
Inflation Is Popping The Biggest Asset Bubble Of All Time | Michael Kao
What this covers
This is a 1h 42m conversation on Forward Guidance, filmed June 2, 2022, in which host Jack Farley interviews Michael Cow, a retired hedge fund manager with a background in convertible arbitrage, options and commodities. It starts with his career and the dot-com comparison, then moves through the Federal Reserve, MMT, energy, crypto, housing and a long closing section on a single company's capital structure. Cow discloses a short position in that company, MicroStrategy. He also tells a 2008 story about hedging a convert book with Fannie Mae subordinated debt, which Hank Paulson's conservatorship terms turned into a net gain.
The macro middle section rests on a few specific claims. Cow separates oil as an operating-expense commodity from capex commodities like copper, and argues that Structural Supply Deficit vs. Cyclical Demand Deficit explains why inflation will last. Farley adds that quantitative easing (QE)) alone is only an asset swap and becomes inflationary when paired with fiscal stimulus. Cow's more contested points are that a 30% S&P drop would not by itself force a Fed pivot (he looks instead to high-yield spreads near 900 basis points), and that a strong dollar will eventually hurt China and emerging markets enough to reverse itself. The energy segment also covers Russian export flows, which he says are largely undisrupted. It includes a refinery argument as well: Gulf Coast plants are tooled for heavy crude, so a U.S. export ban could push WTI negative again.
The last third turns to crypto and the leverage behind it. Cow calls bitcoin a greater-fool trade, argues that DeFi token valuations are circular, and describes Bubble Assets as Capacitors that store Fed liquidity and discharge together. On MicroStrategy he explains convertibles through option theory and the negative gamma of deeply out-of-the-money converts. He also puts the debt break-even at roughly $19,000 per bitcoin.
Michael Cow argues that current asset bubbles across equities, crypto, and real estate resemble the dot-com crash (not 2008) due to equity volatility dominance, but are uniquely dangerous because structural commodity inflation from energy scarcity will force extended Fed tightening that cannot be solved by QE, requiring demand destruction that will simultaneously deflate all asset bubbles including a heavily-leveraged MicroStrategy.
- Structural opex commodity deficit (especially oil) driven by years of capital starvation will persist for a decade, forcing sustained Fed hawkishness despite equity pain
- QE and MMT combined created unprecedented balance sheet expansion that can only be unwound via monetary policy-driven demand destruction, not pauses
- MicroStrategy's leverage into bitcoin via convertible debt creates short-put dynamics vulnerable to perception-to-reality business deterioration, and a concentrated whale liquidation event could move bitcoin prices materially
This asset isn't compiled yet
You're seeing its claims, ranked. Compile it to build the argument threads, weight them, and check each claim against your library — the full view.
Oil should be differentiated from other commodities as an opex commodity (operational expense, consumed daily as a factor of production) rather than a capex commodity (capital expenditure like copper or steel used for cyclical projects), making oil inflation particularly damaging because it is inelastic and unavoidable in all economic activity.
“opec i differentiate between opex and capex commodities because unlike capex commodities like for instance um you know copper steel etc um those tended those tend to be fueled more by sort of a growth capex and and home building and they tend to be more uh pro cyclical than an opex commodity commodity like oil that is by far the largest the largest opex commodity that has to be consumed on a daily basis that's a factor of production and just about everything under the sun”
A U.S. crude oil export ban (similar to the 1975-2015 ban) would cause WTI crude to collapse to negative territory again (as in COVID 2020) because U.S. refineries in the Gulf Coast are tooled for heavy crude, cannot process all the light shale oil being produced, and would be backed up to Cushing storage at tank tops, with no viable domestic market for the excess light crude (the Northeast refineries are too small and lack pipeline connections).
“the refiners in the gulf coast which are already running at capacity would basically have to turn back uh the excess oil because they can't ship the rest out so uh oil backs up all the way back to cushing cushing fills to tank tops you get a repeat of what we saw during covid where you know oil prep wti collapses potentially goes to negative as cushion goes to tank tops”
The only way the U.S. could achieve true energy independence and stop needing Middle East heavy crude imports is to subsidize multi-billion dollar refinery retooling to handle light shale grades, which is a multi-year, multi-tens-of-billions project; without this, the U.S. will continue importing heavy crude from Middle East regardless of shale production levels.
