What this covers

Four international economists examine whether the dollar is losing its grip on the global monetary system. Maurice Obstfeld, Joseph Gagnon, and Moritz Schularick—joined by moderator Adam Posen—assess how recent US policy shifts might reshape the architecture of international finance. The panel argues that the dollar's centrality faces genuine erosion, driven not by economic fundamentals alone but by threats to the institutional pillars that have long anchored its dominance: the rule of law, multilateral commitment, fiscal credibility, and monetary stability. Rather than a sudden collapse, the concern is a slow de-centering, where the world moves toward a multipolar currency arrangement.

The discussion spans several distinct terrains. The speakers parse the mechanics of the dollar's actual decline: its share of global reserves has fallen from roughly 70 percent to 58 percent since 2000, though the euro captured little of that loss—the gains went to gold and non-traditional currencies instead. Gagnon unpacks the puzzle of US debt sustainability and the so-called exorbitant privilege, showing how tariffs interact with currency movements and trade deficits in ways that may defy simpler economic models. Schularick identifies the euro's chief constraint: a structural shortage of safe assets that no single European nation can supply. He sketches how a joint European defense bond could close that gap and attract the kind of scale investors demand. Obstfeld raises stakes by contending that current US policy—driven by what he calls a grievance narrative about unfair trade and global arrangements—threatens the very credibility that makes dollar supremacy valuable, while also detailing risks from unregulated dollar-pegged stablecoins that could fragment rather than integrate the world payment system. The analysis turns contentious around causation and forecasts, with the speakers disagreeing on how much the trade deficit reflects structural imbalance versus the dollar's continued appeal to foreign investors.

Sharpest takeaway

The dollar's centrality in the global financial system is eroding due to deteriorating US institutions, fiscal discipline, and political norms, while no clear alternative has yet emerged—potentially leading to a fragmented multipolar monetary system with significant risks to global stability.

  • US institutional pillars—rule of law, central bank independence, fiscal discipline, multilateralism—are under unprecedented threat, undermining the dollar's reserve currency status
  • The US fiscal deficit is unsustainable ($4 trillion additional borrowing over 10 years), foreign Treasury holdings are declining, and the exorbitant privilege enabling dollar dominance faces erosion
  • While the euro could theoretically replace the dollar, Europe's lack of safe assets, geopolitical weakness, and fragmented capital markets make it an inadequate alternative in the near term

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0.81

The most important drawback holding the euro back as a global currency is the scarcity of safe assets: the US supplies about 30% of world GDP in safe assets, while Germany alone is far below that, the core safe euro-zone countries together reach maybe 5% of global GDP, and including France brings it to about 10% — leaving a huge gap.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Moritz Schularick

“the lack and scarcity of safe assets... the US supplies about 30% of world GDP in and safe assets right now... If you add in the other safe countries in the Euro zone... you get to maybe 5% of global GDP. If you add in France... then we're at 10%. But there's a huge gap”

0.78

Alexander Hamilton believed that for America to be strong, the government had to have good credit and states like individuals who observe their engagements are respected and trusted while those who pursue the opposite fate are not.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Mory Obstfeld

“The credit of the US was a very big um uh topic for Alexander Hamilton, first treasury secretary...he believed that for America to be strong the government had to have good credit. uh in his report relative to a provision for the support of public credit uh setting out the um vision that he had he wrote states like individuals who observe their engagements are respected and trusted while the reverse is the fate of those who pursue an opposite conduct”

0.76

The dollar's share of global FX reserves declined from about 70% at the turn of the millennium to about 58% now, but the dollar's loss was not the euro's gain — the euro held stable around 20% while non-traditional reserve currencies and gold absorbed the shift.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 2/4· Moritz Schularick

“it goes down on the right hand scale from about 70% at the turn of the millennium to now 58%... the euro the blue line is very stable... about 20%... the dollar's loss if you will was not the euro's gain”

0.73

Rather than the US net debt threatening the dollar's role, it is the dollar's global role that has driven the deficit: US financial assets — treasuries plus private securitized assets — are uniquely attractive due to the economy's size, perceived military and legal safety, and the creativity of US financial markets, which sustains the dollar's reserve role and skews the trade deficit toward the US.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Joseph Gagnon

“we think it's the dollar's global role that has basically driven this process... US financial assets are uh, uniquely attractive to international investors... The very large size of the US economy, the perceived safety both military and legal... and creativity of US financial markets that are able to securitize productive assets”

0.73

The 'exorbitant privilege' — the US paying a lower return on its borrowing than it earns on its lending — is not unique to the US but shared by most advanced economies, while developing economies have the reverse; if the US retains this privilege, stabilizing its net liability/GDP ratio requires the goods-and-services deficit to shrink by 2% of GDP (implying a 15-20% real depreciation), but if it loses the privilege the deficit must shrink 3.5% of GDP (implying a 25-30% real depreciation).

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Joseph Gagnon

“the exorbitant privilege... we define as the fact that the US pays a lower rate of return on its borrowing than it earns on its lending... If we retain that uh uh privilege then the trade part... has to shrink by 2% of GDP and that would require... a real depreciation of 15 to 20%... if it loses that exorbitant privilege... that would require a real dollar depreciation of 25 to 30%”

0.73

There is a deep paradox in Franco-German fiscal politics: Germany is fiscally hawkish but nation-state dovish (willing to give up sovereignty toward political union, given its post-1945 DNA and need for a taxation power), while France is fiscally dovish but nation-state hawkish (unwilling to sign the political-union 'marriage contract'); a genuine French crisis requiring euro-zone fiscal support could push toward deeper integration.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Moritz Schularick

“Germany is basically fiscally hawkish but if you will nation state doubbish Germany would go the next step towards more political union... France is fiscally dovish and nation state hawkish. So France is ultimately not willing to sign that marriage contract... If that crisis in France leads to the point where France really needs that fiscal support from Europe, I could see... a push towards more integration”

0.73

Basic economic theory implies a 10% broad tariff should push the dollar up about 5%, offsetting the tariff's effect on import costs and equally reducing both exports and imports, leaving the trade deficit unchanged in that simple framework.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Joseph Gagnon

“a 10% broad tariff should push the dollar up about 5%... the dollar appreciation would offset some of the effect of the tariff on the cost of imports... both exports and imports would go down equally and there'd be no effect on the trade deficit in that basic theory.”

