
The Biggest Threats To US National Security, Foreign And Domestic | GZERO World
What this covers
This is a 15-minute interview excerpt from GZERO World, in which Ian Bremmer questions New York Times national security correspondent David Sanger about the Biden administration's new National Security Strategy. Sanger ranks the threats in an order that may surprise: China as the leading external competitor, and an "insider threat" to elections as the most serious danger at home. He moves between three arenas: Russia and Ukraine, the semiconductor rivalry over Taiwan, and the stability of American elections.
On Russia, Sanger describes a strategic paradox: analysts at the war's start put nuclear use well under 1%, assuming Ukraine would be no match, but Ukraine's success with NATO backing makes escalation by Putin more tempting. He explains why tactical nuclear weapons are the worry. Russia has roughly 2,000 of them, they fall outside New START, and the US has only about a 50% chance of seeing them being readied. He also explains why chemical and biological options make little sense for Putin. The contested question is how the West would respond, and Sanger says the administration is split between military action, economic sanctions, and an effort to peel Russia away from China and India. He cites Ash Carter on why nuclear weapons appearing in the news is itself a warning sign.
The chip discussion turns on dependence. Leading-edge manufacturing sits on an island about 100 miles from mainland China, globalization having made that look safe. Sanger covers Dutch lithography machines, China's stalled progress below seven nanometers, and the new US export controls. He calls these controls a "fingers in the dyke" delay, and he asks whether they push Beijing toward aggression over Taiwan. He argues that TSMC's importance may itself be what deters an invasion. The closing section covers entrenched doubts about Joe Biden's legitimacy and a level of political violence he says the country has not seen in 125 to 150 years.
Sanger argues that nuclear weapons use has shifted from unthinkable to actively considered by policymakers due to Ukraine stalemate, while simultaneous US-China semiconductor competition and domestic election instability represent compounding national security threats requiring urgent strategic response.
- Ukraine paradox means Putin faces incentive to use tactical nuclear weapons as conventional options exhaust, changing 77-year nuclear taboo
- US semiconductor supply chain vulnerability concentrated in Taiwan makes US dependent on adversary's proximity for critical technology
- Domestic insider threats from election denial and political violence now exceed foreign interference as top election security risk
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Tactical nuclear weapons, of which Russia has about 2,000, have no restrictions unlike strategic weapons covered by the New START Treaty, and the US does not inspect them, does not know their size, does not know their effects, and has only a 50% chance of seeing them being prepared.
“the tactical weapons of which the Russians have about 2,000 have no restrictions. We don't know very much about them. We don't inspect them We don't know whether they are small, medium or large. We don't really know their effects and the chances that we would see them being prepared are only sort of 50/50.”
US government officials believe the chances of nuclear weapon use in Ukraine are now far greater than they were at the war's beginning in late February, though they still consider the probability remote; the Pentagon and intelligence agencies are focused on the possibility of small tactical nuclear weapons, which range from sub-kiloton to much larger than the 15 kiloton Hiroshima bomb.
“the people inside the US government, who I speak to, while they still think the chances of use are remote, they think they are far greater than they were when the war began in late February. What the Pentagon has been looking at, what the intelligence agencies have been looking at, are the use of small tactical weapons, which could still do a huge amount of damage. Tactical weapons range from sub kilo ton to much larger than what the US used at Hiroshima.”
Chemical weapons would not be terribly useful in the Ukraine conflict because chemical doesn't spread far and Putin can do more damage with conventional missiles; biological weapons are hard to control and Russia is right near its own border, making biological use counterproductive.
“I don't think that chemical or biological is terribly useful in this conflict at all. And chemical doesn't spread out very far. He can do more damage with his conventional missiles. Biological is very hard to control and he is right near the Russian border.”
Nuclear war, which has been unthinkable for most of Ian's life, is now something that policy leaders are actively thinking about and planning for, representing a fundamental shift in strategic culture.
“nuclear war, which has been for most of my life, unthinkable, is now something that policy leaders are actively thinking about”
To manufacture chips with seven-nanometer or smaller dimensions, the world is highly dependent on specialized semiconductor equipment made by companies in the Netherlands, including $100 million machines used in clean rooms by major chip manufacturers; the US is actively working to prevent China from accessing these machines.
“To get to those dimensions, we are highly dependent on some semiconductor equipment that is made by a company that's in the Netherlands. And when you go into a big chip manufacturing company, you frequently see these $100 million machines sitting right in the middle of a clean room. And it's those machines that the US is going out of its way to make sure that the Chinese cannot get access to.”
