Derek Thompson
What this covers
Ezra Klein and Derek Thompson sit down with Lex Fridman to examine what they see as a foundational crisis in American liberalism: a government paralyzed by procedural complexity that has engineered scarcity in housing, energy, and infrastructure while the Democratic Party watches from the sidelines. The conversation maps a stark diagnosis of how manufactured scarcity undermines liberal legitimacy, why demand-side policies alone fail without supply expansion, and how Donald Trump's ascent represents not a genuine efficiency agenda but a consolidation of executive power dressed in the language of deregulation.
The three move across interconnected terrain: how process regulations like NEPA, originally meant to protect the environment, now paradoxically block clean energy and dense housing; why the Democratic Party, dominated by lawyers, prizes procedural legitimacy over tangible outcomes and thereby forfeits political authority to populists promising to break through the walls; how political orders rise and fall, and what would define the next one; and why the left must embrace a supply-side progressivism that asks "how do we build this?" for housing, energy, and science rather than stopping at redistribution. Klein argues attention as agenda control has become the real currency of modern politics, which the right grasps and Democrats do not. Thompson traces how thermostatic public opinion turns establishments into victims of their own weapons, and how Trump's presidency, whatever its intentions, contradicts abundance through tariffs that will drive housing costs higher. The discussion also touches cognitive decline, the value of funding "weird science," and the peculiar paradox that deregulation, coded as exclusively right-wing, actually means government should deregulate itself to achieve its own stated ends.
Klein and Thompson argue that the core failure of American liberalism is self-imposed scarcity created by process-obsessed government, and that the left must adopt an 'abundance' agenda focused on supply-side outcomes (housing, energy, science) rather than only redistribution, while DOGE represents not genuine efficiency but an ideological purge aimed at centralizing power.
- Government has manufactured scarcity in housing and energy through process regulations like NEPA and zoning that empower opposition to building
- Liberalism prizes process over outcomes, undermining its own legitimacy, while DOGE is destruction-for-control rather than efficiency
- Attention, not money, is the currency of modern politics, which the right understands and Democrats do not
Trump has radically centralized Republican Party power through willingness to break norms and punish dissent, creating top-down control.
- One of Trump's defining talents is his ability to upend the coalitional and interest-group structure of the right, exemplified by his disempowerment of the once-dominant Koch brother network simply by disagreeing with them, producing a highly top-down party structure where Republicans in Congress are extraordinarily disempowered and do what they are told.
“one of Trump’s talents, one of the things that makes him a disruptive force in politics is his ability to upend the sort of coalitional structure, the interest group structure that used to prevail.”
- Trump is a very old-school, relational, 19th-century, zero-sum politician always looking for the angle to acquire power: DOGE gets power over the bureaucracy, tariffs get power over the international financial system, weaponizing the Justice Department against Eric Adams gets power over a Democratic mayor—a coherent governing philosophy in which the president should wield the kind of power leaders have in Russia, India, or China.
“Trump is a very old school politician. He’s very relational. He’s very 19th century. He’s looking for the angle. He’s very zero sum.”
- Elon Musk created a 'death star of primary money' by making known he will dump 50-100 million dollars into a primary against any congressional Republican who defies Trump on a key vote—trivial money for him, lethal for them—which together with DOGE and tariffs reveals a consistent goal of centralizing power under Trump, suppressing Congress's role as an aggregator of information from across the country.
“Elon has made it known that any house or Senate Republican who defies Trump on a key vote... he will dump 50 to a hundred million dollars into a primary.”
Democrats are fragmented, leaderless, and trapped by process-obsession when they should prioritize outcomes and willing norm-breaking leadership.
- The Democratic Party is more internally fragmented, weak, and leaderless than at any point in Klein's lifetime, and it cannot change without standard-bearers willing to upset people and admit they were wrong, because the Obama Coalition is exhausted; Trump reformed the Republican Party precisely by being willing to fight his own party's sacred cows.
“In my lifetime, the Democratic Party has never been as internally fragmented and weak, leaderless, rudderless as it is right now.”
- The Democratic Party is uniquely a party of lawyers (every presidential ticket member from Mondale to Walz attended law school), and lawyers see government as legitimate by following process; but per Nick Bagley, government attains legitimacy at least partly through outcomes—so prizing process over outcomes makes leaders feel legitimate while the public, seeing nothing built, turns to populist strongmen promising to bust through the walls.
“between Walter Mondale and Tim Walz, there’s not a single person on a Democratic presidential ticket who didn’t go to law school, not one... the Democratic Party in particular is a party of lawyers.”
- If democracy survives, Democrats who want to make government work must become less rule-bound, because DOGE has demonstrated that the room for movement inside the American state is much wider than either party gave it credit for; there is no abundance agenda that works if the party remains as process-obsessed as it has been, willing to listen to any lawyer's intense interpretation that turns them back.
“What DOGE has demonstrated is that the room for movement inside the American government, inside the state, as much wider than anybody gave it credit for both Republican and Democratic administrations.”
Political success requires controlling attention through conflict and negative attention, not avoiding it through process and staff mediation.