“the only way that we can truly be quote energy independent is to essentially offer subsidies to enforce sort of forced subsidies in a way force the refiners to spend these subsidies on retooling all of their um uh refiners now to be able to hand handle basically our light grades then but that but that's a multi-tens of billions multi-year type of retooling project”
The Fed put assumption (that the Fed will rescue markets on downturns) is subject to major rug pull because it was enabled by unprecedented low-to-nonexistent inflation from 2008-2021, but structural commodity inflation driven by years of capital starvation in opex commodities (especially oil) will persist for an entire decade, making QE ineffective and requiring the Fed to stay hawkish far longer than markets expect.
“what enabled this massive balance sheet expansion from 2008 till now was just an unprecedented period of low to almost non-existent inflation we just had no inflation and so every financial ill was curable by this panacea of of uh flooding the markets”
Equity in a company can be modeled as a call option on the company's assets with a strike price equal to total debt outstanding; conversely, bondholders are short a put option on company assets with strike at par value of debt, meaning bond value declines parabolic when company approaches distress (negative gamma zone) because put options lose value as underlying drops.
“here's what you how here's how to think of it in option terms the equity is basically a call option on the company's assets and the strike price of that option is struck at the at the amount of debt there is so anything any if the company's assets exceed the amount of debt right then you have uh you as the equity holder have a call option on that right um now conversely if you own a bond that that company has issued you are effectively short a put on the company's assets and the put strike is the par amount of total amount of debt”
Quantitative easing by itself (central bank printing money and buying assets) is not inflationary because it is a swap of one financial asset for another (like exchanging 100 dollar bills for 100 dollars of Treasury bonds), but when combined with fiscal stimulus (government issuing debt and distributing the proceeds), it becomes inflationary because actual money (fiat) is being created.
“i i do agree with the view that quantitative easing by itself is is not uh very inflationary or perhaps not inflationary at all because it's just like printing a as joseph wang uh former central banker says it's like quantitative easing is like printing a hundred dollar bill the federal reserve prints a hundred dollar bill and then it buys a hundred dollars worth of treasuries and it's just a swap of 100 bills however if you have the treasury issuing debt at the same time and also you have the government making loans that are forgivable i mean that is just we've had a money printing bonanza over the past two years uh to me it's undeniable not by the commercial banks but by the government and the federal reserve definitely helped play that and yes i mean the us is not used to having fiscal constraints”
Ethereum and other DeFi tokens attempt to use discounted cash flow models based on gas fees, but this creates circular logic because the gas fees are priced in terms of the token itself—creating recursion where you're valuing a company (the blockchain network) whose business is issuing shares of itself, a fundamentally broken valuation framework.
“the the pushback i've gotten is that there are some people who have actually tried to do a dcf of ethereum and say hey look you can model it out you've got these gas fees um that are that are revenues and you know based on the gas fees there's discounted cash flows back to token holders really what are the revenues based on what are the gas fees based on oh the gas fees are actually based upon a starting value to the tokens themselves that you're trying to value it's as if you're trying to value company xyz whose business is basically issuing shares of xyz so the problem i have is there's this built-in recursion into these valuation frameworks”
Reminiscences of a Stock Operator (a classic market psychology book) was required reading for all analysts that Cow hired during his hedge fund career, because the fundamental lesson—that greed and fear never change—is more important than any technical analysis or valuation framework.
“i think i've been around in the capital markets long enough that i can say that the one thing that doesn't ever change about the capital markets is greed and fear which is why you know that that famous book reminiscences of a stock operator was a required reading for all analysts that i hired back in the day”
Russian oil flows have not been materially disrupted by Western sanctions and embargoes; the majority of Russia's 5 million barrels per day of exports are seaborne (with only ~1 million bpd flowing via the ESO pipeline to China), meaning if seaborne routes were actually blockaded with material disruptions of 2+ million bpd, oil prices would spike, but current price increases are sentiment-driven rather than fundamentally driven by actual Russian supply loss.
