What this covers
Aldrete and Fridman discuss Rome's rise, persistence, and fall across roughly two thousand years of history, treating the empire as a case study in institutional durability and the integration of conquered populations. The conversation oscillates between broad structural lessons—why Rome endured where Alexander the Great's empire fragmented, how Augustus solved the problem Julius Caesar could not, what made the Roman legal system singular—and granular reconstructions of daily life, military technology, and the small gestures that reveal an ancient mind. Aldrete argues that Rome's advantage was neither military technology nor brilliant generals, but rather a willingness to grant degrees of citizenship to conquered peoples, turning enemies into manpower and loyalty into permanent structure.
The conversation moves through several distinct territories. It covers the mechanics of Augustus's political settlement—his ambiguous titles, his republican facade, his fifty-year reign that erased living memory of the Republic itself—and contrasts this with Julius Caesar's arrogance and failure to imagine succession. It examines military inflection points, including the phalanx versus legion at Cynoscephalae and the shift from monarchical inheritance to adoptive succession after Nero and Caligula. It traces how Status Dissonance made Christianity's promise of equality seductive to women and slaves, how the Unequal Distribution of Spoils from conquest fractured the Republic from within, and how the Vandal seizure of North Africa's grain supplies starved Rome's symbolic importance. A running theme is Historiographical Bias—that interpretations of Julius Caesar shifted sharply between the 1920s and post-WWII eras, that traditional histories omit slave women like Musa entirely—and the value of studying small material details to recover moments of genuine historical strangeness.
Aldrete argues that Rome's enduring success and influence stemmed not from technological or tactical superiority but from its capacity to integrate conquered peoples, its obsession with the past as a binding force, and its mastery of institutional structures and image-management—while reminding us that human nature is roughly constant across antiquity and today.
- Rome's military dominance rested on limitless manpower via incorporating allies, half-citizens, and auxiliaries, not better generals or technology.
- Augustus solved Caesar's riddle of one-man rule through propaganda, ambiguous titles, and a republican facade, creating a durable imperial template.
- Studying the small details (farmers, slaves, gestures, armor) reveals both moments of sympathy and disconnection that help reconstruct an alien culture.
Rome's manpower advantage through integration of allies made it unbeatable by attrition.
- The secret to Rome's early military success was not better generals, equipment, strategy, or tactics, but relatively limitless manpower: because they incorporated conquered Italians as half-citizens and allies who supplied troops, Rome could lose a war, come back, and raise new armies until they won.
“It's that they have limitless manpower, relatively speaking. They lose a war and they just come back”
- Hannibal correctly identified that the only way to defeat Rome was to cut it away from its Italian allies, since Rome's allied manpower made it unbeatable by attrition; his plan to invade Italy aimed to win big battles so the conquered Italians would rebel and seek their freedom, which was a reasonable bet because most conquered peoples want their freedom back.
“Hannibal, I think correctly figures out the one way to maybe defeat Rome is to cut them away from their allies”
- A secret of Rome's success was integrating rather than annihilating conquered peoples: instead of the normal ancient practice of killing the men and enslaving women and children, Rome extended degrees of citizenship (full citizens, half-citizens, or allies) to conquered Italians, demanding troops rather than money, so the army became a mechanism of Romanization that turned former enemies into Roman strength.
“they're very good at integrating non-Romans or non-Roman ideas and kind of absorbing them”
- The Roman Republic fell because of a central contradiction: its very success in conquering the Mediterranean made almost every group in society resentful because the benefits of conquest were not equitably shared—unemployed veterans who got little reward, excluded aristocrats, and loyal Italian allies denied full citizenship—so Roman society broke apart and turned on itself, a lesson about concentrating rather than sharing the benefits of empire.
“Rome's very success has made almost every group within Roman society deeply unhappy and boiling with resentment”
- The Roman civil wars, particularly after Caesar's assassination, were effectively world wars of their time—fought across Spain, North Africa, Greece, Egypt, and Italy among many factions—and adjusting for transportation time (a month from Spain to Egypt versus a week US-to-China in WWII), they arguably spanned a larger space-time zone than World War II, which was comparatively more contained.
