What this covers

This is a seven-minute DiEM25 video in which Yanis Varoufakis looks ahead to 2025 through the economics of Donald Trump's second term. He is the only voice. His argument starts from what Trump says he wants: a smaller trade deficit, more exports, and a weaker dollar to get them. Varoufakis then asks whether the tools Trump is likely to use can deliver that, and whether Trump is willing to give up the dollar's exorbitant privilege, which conflicts with the goal.

The middle of the talk is a causal account of how Trump's own policies work against him. Tariffs create global uncertainty, and Varoufakis argues that uncertainty sends foreign money into the United States, as it did in 2008, lifting the dollar and offsetting the tariffs' effect on trade. Large corporate and oligarch tax cuts would draw in more foreign capital and widen the gap between American savings and investment, which he treats as a root cause of the deficit. He also argues that crises, especially those starting in the US, push the dollar up and make the deficit worse. Several of these claims are flagged as contested.

The last part turns to coercion and geopolitics. Varoufakis reads Trump's tariff threats as a possible attempt to repeat the 1985 Plaza Accords, which he describes as a Washington ultimatum to Tokyo presented as a multilateral deal, under Ronald Reagan. He credits the forced yen appreciation with ending Japan's 1950–85 growth. China, he says, differs: it was never occupied, the US did not write its constitution, and no American troops are stationed there. Its capital account position would also point toward a weaker yuan, not a stronger one. He ends on a choice for Beijing between waiting out American contradictions and building a BRICS-based monetary order centered on the yuan, which he calls the gravest threat to the dollar's privilege.

Sharpest takeaway

Trump faces an irreconcilable trilemma: tariffs and tax cuts will strengthen the dollar (attracting foreign capital), but a strong dollar worsens the trade deficit he aims to reduce, while maintaining dollar hegemony prevents the currency depreciation needed to fix it—making his stated goals mutually exclusive unless he coerces currency realignment like Reagan's Plaza Accords, which China will reject.

  • Tariffs and corporate tax cuts attract foreign capital, boosting dollar value and expanding the trade deficit
  • Dollar hegemony ensures safe-haven flows to the US during crises, perpetuating the trade imbalance Trump opposes
  • China will not accept Plaza Accords-style currency appreciation like Japan did, making Trump's goals unachievable without abandoning dollar dominance

The claims · ranked34 claims · weighted by value

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0.75

Tariffs introduced by Trump will most likely boost the value of the dollar because global uncertainty paradoxically triggers a rush of foreign money into the United States, as happened during the 2008 financial crisis.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Unidentified Speaker — Yanis Varoufakis: What to watch for in 2025 – Trump, the US… [j0xHazbvKfg]

“Donald Trump's first problem is that the tariffs that he has invested so much political capital in introducing, announcing, and advocating for will most likely boost the value of the dollar, why? Primarily because every time there is global uncertainty whenever there is a problem that emanates from the United States whether that was the 2008 crisis or whatever crisis there is, there is a paradoxical rush of foreign money into the United States boosting the dollar.”

0.75

If Trump's tariffs create global consternation in China, the European Union, and Britain, the influx of foreign capital into the United States will boost the dollar's value, which will counter the tariffs' effects on limiting imports and enhancing exports.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Unidentified Speaker — Yanis Varoufakis: What to watch for in 2025 – Trump, the US… [j0xHazbvKfg]

“So if Trump's tariffs create global uncertainty, The likely outcome will be an increased value of the dollar and that's his first problem because if his tariffs succeed in creating a lot of consternation across the world in China, in the European Union, in Britain, the result will be, that even if imports initially shrink as a result of these large tariffs, the influx of money into the United States, of capital is going to boost the value of the dollar therefore, countering whatever effects the tariffs had on limiting imports and enhancing American exports.”