- If you can't turn your candidate into the product—if you don't trust your candidate to be the product in an election—you are doomed; Biden's team revealed they didn't trust him to do extemporaneous interviews like the Super Bowl interview, which was the tell that the 2024 strategy could not work.
“If you can’t turn your candidate into the product, if you don’t trust your candidate to be the product in an election, you’re fucked, right?”
- Democrats still operate as if money is the currency of politics while the right understands that attention is the real currency; this is a fundamental strategic divide, because Democrats raise and spend money to buy attention via staff-run social media, whereas the Trumpist right makes the candidate personally the product who generates attention directly.
“Democrats still think the currency of politics is money and the currency of politics is attention. And that’s a huge difference between the two sides right now.”
- A volume of attention is itself politically valuable and can only be reached by accepting negative attention, because agenda control comes not from positive attention but from conflict: by doing things the other side disagrees with, you force them into a functioning agreement to keep your issue at the front of the agenda; most Democrats optimize to avoid negative attention, which forfeits this lever.
“A volume of attention is itself good and you can only get a critical mass of it if you’re willing to accept negative attention. Agenda control doesn’t come from positive attention. It comes from conflict.”
- Trump's strategy does not optimize for favorability—he is the most unpopular modern president at this stage except his own first term, taking ~55 days to go net-negative versus Biden's 221—nor for big wins, since his 2024 popular vote margin was the smallest since 2000; instead it optimizes for sustained attention dominance, which Trump has held over American politics since the 2015 golden escalator.
“Donald Trump is the most unpopular modern president at this stage of his presidency except for Donald Trump’s first term. It took, I think Nate Silver said it was 221 days for Joe Biden’s net favorability to go negative. It’s taken something like 55 days for Donald Trump to do the same.”
DOGE's true purpose is not efficiency but deletion and rebuilding to ensure executive control, mirroring Elon's Twitter takeover playbook.
- The real steelman for DOGE is not efficiency but deletion: because government has no competitive pressure (the Department of Education isn't outcompeted by a rival agency), the only way to make radical change possible is to bulldoze what exists—fire half the department, stop following regulations—so you can then rebuild it staffed by people who will do what the president wants, turning the federal government into a 'neural link' of Trump himself.
“I think the steelman case for what DOGE is, right, rather than what it pretended to be, is that the government is an interest... it’s not about efficiency, never was.”
- What Elon did at Twitter was not make it more efficient or a better product but make it controllable—he went into something where he thought people disagreed with him and broke it until he had operational control; the same playbook in the federal government, per Russ Vought's stated aim to 'traumatize the civil servants,' is the language of conquering and destruction, not of identifying who does a good job.
“What he did at Twitter was he went into something where he thought the people disagreed with him, and he broke it until he had actual operational control of the thing”
- Efficiency does not exist in a vacuum and only makes sense when yoked to a goal: a state efficient at building dirty energy and one efficient at clean energy are opposites, so any 'efficiency' or AI deployment must be evaluated by the value function it optimizes—and DOGE's revealed goal is to serve Donald Trump's movement, not any articulated public outcome.
“efficiency only makes sense when yoked to a goal.”
Declining social cognition, entrenched interests blocking mobility, cultural abandonment by progressives, and broken city-driven opportunity pathways undermine flourishing.
- We live in a more liquid, high-variance moment resembling the late 19th and early 20th century rather than the stable 1990s, because things have gotten faster and less predictable as the stable structures of technology and global governance broke down; this carries tremendous peril but also tremendous possibility across AI, biotech, energy, and shifting global alliances.
“we live in a more liquid moment than many... We’re in an age it seems to be more like the early 20th century, late 19th century than like the 1990s.”
- The left abandoned vast swaths of significant culture by treating spaces as verboten for having platformed disfavored people; the idea that you only go where people agree with you is genuine lunacy and a cultural habit the left needs to get over.
“They began to do a thing where spaces were verboten because it had platformed so-and-so... The idea that you only go where people agree with you is genuine lunacy.”
- We spend too much time discussing how to get smarter and not enough on how to avoid getting dumber; the Flynn effect of rising IQs has stopped while literacy and test scores decline, and things we think make us smarter, like constant social media on our phones, actually make us dumber not because the information is bad but because of the lack of concentration, constant distraction, and lack of focus—a possibly global, certainly societal cognitive wound we are inflicting on ourselves.
“we spend a lot of time talking about how to get smarter and not enough time talking about how to avoid getting dumber.”
- Drawing on Mancur Olson's Rise and Decline of Nations, affluent stable societies over long periods develop entrenched bargaining organizations (AARP, Chamber of Commerce, unions) that grow powerful and pass laws making themselves more powerful, which explains why bombed-out Germany and Japan became postwar growth miracles while the victorious UK stagnated.
“affluent, stable societies over long periods of time, develop something that is very difficult to develop and very important to develop, which is bargaining organizations”
- The left's foundational view is that life is unfair due to luck operating across our whole lives (birth nation, family, talents), so success is not fully deserved, and a fundamental role of government should be to rectify that unfairness not into perfect equality but into universal dignity allowing lives of flourishing.