0.73

US institutions—deep and open financial markets, multilateralism, strong monetary and fiscal frameworks, limited government intervention, and rule of law—have been critical in underpinning the dollar's role as the world's global currency, but all of these are currently under threat in the existing political environment.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Maurice Obstfeld

“US institutions have been critical in underpinning uh the dollar's role in bringing it to the point where it is in effect the world's uh global currency. Uh what institutions are at stake? deep and open financial and product markets. Commitment to multilateralism including credibility in the security sphere. Uh strong monetary and fiscal frameworks which have generally produced fiscal and price stability. Uh a commitment to limited government intervention in the marketplace. And finally the rule of law. All of these underpin the dollar's central role. Uh it's fair to say they're all under threat in the current political environment in the US.”

0.73

Europe remains dependent on US security guarantees and is not yet an adult at the table when it comes to security questions, and things are happening but will probably take at least five years for renewed emphasis on defense to translate into real geopolitical strength.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Moritz Schleick

“Geopolitical strength um is another clear uh uh issue. Europe remains dependent on US security guarantees. It is not uh sort of an adult at the table when it comes to security questions. Um again things are happening here but uh we will probably have to wait at least uh five years or so for this to trans the renewed emphasis on on defense in this new geopolitical environment to translate into into real strength”

0.71

Invoking Alexander Hamilton's principle that good government credit is essential to national strength ('states like individuals who observe their engagements are respected and trusted'), Obstfeld argues that if the US does not change course, dollar supremacy will erode — slowly and then quickly — moving the world toward a multipolar currency system.

forecasthigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Maurice Obstfeld

“if we don't have a course change the dollar supremacy will erode it will become desentered in the term Adam used slowly and maybe then quickly and we'll move to a multipolar system”

0.71

The Genius Act is setting the stage for a proliferation of lightly regulated stablecoins pegged to the dollar coming from the US, which has the potential to spark reactions in countries that don't want to see their financial stability compromised or lose monetary sovereignty, and these stablecoins are ultimately a mechanism for fragmentation rather than integration of the world payment system.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Maurice Obstfeld

“The Genius Act is setting the stage for a proliferation of lightly regulated stable coins uh pegged to the dollar coming from the US. Uh this has the potential to um spark uh reactions in countries that don't want to see their financial stability potentially compromised or give up monetary sovereignty. I think ultimately these are a mechanism for fragmentation rather than integration of the world payment system.”

0.70

Foreign willingness to buy US treasuries has fallen in relative terms — from about 50% of treasuries sold to the global market around 2010 to roughly a third now — and combined with an investment boom and low US saving, this makes financing the deficit expensive, with average treasury yields having risen sharply.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Maurice Obstfeld

“Then 50% of treasuries were sold to the global market. Now it's more like a third of treasuries. And with an investment boom going on with low US saving um with low foreign participation uh financing this is going to be expensive.”

0.70

The Treasury has been lowering the duration of its debt issuance, which raises the risk of a rollover crisis as more debt must be refinanced frequently at potentially adverse rates.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Maurice Obstfeld

“the Treasury is currently and has been uh even under the last administration lowering duration raising the risk of um uh rollover crisis.”

0.70

Gold has become the go-to diversification asset for official reserve holders, with about 20% of official reserves now held in gold; scaling everything down, dollars are now less than half of reserves with about 16-17% in euros.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Moritz Schularick

“About 20% again of of uh reserves of official reserves are held in in gold... gold has been the uh sort of go-to place for at least for official holders of of uh of reserves um moving diversifying out the dollar”

0.70

The US current account has been in deficit continuously for over 40 years, with net liabilities to the rest of the world reported at 90% of US GDP at end of last year (perhaps ~67% adjusted for measurement issues); no single country in human history has ever borrowed so much as a share of the world economy.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Joseph Gagnon

“The accumulated uh debt net liabilities uh were reported at 90% of US GDP at the end of last year... maybe the true net number is more like 67% GDP... no single country has ever borrowed so much as a share of the world economy.”

0.70

Because about 80% of US bond and bank-loan claims on foreigners are in dollars, the exorbitant privilege is largely driven by the spread between what the US charges foreign dollar borrowers and what it pays on dollar liabilities (tied to treasury spreads); those spreads are now at their lowest in over 25 years, with a risk of going lower that would reduce the privilege.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Joseph Gagnon

“the vast majority of US bond and loan bank loan holdings claims on foreigners uh are in dollars about 80%... what really drives uh that part of the exorbitant privilege is the spread between uh what we can charge foreign dollar borrowers and what we pay uh on our dollar liabilities... we are now if you squint hard enough at the lowest level in over 25 years”

0.70

If all the factors (large fiscal deficit, AI investment boom, clean household balance sheets) were truly pushing up the trade deficit, the dollar should be stronger; since markets are not pricing that, the trade deficit cannot widen unless the dollar rises — the saving-investment imbalance reconciles with a depreciated dollar through inflation and timing rather than being a genuine conundrum.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Joseph Gagnon

“if all this were expected to be pushing up the trade deficit, the dollar should be stronger. So, markets are not seeing it. Uh and unless the dollar goes up, I don't think the trade deficit can widen.”

0.70

Europe's joint debt faces a Hamiltonian obstacle: whereas Hamilton justified federal assumption of state debts by creating a federal taxation power to service them, issuing large joint European debt lacks a clear corresponding taxation power, creating reluctance because the institutional framework for paying the debt is not clear.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Maurice Obstfeld

“his scheme was that the federal government would assume the debts of the various states and it was a way of actually justifying a federal taxation power to service those. And um Europe kind of has the adverse problem that if you issue all this joint debt... where is the taxation power that that um uh covers it?”

0.69

Gagnon noted that unless the dollar goes up, the trade deficit cannot widen; markets are apparently not seeing the factor increase the trade deficit that the audience member expected, or markets are viewing it as outweighed by other issues.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Joseph Gagnon

“I would only point out that if all this were expected to be pushing up the trade deficit, the dollar should be stronger. So, markets are not seeing it. Uh and unless the dollar goes up, I don't think the trade deficit can widen.”

0.69

The Treasury is lowering duration and raising the risk of rollover crisis, a concerning shift in debt management strategy.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Maurice Obstfeld

“Uh the Treasury is currently and has been uh even under the last administration lowering duration raising the risk of um uh rollover crisis.”