0.75

Large corporate and oligarchic tax cuts under Trump will attract foreign capital into the United States, boosting the dollar's value and widening the gap between American savings and investment, which is a root cause of the American trade deficit.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Unidentified Speaker — Yanis Varoufakis: What to watch for in 2025 – Trump, the US… [j0xHazbvKfg]

“Donald Trump's second problem is that if he proceeds with his very large tax cuts especially for corporations and the oligarchs, the very rich in the United States this is also going to attract into the United States foreign capital and what will that do? Boost the value of the dollar and therefore, enhance the gap between American savings and investment with investment being much greater than savings, which is a root cause of the American trade deficit.”

0.75

China's capital account economics would recommend a depreciation of the yuan from an economic point of view, which means China will not accept the massive yuan appreciation that would be necessary to meaningfully reduce the US trade deficit.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Unidentified Speaker — Yanis Varoufakis: What to watch for in 2025 – Trump, the US… [j0xHazbvKfg]

“It is highly unlikely that they will accept at a time when the capital account of China if anything, would recommend from an economic point of view, a depreciation of the yuan. They will never accept a massive appreciation of the kind that would make the difference for the United States' trade deficit in the way that Donald Trump would like.”

0.72

The exorbitant privilege of the US dollar causes the currency to appreciate during crises (especially those emanating from the US), which worsens the trade deficit by making exports more expensive and imports cheaper, particularly during periods of reduced demand and employment.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 4/4· Unidentified Speaker — Yanis Varoufakis: What to watch for in 2025 – Trump, the US… [j0xHazbvKfg]

“Tump's third problem is the exorbitant privilege of the United States dollar. It is the reason why every time there is a crisis [2:36] especially one emanating from within the United States, the dollar goes up and the US trade deficit gets worse especially during periods of reduced demand, jobs and employment within the United States.”

0.69

The Plaza Accords of 1985 were supposedly a multilateral meeting between European, American, Canadian, and Australian representatives, but were in reality an ultimatum by Washington on Tokyo to appreciate the yen massively or face large tariffs on Japanese exports.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unidentified Speaker — Yanis Varoufakis: What to watch for in 2025 – Trump, the US… [j0xHazbvKfg]

“The infamous Plaza Accords, supposedly a multilateral meeting between the Europeans, the Americans, the Canadians, the Australians, but in reality, what the Plaza Accords were about, was an ultimatum by Washington on Tokyo, appreciate the yen massively, or else I'm going to slap large tariffs on Japanese exports.”

0.69

China is fundamentally different from Japan because China was not an occupied country, the United States did not write its constitution, and there are no tens of thousands of American soldiers occupying Chinese territory as there are in Okinawa.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unidentified Speaker — Yanis Varoufakis: What to watch for in 2025 – Trump, the US… [j0xHazbvKfg]

“China is no Japan. Japan was an occupied country by the United States. The United States wrote its Constitution, there are tens of thousands of American soldiers still occupying Okinawa. China, I will repeat this once more, is not Japan.”

0.69

Trump's large corporate and oligarch tax cuts will attract additional foreign capital into the United States, further boosting the dollar's value and worsening the trade deficit by increasing the gap between American investment and savings.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unidentified Speaker — Yanis Varoufakis: What to watch for in 2025 – Trump, the US… [j0xHazbvKfg]

“Donald Trump's second problem is that if he proceeds with his very large tax cuts especially for corporations and the oligarchs, [2:04] the very rich in the United States this is also going to attract into the United States foreign capital and what will that do? Boost the value of the dollar and therefore, enhance the gap between American savings and investment with investment being much greater than savings, which is a root cause of the American trade deficit.”