Ukraine plus NATO support creates a military match for Russia, whereas without NATO support Ukrainians would not have held on; but Ukraine still lacks capacity to win in current standoff, and Russians also lack capacity to win, creating the 'Ukraine paradox' where Ukrainian military success increases rather than decreases the likelihood of Putin considering nuclear, cyber, chemical, or biological weapons.
“Ukraine plus NATO support is very much a match for the Russian military”
Putin has used cyber extensively against Ukraine but has been cautious about not crossing into NATO territory; he could have physically struck weapon supply flows from NATO out of Poland and Romania but has not; he could have struck US financial institutions like Bank of America and Citigroup in retaliation for sanctions but has not; and cyber activity against NATO has not shown a big uptick, suggesting Putin is maintaining escalation thresholds.
“Cyber he has used extensively in Ukraine. But I think it is fair to say that Putin has been pretty cautious not to go over the boundaries of Ukraine. He could have struck physically the incoming weapons flow from NATO out of Poland and Romania. He has not. He could have gone after Bank of America and City Group and others in retaliation for the devastating economic sanctions and export controls on Russia. He has not, and similarly in cyber we have not seen a big uptick.”
The Chinese have made huge advances in artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and biosciences, but have been continually frustrated in their ability to manufacture the smallest diameter chips with dimensions narrower than seven nanometers, which the US and world depend on Taiwan Semiconductor (TSMC) to produce.
“the Chinese have made huge advances in many different arenas, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, the biosciences, and so forth, one area where they have been continually frustrated has been the ability to make the smallest diameter chips the kinds that we get from Taiwan semiconductor and we'll get back to that. And that the Chinese get from Taiwan semiconductor as well. We're talking about chips that have dimensions that are narrower than seven nanometers. And that has been a barrier that the Chinese have not been able to break.”
A substantial minority of Americans still believe that Joe Biden was not legitimately elected president; this belief has not dissipated over time but instead has held quite steady, indicating entrenched political division on the legitimacy of election outcomes.
“there's still a substantial minority of Americans who believe that Joe Biden was not legitimately elected president. And that's pretty remarkable. You would've thought that over time that would've dissipated and instead it's held quite steady.”
The US can buy time by preventing China from purchasing high-end semiconductor manufacturing and lithography equipment, but this only works if the US simultaneously builds sufficient domestic capacity; Taiwan Semiconductor and Samsung's new facilities in the southwest US will address less than 5% of US semiconductor needs when opened.
“You can buy yourself some time by trying to prevent the Chinese from buying these high-end manufacturing machines and the lithography all around it. But that only works if you then turn around and build enough capacity back in the United States. But the fact of the matter is that while Taiwan semiconductor is building in the southwest and Samsung is building in the southwest, when those facilities are open, it will address under 5% of the problem.”
At the beginning of the war in Ukraine, the fear of nuclear weapon use was well under 1% because analysts thought Ukrainians would not be much of a match for Russian military, but this assessment proved completely wrong as Ukrainians turned out to be quite a match.
“at the beginning of the war in Ukraine I think the fear of use of a nuclear weapon was pretty low. I would say well under 1%, because at the time we thought that the Ukrainians would not be much of a match for the Russian military. We've now discovered we had that completely wrong and that the Ukrainians were quite a match.”
If Russia uses a tactical nuclear weapon in a conventional war and essentially gets away with it (pays a price but not too big), then the taboo against using nuclear weapons in conventional conflict since 1945 will be broken, nuclear weapons will become a weapon of choice in conventional conflicts, and the world enters a fundamentally different strategic paradigm.
“the instability that you refer to comes from the fear that if the Russians use a tactical nuclear weapon in a conventional war and essentially, get away with it, in other words that they pay a price, but not too big a price. Then all of a sudden the taboo about using nuclear weapons in a conventional conflict is gone. We have not seen nuclear weapons used in anger since the United States dropped weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. And if that goes away and suddenly smaller nuclear weapons become a weapon of choice in a conventional conflict, we're in a whole different world.”
The greatest national security threat to the United States is now an insider threat, primarily consisting of Americans working to install vote counters who can assure victory for their preferred candidate or undermine elections they oppose, backed by a new acceptance that violence is warranted when people disagree with election outcomes.
“our greatest national security threat right now is really an insider threat to a great degree...the number one threat to the stability of our election system was going to be Americans who were trying to put in place the vote counters so that they could assure a victory for their favorite candidate or attempt to assure that. And that really is the number one problem and it's backed up by a new acceptance that if you don't like the outcome of an election, violence is then in some way warranted.”
