Zack Fuss – Breaking Down the Food Ecosystem – [Invest Like the Best, EP.208]
What this covers
Patrick O'Shaughnessy talks with Zack Fuss, an investor at Continental Grain, about how to read the food economy layer by layer. The anchor is the value chain. McDonald's, Sysco and Tyson sit in the same chain yet trade at roughly 20, 13 and 8 times EBITDA, which Fuss uses to show how unevenly layers capture value. The conversation then covers grocery's thin margins, private label as a way to cut out part of the chain, and delivery. Aggregators like DoorDash take 20 to 30 percent and may cannibalize a restaurant's own orders, though Fuss argues route density can make delivery profitable.
The middle of the episode is case studies. Domino's gets the longest treatment: who actually owns its US stores (about 95 percent are former store-level employees), its 2010 "cardboard" admission, and why it keeps delivery in-house. Dollar General follows, with its rural format and a development program in which outside developers build stores and sell the lease-backed assets to a REIT. Fuss reads that program against the Seven Powers. Walmart's abandoned small-town stores and Best Buy's response to Amazon showrooming serve as side comparisons.
The more contested passages concern the future. Fuss thinks lab-grown ground meat could eventually compete with commodity beef, but he expects large CPG incumbents to keep their advantage in advertising and shelf placement. He questions whether factory automation rewards investors or only consumers, framing it as a Red Queen Effect problem. He also argues that today's best operators are avoiding the classic innovator's dilemma. The closing stretch turns to investing, including the Asset-Liability Mismatch facing hedge funds and the Cholula resale from roughly $200 million to $800 million.
Zack Fuss argues that profit in food and retail accrues to whichever layer of the value chain is least commoditized and most differentiated, and that legacy operators who embrace technology, distribution density, and franchise systems can earn outsized returns, as Domino's and Dollar General illustrate.
- Profit pools concentrate in the least commoditized layer of a value chain (law of conservation of attractive profits)
- Domino's earns high franchise returns because pizza's high gross margin funds delivery and a unified tech and franchise system scales the unit economics
- Dollar General's repeatable store-development program and rural format let a non-tech retailer compound returns through build-once, sell-many economics
This asset isn't compiled yet
You're seeing its claims, ranked. Compile it to build the argument threads, weight them, and check each claim against your library — the full view.
Private label grocery, as led by Aldi, Lidl, and Trader Joe's-style stores where 90 percent of the store is private label, lets retailers offer lower prices while earning a higher margin by disintermediating part of the value chain.
“There are a lot more similar to a Trader Joe's type of business where 90% of what's in the store is private label. And what's amazing about private label food is that you can offer to your consumers at a lower cost, but get a higher margin for it.”
For a non-tech company, Dollar General exhibits many of Hamilton Helmer's Seven Powers, including counter-positioning in rural markets too small for Walmart, process power in its development program, a cornered resource in its developer relationships and capital access, scale economics, network density, and branding.
“For a non-tech company, Dollar General exhibits a stunning number of Helmer's seven powers, that set of conditions to create potential for persistent supernormal returns.”
It is unclear whether automating an entire factory creates investor profit or whether automation gains flow only to consumers, which is the Red Queen problem: new disruptive technology may only produce incremental returns that never accrue to the end user or the investor.
“the question being does that mean that these legacy businesses and these disruptive forces are going to have impacts on profit pools that are durable, or are we just going to be running in place”
Walmart opened more than a hundred small rural-format stores a couple of years ago, shuttered the concept, and sold dozens of them to Dollar General, illustrating that small-town formats can be unattractive even to dominant incumbents.
“Walmart opened more than a hundred of these rural small-format stores a couple of years ago, but the concept was shuttered and dozens of them were sold to Dollar General.”
Dollar General generates about 30 billion dollars of sales across 17,000 stores, adds about 1,000 stores a year, has around 75 percent of Americans living within five miles of a store, and operates roughly 7,500-square-foot stores with about 10,000 SKUs that generate about 2 million dollars in sales and run with six or seven staff.
“It generates $30 billion of sales across 17,000 stores... They're adding a thousand stores a year. At this point, I think 75% of Americans live within five miles of a Dollar General.”
Best Buy faced irrational fear of Amazon showrooming in the 2000s, then matched online prices and shifted competition to convenience and services like Geek Squad, a move up the value chain that many retailers have since copied with insurance and buy-now-pay-later offerings.
“Best Buy realized this and they decided that they would start to match prices. There was this inherent creative disruption in their store where they realized we no longer can compete on price.”
Franchisees typically pay franchisors 4 to 6 percent of top-line sales as royalties, which reduces the restaurant-level four-wall margin, and a best-in-class food store should have a four-wall margin above 20 percent, such as Chipotle, to justify investment.
“the franchisee pays the franchisor, call it 4% to 6% off of their top-line sales. So that restaurant-level margin I just talked about is going to be automatically reduced by the cost of that royalty.”