“if russia if we actually do blockade seaborn routes to me why am i harping on seabourn routes because if you think about russia oil flows to china the only land-borne routes are via the espo pipeline the east siberia pipeline and that's currently flowing at around a million barrels per day it maxes out at 1.6 million barrels per day the rest of you know russia's call it 5 million barrels per day of exports are seabourn so the bulk the majority are seabourn”
The U.S. government has lived without fiscal constraints for 30-50 years because the dollar is the global reserve currency, allowing perpetual deficit spending; now that inflation has returned, these deficits must be constrained, but the U.S. political system is unwilling to raise taxes or cut spending (gridlock), leaving the entire burden of demand destruction on the Federal Reserve's monetary policy.
“and yes i mean the us is not used to having fiscal constraints for what 30 40 50 years because we've been the global reserve currency so all of this tightening has to come from the monetary policy”
The Federal Reserve's QE program was a legitimate crisis-fighting tool in 2008 when banks faced systemic collapse and runs on deposits, but since then the Fed has become addicted to QE and applied it during non-systemic crises, enabling the invention of Bitcoin as a hedge against dollar debasement and creating moral hazard where investors expect Fed puts whenever asset prices decline.
“the massive uh flooding and and outright asset purchases like uh represented by tarp um were absolutely necessary because that that was really the only quote legit use of qe i can think of because if you lived through that crisis as i did um you knew that even good banks were basically were down to maybe one to two weeks of liquidity”
When MicroStrategy stock is deeply out of the money on its convertibles (trading at $244 vs. conversion prices in the $500-600 range), both converts are in the distressed zone with negative gamma, creating massive volatility swings and unhedgeable losses for convert arbitragers—this state will persist until the stock recovers above conversion prices or the company defaults.
“one of the things about negative gamma is that when you are in the um that distressed zone um you will see the stock make massive gyrations both on the downside and on the upside and that is because you know if you go back to that that chart that i keep talking to right the steepness of credit deterioration in that distress zone makes it so that if you're a convertible arbitrator it's nearly impossible to hedge because on the downside your credit losses are going to massively outstrip what the equity what your equity can do you could you could be on a three or four hundred percent delta and still be under hedged but then when there's a short covering rally caused by whatever all of a sudden your 400 percent short is going to be a massive overhead so you're just going to see crazy crazy ball and the stock for the foreseeable future until you know if uh if the stock recovers back to like 500 or 600 then you're gonna see it calm down because it'll be at least one of the converts will have moved out of the distressed zone but at 2 244 um the both converts are deeply out of the money and so it you're going to see massive vol and that's why i put it on”
Bitcoin and NFTs (store-of-value category crypto) cannot be fundamentally valued using standard financial frameworks (discounted cash flow) because they generate no cash flows to investors; the narrative constantly changes (from digital gold to network effects) to justify higher prices, making bitcoin a classic greater-fool trade fundamentally no different from dot-com bubble stocks that had irrational valuations.
“the category one um you know you you really cannot you cannot value fundamentally and the problem i have with bitcoin is that the narrative keeps changing because you know some people will argue that it's a store of value and you know it's like it's like digital gold and okay so then i say okay so then you agree that it's a greater full trade oh no no it's not a greater world that is a negative connotation but there's value in the network you know again netcast law the adoption the network okay how does the value of the network translate into cash flows to the investor”
In 2008, Cow shorted Fannie Mae senior subordinated bonds (trading at LIBOR+35bps vs senior notes at LIBOR+20bps) to hedge interest rate risk on his convert portfolio, because they were a liquid agency credit that offered 35bps pickup for taking lower-ranked credit risk; when Hank Paulson put Fannie into conservatorship pre-bankruptcy, he drew a line protecting senior and senior-sub but wiping out junior preferred, causing Cow's super-senior short to lose money (spread collapsed) but his long-short capital structure arb (long preferred/short straight preferred) to make much more, netting positive.