If Russia uses a tactical nuclear weapon in Ukraine, it is unclear exactly how NATO, the United States, or Ukraine would respond; Russia could use such a weapon as a demonstration over the Black Sea, hit a Ukrainian military base, hit a civilian location, use a small weapon or larger weapon, and the larger the weapon used the bigger the chance that radiation cloud flows back over Russia itself due to prevailing winds.
“If the Russians want to use one, would they use it first in sort of a demonstration over the Black Sea? If they did that, Ian, it's hard for me to understand exactly how NATO or the United States, whether the Ukrainians would respond, because there are nuclear tests that the North Koreans do. We don't respond to those in a similar way. They could hit a Ukrainian base, a military target. They could hit a civilian location. They could use a small weapon. They could use a larger one. The larger they use the bigger the chance that the radiation cloud flows back given the prevailing winds on Russia itself.”
The US effort to prevent Chinese access to advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment is a 'fingers in the dyke' approach—an effort to delay Chinese technological development for years, but ultimately China will figure out the technology, and the question is whether this containment effort convinces China that the US is so committed to containing Chinese technological power that China makes aggressive moves in military arenas, particularly regarding Taiwan.
“The US effort right now is sort of fingers in the dyke. In other words, it is an effort to try to make sure that the Chinese have years more delay, but sooner or later China is going to figure this out. And the question is along the way do we make them convince that the US is so out to contain Chinese technological power that they begin to make moves in other areas, including military arenas.”
In 2016, if analysts had predicted where Russian and Chinese election interference would be 6 years later, they would have expected greater Russian interference, more Chinese interference, and some disinformation from Iran or North Korea, but none would have predicted that Americans attempting to manipulate vote counters would become the number one threat.
“if you and I were sitting around in late 2016 as we began to understand the scope of the Russian interference in the 2016 election and we said where do we think this will be in six years? I think what we would've said is greater Russian interference, more Chinese interference. And we are seeing China try to figure out a little bit about our election system and disinformation, maybe more from Iran or North Korea. But I don't think, Ian, that we would have thought that the number one threat to the stability of our election system was going to be Americans”
The big debate inside the US administration is whether to respond to Russian tactical nuclear use militarily, respond only with economic sanctions, or try to use it to separate Russia from China and India and others buying Russian oil, with no clear consensus on the right approach.
“I think the big debate inside the administration right now is do you respond militarily? Do you respond just with economic sanctions? Do you try to use this to separate Russia from China and India? Everyone else who's buying their oil right now?”
The greatest defense against Taiwan being invaded is the existence of Taiwan Semiconductor (TSMC), because the economic consequences of losing TSMC control would be so catastrophic that even China would be deterred from military action.
“right now in my view, Ian, the greatest defense we have against Taiwan being invaded is the existence of Taiwan semiconductor.”
The vulnerability of Taiwan to Chinese military action was never considered a high-end security concern until the past few years, despite the reality that the US depends on an island 100 miles from mainland China for the most critical semiconductors, representing a major gap in US strategic planning.
“the vulnerability of Taiwan was never really considered to be a high end concern until the past few years. And that's remarkable to me.”
The US has not seen the level of political violence and willingness to use violence for political outcomes that is currently observed for 125-150 years, except at sporadic moments, representing a historical reversal of post-Civil War norms.
“We haven't seen that in this country in 125, 150 years except at sporadic moments.”
The US has allowed the manufacturing of leading-edge semiconductors (which the US invented and dominated) to be located outside the US in an era of globalization with the assumption that world supply chains were reliable, but this was a vulnerability that was not considered a high-end concern until the past few years, similar to how Europe became dependent on Russian oil and gas.
“if there was ever a reason for sort of a commission on American vulnerabilities, one of the first things I would put on their agenda, Ian, would be a study of how we allow the manufacturing of key semiconductors. Not the commodity semiconductors that go into your car or your microwave or whatever, but the real leading-edge semiconductors which the US invented, dominated the technology, and then came to the conclusion in the era of globalization that the supply chain around the world was reliable enough that it didn't make any difference where we manufactured them. And you know, this was a feature of the past two decades. The Europeans did it with oil and gas, being dependent on the Russians. We did it in the semiconductor arena where we were dependent on Taiwan, but many other places.”
Former Defense Secretary Ash Carter believed that nuclear weapons being in the news regularly is a sign of serious trouble, making recent Kremlin saber-rattling and Putin's nuclear threats significant signals of systemic instability.
“I always tell people the day when nuclear weapons are in the newspaper, we're in real trouble.”
The US was not surprised that it had not already engaged in semiconductor export controls against China, but was surprised that it took so long to implement such controls given China's persistent frustration with advancing beyond seven-nanometer chips.
“I was not surprised that they did it. I was actually surprised it's taken the United States so long to do this.”