0.69

Gold purchases by central banks have increased significantly, with over 20% of official reserves now held in gold, representing a clear trend of official holders diversifying out of the dollar and toward gold as part of the broader dollar descentering process.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Moritz Schleick

“Um about 20% again of of uh reserves of official reserves are held in in gold and you scale everything down less than half now in dollars about 16 17% in euros. right inside is the that the gold purchases by central banks and I think it's over the last few years at least very clear that gold has been the uh sort of go-to place for at least for official holders of of uh of reserves um moving diversifying out the dollar”

0.69

There was massive currency manipulation in the decade 2003 to 2013, which persists at a much lower level to this day, with the dollar being the main currency into which manipulation occurs, meaning the dollar tends to skew the trade deficit toward the US.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Joseph Gagnon

“I note that in particular the work I did with Fred Bergston a few years ago uh showed that uh there was a massive amount of what we call currency manipulation in the decade 2003 to13. it persists at a much lower level to this day and the dollar is the main uh uh currency that that goes into which means that it tends to skew the trade deficit to the US.”

0.69

There is a real risk that the US moves into fiscal dominance, where the president talks about why interest rates need to be lower in the US as a way to finance the deficit at lower cost, representing an assault on norms and domestic rule of law.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Mory Obstfeld

“And of course, as Adam mentioned just now, pressures on the Fed, pressures on central bank independence certainly threaten to undermine the position of the dollar and destabilize the system. Uh we should not ignore fiscal in discipline and the real risk that the US moves into fiscal dominance. When um the president talks about why interest rates need to be lower in the US, often the theme is that uh it's about um uh financing the deficit at lower at lower cost. Um so there's a general assault on norms and the domestic rule of law.”

0.69

The vast majority of US bond and loan bank loan holdings (claims on foreigners) are in dollars—about 80%—which is unique to the dollar and is a key part of exorbitant privilege, driven by the spread between what the US can charge foreign dollar borrowers and what it pays on dollar liabilities, which is particularly associated with the spread on US treasuries.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Joseph Gagnon

“The other thing though that's interesting uh is that be partly because mainly because of the dollar's unique uh role most the vast majority of US bond and loan bank loan holdings claims on foreigners uh are in dollars about 80%. Uh so what really drives uh that part of the exorbitant privilege is the spread between uh what we can charge foreign dollar borrowers and what we pay uh on our dollar liabilities and that really is uh associated with the spread on US treasuries.”

0.69

A 10% broad tariff should push the dollar up about 5%, which would offset some of the tariff's effect on import costs, making the decline in imports smaller and exports more expensive, reducing both equally with no effect on the trade deficit in basic theory.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Joseph Gagnon

“Well, simple economic theory, and this is with some pretty strong simplifying assumptions, but it's a good place to start. It says that a 10% broad tariff should push the dollar up about 5%. Uh, and that would the dollar appreciation would offset some of the effect of the tariff on the cost of imports. So it would uh it would reduce the it would make the decline in imports smaller and it would also make exports more expensive and reduce exports. So both exports and imports would go down equally and there'd be no effect on the trade deficit in that basic theory.”

0.69

US-based stablecoin companies would be a tempting mechanism for sanctions on other countries, and stablecoins raise concerns abroad about financial stability, dollarization, and AML/CFT, likely provoking pushback — while a trillion-plus dollars of physical cash abroad may migrate into stablecoins as a more efficient way to do undetected transactions, with unclear net effect on dollar strength.

forecasthigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 2/4· Maurice Obstfeld

“US-based stable coin companies would be a very um tempting mechanism for sanctions on on other other countries. I think there's a lot of concern in the rest of the world about financial stability about uh dollarization... there are about a trillion uh uh uh dollars in um uh dollar bills out there... that migrate into the stable coin system”

0.69

The Genius Act sets the stage for a proliferation of lightly regulated dollar-pegged stablecoins from the US, which could spark defensive reactions in countries fearing for their financial stability or monetary sovereignty, ultimately acting as a mechanism for fragmentation rather than integration of the world payment system.

forecasthigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 2/4· Maurice Obstfeld

“the Genius Act is setting the stage for a proliferation of lightly regulated stable coins uh pegged to the dollar coming from the US... I think ultimately these are a mechanism for fragmentation rather than integration of the world payment system.”

0.68

Large investors would welcome a big, liquid pool of joint euro debt because it lets them move in and out in size without moving the market, unlike fragmented national markets (German Bunds vs Italian bonds) where size constraints bite.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Moritz Schularick

“I sense a great openness and uh support for joint debt issuance... they're not attracted by figuring out how much can I buy of buns and how much can I buy of Italian without moving the market. So the idea of having a large joint uh pool of debt that is liquid and where you can move in and and size in and out in size is something that I think markets would welcome.”

0.68

The concern is not that the dollar will collapse in a crisis, but that the centrality of the dollar — and the benefits to the US and world economy of having a strong central currency and insurance provider — is being eroded and somewhat replaced ('de-centering').

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Adam Posen

“it's not that the dollar is going to fall some huge amount the dollar's in crisis. but that the centrality of the dollar and the many important benefits for both the US and the world economy that went with having a strong central currency”

0.68

Administration policies threaten to undermine US global hard and soft power as much as they might be designed to do the opposite, fragmenting not only trade markets but potentially financial markets too, via coercive tariffs, retreat from regulatory cooperation, risk of capital controls, lightly regulated dollar stablecoins, and withdrawal from providing global public goods.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Maurice Obstfeld

“the administration's policies are threatening to undermine US global power as much as they might be uh designed to do the opposite. Hard power and soft power... not only are trade markets being fragmented, financial markets may be uh on the way to that fate as well.”

0.68

The institutional pillars underpinning the dollar's global role — deep and open financial/product markets, commitment to multilateralism and security credibility, strong monetary and fiscal frameworks, limited government intervention, and the rule of law — are all under threat in the current US political environment.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Maurice Obstfeld

“deep and open financial and product markets. Commitment to multilateralism including credibility in the security sphere... strong monetary and fiscal frameworks... a commitment to limited government intervention... And finally the rule of law. All of these underpin the dollar's central role... they're all under threat in the current political environment in the US.”