“i i this is before the fannie mae conservatorship their fannie mae was a super super levered capital structure right if memory serves was like something like you know 900 there was there was something like 900 billion of senior uh senior notes um then there was a small sliver of senior sub i think it was something like uh uh 15 15 billion or something like that and then there was a sliver of uh preferred that was 35 billion the senior notes the 900 billion or so because they were kind of implicit fannie mae you know agency credit they were trading at something like libor plus 20. 20 basis points 20 surprised yes yes beneath that sliver of uh of the 900 billion you had you had basically 15 billion of senior sub that was trading at maybe libor plus 35 so an additional 15 basis points to be on that that lower uh rung right”
The Federal Reserve's 2008 QE and the Treasury's TARP program were legitimately necessary because the banking system was at systemic risk of collapse—banks had only 1-2 weeks of liquidity remaining and faced perception-to-reality runs like in Mary Poppins, so massive balance sheet expansion was the correct policy to prevent systemic failure.
“the uh cute qe at least the qe that we all know and love uh was basically invented during that crisis right um the massive uh flooding and and outright asset purchases like uh represented by tarp um were absolutely necessary because that that was really the only quote legit use of qe i can think of because if you lived through that crisis as i did um you knew that even good banks were basically were down to maybe one to two weeks of liquidity because in banks unlike most businesses the what i call perception to reality risk is very very real”
High-yield credit spreads at 900 basis points would represent a significant market stress level that might force Fed reconsideration of tightening, but an S&P 500 decline of 30% alone (equity pain without credit stress) would not be sufficient to trigger a Fed pivot, contradicting market expectations that equity weakness brings rescue.
“i think that is exactly the type of moral hazard that has been ingrained into the system over the last 15 plus years that needs to be run out of the system um the assumption that the fed put is always there around the corner we are in a different regime it's a different regime that none of us frankly have lived through i mean i've technically lived through it because i'm 51 but but i was a kid star wars just came out so i think i think this is a brand new uh regime and it's uh it's kind of it's got some scary implications um you know it's it's something unlike uh you know pretty much all of us that are active market practitioners uh something unlike uh we've ever seen before really”
Bitcoin is yet another dot-com-style example of artificially engineered supply scarcity, and if Cow is right that structural opex inflation persists, liquidity will be drained from crypto and other inflation capacitors, leading to further depreciation.
“ultimately i'm left with just thinking you know what i think this time is no different this is yet another to b example of like an artificially um scarce artificially engineered supply scarcity that's very very reminiscent of the the dot-com bubble and if i'm right that structural opex inflation is here to stay for a long time you're going to see continued draining of of this inflation capacitor along with other uh inflation capacitors”
The housing bubble faces significant headwinds from rising risk-free rates; cap rates (capitalization rates, the real estate equivalent of credit spreads) and equity market risk premiums are built on the risk-free rate foundation, so rising Treasury yields across the curve will compress real estate valuations through higher discount rates, not just through credit spread widening.
“i think of the world that way too i mean the equity market risk premium is what real estate people call cap rates credit spreads is basically the same thing except for uh you know uh you know credit markets so all of those all of those various uh estimates of risk premiums are built upon the risk-free rate and i think the risk-free rate all along the curve is going up”
Bitcoin's supply inelasticity (21 million coin cap with 19 million already minted) cuts both ways: if demand increases, prices can spike parabolic, but if demand drops, prices plummet parabolic; with perfectly inelastic supply there is no marginal buyer to stabilize price, making bitcoin adoption impossible if it becomes a store of value (high price) because no one can afford to buy it.
“the sword i'd like to say that the sword of inelastic supply cuts both ways if you think if you look at if you look at that thread i basically go into like basic econ 101 and look at what a perfectly inelastic supply curve looks like when you've got a perfectly inelastic supply curve it's it's vertical right and so what happens is that if if demand if demand keeps going higher then you have these parabolic increases in price but if demand goes down you've got a parabolic decrease in price”
There is a trade-off between tokenomics (mechanisms that increase price) and economics (actual utility): protocols that maximize price appreciation often sacrifice user-friendliness and functionality, while user-friendly protocols often have poor tokenomics.
“i think you're absolutely right that there is a trade-off between the tokenomics and the economics meaning that the the protocols and practices and technology that would incline a uh digital asset to increase in price are sort of contrary to it actually being useful to its holders for example unit swap is an incredibly useful protocol...but the tokenomics are not that great...there are some other protocols perhaps uh you know in the number one number two slot that are a little bit more they have they're a little trickier to use but their tokenomics are phenomenal”
In a bankruptcy, all debt maturities 'spring to tomorrow'—they all become immediately due—regardless of their original maturity dates, so the temporal structure of MicroStrategy's debt is less important than the total amount.
