
Is Berkshire Hathaway Undervalued Right Now? (Chris Bloomstran Explains) (TIP810)
What this covers
The episode is Stig Brodersen's annual conversation about Berkshire Hathaway with Chris Bloomstran of Semper Augustus, credited in the transcript as Chris Brewster. A second voice, Chris Brown, also adds commentary. It opens with long-run context: the S&P 500's compounding from its June 1932 low against Berkshire's record since 1964. From there it moves into the Five-Factor Return Model, which breaks returns into sales growth, share count, multiple change, profit margin change and dividend yield. The question is what Berkshire and the broader market can plausibly earn from here.
The Berkshire material covers Greg Abel's first shareholder letter, his more hands-on management style compared with Warren Buffett's "you'll figure it out" approach, and Berkshire's insurance underwriting discipline. It also takes up Buffett's admission that he under-deployed capital in 2008-09, and the opportunity cost of a roughly $300 billion cash pile. Compensation gets its own stretch. Berkshire's no-options, low-director-pay model is held up as a gold standard that other companies cannot easily copy, while most executive pay tied to EBITDA or revenue growth is criticized.
The most contested turns concern the wider market. Bloomstran argues that hyperscaler capital expenditure (CapEx)) of hundreds of billions a year looks economically irrational against the revenue it supports. He also says the Mag Seven are shifting from cash-rich to debt-dependent. The group discusses how to think about OpenAI, including Microsoft's rationale for investing. Elsewhere he makes the case that share repurchase programs have not reduced S&P 500 share counts, and that margins have risen structurally but may partly revert. He also says slower real GDP per capita growth and heavier leverage imply lower long-run multiples. The episode closes on investing risk and on Buffett reading Bloomstran's own letters.
Chris Brewster argues that Berkshire Hathaway's 9.3% intrinsic value growth is sustainable at 10-12% annually, that Greg Abel's leadership demonstrates proper capital allocation discipline, and that current market valuations—particularly in mega-cap tech at 26x earnings with high margins—face significant mean-reversion risk despite structural improvements in profit margins.
- Berkshire's operating earnings actually grew $1.1B when properly adjusted for currency, reserve development, and goodwill write-downs, contrary to media interpretation of decline
- Greg Abel's $25M compensation is appropriately structured for alignment when the CEO is already wealthy, contrasting with typical CEO compensation incentive misalignment
- High current margins (12.8%) combined with extreme valuations create inflection risk; even modest margin compression to 10% crushes a 26x multiple to 1x
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The S&P 500 from its peak in June 1932 compounded at 12.1-12.5% through 2025, turning $100 into approximately $4.4-4.5 million; Berkshire Hathaway from its fiscal year start in 1964 compounded at 19.7%, turning $100 into $6.1 million over 61 years, demonstrating Buffett's outperformance despite being measured from an even lower starting valuation point.
“if you do the whole record from the single best moment in history of the stock market to buy the S&P 500, June 1st, 1932, you compounded it 12 point whatever it was, I think it was 12.1%. Maybe it was 12.5%, but you grew $100 to 4.4 million. Berkshire grew $100 to 6.1 million in 33 fewer years.”
The value investing community has an informal obligation to teach and mentor the next generation, inherited from Ben Graham's model as exemplified by Buffett and Charlie Munger, creating a continuous transmission of investment discipline and ethics.
“there is this ethos in the value investing community probably comes all the way from Benjamin Graham, where even though you don't have to, you're supposed to help the next generation. It's just it's part of the honor code”
S&P 500 companies have spent approximately $1 trillion on share repurchases in 2025 (or expected to when reported), yet the aggregate share count has risen 3.3% since June 2020 despite $1 trillion in repurchases, indicating repurchases have been ineffective at reducing share count.
“once reported for 2025, the S&P 500 combined share repurchase is likely to exceed $1 trillion... But then you also look at the aggregate share count. It has not. That's really so impressive.”