0.68

To stabilize the net liability position as a share of GDP while retaining exorbitant privilege, the goods and services trade deficit must shrink by 2% of GDP, requiring a real depreciation of the dollar by 15 to 20 percent; if the US loses exorbitant privilege, the goods and services deficit must shrink by 3.5% of GDP, requiring a real depreciation of 25 to 30 percent.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Joseph Gagnon

“We do in our paper some calculations of what it would take to just stabilize uh the net uh liability position as a share of GDP. And it turns out that uh the exorbitant privilege which people talk about we define as the fact that the US pays a lower rate of return on its borrowing than it earns on its lending. uh and that uh that by the way is not unique to the United States is actually shared by most advanced economies. Uh it's the developing economies that have the reverse. They pay more than they earn. Uh uh advanced economies have exorbitant privilege. The US notably so. Um if we retain that uh uh privilege then the trade part the goods and services trade part of our our deficit has to shrink by 2% of GDP and that would require other things equal uh a real depreciation of 15 to 20%. Now, if the US has to pay the same rate of return uh going forward, if it loses that exorbitant privilege for some of the reasons that were discussed earlier, um then that goods and services deficit has to shrink by 3 and a half% of GDP because we're losing uh the profit that can support a larger deficit. Uh and that would require a real dollar depreciation of 25 to 30% clearly uh more.”

0.68

The net debt to the rest of the world cannot go on forever; at some point the trend has to stop, possibly at 100% of GDP or more, but the longer it continues, the greater the risk of a sharp reversal.

forecasthigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Joseph Gagnon

“So uh at some point this trend of net debt to the rest of the world has got to stop. I mean it can't go on forever. Now it could go further. Maybe we'll get to 100% of GDP or more. I I don't know. Uh but it it can't go on forever. Uh and the longer it goes maybe the greater the risk of a sharp reversal.”

0.68

The effect on the broadest trade deficit (current account deficit) may be even smaller than the goods and services reduction because the investment income deficit is likely to widen; US interest rates are now higher than in other advanced economies, meaning the US will pay more on its liabilities than it earns on those assets.

forecasthigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Joseph Gagnon

“Now, uh the effect on the broadest trade deficit, the current account deficit may be even smaller than that. However, because there's reason to think that the investment income balance, the investment income deficit is likely to widen. Uh for one thing, US interest rates are now higher than in other advanced economies. Uh in earlier times, that wasn't always not often true. uh and so we'll be paying more on our liabilities than we'll be earning on those assets.”

0.68

Central bank reserve managers in Asian countries are aware that if there is a problem with the dollar, the only port of call in the short term is the euro, but they are reluctant to adopt the euro as a reserve because of concerns about Europe's fiscal framework, as evidenced by historical episodes like Greece in 2012.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Nicholas Veron

“I remember a conversation with a former uh senior uh central bank reserve manager in a in an Asian country where he said well we know if there's a problem with the dollar only port of coal in the short term is the euro but we don't like it because we remember Greece 2012 which is your point about safe assets and therefore we would go to euro but we would not want to stay there as long as the euro hasn't solved their fiscal framework”

0.68

Obstfeld noted that to reconcile a big excessive investment over saving with a depreciated dollar, it must be through inflation: the economy may temporarily have a trade balance surplus, but excess demand pushes up prices, so the real exchange rate doesn't depreciate as much as the nominal, and the economy returns to where it was—a question of timing rather than a conundrum.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Maurice Obstfeld

“I just want to say one thing if I could about the saving investment imbalance. you know, how do you how do you um reconcile a big um excessive investment over saving with a depreciated dollar? Well, it's by inflation. You know, basically the the uh the economy uh you know may temporarily have a trade balance surplus, but um uh you have excess demand and this pushes up prices and then the uh real exchange rate doesn't depreciate as much as the nominal and you go back to a uh you know where where you were. So, I think that's the the answer to the conundrum. It's not really a conundrum. It's a question of timing.”

0.66

Schleick noted there is a deep paradox in European fiscal affairs between Germany and France: Germany is fiscally hawkish but would be willing to go toward more political union; France is fiscally dovish and nation-state hawkish, unwilling to sign the marriage contract for deeper integration due to a strong tradition of keeping national sovereignty.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Moritz Schleick

“I think it's important to remember there's a deep paradox in in European so of fiscal affairs between Germany and France. So Germany is basically fiscally hawkish but if you will nation state doubbish Germany would go the next step towards more political union that's the DNA after 45 uh the European integration Germany would have would have a much easier time giving up the nation state and in the sense that Mori also mentioned in terms of taxation capacity etc. France is fiscally dovish and nation state hawkish. So France is ultimately not willing to sign that marriage contract or hasn't been. There's a very strong long tradition of keeping national sovereignty”

0.66

The investment that the administration wants foreign countries to commit to making in the US would argue for a larger trade deficit, because the trade deficit is mathematically the inverse of the investment coming in—capital inflows must equal trade deficits.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 4/4· Joseph Gon

“I would note all the the the money that the administration wants foreign countries to commit to investing in the US would seem to uh vote argue for a bigger trade deficit because the trade deficit is the inverse of the investment coming in.”

0.65

The lack and scarcity of safe assets is one of the most important drawbacks holding the euro back from playing a larger role as a global reserve currency; the US supplies about 30% of world GDP in safe assets due to high public debt and agency debt, while the eurozone supplies far less.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Moritz Schleick

“Let me turn to uh one area that Adam mentioned in his introduction and I think that's uh if you think about the international role of the euro and the global role of the euro remains one of the most important if not the most important uh uh drawback and and what's holding the euro back namely the lack and scarcity of safe assets um here you know we can have a discussion how safe US treasury assets are my um told us about that but here that in terms of world GDP You can take other scales but about the US supplies about 30% of world GDP in and safe assets right now owing to the high public debt obviously and and and the uh also the um uh the the housing related the agency debt. Um if you compare this to the Euro zone”

0.65

Customs duties have quadrupled this year but, as of August, were only about 8 percentage points of goods imports higher — roughly half of estimates like Chad Bown's 21pp, CBO's 18pp, or Yale Budget Lab's 15pp — suggesting either loopholes/exemptions, evasion, or more increases to come.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 1/4· Joseph Gagnon

“customs duties although they're rising rapidly have quadrupled this year, they haven't risen as much as you might have expected... as of August uh they were only uh eight percentage points of goods imports higher. So uh maybe half of what some of these estimates say.”

0.65

Even the larger needed depreciation of 25-30% would not be unprecedented, could occur smoothly, but obviously the larger the needed depreciation, the greater the risk of something that would be unpleasant.

forecasthigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Joseph Gon

“clearly uh more. But even this depreciation is not unprecedented. It's possible it would occur smoothly, but obviously the larger the needed depreciation, the greater the risk of something that u would be unpleasant.”