“i i used to always tell my analysts look in a bankruptcy all maturities spring to tomorrow it doesn't matter whether you have 2025 maturities or 2050 maturities because in a bankruptcy all of those maturities need to be met before there's any value to the equity”
The dollar wrecking ball (strong dollar driven by high U.S. interest rates) will ultimately be self-correcting because it will severely damage China (already facing Evergrande crisis and COVID lockdowns) and emerging markets; as their growth slows, demand destruction reduces oil prices, which eventually reverses the dollar strength cycle.
“the dollar wrecking ball is going to be self-correcting because i i feel like you know it's going to really hurt china for instance i keep honing in on china because i think that china in particular already had major issues of its own given evergrand last year and then these perennial covid lockdowns and so their monetary policy is going the exact in the exact opposite direction as ours and they've been naturally they've been artificially pegging the yuan at a at a an artificially strong rate and so as you've seen in recent weeks um you know that that yuan has been weakening i personally think that the yuan is going to go north of seven before all before all is said and done but ultimately that will self-correct because it's going to produce a a recession and some demand destruction and oil um you know oil i think you asked me earlier oil is a little bit complicated”
Bubble assets function like capacitors in an electrical circuit, storing excess liquidity provided by the Fed (the battery); when liquidity must be drained due to inflation, these capacitors discharge simultaneously, and larger bubbles (housing 2008, crypto 2021, equities now) inflate to absorb the excess liquidity that cannot be deployed elsewhere.
“i think of bubble assets as capacitors and you know i guess the the the uh the non-electrical engineering analog to a capacitor would be like a water tower right so it's kind of like a temporary store of excess liquidity and and when there is a need for that excess liquidity to be drained these capacitors basically get drained right so if you think about my capacitor diagram my circuit diagram the fed has been the battery that has been charging this the circuit which is the the economy right”
MicroStrategy's debt break-even bitcoin price (price at which all debt is made whole at par in liquidation before equity gets anything) is approximately 19,000 dollars per bitcoin; if Saylor trips a financial covenant due to business deterioration or bitcoin decline, bankruptcy forces liquidation and all debt maturities become immediately due, meaning bitcoin must stay above 19,000 or equity receives zero.
“the break-even value i guess this is the way to think about it right the the the price the bitcoin price the minimum price that bitcoin has to be at for all of his debt to re uh be made whole at par in a liquidation is around just below 19 000 so if he trips some sort of covenant and he's put into liquidation right bitcoin has to be above 19 000 for the equity to get a dime”
The current confluence of the largest asset bubble in all time history, structural oil/energy inflation reminiscent of the 1973 embargo, a strong dollar wrecking ball (reminiscent of 1997-98 Asian crisis period), geopolitical escalation with Russia-Ukraine war, and potential energy crisis across all energy types (oil, gas, coal, uranium) creates a historically unprecedented scenario unlike anything most market practitioners have lived through.
“it's uh it's kind of it's got some scary implications um you know it's it's something unlike uh you know pretty much all of us that are active market practitioners uh something unlike uh we've ever seen before really it's this confluence of and all you know the biggest asset bubble biggest everything bubble of all time meets this structural inflation that we haven't seen since the 70s where we've got the makings of an energy crisis that's as bad as the 1973 embargo of oil the difference this time being that maybe maybe the oil spike isn't as bad as 1973 and in percentage terms but this time the energy crisis involves not just oil but all energy natural gas coal uranium everything and and then you and this is driving also this dollar wrecking ball which ultimately the dollar wrecking ball is going to be self-correcting because i i feel like you know it's going to really hurt china for instance”
A 'bearish steepening' of the yield curve—where the Fed caps short-term rates at 2.5-3% but allows/encourages longer-term Treasury yields to rise (30-year higher)—could accomplish demand destruction (depressing housing and real estate via rising cap rates) without creating system-breaking funding stress on short-duration corporate and government debt; this could be more achievable than a Paul Volcker-style aggressive rate hike that breaks the system.