“One is that life is unfair. We are born with different talents. We are born into different nations... We have luck operating as an omnipresence across our entire lives.”
- Constricting housing supply enriches those who bought when getting was good—a $220,000 home becoming $2.7 million—while working-class families are priced out, so creating opportunity and mobility sometimes requires sufficient supply of the thing itself rather than redistribution alone; American law has shifted toward 'gentry law' that protects current holders.
“you bought a place in 1977 for $220,000, and now it’s worth $2.7 million... but the working class families can’t afford to live there anymore.”
- Cities are engines of opportunity and economic dynamism with huge spillover effects—a barber near Google earns far more than one in rural Arkansas—and historically about a third of American mobility came from people moving to richer areas, but this income-convergence process has thrown into reverse because janitors can no longer afford to live near the lawyers, breaking the ancient pathway to mobility.
“You make a lot more money being a barber near Google than you do being a barber in rural Arkansas, and this is the ancient pathway to mobility.”
- Politicians' avoidance of three-to-four-hour interviews is driven more by booking culture than by fear of saying the wrong thing: staff and schedulers operate in a world where nobody—reporters, donors, policy staffers—gets that much time, so the default answer is no, and only the principal personally overriding the staff can make the time happen.
“The staff is used to a world where nobody gets three to four hours for the boss. Reporters don’t, donors don’t, policy staffers don’t. So then, when some interview comes in and they say, “Hey, I want three to four hours.” The answer is no, because culturally it’s not done.”
- The important part of madman theory is that you are not actually a madman—you just have to convince people you are; effective process-breaking diplomacy (like Obama negotiating with adversaries) works when paired with principled policy and traditional alliances, not when it alienates allies.
“I think the important part of madman theory is that you’re not actually a madman. You just got to convince people you are.”
- Sam Harris has been admirably independent, not falling into conspiracy as the Weinstein brothers did, not letting his anger at the left blind him to the failures of the right, and willing to stand alone in a crowd—being clear-eyed on Trump—deliberately resisting audience capture.
“Harris has done a good job not falling into conspiracy as the Weinstein brothers did. Not letting his anger at the left blind him to the failures of the right.”
The left-right divide is not about government size but government type: left trusts the regulatory check, right trusts the coercive gun.
- The 'left likes big government, right likes small government' framing oversimplifies; the right is very comfortable with a powerful police, surveillance, and national security state, demonstrated by trusting government to invade and rebuild Afghanistan and Iraq into functioning democracies—an extraordinary level of trust in big government—so the left has more confidence in the government of the check and the right has more confidence in the government of the gun.
“the left is more confidence in the government of the check and the right has more confidence in the government of the gun.”
- Every country has a form of natural selection that rewards the skills needed to navigate its kind of economy: China in its developmentalist phase rewards civil infrastructure builders, while a US that makes building the output of negotiations rather than clear standards selects for lawyers, management consultants, and finance people—because that is where agency and freedom to do big things have been made possible.
“every country has a kind of form of natural selection within it, and that form of natural selection will select for people with the skills to navigate, best navigate the kind of economy that country has.”
- Deregulation is wrongly coded as exclusively right-wing; what is under-discussed is how much the government regulates the government and how badly it needs to deregulate itself—getting rules out of the way that keep government from achieving the democratic outcomes it is trying to achieve, since regulations are just rules and some are good while some are stupid.
“What we don’t talk about enough is how much the government regulates the government and how badly it needs to deregulate the government.”
America faces a molten interregnum without equilibrium as neoliberal order collapsed and Trump's realignment breaks traditional alliance structures.
- American politics moves through political orders, each with a founding party, an opposition that accepts the order's key premises, and an external antagonist holding it in place; the New Deal order (FDR, entrenched by Eisenhower, held by the USSR) gave way to the neoliberal order (Reagan, entrenched by Clinton, validated by the USSR's fall), and we are now in a molten interregnum where no new order has reached equilibrium.
“an idea that is picked up from a historian named Gary Gerstle, which is an idea of political orders. And political orders are periods that have a sort of structure of consensus and a structure of a zone of conflict”
- The distinction between Trump and Obama or Biden is not willingness to negotiate with adversaries—Obama negotiated with Iran, Cuba, and Russia without alienating allies—but that Trump is realigning alliances, doing diplomacy from a hostile position, wanting to make Canada the 51st state and turning traditional allies into perceived enemies, which is the genuinely abnormal break, not the act of negotiation itself.
“the difference between Trump and, say, Biden or Trump and Obama is not that Trump will negotiate with Putin and Obama wouldn’t. It’s that Trump is realigning our alliances.”
- Trump won by running headlong into the failures of neoliberalism within the Republican Party—against free trade, against open immigration, against the Iraq War and foreign adventurism—reimagining the GOP as a right-wing populist party that is socially conservative and economically populist, though no new order has reached equilibrium since neither side has accepted the other's premises.
“Donald Trump runs like headlong into the failures of neoliberalism in the Republican Party. He runs against trade. He runs against a sort of Paul Ryan more open immigration.”