0.68

China faces a critical decision: whether to accept Trump's pressures and wait for US internal contradictions to resolve, or whether to proactively create a new international monetary system based on BRICS and centered on the yuan instead of the dollar.

forecasthigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Unidentified Speaker — Yanis Varoufakis: What to watch for in 2025 – Trump, the US… [j0xHazbvKfg]

“The great question however, for 2025 and beyond, concerns China's dilemma. Will Beijing will decide to stay put, [6:15] gaining time until the United States internal contradictions, Trump's conundrum and dilemma plays out, or will Beijing make the choice that it has not made yet, they have not made up their minds yet, and I think reasonably, will however, at some point, make the choice, make the decision to convert the BRICS area into a new version of Bretton Woods”

0.68

Trump simultaneously wants to maintain the exorbitant privilege of the American dollar—its centrality, hegemony, and dominance in international transactions—which is fundamentally incompatible with his goal of weakening the dollar.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Unidentified Speaker — Yanis Varoufakis: What to watch for in 2025 – Trump, the US… [j0xHazbvKfg]

“But at the same time, Donald Trump wants a strong dollar, and he will not brook any discussion [0:30] of ending the exorbitant privilege, the centrality, the hegemony, the dominance of the American dollar in international transactions.”

0.68

Trump's tariffs will most likely boost the value of the dollar because global uncertainty—especially uncertainty emanating from the United States—triggers a paradoxical safe-haven rush of foreign money into the US, strengthening the dollar regardless of tariff intent.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Unidentified Speaker — Yanis Varoufakis: What to watch for in 2025 – Trump, the US… [j0xHazbvKfg]

“Donald Trump's first problem is that the tariffs that he has invested so much political capital in introducing, announcing, and advocating for will most likely boost the value of the dollar, why? Primarily because every time there is global uncertainty [1:02] whenever there is a problem that emanates from the United States whether that was the 2008 crisis or whatever crisis there is, there is a paradoxical rush of foreign money into the United States boosting the dollar.”

0.68

Even if tariffs succeed in initially shrinking imports, the influx of foreign capital attracted by global uncertainty will boost the dollar's value, thereby countering the tariffs' trade effects and preventing the export enhancement Trump seeks.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Unidentified Speaker — Yanis Varoufakis: What to watch for in 2025 – Trump, the US… [j0xHazbvKfg]

“So if Trump's tariffs create global uncertainty, The likely outcome will be an increased value of the dollar and that's his first problem because if his tariffs succeed in creating a lot of consternation across the world [1:32] in China, in the European Union, in Britain, the result will be, that even if imports initially shrink as a result of these large tariffs, the influx of money into the United States, of capital is going to boost the value of the dollar therefore, countering whatever effects the tariffs had on limiting imports and enhancing American exports.”

0.68

Trump cannot simultaneously achieve both his stated objective of shrinking the US trade deficit and maintaining the exorbitant privilege of the dollar in 2025 or the next four years; these goals are mutually exclusive under current structural conditions.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Unidentified Speaker — Yanis Varoufakis: What to watch for in 2025 – Trump, the US… [j0xHazbvKfg]

“In that sense, it looks very unlikely that what Donald Trump wants, at least, both his objectives of shrinking the US trade deficit and maintaining the exorbitant privilege of the dollar that both these objectives will be satisfied at once in 2025 in the next four years.”

0.68

A BRICS-centered monetary system with the yuan at its core—analogous to Bretton Woods with the dollar—would represent the greatest and most lethal danger to the exorbitant privilege of the US dollar.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Unidentified Speaker — Yanis Varoufakis: What to watch for in 2025 – Trump, the US… [j0xHazbvKfg]

“just as Bretton Woods had at its heart, the US dollar [6:45] for the BRICS area to have the yuan at its heart with more or less fixed exchange rates between the yuan, the rupee and other currencies and with a view to recycle China's surpluses within the BRICS area because that would be the greatest and most lethal danger for the exorbitant privilege of the dollar.”