“they are world wars at the time”
- The Republic was destroyed by a chain of increasingly ambitious strong men—Marius, Sulla, Pompey, Julius Caesar—each pushing the boundaries of Roman institutions a little further (Marius made armies loyal to himself rather than the state, Sulla marched on Rome, Pompey held offices illegally), prioritizing personal gain over the state, until Caesar made himself dictator for life and was assassinated.
“you have a succession of strong men... Marius, Sulla, Pompey, Julius Caesar, where each one pushes the boundaries of the Roman Republic a little bit”
- Civilization itself is strongly geographically determined—early civilizations arose in river valleys (Mesopotamia, Nile, Indus, Yellow/Yangtze) and their religions developed as reactions to those environments; the best map of the Roman Empire would show where olives could be cultivated, since Roman culture spread successfully where people grew the same crops (olives, wine, wheat), defining 'civilized' diet against barbarian meat, dairy, and beer.
“I think there's a real geographic determinism to civilization itself.”
- The Punic Wars between Rome and Carthage had a geographic inevitability—as two expanding powers (Rome strong on land, Carthage strong at sea), their conflicts were dictated by geography: the first war over Sicily (between them), the second over Saguntum (where their expansions met on the Spain-France border)—illustrating that sometimes geography is inevitability.
“Sometimes geography is inevitability, and I think in the course of the wars between Rome and Carthage called the Punic Wars, there is this geographic inevitability to them.”
Structural institutions and succession planning determined whether empires endured or collapsed.
- The reason Rome's empire lasted while Alexander's fragmented immediately upon his death is that Alexander's empire depended entirely on his personal loyalty and charisma without any permanent structure or succession plan, whereas Rome built durable structures and integrated conquered peoples into the Roman project to keep rejuvenating itself.
“Alexander's Empire fragmented the moment he died. And so his empire was all about personal loyalty. It was his charisma holding it together”
- Augustus's great failure was not solving succession; he settled on heredity (nearest male blood relative), which produced crazy or cruel emperors like Caligula and Nero, until in 98 AD the Romans made a rare deliberate change to adoptive succession—picking the best-qualified man and adopting him as son—which produced the run of 'good emperors' culminating in Marcus Aurelius.
“his great failure is that he did not solve was the problem of succession”
- Two factors secured Augustus's new order: he brought peace and stability after a century of civil war, making people willing to accept the loss of the Republic, and he lived and ruled for about 50 years, so that by his death almost no one was left alive who could remember the Republic, making the imperial system the only one anyone knew.
“by the time he dies, there's no one literally almost left alive who can remember the Republic. So, at that point, by the time he dies, this is the only system we know.”
- Augustus founded the Roman Empire and set the template every future emperor followed for 500 to 1500 years, becoming the paradigm of the good absolute ruler; his influence persists in the literal titles of later rulers—Czar and Kaiser from Caesar, emperor from Imperator, prince from Princeps—and in figures like Charlemagne being crowned 'Augustus, Emperor of the Romans.'
“he sets the template which every future emperor follows”
- Diocletian attempted to curb inflation by issuing a guaranteed solid gold coin (the Solidus) and a price edict setting maximum legal prices for goods and services—which couldn't fully work but helped—and amusingly, the most expensive item on that edict was hiring a lawyer, illustrating that some things never change.
“He famously issues a price edict where he says, 'This is the maximum it's legal to charge for any good or service.'”
Historians must recognize constant human emotions while remaining aware of radically different material conditions.
- Human nature is roughly constant across history—fear, greed, love, hope, optimism, and cynicism permeate human history—and the way a historian understands an alien ancient culture is by lining up moments of sympathy (recognizing how someone felt) against moments of disconnection (incomprehension at how they acted).
“Crude answer, yes. I think human nature is roughly constant.”
