves on this nationalistic story of being in a position to prevent that from happening again.”
- The surveillance state at its worst, seen in Xinjiang, operates like Minority Report: people are rounded up as potential radicals based on pattern-based behavioral cues such as giving up smoking or not drinking alcohol (seen as signs of devotion to Islam), prompting Uyghur writers to deliberately keep alcohol on their tables to stay ahead of the system.
“the cues could be something like, somebody giving up smoking, or not drinking alcohol. Because that was seen as something that sometimes went along with becoming more devoted to Islam”
- China is distinctive but not unique in having learned no-go zones; the same pattern appears in Singapore (a world-class history department with no historian of Singapore), Thailand (lèse-majesté laws), and at foreign correspondents' clubs across Asia where one can say anything about the country next door but not about the host country, making self-censorship a powerful force.
“the National University of Singapore has a world-class history department, but no Singapore historian in it, nobody who focuses on the history of Singapore.”
- Per journalist James Palmer, observers should be honest that Chinese elite politics is a black box and not pretend to know more than they do; whereas earlier there was a sense of mappable ideological factions and rival power bases based on personalities and economic views, under Xi Jinping there is far less visibility into how decisions are made beyond the small group around him, and there is no major defector to explain it.
“we should really be straight about what a black box of the Chinese elite politics are. And really not try to pretend we know more than we do.”
- Against the orthodox Marxist idea that revolution comes from the cities, Mao developed the heterodox vision that the peasantry — drawing on China's tradition of peasant rebellions — could be the revolutionary vanguard, and his rise to leadership in the Communist Party was tied to this peasant-centered model of communist revolution.
“Mao has this idea that actually he loves this idea of peasant rebellions in China’s past is driving history forward... maybe in China’s case actually the peasantry farmers can be a radical force.”
- Economic and human interconnectedness can act as a check on conflict; writer Han Han argued it would be absurd for Americans to bomb China's Three Gorges Dam because downriver lie the factories where their iPhones are made — and flows of people studying, traveling, and living across borders can help stabilize the world.
“Americans know that down river from there, what would be flooded out was the place where their iPhones are built and they want their iPhones.”
- There is a tendency to treat US-China relations as a bilateral dispute, but historically third parties are key variables: the Sino-Soviet split, not just Nixon's initiative, made the US-China rapprochement possible, and Xi's positioning vis-à-vis Southeast Asia (where both the US and China have histories as aggressors) shapes the current standoff.
“there’s a tendency in discussions of US-China relations to think about it in terms of a bilateral discussion or dispute. Even though time and again, we realize that places other than the United States are key variables”
- Hong Kong's sovereignty was transferred to the People's Republic of China in 1997, not 'given back,' because Hong Kong never belonged to the PRC — it was part of the Qing Empire, a different state; the 1984 Sino-British deal addressed the expiry of the 99-year lease on the New Territories, on which Hong Kong Island and Kowloon depend for energy, water, and food, making partial transfer impractical.
“I carefully say transfer sovereignty, not give it back to the People’s Republic of China, because it never belonged to the People’s Republic of China. It was part of the Qing Empire”
China's censorship targets leaders' private lives and corruption exposés that undermine moral exemplar image, not abstract criticism.
- Chinese censorship is most restrictive only when material is directly about China and its Communist Party leaders; works on totalitarianism in the abstract (Hannah Arendt) or dystopian fiction can be read freely, but allegory or direct discussion of Chinese leaders is intensely censored — demonstrated by the Dystopian Trilogy box set sold on the mainland with only the China-referencing passages of Brave New World Revisited scalpeled out.
“censorship is most restrictive when it’s things that are actually about China. Things about leaders of the Chinese Communist Party, there’s intense kind of censorship of that”
- The tightly policed topics in China are discussions of the private lives of Chinese leaders and their families and money trails for corruption — exposés that contradict the vision of leaders as moral exemplars — which is why Hong Kong bookseller Gui Minhai, connected to a publishing house producing such works, was spirited from Thailand to the mainland and imprisoned, whereas general criticism of the party's authoritarianism does not trigger such reprisals.
“discussions at the private life of Chinese leaders, and their families, and issues of really following money trails for corruption and things like that.”
- China's denial of entry to foreign scholars and journalists is not primarily aimed at those who criticize the party in general terms (Wasserstrom wrote critical op-eds, testified to Congress on Tiananmen, and kept getting visas), but at those who amplify the voices of dissidents and exiles the government wants to silence — people connected to the Dalai Lama, Uyghurs, or who translate and promote dissidents' work.
“The Communist party is particularly concerned about people from outside of China who are amplifying the voices of people within China, or exiles from China who the government would like to silence.”
- Modern China is better understood through Huxley's Brave New World (control via distraction and pleasure) than Orwell's 1984 in many regions, but it mixes both: places like Xinjiang and Tibet experience crude 1984-style boot-on-the-face control, while consumer-oriented regions like Shanghai had their Orwellian moment during COVID lockdowns — so there are both more-1984 and more-Brave-New-World parts and moments across the country.
“I think with China I was feeling it was definitely moving more toward Brave New World, except Tibet and Xinjiang being more the crude boot-on-the-face, 1984 style of control.”
- Despite censorship and claims of brainwashing, the Chinese information control system is more porous than North Korea's; many mainland students emerge as incredible free thinkers because curiosity persists — they go over the firewall, get intrigued, or see a friend's social-media image on WeChat that contradicts the official line, so creativity and freedom of thinking survive within the system.
“I’ll still get students who are incredible free thinkers who have come through that system and it just doesn’t hold or there are limits to it.”
Xi revives Mao's personality cult, dominating bookstores with his works after decades of post-Mao restraint on leader publications.