Delivery can be profitable at a positive contribution margin when there is enough route density, meaning enough drops per trip in urban areas, which lets take rates fall while restaurants and aggregators both make money.
“in urban areas specifically, if you have enough route density or drops per trip, take rates can be lowered.”
Hedge funds face an asset-liability mismatch in which they want long-term holds but their LPs require lock-ups as short as three months, creating an implicit advantage for capital that is permanent or semi-permanent, and crossover funds that span public and private assets have an advantage because insights from private assets inform public strategy.
“There's this inherent asset-liability mismatch between you as the investor that wants to take a long-term approach to the market and your LPs that in many cases require short-term lock-ups on their capital sometimes that are as short as three months in time.”
Cholula was bought by a private equity investor for about 200 million dollars two years ago and sold to McCormick for about 800 million dollars just last month, illustrating how ethnic and flavorful food brands can create outsized value in the food trend cycle.
“that business was bought by a private equity investor for $200 million two years ago, and was sold to McCormick, the spice manufacturer and distributor, for 800 million just last month.”
Grocery is a low-margin, high-turnover business where a retailer keeps roughly 2 to 4 dollars of a 100-dollar basket, yet on an approximately $800 billion category that still represents a $20 to $30 billion annual profit pool.
“if you consider a $100 basket of groceries, the retailer keeps, I don't know, $2 to $4. Two to 4% of $800 billion is still a 20 to $30 billion annual profit opportunity.”
About 95 percent of US Domino's restaurant owners are former store-level employees who worked or managed a store, whereas international franchisees are institutional master franchisors, many of them public companies.
“in the US, 95% of the restaurant owners are former Domino store-level employees, so they either worked or managed the store.”
Today's best businesses are willing to embrace change and compete, so the classic innovator's dilemma is not hitting them as hard as it hit incumbents in the past, as shown by Home Depot's acquisitions, Chipotle's digital pivot, Disney+, and Walmart's subscription pilot.
“It's abundantly obvious to me that today the best businesses are those that are willing to embrace change and compete. And that classic innovator's dilemma is not impacting them into the same extent that it has businesses in the past.”
Ground meat grown in a lab could become cost-competitive with commodity ground beef, which Fuss says can be produced for about 25 cents a pound, so lab-grown products may eventually win a subset of the market even though incumbent CPG companies have scale advantages.
“something like ground meat that could be grown in a lab at the cost of which we can deliver it today, will be competitive. The reality is that we can produce ground beef today, something like 25 cents a pound”
Large consumer packaged goods companies such as Tyson and General Mills have the size to spend on advertising and shelf distribution, and because so much CPG retail competition is about paying for placement and attention, incumbents' competitive advantage is unlikely to disappear.
“unfortunately, so much of CPG retail is the ability to spend, to get your product in front of the consumer.”
Markets are largely efficient, so trying to outcompete multi-billion-dollar asset managers for the next incremental data point is very difficult, and the edge lies instead in connecting dots across private and public investing rather than analyzing a business better than others.
“the reality is that the markets are largely efficient. If you're trying to compete with multi-multi billion-dollar asset managers for the next incremental data point, it's going to prove very difficult.”
E-grocery is not going away, and grocers must embrace technology because roughly 60 percent of online commerce searches start on Amazon, so the question is where a shopper will begin a grocery search, which will create a dynamic battle among Walmart, Kroger, apps, and Amazon.
“I think something like 60% of online commerce searches today are started on Amazon. And the question is going to be, when you go to do your local grocery shopping, where are you going to start your search?”
Competing against uneconomic, venture-funded delivery platforms that subsidize losses is very difficult, which is why the mode-attack dynamic of deep-pocketed competitors worked for DoorDash and Uber over the last three or four years.
“When you're dealing with competition that's uneconomic, it's very difficult.”
When restaurants outsource delivery and lead generation to aggregators like Uber Eats or DoorDash, the aggregators take 20 to 30 percent, which is a bad economic trait if the orders cannibalize existing sales, though lead generation itself is a valuable business.
“they're looking to take 20 to 30% on top of that. And in the event that it's replacing or cannibalizing your current sales, it's a bad economic trait.”
McDonald's is a roughly $200 billion business trading at 20 times EBITDA, Sysco a roughly $50 billion business at 13 times EBITDA, and Tyson a roughly $35 billion business at 8 times EBITDA, even though all three sit in the same value chain, showing how differently value is captured by layer.
“There's a reason that McDonald's is a $200 billion business that trades at 20 times EBITDA. And Tyson is a $35 billion business that trades at eight times EBITDA.”
Dollar General's Preferred Development Program is a programmatic joint venture in which independent developers find, permit, and build stores to Dollar General's specification on a 15-year lease at a 5 to 6 percent cap rate, then sell the lease-backed asset to a REIT for about 1.3 to 1.4 million dollars against a build cost of 800,000 to 1 million dollars.