- A defining structural difference between the ancient and modern worlds was that 30-40% of children died before puberty up until the Industrial Revolution, meaning the average ancient person would have buried multiple children and siblings, which constituted a huge psychological difference from modern experience.
“about 30 to 40% of kids died before they hit puberty”
- Despite lacking modern technology and some sophisticated economic systems, people in the ancient world were fully as intelligent as people today—the common assumption that ancient people were stupider is wrong; the difference is access to technology, not intelligence.
“they weren't stupider than us... They were fully as intelligent as we were.”
- What makes humans special and gives hope for the future is curiosity and the ability to store up an accumulation of knowledge and pass it on to the next generation—we are essentially the accumulation of infinite prior generations' knowledge, without which we would each start from ground zero—and as Livy held, the utility of history is providing models of noble things to imitate and shameful things to avoid.
“our ability to store up knowledge and pass it on, I think is our special power as human beings. And I think our curiosity is what keeps us going forward.”
- You cannot make good decisions in the present or future without understanding the past—not only your own past but the past that shaped others, since you cannot interact with people unless you understand where they came from and what forces affect them—so historical understanding is vital for competent decision-making and for empathy across cultures.
“you can't make good decisions in the present, and you can't make good decisions about the future without understanding the past”
- Leaders consistently fail to learn the lessons of military history, exemplified by Afghanistan, where the most sophisticated armies—Alexander, the Mongols, Huns, Mughals, Victorian Britain, the Russians, and the Americans—all invaded and met failure by making the same two mistakes: not understanding the rocky mountainous terrain where people hide in caves, and not understanding the fundamentally tribal nature of allegiance there rather than to centralized government.
“how people don't learn the lessons of the past in military history”
Military technology and tactical flexibility determine battlefield outcomes and historical change.
- At the Battle of Cynoscephalae in 197 BC, the Roman legion's flexibility—being organized into ever-smaller subunits (contubernia, centuries, cohorts, legion) that could break off and attack from the side—defeated the rigid Macedonian phalanx armed with the 15-foot sarissa, proving that tactical flexibility could overcome a frontally invincible formation.
“the Romans have the flexibility to break off a little section of their army, run around to the side, and attack that formation from the side, and they win the battle”
- Linen armor dropped out of frontline use around Roman times because metallurgical advances toward steel allowed sharper, razor-like arrowhead edges that penetrate fabric more easily, combined with the arrival of more powerful eastern composite bows—so the linothorax became outdated against top-line military equipment while persisting for hunting dangerous animals and as a stab-proof undergarment.
“a key factor to penetrating fabric is the edge on the arrowhead. So as soon as you start to get something more like a razor edge, it's going to go through it more easily”
- Hannibal's double envelopment at Cannae—holding the center with weaker troops while strong flanking cavalry circled to attack the Roman phalanx from the rear, trapping them in a cauldron—became the model for military strategies throughout later history, including the German Blitzkrieg encirclements in World War II.
“that strategy of double envelopment, of sort of going around both sides becomes the model for all kinds of military strategies throughout the rest of history”
- The history of warfare is largely the history of technological change, with periods of accelerated transformation (e.g., WWII aircraft going from biplanes to jets in four years, battleships becoming obsolete in favor of aircraft carriers), and the civilization or army that adapts more quickly to new technology will often be the one that wins.
“the army that adapts more quickly to the new technology will often be the one that wins”
- Reconstruction experiments showed that a one-centimeter-thick layer of laminated or sewn linen (the linothorax) provided about as much protection as two millimeters of bronze—the thickest comparable body armor of the time—stopping random arrow strikes, while weighing only about 11 pounds versus 24-28 pounds for bronze or chainmail, being cooler, cheaper, and producible domestically by women.
“a one centimeter thick linothorax, laminated, or even sewn... is about as good protection as two millimeters of bronze”
Roman law's sophistication and the concept of citizenship became Rome's most durable legacy.