Berkshire has a documented history of disciplined insurance underwriting, running off unprofitable business for 13 consecutive years by declining to renew policies, reducing insurance premiums from $232 million to $50 million when prices were inadequate, as documented in their 2004 annual letter.
“I've got a letter I put the table from Berkshire's 2004. I think it was annual letter, the history of whatever they called it, portrait of a disciplined underwriter. And so for 13 years in a row, they ran insurance premiums down from $232 million to $50 million because the insurance prices were not adequate.”
Warren Buffett acknowledged in 2008-2009 that he underdeployed capital during the financial crisis, making only $5-3 billion in GE, Goldman Sachs preferred, and Bank of America investments when he should have been much more aggressive given Berkshire's historical 14% average cash reserve relative to assets.
“Warren acknowledged that in 0809 he screwed up and he didn't do enough. So you got the 5 billion or the $3 billion into the GE. And Goldman preferred got some of the Dow Preferreds. The Warren's later did some of the Bank of America. But on the stock part, I didn't do a lot of stock portfolio.”
Warren Buffett reads Chris Brewster's annual letters and has sent correspondence indicating he is doing so since at least 2002, creating a significant motivational and quality filter for Brewster's letter composition.
“one of the biggest honors and surprises that I had was, jeez, might have been 2002. I've got the letter hanging in my office, but I received a letter from Warren letting me know that a friend it heads, and our letters have only been on our website and public since 2000 and the 2050 letter.”
Warren Buffett's management style was to 'not oversee anything'—he would buy companies and tell managers 'you're smart, you'll figure it out'; this differs significantly from Greg Abel's more involved hands-on management style with regular contact with subsidiary leaders.
“Warren's approach was I'm not going to oversee anything. I mean, I buy you I'll let you run your thing. You know, if you call me for help, I'll catch you on the back, say, good luck. You'll solvent your smart guy. Greg's then much more involved. He's proven that he's much more involved.”
Microsoft's early venture investments in OpenAI (with funding rounds at $11 billion valuation) were rational because of Microsoft's ownership of the IP, meaning if OpenAI fails, Microsoft retains the intellectual property and ChatGPT technology.
“Microsoft came in early with a couple of funding rounds at $11 billion. The valuation at those moments was something like 28 or 29 billion... Microsoft was pretty rational. But they had these successive funding rounds... because they own the IP. So if if OpenAI fails, Microsoft owns OpenAI. ChatGPT.”
Mega-cap technology companies (Mag Seven, representing 37% of S&P 500 at 30+ multiples) are transitioning from net-cash, free-cash-generating businesses to leverage-dependent AI capex stories, with capital expenditures of $650-750 billion annually exceeding combined operating cash flow, forcing them toward debt and reduced buybacks.
“These things are rapidly turning into EBITDA stories, which is incredible because they were net cash on the balance sheet, free cash generating machines that didn't take any capital to here you are all of a sudden in this AI arms race, and all of a sudden increasing proportion of cash flow from operations is going into CapEx.”
AI hyperscaler CapEx spending of ~$400 billion annually (projected to grow to $3 trillion cumulatively over 5-6 years) appears economically irrational because incremental revenues supporting this CapEx are only ~$30 billion, implying depreciation expense ($40B on 10-year schedule) will exceed revenue.
“If your depreciation schedule linearly on a straight line basis is ten years on 400 billion of CapEx, that's $40 billion of depreciation expense. As far as I can tell, aggregate revenues supported on this incremental CapEx are about $30 billion.”
Long-run P/E multiples should reflect long-run earnings growth; if real GDP per capita growth has fallen from 2%+ to ~1%, the equilibrium P/E should fall from ~15-17x to perhaps 13x, as valuation multiples are mechanically linked to growth rates.
“Faster growing asset warrants, a higher PE, lower growing asset, more PE. If aggregate growth on a real population adjusted growth in the economy, maybe the long run average is not 17 or 16 or even 15. Maybe it's supposed to be 13.”