0.64

The euro is a solid but distant second to the dollar, accounting for roughly 20% across most international markets (FX reserves, international debt, loan and deposit markets, FX turnover), while the dollar denominates about 54% of global equity market capitalization with about 10% of that foreign-owned.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Moritz Schularick

“the euro is a solid second... it accounts for roughly about 20% of uh across most of these uh markets... 54% of global equity market capitalization is in is in in in denominated in in dollars but about 10% of this is now foreignowned.”

0.64

Manufacturing employment in the US has not recovered as a result of tariff policies; after a recovery starting at the end of 2024, manufacturing employment has fallen again, indicating that the stated goal of restoring manufacturing jobs through tariffs is not yet being achieved.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Maurice Obstfeld

“The record is clearer on manufacturing employment though again you know time will tell but we did see something of a uh recovery here uh starting at the end of 2024 and uh this is come to an end and reversed uh uh with manufacturing employment falling. So if the goal was to restore this we're not we're not seeing it yet.”

0.64

So far, in terms of equity portfolio inflows to the US after recent political changes, there is no significant decline; European equity investors have been keen to continue investing in the US, consistent with the stock market boom.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Moritz Schleick

“Um so far in terms of of portfolio inflows to the US there is no significant uh decline if anything uh with the stock market boom uh European uh equity investors have been keen to continue to invest in the US.”

0.64

The accumulated net liabilities of the US (assets minus liabilities) were reported at 90% of US GDP at the end of last year, but adjusting for measurement issues, the true net number is more like 67% of GDP, which is a very large number with few countries reaching that point and is pretty much unprecedented as a share of world GDP.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Joseph Gagnon

“And uh so this uh line is a measure of the net uh liabilities, the net debt that we owe to the rest of the world. Sort of uh uh a assets minus liabilities. and it's been in deficit for over 40 years pretty much continuously. Uh the accumulated uh debt net liabilities uh were reported at 90% of US GDP at the end of last year. That's an astonishing number. Um however uh we argue that if you could adjust for some measurement issues, maybe the true net number is more like 67% GDP. But even that is a very large uh number. Few countries get to that point and uh it's pretty much unprecedented in terms of a share of world GDP. I think I think it's safe to say that in human history no single country has ever borrowed so much as a share of the world economy.”

0.64

The spread between US BBB corporate rates and foreign emerging markets BBB corporate rates is now at the lowest level in over 25 years, indicating significant erosion of the exorbitant privilege from spreads, with risk it could go lower and further reduce exorbitant privilege.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Joseph Gagnon

“So here we have two spreads on treasuries. one is a US BBB corporate spread uh and one is a foreign emerging markets BBB corporate spread uh and and that especially that dashed green line is kind of a big part of the exorbitant privilege as you can see in the far right we are now if you squint hard enough at the lowest level in over 25 years I don't know how far back this data goes but we haven't seen levels this low uh and there's a risk it could go lower that's uh would reduce our exorbitant privilege.”

0.64

Schleick responded to a question about how the ECB and European institutions deal with a fiscal and economic crisis in France by noting first that the ECB has instruments to ensure proper market functioning, and the presence of those instruments probably play their role already.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Moritz Schleick

“So I think first of all, we're not we're not there. The ECB has the instruments um to ensure what they call proper market functioning and the presence and the existence of those um um probably play their role already.”

0.64

The dollar dominates global equity markets, with 54% of global equity market capitalization denominated in dollars, though about 10% of this is now foreign-owned, indicating significant foreign participation in the US stock market boom.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Moritz Schleick

“There's one dimension that's not covered here, that's the global equity markets. And here uh obviously the attractiveness and the size of American markets means that uh the dollar really dominates uh a global market equity shares where at 54% of global equity market capitalization is in is in in in denominated in in dollars but about 10% of this is now foreignowned.”

0.64

Foreign participation in US Treasury markets has declined significantly; in 2010, 50% of treasuries were sold to the global market, but now it is only about a third, creating a structural shift in financing requirements.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Maurice Obstfeld

“If we look at the data, we see that the um foreign participation, the foreign uh willingness to buy treasuries is much lower um in relative terms than it was say in 2010. Then 50% of treasuries were sold to the global market. Now it's more like a third of treasuries.”

0.63

The attack on Fed independence, usually framed around monetary policy and inflation, also extends to financial regulatory matters and international financial cooperation; reduced coordination through the Basel process and FSB will end up fragmenting financial markets.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Maurice Obstfeld

“the attack on Fed independence which we usually think about in terms of uh monetary policy and inflation certainly also extends to financial regulatory matters and to international financial cooperation... less um coordination among global regulators through the Basel process, through the FSB, uh that's going to end up fragmenting fragmenting financial markets.”

0.63

US policy is being driven by a 'grievance narrative' — that trade has been unfair and caused deficits and manufacturing decline, that global capital markets and even dollar primacy work against US interest, and that foreign security commitments are unfair burdens — and the resulting zero-sum approach plus routine use of tariffs for geopolitical coercion is genuinely new in the post-war period.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Maurice Obstfeld

“US policy is being driven by a grievance narrative. Uh it's a narrative that trade has been unfair uh to the US... the current US zero someum approach to redressing them uh is very new and so is the routine use of tariffs for geopolitical coercion”

0.63

There was a massive amount of currency manipulation in 2003-2013 (now persisting at a much lower level) that, because the dollar is the main currency it flows into, tends to skew the trade deficit toward the US.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Joseph Gagnon

“the work I did with Fred Bergston a few years ago uh showed that uh there was a massive amount of what we call currency manipulation in the decade 2003 to13. it persists at a much lower level to this day and the dollar is the main uh uh currency... which means that it tends to skew the trade deficit to the US.”

0.62

Gagnon noted that a report by Jacob Kirkegaard and himself for the European Commission several years ago discussed the idea that national defense would be the way into joint issuance, providing a pathway around the fiscal union constraint.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Joseph Gagnon

“Um I'll just mention that uh Jacob Kirkagard and I did a report with some colleagues contributing for the European Commission several years ago in which we talked about the idea that national defense would be the way into joint issuance. And again this the the logic is there.”