- Roman law is arguably Rome's most significant legacy on the modern world, with roughly 90% of the world using a legal system directly or indirectly derived from it; unlike most early law codes (agricultural, retaliatory eye-for-an-eye codes that enable group living), the Romans uniquely kept developing their code into highly sophisticated, esoteric territory rather than stopping at the basic agrarian level.
“something like 90% of the world uses a legal system, which is either directly or indirectly derived from the Roman one”
- The notion of Roman citizenship—carrying both obligations (military service, voting) and privileges (protection of Roman law, theoretical equality before it)—was a major Roman legal innovation and legacy, but it applied to only a tiny minority: of roughly 50 million inhabitants of the Empire in the 2nd century AD, only about 6 million were actual citizens, and citizenship excluded women, slaves, and resident foreigners.
“there were about 50 million human beings living within the boundaries of the Roman Empire, maybe 6 million were actual citizens”
- Roman use of concrete (which they didn't invent but used more creatively than anyone before) exploded architectural possibilities beyond the rectilinear, column-dependent Greek style—enabling curves, domes, and vaults—and the Pantheon demonstrates sophisticated engineering by using denser, heavier concrete at the dome's base and lighter pumice toward the top, allowing it to survive 2000 years.
“The Romans, because of their use of concrete, could build wooden frames, they could have curves, they could have domes... And it just explodes the architectural possibilities.”
Multiple overlapping causes explain Rome's decline; no single date or mechanism suffices.
- There is no single defensible date for the fall of the Roman Empire—candidates range from 31 BC (Actium) to 180, 410, 455, 476, or 1453 (fall of Constantinople, where the Eastern Empire legitimately considered themselves Romans)—and the question is complicated because by the 5th century it is unclear who counts as a 'real Roman' since barbarians had long formed large parts of the Roman army and crossed the identity boundary fluidly.
“this whole game of when does the empire fall is problematic”
- Beyond barbarian invasions (the traditional answer, summarized as 'the Roman Empire didn't fall, it was murdered'), there are multiple competing explanations for Rome's fall—Christianity, climate change (a late Roman little ice age after a favorable climate), disease (waves of plague from Marcus Aurelius onward causing death and economic disruption), and moral decline—while the lead-poisoning theory fails because Romans drank from the same pipes while the empire was expanding.
“a French historian famously said, 'The Roman Empire didn't fall. It was murdered.' It was killed by barbarians”
- The Crisis of the Third Century was a self-reinforcing collapse: the secret that 'who commands the most swords makes an emperor' produced multiple generals declaring themselves emperor and rushing to fight civil wars, leaving borders undefended for barbarian raids, which destroyed farms and cities, shrank the tax base, prompting higher tax rates on fewer payers and debasement of coinage that triggered horrific inflation.
“the secret is out that what makes an emperor is who commands the most swords”
- Many so-called barbarian invasions were arguably migrations: groups like the Visigoths crossed into the Empire fleeing pressure from the Huns and other Goths, seeking asylum and offering to fight for Rome in exchange for territory and supplies—but the Romans frequently reneged on these deals (failing to supply promised food), turning the settlers against them with good reason, so Roman blundering contributed to the conflicts.
“is this an invasion as it was originally described, or is it a migration as some scholars have started calling it?”
- An underappreciated decisive factor in Rome's decline was the Vandals conquering Spain and then North Africa—the main areas supplying food surpluses to feed the city of Rome—after which Rome's population plummeted; combined with the capital having already moved to defensible Ravenna and to Constantine's new eastern capital Constantinople, the old symbolic capital lost its importance.
“it's after those Vandal invasions of the takeover of those areas that the population of Rome plummets”
Christianity appealed to Rome's lower ranks by offering equality while threatening status hierarchies.
- Christianity threatened and yet appealed within Roman society because Romans were obsessed with status distinctions (citizen/non-citizen, man/woman, free/slave) while Christianity declared all equal in God's eyes—which is why its earliest converts were disproportionately women and slaves, and even early congregation leaders (deaconesses) were slave women—offering value to those at the bottom of the Roman hierarchy, plus a desirable afterlife and good works.