The best single day to have invested in the S&P 500 was June 1, 1932 (peak of Great Depression), when the index was down 86.2-86.4% from its 1929 peak, creating the optimal buying opportunity in market history.
“S&P 500 June 1st, 1932. The S&P had fallen 86.2 or 86.4% from its peak in 1929. The Dow Jones, which is what you're talking about, had fallen 89%. And kind of more famously, I think it was July 8th, 1932, of that the Dow traded in its low, but the S&P is low was on June 1st, 1932 at $4.40”
S&P 500 profit margins have durably increased from historical 4-6.5% range to current 12.8%, driven by: (3%) lower interest rates reducing debt service costs, (1%) lower corporate tax rates from 35% to 21%, and (8%) technology/platform business model structural improvements, with only modest mean reversion risk to perhaps 10-11% rather than historical 4-6.5%.
“3% of the increase has come from lower and lower interest rates... The tax code at the corporate level for a lot of years was 35%. It changed the handful of years ago to 21%. That added 1% to the after tax margin... And so the profit margins of those businesses, with the exception of the retail side of Amazon... you've got a handful of very, very profitable businesses from a margin standpoint.”
Returns on equity across the S&P 500 appear higher than they actually are because: (1) share repurchases above book value inflate per-share metrics, (2) accumulated write-offs/write-downs understate historical asset values, and (3) asset inflation hasn't been reflected in historical cost book values, making returns on equity significantly overstated relative to economic returns.
“if you look at the return on equity and nuances as to how it gets overstated in the current environment based on share repurchases above book value, based on write offs and write downs over time based on the amount of historical assets that are carried... Book values are understated, meaning returns on equity are overstated.”
Real GDP per capita growth in the US has fallen from averaging over 2% per decade (1930-2000) to approximately 1% or less in the last 25 years, due to total credit market debt rising from 250% of GDP in 2000 to nearly 350%, with government debt now exceeding 100% of GDP, creating diminishing returns from leverage.
“when total credit market debt reached 250% of GDP in 2000, now 300, almost 350%, and in even more recent years, post the financial crisis, the government piece of total credit market debt is now over 100% of GDP. At a point, more and more leverage is deleterious to economic growth. It's the law of diminishing returns.”
Warren Buffett was correct that profit margins mean-revert, but wrong about the level to which they revert—he predicted 4-6.5% in 1999 when margins reached 7.5%, but margins did revert when they contracted to 5.8% in 2011, validating the mechanism even though he didn't foresee the upward re-expansion afterward.
“he noted correctly, but ultimately, wrongly, that margins were rangebound. And and I think he used a range of 4% to 6.5%. And in 99, the profit margin on the S&P 500 got up to seven and a half or 7.6%... So he was right. And a high multiple to earnings, mid 20s, multiple to earnings contracted when margins came back down to 5.8%.”
Berkshire's compensation structure—paying board members a few hundred dollars per board meeting, no stock options, no restricted shares, with board alignment achieved through out-of-pocket stock purchases—represents the gold standard of shareholder alignment rarely found elsewhere in corporate America.
“They've never given a stock option away to anybody. They've never given a restricted share away. The board is extremely I mean silly how little they're paid to the board meeting a few hundred dollars for a board meeting. You make a little bit more if you're on the audit committee, but the board all owns big positions in the stock and everybody's bottom and paid for them out of pocket.”
Most regulation targeting share repurchases won't solve the executive compensation problem because the issue is fundamental to human nature—CEOs given 4-year tenure and stock-based compensation have intrinsic motivation to artificially boost stock prices, requiring deep recession to reset compensation practices.