0.61

Despite the political changes of the past year, there has been no significant decline in European portfolio inflows to the US; with the stock market boom, European equity investors have kept investing in the US, and euro-area inflows into US treasuries show no clear downward trend.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 1/4· Moritz Schularick

“in terms of of portfolio inflows to the US there is no significant uh decline if anything uh with the stock market boom uh European uh equity investors have been keen to continue to invest in the US”

0.61

The euro could simultaneously address its two key gaps — scarce safe assets and weak geopolitical/security posture — by issuing joint 'team Europe' defense bonds: a variable-geometry coalition (possibly including the UK) issuing future-of-defense bonds to finance strategic dual-use enablers (AI, space, missile shield), achieving sovereign benchmark status and capturing convenience yield such that it could be nearly self-financing.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 4/4durability 3/4· Moritz Schularick

“two of these um two of these gaps in the euro's posture... namely the lack of supply of safe assets and sort of the geopolitical security dimension could be tackled jointly by creating uh safe assets as European joint defense debt of we call it team Europe... If that's happening and the the Euro convenience yield... this could almost be self- financing”

0.60

Moritz has faced criticism for changing the German debt brake after promising not to, which was historically seen as a sign of German fiscal rectitude, making the next step toward European joint issuance politically difficult and requiring reminders that this serves European self-interest, not southern state exploitation.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Moritz Schleick

“Meritz has taken quite some criticism for changing the debt break because he promised he wouldn't and this was always seen as a sign of German fiscal rectitude. So now doing the next step I I wish we we are wish the German political becomes more open but it's still uh a long way uh I think to to get there and it just we constantly need to remind them that this is a new economic self-interest as low as borrowing costs this makes Europe stronger this is not about the southern states somehow exploiting German efficienc”

0.60

Under heroic assumptions, a 15pp tariff increase with the dollar at current levels would shrink the goods-and-services trade deficit by $300-400 billion (about 1% of GDP), but since the current account deficit is 4% of GDP, this is a material change rather than elimination — and the effect on the current account may be even smaller because the investment income deficit is likely to widen.

forecasthigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Joseph Gagnon

“you would expect the trade deficit to shrink this is the goods and services trade deficit to shrink by 3 to400 billion dollars which is about 1% of GDP however we saw earlier that the the broadest measure... the current account balance is 4% of GDP so this is not getting rid of our trade deficit but it is a material uh change.”

0.60

When the US president argues interest rates need to be lower, the recurring theme is financing the deficit at lower cost, signaling a real risk that the US moves toward fiscal dominance — where monetary policy is subordinated to fiscal financing needs.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Maurice Obstfeld

“When um the president talks about why interest rates need to be lower in the US, often the theme is that uh it's about... financing the deficit at lower at lower cost. Um so there's a general assault on norms”

0.59

Schleick and Philip Hildebrand propose creating safe assets as European joint defense debt (team Europe) with a variable geometry approach, where countries willing to team up on defense use these funds to finance strategic enablers (AI upscalers, space capabilities, rocket shield) with strong dual-use character.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Moritz Schleick

“There's one idea that I wanted to close on. This is Senator Philip Hilden Ray and I've been working on over the past few weeks namely the idea that two of these um two of these gaps in the euro's posture and international financial markets namely the lack of supply of safe assets and sort of the geopolitical security dimension could be tackled jointly by creating uh safe assets as European joint defense debt of we call it team Europe. So a variable geometry of the the countries possibly even including the UK uh who are willing to uh team up um on on defense and use these funds to generate uh to to finance strategic enablers that currently are lacking in Europe for both for the defense efforts by the way and for civilian efforts. So AI upscalers space capabilities the rocket shield etc.”

0.59

As of September 25th, Peterson Institute's own Chad Bound estimated a 21 percentage point increase in the average tariff; the Congressional Budget Office says 18 percentage points as of August; the Yale Budget Lab says 15 percentage points as of late September; but customs duties although rising rapidly have only risen 8 percentage points of goods imports higher, roughly half of what these estimates suggest.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 1/4· Joseph Gagnon

“there continue to be new announcements about new tariffs on different products or different countries. So, we don't know where that's going to be. Uh, as of September 25th, our own PIE's own Chad Bound estimated 21 percentage point increase in the average tariff, but there are issues about how you weight the tariffs and how you deal with all kinds of exclusions, exemptions, loopholes. Uh, it's devilishly complicated. It's hard to interpret even what the administration has said. Um the Congressional Budget Office said a says an 18 percentage point increase as of August. The Yale Budget Lab says 15 percentage point increase as of late September. I note interestingly that uh customs duties although they're rising rapidly have quadrupled this year, they haven't risen as much as you might have expected uh given these tariff announcements. uh as of August uh they were only uh eight percentage points of goods imports higher.”

0.58

The house version of the One Big Beautiful Bill included a 'revenge tax' on foreign investors' US profits which, though dropped after outcry, signals greater US openness to using financial instruments to tax cross-border financial flows.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 1/4· Maurice Obstfeld

“the um first version of the one big beautiful bill, the h the house version of that um included the so-called revenge tax... taxing uh foreign profits of investors in the US. There's a great outcry. It didn't come to fruition, but it indicates the great the greater openness to using um financial instruments to tax uh financial flows across across the border.”

0.57

The US faces a difficult fiscal situation with $4 trillion more borrowing than baseline over a 10-year horizon due to the one big beautiful bill, and tariff revenues are substantial but unlikely to cover more than half of that, leaving a very large fiscal hole.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 2/4· Maurice Obstfeld

“probably we're looking at over a 10-year horizon uh uh $4 trillion more of borrowing than was true at the beginning of the year baseline uh due to the one big beautiful bill act. Uh tariff revenues are substantial but in um estimates that um some of us at Peterson have done uh probably are unlikely to cover uh more than half half of that. So that's a big hole.”

0.57

The euro accounts for roughly 20% of global foreign exchange reserves, international debt outstanding, international loan markets, deposit markets, and foreign exchange turnovers, making it a solid second to the dollar, which remains by quite a large margin the leading currency.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 2/4· Moritz Schleick

“uh that Mory just uh described. So in terms of foreign exchange reserves of international debt outstanding of international loan markets, deposit markets and foreign exchange turnovers, the euro is a solid second. Uh it accounts for roughly about 20% of uh across most of these uh markets. And as you can see, the dollar is still uh by quite a distant quite a large margin the leading currency.”