“Christianity comes along and says, 'In God's eyes, you're all equal.' Now, that's a pretty problematic idea if you're deeply invested in Roman hierarchy.”
- The rise to dominance of monotheistic religions was one of history's huge turning points because it represents a fundamentally different mentality: in Roman polytheism (dominant for more than half of human history) religion was auxiliary and didn't drive decisions, whereas declaring one exclusive correct God foregrounds religion in decision-making and shifts how people think and act.
“the rise to dominance in a lot of the world of monotheistic religions is one of the huge turning points, because it's just such a different mentality”
- The early conflict between Romans and Christians arose from a near-failure of communication: the Romans saw the emperor's birthday sacrifice as a patriotic loyalty act (like a pledge of allegiance) within a polytheistic framework where everyone has different gods, not understanding why Christians couldn't simply add good wishes—while to Christians it was worshipping another God, the actual sticking point.
“I think there's almost a failure of communication here, that the Romans just at least initially didn't quite understand”
- A compelling non-religious reason emperors were drawn to Christianity is that it helped solve their biggest problem—legitimacy—as illustrated by Constantine using a divine vision to fire up troops before battle, though his conversion's sincerity is debatable given he had invoked other gods similarly before and continued minting coins with other gods after.
“there is that very compelling reason for emperors to want to go to Christianity because it helps them with their biggest problem, which is legitimacy”
Obsession with the past gave Romans strength but also conservative rigidity that prevented necessary reform.
- One of the keys to understanding all of Roman history is that Romans were obsessed with the past, which had real power—it didn't merely inspire but dictated daily behavior—giving them strength and guidance, but also making them so traditional and conservative (resistant to change) that they failed to make obvious reforms that might have saved the Republic.
“this was a people who were obsessed with the past and for whom the past had power, not just as something inspirational, but it actually dictated what you would do in your daily life”
- The Greek historian Polybius, whose city was captured by Rome, wrote his history of Rome to answer how the Romans conquered the entire Greek world in just 53 years—a feat that seemed unimaginable to him—reflecting how the Greeks viewed themselves as culturally superior yet were militarily defeated relatively easily.
“Surely there can be no one so incurious as to not want to understand how the Romans could have conquered the entire Greek world in 53 years”
- Historical interpretations often reveal more about the time they are written in than the subject they describe; for example, Julius Caesar was admired as a strong-man hero in the fascism-trendy 1920s-30s, then reviled as a Republic-destroying dictator in the post-WWII generation after Hitler discredited fascism.
“often histories that are written tell you a lot more about the time they're written than they do about the subject they're written about”
Rhetoric and persuasive delivery matter more than truth and evidence in swaying human decisions.
- Roman orators like Cicero used a codified system of gestures (described in handbooks like Quintilian's) that, unlike modern sign language where a gesture equals a word, indicated the emotion the audience was meant to feel when hearing the words—the body adding an emotional gloss—based on the belief that certain hand gestures could almost involuntarily induce specific emotions in the audience.
“a certain gesture would indicate a certain emotion that you were meant to feel when you heard the words. It's like your body is adding an emotional gloss to your speech.”
- How a speech is delivered is often more important than its content—as Demosthenes said the three most important things in oratory are 'delivery, delivery, and delivery'—and these persuasive techniques are a double-edged sword usable for good (Martin Luther King) or evil (Hitler's gesticulation channeling resentment to persuade a nation toward atrocities).
“how you deliver a speech is often more important than what you say”
- Cicero, who rose to the highest Roman office purely through oratory despite lacking famous ancestors, wealth, or military talent, believed people are fundamentally ruled by emotion—so if you can emotionally arouse an audience (fear and anger being especially powerful), facts, truth, evidence, and reason become less important—and he used rhetorical tricks like name-calling, mudslinging, ad hominem attacks, us-versus-them framing, and emotional props to win.
“Cicero believed that people are fundamentally ruled by emotion. So, if you can touch their emotions, all sorts of other things become less important.”