“I don't know what fixes that, because if you get the job as CEO when you're 60 and they give you a bunch of stock on the barrel head, because that's what your competitors get, and that's what the compensation consultant says you should get. I'm going to get rich by driving the stock price up for four years”
A $300 billion cash pile earning 3% will never be recovered if equities compound at 10% linearly; specifically, $100 at 3% for 5-6 years becomes $116-119, while $100 at 10% becomes $159-177 and $259 at year 10, making the opportunity cost of holding cash during long bull markets extreme.
“And you will never recover if you're sitting on cash earning 3% for too long. If you compound stocks linearly at 10%. This is what my table shows. You take $100, it becomes 110 a year, one. It becomes $121 a year or two it becomes $259 a year or ten week.”
Berkshire's compensation approach is not exportable to other companies because the next CEO after Greg Abel will not inherit $600M+ in wealth from a prior Berkshire position, requiring compensation to be higher for the succeeding CEO while maintaining alignment.
“The next CEO is not going to come to the party with a net worth of 6 or 7 or $800 million at the moment he or she becomes CEO, and so the compensation of that person needs to be sufficiently high relative to the 1.2 or 3 trillion of assets.”
Most executive compensation structures are poorly designed, using adjusted EBITDA, revenue growth, or short-term performance hurdles that incentivize destructive behavior like acquisitions at premium prices or aggressive accounting, whereas return-on-capital metrics better align executives with long-term shareholder value.
“the ones that I really struggle with are the ones that are adjusted EBITDA heavy, or where you're motivated by sales growth with no tie to profitability... if you're motivated by EBITDA and revenue growth, you could put a whole bunch of business on the books and not have any of that make any money”
Berkshire's five-factor return model (sales growth, share count change, multiple expansion/contraction, margin change, dividend yield) provides framework showing current elevated multiples (26x) combined with high margins (12.8%) can only produce 5% returns in optimistic scenarios, and negative returns if multiples contract.
“I've got my five factor work that we've had in the letter for 2 or 3 years, four years maybe, where I take the five variables that make up return dollar, sales growth, change in the share count, the multiple and the margin which all four of those are multiplicative factors.”
The S&P 500 currently trades at 26x earnings while having the second-highest profit margin in stock market history, a combination that historically has led to bulk returns or worse, as evidenced by the post-1999 peak performance.
“The S&P 500 now trades for 26 times current earnings against the second highest profit margin in the history of the stock market. That's against all stock markets anywhere in the world. Ever. High prices mixed with high margins are typically a recipe for bulk returns or worse.”
The value of leadership integrity and honor codes in finance cannot be replicated through compensation structures alone, and some of the worst-structured compensation systems have still produced good results because the underlying person had strong character and parenting, while well-structured systems have produced poor results when led by people lacking integrity.
“There's a lot to integrity and morality. And either you've got it or you don't. And there's no pay package. There's no compensation structure that's going to alter behavior depending how you wired... I think a lot of it comes down to good parenting.”
Berkshire's reported operating earnings decline of approximately $3 billion year-over-year was misleading because when adjusted for currency movements on foreign debt (+$1.7B), positive reserve development changes (-$600M), and goodwill write-downs ($1.1B), operating earnings actually grew $1.1 billion.
“Where operating earnings were $44.5 billion for the year, that was down by almost $3 billion year over year. So a number of things transpired... I strip that out, and I think you should strip it out because the currency movement is getting translated into the stocks.”
Greg Abel's $25 million annual compensation as CEO is appropriate and not excessive because: (1) he is already wealthy ($600M+ net worth from Berkshire Energy payout), (2) he has demonstrated strong capital allocation discipline through his willingness to buy back stock at fair value, and (3) alignment comes from personal responsibility and integrity, not incentive structures.
“When Greg Energy got promoted, moved up, kicked up to vice chair of operations and insurance, they had matching salaries and I don't remember where they started, but they were 17 million or $18 million... Greg now that he is 25 million, there's no better way to do it. Compensation is a hard thing. He's already rich and he's in his early 60s.”