0.57

The US has been in a trade deficit for more than 40 years, and the broadest measure of the trade deficit (current account balance) includes all income that Americans earn from foreigners minus all income paid to foreigners, representing the net debt owed to the rest of the world.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 2/4· Joseph Gagnon

“We uh focus on the US trade deficit uh which has been in deficit for more than 40 years. Uh here is the broadest measure of the trade deficit, the current account balance which includes all income that Americans earn from foreigners minus all income that we pay to foreigners. And uh so this uh line is a measure of the net uh liabilities, the net debt that we owe to the rest of the world.”

0.57

To date, the net effect of all developments on the US exorbitant privilege is pretty small and it has not yet really changed the privilege significantly, but it is a risk for the future and there are indications that investors are thinking about this, though it has not really happened yet.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Joseph Gagnon

“Um so uh however if you look at uh the net effect of all this going forward uh so far well to date um it is pretty small uh this is not yet really changing uh the US exorbitant privilege to date but it is a risk uh for the future and you know there's certainly a lot of indications that investors are shining think about this. But I would say that yet, as of yet, it's not really happened, but it is something that we um that people are beginning to worry about.”

0.57

Obstfeld responded to a question about stablecoins that it is not clear how the stable coin enterprise affects the strength of the dollar; about a trillion dollars in dollar bills abroad migrate into stablecoins because it is a much more efficient way of doing undetected transactions.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Maurice Obstfeld

“I'll take the stable coin question. I think I think it's not clear how the whole stable coin enterprise affects the uh the strength of the dollar and there are about a trillion uh uh uh dollars in um uh dollar bills out there that you know that are abroad and these migrate into the stable coin system because it's a much more efficient way of doing transactions that are undetected.”

0.55

The US faces a difficult fiscal trajectory: roughly $4 trillion more borrowing over a 10-year horizon than the start-of-year baseline due to the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, with tariff revenues likely covering less than half of that, leaving a large financing hole.

forecasthigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 1/4· Maurice Obstfeld

“probably we're looking at over a 10-year horizon uh uh $4 trillion more of borrowing than was true at the beginning of the year baseline uh due to the one big beautiful bill act. Uh tariff revenues are substantial but... probably are unlikely to cover uh more than half half of that. So that's a big hole.”

0.55

The current US zero-sum approach to redressing balance of payments concerns is very new, as is the routine use of tariffs for geopolitical coercion going far beyond trade-related issues, representing a significant policy pivot from the post-war period.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Maurice Obstfeld

“Now if you look back over the entire post-war period these types of concerns are are not new. Um concerns over the US balance of payments go back to the 1960s uh uh of course but uh the current US zero someum approach to redressing them uh is very new and so is the routine use of tariffs for geopolitical coercion often going far beyond uh trade related issues.”

0.55

The urgency to create a unified single European capital market (capital market union) has never been greater than today, and while progress has been minimal over the past decade, this could be a good moment for things to move ahead.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Moritz Schleick

“Um open and deep capital markets brings us very quickly to the capital market union agenda that um over the past decade has made nearly uh has has made very very little progress. there is a little bit of a drive now also coming from the German side from the fir for the first time. Um but if anything this will take time uh to achieve. Um but my my reading here is that uh at least as long as I follow these things the urgency um to create a unified uh single European market uh capital market union has never been greater than today.”

0.53

Issuing 1% of GDP per year for ten years would leave roughly 10% of GDP outstanding — adding €1.5 to €2 trillion over the decade to both European defense capabilities and the depth of European financial markets.

forecasthigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 2/4· Moritz Schularick

“if you issue 1% of GDP for 10 for each for each of the next 10 years we have roughly 10% of GDP outstanding uh that adds one and a half trillion or even more two trillion over the next decade not only to European defense capabilities and and spending but also to the depth of uh European financial markets.”

0.51

Posen asked Schleick about the holdup on joint debt issuance proposals given that both Blanchard/Benassy's Eurobonds proposal and Schleick's defense bonds proposal exist, and Schleick responded that while the March debt brake reform was a big political struggle and enabled defense and infrastructure issuance, appetite for joint European integration is still limited.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Moritz Schleick

“So yeah, I should have mentioned this. I think the the Olivier and angel's proposal to convert part of the outstanding debt into joint debt is is totally complimentary to I think it follows the same idea. It's it's also deal of support. So I can speak I think for the German context um the change in the debt break that we've had in March has relief financing constraints debt issuance now is possible for defense and uh at least for some time for infrastructure projects uh a few hundred billion um that was for domestic politics that was a big struggle and the appetite to go the next step in terms of European joint issuance integration is I think right now unfortunately still limited.”

0.51

Obstfeld noted the parallel to Alexander Hamilton's scheme in which the federal government would assume the debts of the various states as a way of justifying a federal taxation power, and argued Europe has an adverse problem: if you issue all this joint debt, where is the taxation power that covers it, which creates reluctance because the institutional framework for paying the debt is not clear.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Maurice Obstfeld

“Well, I don't want to be too obsessed with Hamilton, but just that, you know, what he did is interesting in this context because his scheme was that the federal government would assume the debts of the various states and it was a way of actually justifying a federal taxation power to service those. And um Europe kind of has the adverse problem that if you issue all this joint debt, you know, where is the taxation power that that um uh covers it? And I think there's some reluctance on this score because the institutional framework for paying the debt is not clear.”

0.50

The dollar appreciated ~5% in real broad terms from October 2024 to January 2025 (consistent with markets pricing a 10% tariff), but from late January it gave up all those gains and returned to the starting point; Gagnon interprets this reversal as foreign investors recoiling from erratic policies, out-of-control fiscal policy, and anti-foreigner grievance rhetoric.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 1/4· Joseph Gagnon

“the dollar did appreciate in real broad terms 5%... However, something changed starting in late in the end of January. Basically the dollar has given up all those gains... if I was a foreign investor would I really want my money in a country that blamed people like me for its problems”

0.50

Investors no longer worry about Greek-style fiscal sustainability in the euro zone to the extent they used to, because it has become 'a contest of ugliness' — many countries are now in fiscally weak positions, so peripheral euro-zone members no longer look so bad by comparison.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 1/4· Moritz Schularick

“I don't in my conversations hear people worrying about Greece or fiscal sustainability to the same extent that they used to I guess because it's now a contest of ugliness and many countries are fiscally in in a Greek position so to say in the old... position right now they don't look so bad actually”