Roman slavery was economically permeable and non-racial but equally dehumanizing as other systems.
- Roman slavery differed fundamentally from American slavery in that it was not racial but an economic status applicable to any color, ethnicity, or origin, and was a permeable membrane that people crossed in both directions (born free becoming enslaved, born slave gaining freedom); yet it was equally dehumanizing, treating humans as 'articulate tools' and legally classifying a runaway slave's act as theft of himself from his master.
“it's not racial slavery... It's an economic status.”
- Many Roman slaves were skilled professionals—doctors, scribes, accountants, barbers—because it was a profitable investment for a wealthy master to train a slave whose earnings flowed back to the owner, and masters often gave such slaves an incentive to work hard by agreeing they could buy their own freedom once they earned a set sum.
“it's actually a good investment for you to train your slaves in a profession”
- In the Republic, Rome collected provincial taxes indirectly by selling contracts to private companies (publicani) who paid money up front and then squeezed as much as possible out of provinces to make a profit—a harmful, hated system (the Bible pairs 'publicans and sinners') that over time shifted toward more standard taxation, often paid in kind (e.g., wheat) rather than cash.
“they would sell contracts to private businesses to collect taxes”
Historical sources are overwhelmingly lost, biased, and copies; all history is interpretation and reinterpretation.
- Roughly 90% of people in the ancient world were small-time family farmers who never traveled 20 miles from their village, never saw a battle, a work of art, or a philosopher—so a realistic textbook of the Roman Empire should devote nine of ten chapters to farming life rather than soldiers, priests, kings, and authors.
“nine out of 10 chapters should be details of what it was like to be a small-time family farmer, because that's what 90% of the people in the ancient world did”
- When future historians thousands of years hence look back at our time and reconstruct the big picture from details, their account will likely be more a commentary on whatever is going on in their own era than on the reality of us—because that is what historians tend to do.
“I would guess it'll be something that's actually more of a commentary on whatever's going on at that point than on the reality of us because that's what we tend to do.”
- The biggest problem in studying ancient history is the sources: roughly 99% of material about the ancient world is lost, surviving literary texts were written by a tiny group of elite males with agendas, and all texts are copies of copies subject to transmission errors (like the whisper game)—so history is an interpretation constantly reevaluated against new evidence, filtered through awareness of both the sources' biases and the historian's own.
“honestly, 99% of things about the world I study are lost”
- Although Rome was a male-dominated, misogynist society, the apparent rarity of influential women (philosophers, queens, army leaders, business patrons like Eumachia and Plancia Magna) may reflect the selective bias of male elite sources rather than actual rarity—since whenever one digs into the sources, the supposed lone exceptions multiply into many, raising whether the bias is in the society, the contemporary historian, or the modern historians who wrote history up to now.
“are they exceptions to the rule or is just the history that was written, which is written by men a little bit selective in how it portrays them”
- Musa, a slave woman sent by Augustus as a gift to the Parthian king, became his concubine then wife, murdered the king, and installed her son as ruler while effectively governing the empire—a literal rags-to-riches story—yet most traditional histories of Roman-Parthian relations omit her entirely, discussing only her son as if he came from nowhere, exemplifying selective editing by historians.
“Musa eventually murders the Parthian king, arranges it so that her son becomes the king of Parthia, and she's really ruling the whole empire behind the scenes as his mother”
Power matters more than titles or appearances; effective rulers hide absolute control behind institutional forms.
- Octavian, despite being a terrible general who lost almost every battle he commanded, emerged victorious because he was politically savvy and brilliant at manipulating his public image and propaganda—notably reframing his civil war against Mark Antony as a war against a foreign enemy (Antony allied with Cleopatra) to legitimize it.
“he wasn't a good general. In fact, he was a terrible general. He lost almost every battle he commanded. But what he is, is he's politically savvy”
- Julius Caesar succeeded in seizing power as a single ruler and naming himself dictator for life, but he could not solve the central dilemma he left behind—how to rule Rome as one person without looking like a king and getting killed—and his arrogance toward the Senate, naming a month after himself, and other egotistical acts contributed to his assassination.