- The biggest commonality between Xi Jinping and Mao is that both are the subject of sustained personality cults; Xi is the first leader since Mao where his books and speeches dominate bookstores, reviving a phenomenon that the post-Mao party had deliberately avoided by not publishing leaders' speeches until they left power.
“Xi Jinping is the first leader in China since him who has had a sustained personality cult of the kind where if you walk into a bookstore in China, the first thing you see are books by him, collections of his speeches.”
- A leaked secret speech reveals Xi believes the Soviet Union collapsed because its leadership didn't pay enough attention to ideology and because none of them were manly enough to keep control; Xi is haunted by the Soviet example and is determined not to be the leader who oversees the diminishment of the landmass rebuilt by Mao and Deng, sharing with Putin a distaste for Gorbachev.
“There was a secret speech, that leaked out, that he talked about how the Soviet Union had collapsed, because the leadership didn’t pay enough attention to ideology. And he also said that none of them were manly enough to keep control.”
Xi prioritizes stability and order unlike Mao, who embraced chaos as a tool for transformation.
- A key difference between the two leaders is that Mao reveled in chaos and disorder, believing turning things upside down (class struggle, his favorite figure the Monkey King) was a way to improve things, whereas Xi Jinping is preoccupied with stability, predictability and order, and dislikes uncontrolled crowds on the streets.
“Mao really reveled in chaos, in turning things upside down... he reveled in disorder and thought disorder was a way to improve things.”
- The Great Leap Forward caused a famine killing 30 to 45 million people partly because a culture of fear around the great leader meant officials, afraid that admitting failure to meet impossible targets would be seen as a political mistake, passed on falsely optimistic reports as a survival mechanism, so Mao did not receive accurate information — combined with ego and the obsession with doing things differently.
“it got to be a survival mechanism to pass on unrealistic reports on what was going. So some of it was a culture of fear around a great leader that led to not getting accurate information.”
After Tiananmen, the party learned to control image production through non-lethal methods and suppress footage of protests.
- After Tiananmen, the Chinese Communist Party internalized the power of images: in Hong Kong (2014 and 2019) it avoided using soldiers, relied on police, suppressed images of peaceful protests, and amplified footage of crowd violence, using brutalizing but non-lethal methods (tear gas, rubber bullets, bean-bag rounds) precisely because they don't produce searing images like a massacre.
“I do think the Chinese Communist Party learned something, has taken to heart the power of the image after that, because we saw this when there were protests in Hong Kong.”
- The Tank Man image is banned and considered toxic by the Chinese regime because it makes the People's Liberation Army look like an invading force rather than a stabilizing one, projecting the image of a government that has lost the mandate to rule — which is why the party suppressed it after their initial attempt to use selective footage to portray soldiers as the restrained martyrs failed.
“I really think the reason why it’s so considered so toxic by the regime is because it just shows the People’s Liberation Army looking like an invading force, not like a stabilizing force.”
Century of humiliation narrative makes Xi desperate to avoid appearing weak, driving willingness to endure pain in confrontations.
- The intensively told story of the century of national humiliation (1840s-1940s) is so central to the Communist Party's legitimating narrative that for Xi Jinping the desire to not be seen as weak is crucial, and anti-Chinese sentiment abroad (as during COVID) feeds the propaganda story, making the populace and party willing to endure short-term pain in a trade-war standoff rather than appear to surrender to bullying.
“It’s so much a part of the legitimating story of the Chinese Communist Party.”
- Military action against Taiwan would be made more likely by a sense of desperation in Xi Jinping — losing popularity or lacking a good story for why he and the party deserve to lead — as a way of playing to nationalist sentiment; conversely, if Xi can position himself as a force for global stability and not look desperate, the chances of a rash, desperation-driven move on Taiwan diminish.
“military action against Taiwan would be increased by a sense of desperation, a sense of losing popularity, or a sense of not having a good story to tell about why he and the party deserves to lead.”
Information control operates through three mechanisms: fear on high-profile targets, friction slowing access, flooding with preferred narratives.
- Chinese government information control operates through three mechanisms (Margaret Roberts's framework): fear (direct censorship and banning), friction (making information harder and slower to access, e.g. forcing VPN use over the firewall), and flooding (saturating media with the preferred narrative); fear is used selectively against high-profile individuals while friction and flooding shape the average citizen's information environment.
“She has three Fs, fear, friction, and flooding, and she says they’re all important, and I think this is true not just of China, but in other settings too.”
- Per journalist Christina Larson, China has simultaneously the best and the worst internet experience in the world: the worst because the Great Firewall blocks and distorts searches on topics like Tank Man, the Dalai Lama, and Xinjiang; the best because consumer technology playing to pleasure and convenience is far more advanced and tried out at massive scale before reaching the rest of the world.
“you need to think about China as having the best, as well as the worst internet experience in the world.”
Tiananmen 1989 sought party reform and meritocratic fairness, not democracy, sparked by corruption and nepotism outrage.
- Because China places such heavy emphasis on standardized-exam meritocracy as the path to advancement, perceived nepotism and unfairness in dividing the spoils provokes especially intense outrage; the 1989 Tiananmen protests were sparked in part by posters denouncing Communist Party corruption and back-door advancement, not primarily by Western-style democracy demands.
“a lot of the first posters that went up that got students really angry were criticisms of corruption within the Communist Party and nepotism”
- The 1989 Tiananmen protests are largely misunderstood — conflated with the collapse of Soviet-bloc communism happening simultaneously — when in fact they were an effort to get the Communist Party to better live up to its own stated reforming ideals and to extend liberalization from the economic into the political realm, not to overthrow the party.
“they were an effort to get the Communist Party in China to do a better job of living up to its own stated ideals, and to try to support the trend within the party toward a kind of liberalizing and opening up”