0.48

Obstfeld noted worrying signs in policy, such as the first version of the one big beautiful bill including a 'revenge tax' on foreign profits of investors in the US, indicating openness to using financial instruments to tax financial flows across borders, and progressive reaching of different norms and policy assumptions means capital controls cannot be ruled out.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Maurice Obstfeld

“I also think we see some worrying signs um uh in the policy sphere. For example, the um first version of the one big beautiful bill, the h the house version of that um included the so-called revenge tax. So, you know, taxing uh foreign profits of investors in the US. There's a great outcry. It didn't come to fruition, but it indicates the great the greater openness to using um financial instruments to tax uh financial flows across across the border. and um you know I think saying you know as as we've seen progressive um reaching of different norms uh and different different policy assumptions um I I don't think we can at all rule this out you know particularly with with some of the financial stresses and the trade tensions that persist”

0.48

Schleick indicated that in his conversations with investors, there is great openness and support for joint debt issuance; investors are not attracted by figuring out allocations across individual country bonds, and a large joint pool of debt that is liquid and allows entry/exit in size is something markets would welcome.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Moritz Schleick

“second point is um I in my in in my conversations I sense a great openness and uh support for joint debt issuance I think investors especially bigger investors are not uh attracted they're not attracted by figuring out how much can I buy of buns and how much can I buy of Italian without moving the market. So the idea of having a large joint uh pool of debt that is liquid and where you can move in and and size in and out in size is something that I think markets would welcome.”

0.47

US policy is being driven by a grievance narrative that trade has been unfair to the US and caused trade deficits and manufacturing decline, and that the very premacy of the dollar is viewed by some as a disadvantage to the US by giving a stronger dollar which may lead to bigger trade deficits and a smaller manufacturing sector.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Maurice Obstfeld

“US policy is being driven by a grievance narrative. Uh it's a narrative that trade has been unfair uh to the US. It's been a cause of trade deficits and manufacturing decline. Uh there's a narrative that global capital markets uh have operated against the US interest. In fact, the very um premacy of the dollar, its status as the global currency is viewed by some as a uh uh a disadvantage to the US by giving a stronger dollar which may lead to bigger trade deficits, a smaller manufacturing sector.”

0.45

Schleick responded that in his conversations, he does not hear people worrying about Greece or fiscal sustainability to the same extent they used to, possibly because it is now a 'contest of ugliness' with many countries in a Greek fiscal position, so Greece doesn't look so bad anymore.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Moritz Schleick

“yeah thank thank you thank thank you Nicolola two quick answers to your question the first one is I don't in my conversations hear people worrying about Greece or fiscal sustainability to the same extent that they used to I guess because it's now a contest of ugliness and many countries are fiscally in in a Greek position so to say in the old in the old Greek position right now they don't look so bad actually”

0.40

Posen raised the question of whether Obstfeld's assessment of financial openness being threatened has changed since April, noting that in April he had a question mark on financial openness while other pillars of dollar strength were being undermined.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 2/4· Nicholas Veron

“Just as a warm-up, Nicholas Veron at the institute. Uh, one question to Mori and one to Morates. Uh my you in April at this kind of exercise, you gave us a very similar but slightly different list of the pillars of the US dollar strength. And the last one was financial openness where you put a question mark on whether the policies of the new administration were undermining that one. The other six, you had seven uh were being undermined, but you had a question mark on financial openness.”

0.39

Germany's March change to the debt brake relieved financing constraints and made debt issuance possible for defense and (for some time) infrastructure, but the appetite to take the next step toward European joint issuance and integration remains limited.

factualestablishednovelty 2/4durability 1/4· Moritz Schularick

“the change in the debt break that we've had in March has relief financing constraints debt issuance now is possible for defense and uh at least for some time for infrastructure projects... the appetite to go the next step in terms of European joint issuance integration is I think right now unfortunately still limited.”

0.33

National defense is the natural way into European joint debt issuance, because it provides a shared rationale that overcomes the usual reluctance toward mutualized debt.

normativecontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Maurice Obstfeld

“Jacob Kirkagard and I did a report... in which we talked about the idea that national defense would be the way into joint issuance. And again this the the the logic is there.”

0.30

The renminbi accounts for only about 2% of global FX reserves and has not been increasing over the last five years, so it is not a significant player in reserve diversification.

factualestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Moritz Schularick

“the renmanb on the... about 2% of glo foreign exchange reserves is not a big player and has also not uh uh been increasing at least not in the last five years”

0.29

Manufacturing employment showed a recovery starting at the end of 2024 but has since reversed and is now falling, so if the policy goal was to restore manufacturing employment, it is not yet being achieved.

factualestablishednovelty 1/4durability 1/4· Maurice Obstfeld

“we did see something of a uh recovery here uh starting at the end of 2024 and uh this is come to an end and reversed uh uh with manufacturing employment falling. So if the goal was to restore this we're not we're not seeing it yet.”

0.19

Gagnon responded that they would need to think about this analysis, noting they have looked at the sectors and haven't done that specific analytical exercise.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 1/4· Joseph Gagnon

“Uh, I'd have to think. I mean, uh, yeah, we looked at the sectors and and yeah, we haven't done that analysis.”

0.13

Posen thanked the three speakers and reminded the audience of upcoming events: at 1:30 p.m. DC time the same day a conversation with Tiff Macklem, Governor of the Bank of Canada, a seasoned monetary civil servant discussing how a country most integrated with the US must navigate these issues; and tomorrow at 1:00 p.m. EC time at the Peterson Institute, events on Europe and the changing international monetary system featuring Benic, Crocstrop, Rain, and Ubid.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 0/4durability 1/4· Adam Posen

“Well done. This is why we read Mory's textbook. Um, it's relevant. Um, with that, let me thank our three speakers, Joseph Gon, Morit Scholick, and Morrisfeld for taking up an update on the uh changing dollar regime. Uh let me just remind all of you in the global audience online as well as here today at 1:30 p.m. Today we DC time uh I'll be having a conversation with Tiff Mlham the governor of the Bank of Canada very seasoned uh monetary civil servant and wise person but also fascinating to think about the country that is most integrated with the US and has to navigate through these issues. And a reminder again to pick up on Europe tomorrow at 100 p.m. EC time we'll be having Benic Kot Kstro Rain and Ubid talking about Europe in the changing international monetary system.”

0.12

Concerns over the US balance of payments are not new and go back to the 1960s.

factual· Maurice Obstfeld

“concerns over the US balance of payments go back to the 1960s uh uh of course”