YouTube6m· Nov 2022· cataloged

Taiwan’s Secret Shield Against Chinese Invasion: Its Semiconductor Industry | GZERO World


What this covers

This is a six-minute GZERO World conversation in which Ian Bremmer questions a policy and technology expert (identified in the description as New York Times national security correspondent David Sanger) about why chips made in Taiwan sit at the center of US-China competition. The framing comparison is Europe's dependence on Russian oil and gas. Bremmer pushes back on it, arguing that oil and gas can be bought from many sources while advanced chips come from one. That makes Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company a chokepoint that China and the US both rely on, which the discussion treats as a shared vulnerability.

The middle of the conversation covers how the US got here and what it is doing now. The expert describes leading-edge manufacturing, which the US invented, drifting offshore during globalization on the assumption that supply chain location did not matter. He says Taiwan's chokepoint role was not a serious concern in policy circles until recently. He walks through administrations: George W. Bush, Obama and Donald Trump recognized the problem without acting, and Trump's attention went to 5G communications rather than chips. Joe Biden has paid attention, including events at a Micron Technology facility and in Silicon Valley.

The most contested material concerns the limits of the current approach. Export controls on chipmaking equipment and lithography are described as a fingers-in-the-dyke) measure that delays China by years but will not stop it. He argues they work only if the US rebuilds domestic capacity, and he claims that planned TSMC and Samsung plants in the Southwest will cover under 5% of the need. He also raises a risk that the controls convince Beijing the US is set on containing its technology, which could push it toward aggressive moves elsewhere, including military ones tied to Taiwan.

Sharpest takeaway

The United States has allowed a critical vulnerability in advanced semiconductor manufacturing by outsourcing to Taiwan, and while recent export controls delay Chinese progress, they must be coupled with domestic manufacturing buildout or will only temporarily contain rather than solve the strategic problem.

  • Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) is the sole source of advanced chips the US invented but outsourced, creating a national security vulnerability 100 miles from hostile China
  • Export controls alone cannot solve the problem; the US must simultaneously build domestic capacity, but planned facilities will address less than 5% of current needs
  • Multiple administrations from Bush through Trump recognized the problem but failed to act; only Biden has moved substantively on the issue

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0.80

Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) is not only critical to Chinese semiconductor development but also critical to American semiconductors, making TSMC a shared vulnerability for both the US and China.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Ian (Interviewer)

“that also raises a question of American vulnerability. If TSMC is not just critical to Chinese semiconductors, but also American semiconductors, not like the US is making these things at home, how do the Americans relate to the fact that one of its most important national security assets happens to be sitting 100 miles away from mainland China?”

0.80

Semiconductors are fundamentally different from commodity goods like oil and gas because while gas and oil can be bought from multiple sources globally, advanced semiconductors can only be sourced from Taiwan, making TSMC an incomparable strategic chokepoint.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Ian (Interviewer)

“at least gas and oil, you can buy those commodities anywhere. These semiconductors you can only buy in Taiwan.”

0.75

The current US challenge is that preventing China from buying high-end semiconductor manufacturing equipment and lithography works only if the US simultaneously builds enough manufacturing capacity back in the United States.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Unknown Speaker (Policy/Technology Expert)

“Here's the challenge right now. You can buy yourself some time by trying to prevent the Chinese from buying these high end manufacturing machines and the lithography all around it. But that only works if you then turn around and build enough capacity back in the United States.”

0.75

Europe made a similar vulnerability mistake by becoming dependent on Russian oil and gas during the era of globalization, just as the US became dependent on Taiwan for semiconductors.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Unknown Speaker (Policy/Technology Expert)

“The Europeans did it with oil and gas, being dependent on the Russians. We did it in the semiconductor arena where we were dependent on Taiwan, but many other places.”