Guy Spear's decision to close his investment firm due to health challenges (brain cancer) reflects the inherent difficulty of succession planning and the risk that cognitive decline happens gradually and isn't self-detected, making it important for investment firms to establish external oversight mechanisms.
“guy spear, mutual friend of ours is do you think the Berkshire world is an acolyte? He runs a really nice business, told aquamarine. He's got a very good long term track record he's struggling with. Well, he's struggling with, pretty bad form of brain cancer. And he had his family join him at one of my dinners in Omaha last year.”
At the next major financial crisis or recession, Greg Abel must deploy approximately $300 billion of capital across acquisitions, stock investments, and whole business purchases to justify holding such large cash reserves, with no fewer than 10-15% of mega-cap companies being liquid enough for partial acquisition.
“at the next big opportunity, he's got to put $300 billion on the order of $300 billion to work if sufficient opportunity exists. And if you get through a cycle like that and a period and they find they can't do it, that they don't have the opportunities to buy whole companies, there are plenty of places in the stock market to put that capital to work. There are among the largest cap companies in the world, and in the United States, there are some really good businesses that they could buy. 10% of 15% of them that are liquid are enough to do it pretty easily.”
Chris Brewster has implemented formal and informal safeguards for potential incapacity: (1) Chad (co-investor) knows the portfolio in detail, (2) a succession merger agreement exists with a trusted partner firm, (3) his investment roundtable of 30-32 peers would provide candid feedback if cognitive decline occurred, ensuring clients remain protected.
“What? Chad knows the portfolio like the back of his hand. We've got young investment people working with us that are evolving and growing. We have a plan in place to essentially respectably with a good friend of mine, merge our operations in the event that I or he he running his firm would, depart suddenly.”
Currency movements created a $1.7 billion swing between 2024 and 2025 due to dollar strength against the yen, which offset between the value of Japanese trading company holdings and the face value of yen-denominated debt, and this swing should be stripped out of earnings analysis.
“for the 2024 or 2025 2024, you had a $600 million change loss on currency, and then you had a $1.1 billion gain in the next year. The Delta, there was $1.7 billion. I strip that out, and I think you should strip it out because the currency movement is getting translated into the stocks.”
OpenAI has raised approximately $73 billion cumulatively and is already burning through $50 billion, indicating a run-rate burn of multiple billions annually, while successive funding rounds at rising valuations ($157B to $500B) without proportional capital raised suggest insiders are cashing out while diluting later investors.
“OpenAI is raise something like $73 billion by year end. They're doing a $100 billion funding round at what they hoped was an 830 billion valuation... Here's an entity, Sammy's OpenAI that's raised call it 73. They've already burning through 50.”
Regulatory risks threaten OpenAI specifically: Elon Musk lawsuit over OpenAI's conversion from non-profit to for-profit will be a multi-billion-dollar lawsuit (not millions), fair use litigation from copyright cases, and European regulatory aggression will constrain OpenAI's expansion.
“You've got regulatory risk. We're going to find out on fair use. The Europeans are very aggressive when this front and you've got you've got a lawsuits on Elon. When Sammy flip from to this thing is a not for profit which is what he had a lot of agreed to at the outset. Elon put it I think $30 million into this thing. Sam a flip over a couple different degrees to now a fully for profit. They're planning on going public and Elon suing them. And it's not going to be a lawsuit with an M in front of the aliens. It's not going to be a millions lawsuit. It's going to be a billions lawsuit.”
Greg Abel's letter demonstrated understanding of Berkshire culture and substance over style by: discussing concrete subsidiary performance metrics, addressing insurance and competitive challenges directly, mentioning specific operational leaders (Adam Johnson, Ted Weschler), and avoiding attempts to replicate Buffett's humor.
“First time writing. He's not going to be as funny ever as Warren, but I think he hit on all of the things he needed to touch on. He paid a nice, brief early tribute to Warren, as he should have done, really demonstrated that he's a Berkshire guy.”