0.68

The 1985 Plaza Accords were nominally multilateral (involving Europeans, Americans, Canadians, and Australians) but were actually a unilateral ultimatum by Washington on Tokyo: accept massive yen appreciation or face large tariffs on Japanese exports.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 4/4· Unidentified Speaker — Yanis Varoufakis: What to watch for in 2025 – Trump, the US… [j0xHazbvKfg]

“The infamous Plaza Accords, supposedly a multilateral meeting between the Europeans, the Americans, the Canadians, the Australians, but in reality, what the Plaza Accords were about, was an ultimatum by Washington on Tokyo, appreciate the yen massively, or else I'm going to slap large tariffs on Japanese exports.”

0.68

To genuinely shrink the American trade deficit, Trump would need to eliminate the exorbitant privilege of the US dollar, but he will never allow this because his political base (rentiers and financiers) depends on maintaining that privilege and would oppose any loss of US hegemonic power.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Unidentified Speaker — Yanis Varoufakis: What to watch for in 2025 – Trump, the US… [j0xHazbvKfg]

“So if Donald Trump were serious about shrinking the American trade deficit, he would want to do away with the exorbitant privilege of the United States dollar. But of course, not only will he never allow himself to do that [3:07] because his best friends, his tribe are the rentiers and the financiers who will be aghast if the United States loses the exorbitant privilege of its dollar. It is highly unlikely that Donald Trump will want to be the first American president after the Second World War, that loses the hegemonic power of the United States by losing the exorbitant privilege of the United States dollar.”

0.65

The exorbitant privilege of the United States dollar means that during crises, especially those emanating from within the United States, the dollar appreciates and the US trade deficit worsens, particularly during periods of reduced demand, jobs, and employment.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unidentified Speaker — Yanis Varoufakis: What to watch for in 2025 – Trump, the US… [j0xHazbvKfg]

“Tump's third problem is the exorbitant privilege of the United States dollar. It is the reason why every time there is a crisis especially one emanating from within the United States, the dollar goes up and the US trade deficit gets worse especially during periods of reduced demand, jobs and employment within the United States.”

0.64

Donald Trump wants to boost exports and reduce the American trade deficit by achieving a weaker dollar, but simultaneously wants to maintain the exorbitant privilege and dominance of the American dollar in international transactions.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Unidentified Speaker — Yanis Varoufakis: What to watch for in 2025 – Trump, the US… [j0xHazbvKfg]

“Donald Trump wants to boost exports to bring American jobs back to the United States and to reduce, to shrink the American trade deficit. For that, he needs a lower value of the dollar, for that, he needs a weaker dollar. But at the same time, Donald Trump wants a strong dollar, and he will not brook any discussion of ending the exorbitant privilege, the centrality, the hegemony, the dominance of the American dollar in international transactions.”

0.63

Trump may be using tariff threats as a negotiating tactic to coerce other nations (particularly China and the EU) into accepting currency depreciation in exchange for avoiding tariffs—similar to Reagan's 1985 Plaza Accords with Japan.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Unidentified Speaker — Yanis Varoufakis: What to watch for in 2025 – Trump, the US… [j0xHazbvKfg]

“Some argue, and I think they do have a point that maybe, what he's trying to do, [3:39] what Donald Trump is trying to do is he is threatening the world, China and the European Union in particular, with very large tariffs in order to come to an arrangement with them to accept a depreciation of the Chinese yuan, of the euro, of competing currencies in order for the United States to see its exports rise and its imports diminish. To cut a deal, in other words, something along the lines of what Ronald Reagan did in 1985.”

0.63

Donald Trump wants a weaker dollar to boost exports and reduce the American trade deficit, requiring lower dollar valuation to make US goods more competitive abroad and foreign goods more expensive domestically.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 0/4durability 3/4· Unidentified Speaker — Yanis Varoufakis: What to watch for in 2025 – Trump, the US… [j0xHazbvKfg]

“Donald Trump wants to boost exports to bring American jobs back to the United States and to reduce, to shrink the American trade deficit. For that, he needs a lower value of the dollar, for that, he needs a weaker dollar.”