0.75

China has made huge advances in artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and biosciences, but has been continually frustrated in its ability to manufacture the smallest diameter chips that come from Taiwan Semiconductor.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Unknown Speaker (Policy/Technology Expert)

“while the Chinese have made huge advances in many different arenas, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, the biosciences and so forth, one area where they have been continually frustrated has been the ability to make the smallest diameter chips, the kinds that we get from Taiwan Semiconductor”

0.69

The United States allowed the manufacturing of leading-edge semiconductors (which the US invented and dominated) to be outsourced globally during the era of globalization, based on the assumption that global supply chains were reliable enough that the location of manufacturing did not matter.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unknown Speaker (Policy/Technology Expert)

“we came to the conclusion in the era of globalization that the supply chain around the world was reliable enough that it didn't make any difference where we manufactured them. And this was a feature of the past two decades.”

0.69

The vulnerability of Taiwan as a chokepoint for global semiconductor supply was not considered a high-end concern in US policy circles until the past few years, despite Taiwan's contested status between the US and China.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unknown Speaker (Policy/Technology Expert)

“The vulnerability of Taiwan was never really considered to be a high end concern until the past few years. And that's remarkable to me.”

0.68

Current US export controls on semiconductors are a temporary containment strategy ('fingers in the dyke') that will delay Chinese progress by years, but eventually China will figure out how to manufacture advanced chips regardless.

forecasthigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Unknown Speaker (Policy/Technology Expert)

“The US effort right now is sort of fingers in the dyke. In other words, it is an effort to try to make sure that the Chinese have years more delay, but sooner or later China is going to figure this out.”

0.63

While Taiwan Semiconductor and Samsung are building manufacturing facilities in the Southwest, when those facilities are open they will address less than 5% of the semiconductor manufacturing problem.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Unknown Speaker (Policy/Technology Expert)

“the fact of the matter is that while Taiwan Semiconductor is building in the Southwest and Samsung is building in the Southwest, when those facilities are open, it will address under 5% of the problem.”

0.61

The Trump administration worried about China installing 5G communications in the US and NATO nations (a legitimate concern) but did not do much in the semiconductor area; they recognized the issue and talked about it but did not act.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unknown Speaker (Policy/Technology Expert)

“when you think back to, say, the Trump administration, they worried about China installing 5G communications in the US and NATO nations, a perfectly legitimate concern, but didn't really do very much in the semiconductor area. They recognized it. They talked about it. They didn't do much.”

0.57

US export controls on semiconductors risk convincing China that the US is so committed to containing Chinese technological power that China may be incentivized to make aggressive moves in other areas, including military arenas, which is critically related to Taiwan's security.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Unknown Speaker (Policy/Technology Expert)

“do we make them convince that the US is so out to contain Chinese technological power that they begin to make moves in other areas, including military arenas? And that's critically related to Taiwan, because right now, in my view, Ian, the greatest defense we have against Taiwan being invaded is the existence of Taiwan Semiconductor.”

0.48

The semiconductor industry itself and a series of US governments (Bush, Obama, Trump, Biden) allowed the capitalist flow of supply chains to work without strategic oversight, with Bush, Obama, Trump recognizing but not acting on semiconductor vulnerability, while Biden has paid attention to it.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unknown Speaker (Policy/Technology Expert)

“The semiconductor industry in and of itself, a series of governments in the US that knew this was an important technology but basically just allowed the capitalist flow of supply chain to work its own way. And so if you're looking for political leaders to blame for this, I'd start with George W. Bush, Barack Obama, Donald Trump and Biden has actually paid attention to the alarm.”

0.32

The Biden administration has promoted semiconductor manufacturing capacity by holding events at Micron technology facility in upstate New York and in Silicon Valley.

factualestablishednovelty 0/4durability 2/4· Unknown Speaker (Policy/Technology Expert)

“That's why you've seen the President show up in Poughkeepsie, New York. The other day, he was at a Micron technology facility in upstate New York. You've seen him in Silicon Valley promoting all of this.”