Berkshire Hathaway's intrinsic value grew 9.3% year-over-year, reaching approximately $1.2-1.25 trillion, with B shares valued at $570 per share, implying the current stock price of $85 represents approximately 0.85 on the dollar of fair value.
“I come up with you just do a simple average of my four methods of progression of 9.3% year over year, which gets you to a little over 1.2 trillion. Almost 1.25 trillion by market cap would be intrinsic value. And on a per share basis, that went from the B shares a year ago were 522. I've got them at 570 per share now”
Greg Abel's appointment of Adam Johnson to oversee 32 of Berkshire's operating subsidiaries, in addition to his own role, represents a thoughtful delegation structure that accounts for the sheer span of control, with Greg maintaining arms-around knowledge of all businesses while selectively involving himself in capital allocation.
“His move to have Adam, who runs Netjets, oversee 32 or 30. I think it's 32 of the operating subsidiaries. So this is what Greg's done. Greg has been running Berkshire effectively as its CEO since 2018, when he became vice chairman. He's got his arms around all those businesses.”
Ted Weschler is running approximately 6% of Berkshire's combined assets (whether measured as $300B stock portfolio, $700B combined assets, or insurance operation holdings), representing approximately $18 billion or more under management.
“he didn't specify what that that was. Of the $300 billion stock portfolio or the $700 billion combined assets, which are now over $120 billion at the holding company, or if it was just the 580 or whatever that are in the insurance operation. So whether he's running 6% of 700 billion or 6% of 300 billion in don't know, it's north of 18 billion.”
Even if S&P 500 profit margins compress from 12.8% to 10%, while multiples stay at 26x, the combined effect would 'crucify' valuations—a 26x multiple applied to 10% margins is economically inconsistent and would collapse to 1x earnings (breakeven valuation).
“So long answer to your question. But Warren was wrong. And I don't think the margin goes back to a range of 4.5% to 6%. You take margins down from today's 12.8% to ten, and you're going to crucify a 26 multiple. They're onex. So multiples come in when margins come in.”
Geico's 2024 underwriting combined ratio of 82% (representing an 18% pre-tax profit margin) improved to 85% in 2025 (15% pre-tax margin), still substantially better than the industry-standard breakeven of approximately 100% combined ratio.
“So Geico in 2024 underwrote it almost an 80% combined, which is incredible because they normally ride at Ford, I think. I think for the year 2024, they were underwriting it 82%, which is essentially an 18% pretax profit margin. Well, in 2025, they still underwrote it, an 85% combined.”
Geico increased its underwriting expenses by 270 basis points and spent over $1 billion more in 2025 versus 2024 on auto insurance, growing policies in force by 5% through volume expansion rather than price increases.
“So their underwriting expenses went up by 270 basis points. They spent over $1 billion more in 25 and 24 on auto. And so they increased their policies in force by 5%. They didn't get price. That was all volume.”
Berkshire Hathaway is now in a transition period where the historic culture and values are embedded in the organization sufficiently that the changeover from Buffett to Abel can preserve institutional continuity, but this is not guaranteed and depends on Abel's decision-making and commitment to the culture.
“There's something that Warren and Charlie created that attracts all these quirky people that share a similar value system. So it's it's fun. And to have the changing of the guard and have great running the show and Warren in the front row is going to be very different. But, should be a great weekend.”
Berkshire's investment portfolio returned 13.7% in 2024 on a total return basis (including both 13-F holdings like Apple and non-13-F holdings like Japanese trading companies), driving significant growth in book value.
“I come up with 13.7%. You got to take the 13 have holdings, the non 13 F holdings like the Japanese trading companies. And I put those together and the portfolio was up 13.7 on a total return basis.”
Brewster's current letter was approximately 182 pages plus appendices despite his stated intention to shrink it, indicating that writing discipline on letter length remains a challenge despite having 'committed' to reduction in previous years.
“And then there was like 182 pages, and then we still have some appendix that was lined up completely unintended.”