“well why can't qt involve an artificial steepening what i call a bearish steepening of the yield curve and maybe that comes from you know issuing a 50-year bond or or pushing uh treasury auctions out along the curve i mean frankly i've thought for decades now that are um you know if if the uh the ducks are clacking at the long end and willing to basically pay three percent for 30-year sovereign risk we should be terming out all of our debt at the long end we should do it”
The crypto bubble in 2022 is like the b2b and dot-com bubble of 1999-2000, where companies like Ariba, Commerce One, and JDS Uniphase (ticker JDSU) traded at crazy revenue multiples with tiny floats, justified by new paradigm narratives like Metcalfe's law and network effects, and bubble blowers like George Gilder promoted these narratives—parallels that are very similar to crypto promoters today.
“you had all these b2b and and b2b companies like ariba and commerce one most of you guys haven't even heard of these companies um you had also the uh the fiber optic companies like jds uniphase jim cramer had a i'll always remember jim kramer used to call jds uniphase the ticker was jdsu just don't sell us famous famous last words so all of these companies were were bubble companies trading at crazy crazy revenue multiples and they floated very very low floats their evaluations made no sense but they were justified by all this new paradigm talk about metcalfe's law s curve adoption um network effects”
MicroStrategy CEO Michael Saylor has issued approximately 2.4 billion dollars of debt across four tranches to fund bitcoin purchases: a 0.75% coupon convertible due 2025 ($650M), a zero-coupon convertible due 2027 ($1.05B), a 6.125% coupon senior secured due 2028 ($500M), and a floating-rate SOFR+370bps private loan due 2025 ($700M, with $200M floating-rate exposure to Fed rate increases).
“the first convertible bond was a 0.75 coupon due in 2025 the second convert he issued was just a heroic uh issuance on his part a zero coupon due in 2027 that was a billion five sorry 1.05 billion the first one was 650 million then he once he's exhausted uh the his convertible uh issuance capacity he issued a senior secured six and one-eighth coupon due in june of 28 to the tune of 500 million and most recently in march he issued a private senior secured piece of debt that even primes that senior secured note this one had silver gate as the private lender this one was priced at sofa plus 3.7 percent and this one uh is due in 2025. so all in he's got about 2.4 billion of debt”
Before MicroStrategy began buying Bitcoin, it was a slow-growth, profitable software business trading at ~$150/share (~$1B market cap), essentially a low-growth business rather than a high-growth technology play.
“before he did any of this uh by any bitcoin i think microstrategy was trading at around a billion dollar market cap i don't even really i've never dealt that deeply into the fundamentals of a software business so i can't speak to it with with a lot of detail but it was from what i understand it's a fairly slow and steady low growth type of business um it was valued around a billion about trading at about 150 dollars a share right money issues it was a profitable business a slow growing profitable business that it was not a monopoly”
The current market bubble environment resembles the dot-com bubble of 2000 more than the 2008 financial crisis because equity volatility dominates the bubble (as opposed to credit volatility in 2008), allowing strategies like convertible arbitrage that exploit equity-credit dislocations to profit, and credit markets have not experienced major meltdowns like they did when Lehman collapsed and Fannie Mae spreads spiked.
“in 2000 during the time when the bubble crashed um traditional you know sort of directional hedge fund strategies whether they were equity based or credit based did very poorly as you would expect just like now right um so just to explain for the audience dimensional means you're betting on the price to go one way normally up so when the price goes down you suffer and they do as opposed to so like even even even when you talk about you know equity long short strategies let's face it when you've got like a 15 20 year sort of equity bull market most equity long short strategies are not really equity long short they're basically closet beta they're basically closet longs with maybe some you know index level hedging”
Crypto's primary use case is for unbanked populations in third-world countries who have more trust in crypto than their own government's currency, but for developed markets, crypto represents ways of making more fiat, not a true alternative currency.
“the the use case to the the people living in uh in third world countries that are truly unbanked there is a real legitimate use case there because um they probably have more trust in um crypto than their own government's uh uh currency but for the bulk of the developed world especially for those of us here um where you know you're not going to buy a pizza with a bitcoin maybe somebody did once upon a time and they're regretting it but ultimately um what bitcoin and the rest of crypto represent are um ways of making more fiat i mean let's just call a spade a spade there are ways of making more fiat”
MicroStrategy's debt service on $700M of coupon-bearing debt is approximately $45M annually, which is greater than half of the company's EBITDA, leaving razor-thin free cash flow margins after capex; this creates "perception to reality risk" where clients might hesitate to renew contracts if they believe the CEO has 'gone crazy' with Bitcoin laser-eyes marketing.