0.62

Japan accepted the Plaza Accords arrangement and appreciated the yen, which caused the elimination of Japan's massive growth rates between 1950 and 1985 and resulted in Japan losing its economic dynamism and verve.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unidentified Speaker — Yanis Varoufakis: What to watch for in 2025 – Trump, the US… [j0xHazbvKfg]

“The Japanese rolled over, They did as they were told. The reason why Japan's massive growth rates between 1950 and 1985 were eliminated, and why Japan lost its verve, its dynamism was because they accepted those Plaza Accords.”

0.62

China's capital account position would economically recommend a depreciation of the yuan, not the appreciation Trump would demand, making any agreement on currency realignment highly unlikely.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unidentified Speaker — Yanis Varoufakis: What to watch for in 2025 – Trump, the US… [j0xHazbvKfg]

“It is highly unlikely that they will accept at a time when the capital account of China if anything, would recommend from an economic point of view, a depreciation of the yuan.”

0.61

China is fundamentally different from Japan: it was never occupied by the US, the US did not write its Constitution, and the US does not maintain tens of thousands of occupying troops in Chinese territory, making China far less susceptible to US coercion than Japan was.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unidentified Speaker — Yanis Varoufakis: What to watch for in 2025 – Trump, the US… [j0xHazbvKfg]

“Is China likely to accept a new Plaza Accords? I assign a zero probability to that possibility. China is no Japan. Japan was an occupied country by the United States. The United States wrote its Constitution, there are tens of thousands of American soldiers still occupying Okinawa. China, I will repeat this once more, is not Japan.”

0.57

Japan's massive growth rates between 1950 and 1985 were eliminated and Japan lost its dynamism and verve because it accepted the Plaza Accords and allowed massive yen appreciation, demonstrating the severe cost of currency realignment imposed by the US.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Unidentified Speaker — Yanis Varoufakis: What to watch for in 2025 – Trump, the US… [j0xHazbvKfg]

“The Japanese rolled over, They did as they were told. The reason why Japan's massive growth rates between 1950 and 1985 were eliminated, [4:42] and why Japan lost its verve, its dynamism was because they accepted those Plaza Accords.”

0.57

China will never accept the massive appreciation of the yuan that would be necessary to meaningfully reduce the US trade deficit in the way Trump desires.

forecasthigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Unidentified Speaker — Yanis Varoufakis: What to watch for in 2025 – Trump, the US… [j0xHazbvKfg]

“They will never accept a massive appreciation of the kind that would make the difference for the United States' trade deficit in the way that Donald Trump would like.”

0.57

A new Plaza Accords between the United States and Beijing is not on the horizon in 2025 or the near term, making Trump's strategy of currency coercion unviable.

forecasthigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Unidentified Speaker — Yanis Varoufakis: What to watch for in 2025 – Trump, the US… [j0xHazbvKfg]

“So, this to be pie in the sky. No new Plaza Accords between the United States and Beijing this time, [5:44] are on the horizon.”

0.57

China has not yet made a final decision on whether to build a BRICS-centered monetary system, but it will eventually do so—making 2025 and beyond a critical window to observe whether this shift occurs.

forecasthigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Unidentified Speaker — Yanis Varoufakis: What to watch for in 2025 – Trump, the US… [j0xHazbvKfg]

“This is not a decision that has been made as yet. Well, in 2025 or in the years following 2025, [7:18] I think we shall know the answer.”