“how do you rule Rome as one person and not get killed for looking like a king? That's the dilemma, the riddle that Caesar leaves behind him”
- Augustus solved Caesar's riddle by caring about the reality of power rather than its trappings: he lived modestly, respected the Senate, formally resigned from offices, and had the Senate vote him the powers of key offices (like consul) without holding the office itself, hiding his monarchy behind ambiguous titles (Augustus, Princeps, Imperator) and the claim that he had merely refounded the Republic.
“he's someone who cared about the reality of power, not the external trappings”
- Alexander the Great's success combined personal skill (intelligence, athleticism, supreme charisma) with luck—he inherited a ready-made military instrument from his father Philip II, who reformed the Macedonian army, introduced the sarissa, and created a flexible mixed army of heavy and light cavalry and infantry—so his father's underrecognized contribution was as decisive as his own talent and ambition.
“he inherited a system created by his father, Philip II. So he was in the right time at the right place and had this instrument placed in his hands”
- Marcus Agrippa, Augustus's self-effacing right-hand man, exemplifies the indispensable but underrecognized number-two: a terrific general, admiral, and builder who won the Battle of Actium and rebuilt Rome, he recognized his own limitations (lacking the front-man politician's gift), chose to serve loyally and let Augustus take the credit, and thereby wielded real power—raising how many such masterminds history overlooks.
“literally, Augustus would not have become the first emperor without Agrippa”
Young rulers given absolute power tend toward megalomania and cruelty before judgment matures.
- A plausible explanation for why so many Roman emperors seemed crazy or sadistic is that the ones who went craziest often became emperor at a young age before their personalities were fully formed—absolute power corrupts especially when given to someone immature, analogous to modern child stars who go wrong after getting wealth and fame too young.
“the ones who seem to go craziest quite often are the ones who become emperor at a young age”
- Whether an emperor was good or bad mattered little to the average inhabitant (a peasant in Spain or Italy) because the crazy emperors mostly affected only people within the sound of their voice, while the mechanism of the empire ground along; technology constrained this further, since a message to a distant province could take one or two months each way, forcing provincial officials to make their own decisions.
“the crazy emperors mostly affect the people within the sound of their voice”
Humans harbor a thin-veiled attraction to violence despite civilization's formal constraints.
- Gladiators exemplify 'status dissonance'—holding high and despised status simultaneously: as mostly slaves performing and dying for others' pleasure, they were the lowest of the low (the Romans considered using one's body for others' pleasure innately demeaning), yet successful gladiators became famous celebrities admired by crowds and found attractive by women.
“they're an example of what historians call status dissonance. It's someone who in society has high status in some ways, and very low or despised status in another.”
- One honest explanation for the gladiatorial games is that humans like violence—people get most excited at the fight in a hockey game or the crash in car racing—suggesting a thin veil of civility over a darker attraction to violence; the hypothetical that a modern lethal gladiatorial contest, especially if anonymous, would draw a global audience supports this.
“There's something dark in human nature sometimes that likes violence. And maybe the Romans are just being more honest about it than we are.”
The most decisive battles immediately shift political control or allow new powers to grow.
- At the Battle of Cannae, using a double-envelopment strategy that surrounded an army of about 80,000 Romans, Hannibal killed roughly 60,000 Romans in a single afternoon with swords—more Romans hacked to death in one afternoon than Americans died in 20 years in Vietnam.
“in one afternoon at the Battle of Cannae, Hannibal kills about 60,000 Romans”
- A decisive battle is most simply defined as one causing an immediate change in political structure (who is in charge), exemplified by Alexander beating Darius III at Gaugamela, which in one afternoon switched rule of the vast Persian empire from Persian to Macedonian; a second type has unforeseen long-term effects, allowing a new people, idea, or institution to grow or be curbed.
“The easiest definition is it causes an immediate change in political structure. So who's in charge?”