“the coupon bearing debt now by my calculation um has estimated debt service of close to 45 million which is about half more than half of his uh ebitda that's before capex if you assume that his capex is necessary for the maintenance of his business he's left with a razor thin uh free cash flow margin on his business and remember we talked about this business to reality risk that the banking system had now granted you know his software business doesn't have the same sort of run on the bank dynamics uh that that a a commercial bank would have however in this macro environment of all these macro headwinds of us dollar wrecking ball slowing growth etc it doesn't boggle the imagination that his fundamental business might be slowing down as well not even counting any sort of perception to reality issues where if you're his long-term client you look at his website there's barely anything on his core business everything is bitcoin laser eyes like the guys like gone crazy”
Spare global oil production capacity is conservatively estimated at 4-5 million barrels per day (not the 1-2 million bpd some cite), and this spare capacity is a deep hedge meant for true geopolitical disruptions, not a consumer policy option to bail out expensive energy policies; it should only be deployed if 2-3 million bpd is actually disrupted, not to lower gas prices from policy mistakes.
“i also more conservative than a lot of uh you know oil folks out there um you know i i tend to gravitate towards the more conservative numbers that capital one puts out on global spare capacity and you know if you if you count the gcc countries as well as outside the gcc countries capital one would say that global spare is closer to four to five million not the one to two million that that some that some people uh uh tout”
The interest rate risk (ROE) hedge for convertible bonds historically never worked because whenever credit or equity crises occurred, safe-haven bid in bonds spiked (Treasury prices up, yields down), offsetting shorting gains from equity hedges; but in current environment with persistently rising interest rates (no safe-haven bid), the ROE hedge finally works for the first time, making convertible arb less painful than in 2008.
“the it's kind of a joke amongst us uh convert arbs that you know the roe hedge never ever seemed to work because every single time there was a major credit credit crisis or equity crisis you would have the safe haven bid and bonds right so whatever money you might have made being you know short equity against your convert you would give it up on your bond hedge because bonds would spike in a safe haven”
Technically, bond investors (not the company) bear the short put risk if a covenant is breached, but practically speaking, the company and investors are incentivized the same way, so the company cares about its own balance sheet health.
“no you're not missing something at all i wrote i wrote a um i wrote a thread about exactly that and it's it's called mscr more real options thoughts april 29th of 21. um i basically said yes technically the answer to your question is yes but practically speaking the company is 99.9 percent of i percent incentivize the same way as investors so even though um you know even though you could argue that from a narrow zero sum perspective the bond issuer wins if bond investors lose and the real put gets exercised right but you know this but the thing the thing is what bond what companies ceo issues a bond to win from that perspective you know what i mean yeah so for all intents and purposes it's exactly you have to look at it from the investor's perspective”
The move index (VIX equivalent for bonds) measures interest rate vol, which is extremely high currently, and combined with equity vol also being high and credit vol relatively stable, creates a unique regime where the risk-free rate (bottom layer) is the most volatile component of the asset sandwich.
“i am joined by michael cow michael welcome to ford guidance thanks so much so michael you are a retired hedgehog manager you're a private investor now you've been dropping a lot of truth bombs on twitter uh or your twitter handle is at urbancowboy...even though you said credit credit has not it remains you know range bound let's say but interest rate risk is super high and then that's you know it is i mean no one who who have you became an options trader in 2013 you never thought about row like the interest or you know people are having to think about right interest rates uh in a whole different level”
Cow has no skin in the game on crypto except for a recent minor short position in MicroStrategy via put spreads, which is a tactical volatility trade in the distressed convert zone, not a directional short on crypto or MicroStrategy equity.
“i hate talking about stuff where i actually have uh an interest in it and up until last week i had no position in bitcoin or in microstrategy as of last week when microstrategy stock ripped um because of what i think of as negative gamma um short covering i put on like a put spread in microstrategy so i i do have a position in it but it's not not material i just think that it's interesting”