0.52

The great question for 2025 and beyond concerns China's dilemma: whether Beijing will stay put and gain time until Trump's internal contradictions play out, or will convert the BRICS area into a new version of Bretton Woods with the yuan at its heart.

forecasthigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Unidentified Speaker — Yanis Varoufakis: What to watch for in 2025 – Trump, the US… [j0xHazbvKfg]

“The great question however, for 2025 and beyond, concerns China's dilemma. Will Beijing will decide to stay put, gaining time until the United States internal contradictions, Trump's conundrum and dilemma plays out, or will Beijing make the choice that it has not made yet, they have not made up their minds yet, and I think reasonably, will however, at some point, make the choice, make the decision to convert the BRICS area into a new version of Bretton Woods just as Bretton Woods had at its heart, the US dollar for the BRICS area to have the yuan at its heart”

0.52

If China converts the BRICS area into a yuan-centered version of Bretton Woods with more or less fixed exchange rates between the yuan, rupee, and other currencies, and recycles China's surpluses within the BRICS area, this would be the greatest and most lethal danger to the exorbitant privilege of the dollar.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Unidentified Speaker — Yanis Varoufakis: What to watch for in 2025 – Trump, the US… [j0xHazbvKfg]

“for the BRICS area to have the yuan at its heart with more or less fixed exchange rates between the yuan, the rupee and other currencies and with a view to recycle China's surpluses within the BRICS area because that would be the greatest and most lethal danger for the exorbitant privilege of the dollar.”

0.48

To genuinely shrink the American trade deficit, Donald Trump would need to end the exorbitant privilege of the United States dollar, but he will not do this because his political base consists of rentiers and financiers who depend on dollar dominance.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Unidentified Speaker — Yanis Varoufakis: What to watch for in 2025 – Trump, the US… [j0xHazbvKfg]

“So if Donald Trump were serious about shrinking the American trade deficit, he would want to do away with the exorbitant privilege of the United States dollar. But of course, not only will he never allow himself to do that because his best friends, his tribe are the rentiers and the financiers who will be aghast if the United States loses the exorbitant privilege of its dollar.”

0.45

It is highly unlikely that Trump will be the first American president after World War II to lose the hegemonic power of the United States by surrendering the exorbitant privilege of the dollar.

forecasthigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Unidentified Speaker — Yanis Varoufakis: What to watch for in 2025 – Trump, the US… [j0xHazbvKfg]

“It is highly unlikely that Donald Trump will want to be the first American president after the Second World War, that loses the hegemonic power of the United States by losing the exorbitant privilege of the United States dollar.”

0.42

Some analysts argue that Trump may be threatening China and the European Union with large tariffs in order to negotiate an agreement where these regions accept depreciation of the yuan and euro, similar to the Plaza Accords of 1985.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Unidentified Speaker — Yanis Varoufakis: What to watch for in 2025 – Trump, the US… [j0xHazbvKfg]

“Some argue, and I think they do have a point that maybe, what he's trying to do, what Donald Trump is trying to do is he is threatening the world, China and the European Union in particular, with very large tariffs in order to come to an arrangement with them to accept a depreciation of the Chinese yuan, of the euro, of competing currencies in order for the United States to see its exports rise and its imports diminish.”

0.42

A new Plaza Accords between the United States and China is highly unlikely to occur, making it improbable that Trump's dual objectives of shrinking the US trade deficit and maintaining dollar exorbitant privilege will both be satisfied simultaneously in 2025 and the following four years.

forecasthigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Unidentified Speaker — Yanis Varoufakis: What to watch for in 2025 – Trump, the US… [j0xHazbvKfg]

“So, this to be pie in the sky. No new Plaza Accords between the United States and Beijing this time, are on the horizon. In that sense, it looks very unlikely that what Donald Trump wants, at least, both his objectives of shrinking the US trade deficit and maintaining the exorbitant privilege of the dollar that both these objectives will be satisfied at once in 2025 in the next four years.”

0.42

China has not yet decided whether to pursue a yuan-centered BRICS monetary architecture, but the speaker believes that China will reasonably make this choice at some point.

forecasthigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Unidentified Speaker — Yanis Varoufakis: What to watch for in 2025 – Trump, the US… [j0xHazbvKfg]

“This is not a decision that has been made as yet. Well, in 2025 or in the years following 2025, I think we shall know the answer.”