“Dollar General Will enter into a 15-year lease at five to 6% cap rate. And the developer will take that rock-solid contract and flip it to a real estate investor, to a REIT.”
Throughout a value chain, a particular player captures a disproportionate share of the economics, and which layer does so depends on which parts have become commoditized; the least commoditized, most differentiated players capture the largest share of the profit pool.
“Start with the idea that throughout a value chain a certain player captures a disproportionate amount of the economics.”
If Walmart described its business in terms of GMV and daily or monthly active users rather than as a retailer, the market would likely treat it as a different industry, showing that the narrative a company tells shapes how it is valued.
“if they were to change the way that they talk about their business to GMV and to daily active or monthly active users, it would probably be treated as a different industry.”
Domino's reinforces a self-reinforcing loop in which investment raises same-store sales, which makes stores profitable enough for franchisees to open more stores, which shortens delivery times and lifts customer satisfaction; it formalizes this as fortressing by telling franchisees with capacity-constrained stores to open another in the region.
“if a franchisee has two stores in a market and that markets starting to show the stores are at capacity, Domino's will inform that franchisee that they should open up another store in that region.”
Publicly saying your product tastes terrible is not a typical marketing strategy, but Rory Sutherland's heuristic that a good business has someone willing to do what the CFO calls a terrible idea supports it, since the virality and consumer trial it caused reinvited customers and enabled improvement.
“I kind of like the heuristic that Rory Sutherland offers that you want someone in your business that's willing to do something that the CFO will tell you is a terrible idea.”
Narrow and focused businesses can still beat large incumbents, and a business with 100 highly profitable, productive restaurants can be better than a 1,000-unit system that needs constant maintenance capex and massive brand spend, because you cannot run in every race at the same time.
“There's a way that you can have a 100 really profitable, highly productive restaurants and be a better business than in 1000 restaurants system that requires constant maintenance CAPEX and massive brand spend.”
Chipotle built a second back-of-house production facility so that it could produce for online and catering orders at twice its front-of-house capacity, which, given the operating leverage on square-footage productivity, positions it for very high returns on capital.
“Chipotle had their second facility in the Back of The House, they had it so if you ordered ahead, or if you had a catering order, they could be producing whatever it was in the front of house at twice the capacity.”
Domino's standardized every store on one point-of-sale system in the mid-2010s, giving corporate visibility into unit economics, sales and store data to guide new store locations, product trials and pricing.
“they also made sure that all of their stores run a unified point of sale system.”
Domino's is effectively a marketplace in which aligned franchisee and franchisor incentives produce value, and the restaurant is the form factor while technology, know-how, and process drive returns, making it resemble a software-in-a-box model that can be scaled once unit economics are proven.
“In many ways, it is kind of that software in a box model that people like to talk about. Domino's created the business once, and then they're selling it multiple times.”
Over time the traditional grocery store will industrialize into something closer to a fulfillment center, with shoppers walking a declining share of the store (from about 80 percent today to 20 percent in the future) and center-store items fulfilled through order-ahead, leaving more dark stores and less valuable real estate.
“What's going to have to happen over time is more of the traditional grocery store is going to become industrialized. It's going to become more like a fulfillment center.”
Domino's fragmented, less institutionalized franchise base makes it easier to roll out new technology than at Yum! Brands or McDonald's, whose owners are often private equity-style sponsor-backed operators, and Domino's unified point-of-sale system gives corporate store-level visibility into sales and unit economics.
“They can work with their franchisees to implement new types of technology that may be more challenging for someone like a Yum! Brands or a McDonald's who are dealing with more kind of private equity-type sponsor oriented owners.”
Domino's 2010 viral admission that its pizza tasted like cardboard showed the company had become a distribution company that under-focused on product, and the public self-critique led to reformulated crust, sauce, and pizza that re-engaged consumers.
“It became very clear that Domino's was a distribution company that wasn't focusing enough on their product. They refocused on the formulation, they improved the crust, they improved the pizza, they improved the sauce.”
Domino's has refused to share its customer and order data with third-party aggregators like GrubHub, DoorDash, and Uber Eats because it values the direct customer relationship, even though this was not easy and it saw some same-store sales deceleration when aggregators subsidized competition with venture-funded losses.
“They've been very adamant about not sharing their data with the third-party aggregators, with GrubHub and DoorDash and Uber Eats, because they really value that relationship they have with the customer.”
A restaurant's margin structure is roughly food costs of 25 to 30 percent, labor of 25 to 30 percent, and rent of 5 to 10 percent, leaving best-case 10 to 15 percent margins for a strong operator, which is why restaurants have historically been considered bad businesses.
“food costs of 25 to 30% and labor costs of 25 to 30%, and rent costs of five to 10%. At the end of the day, best-case scenario, you're left with 10 to 15% margins if you're a strong operator.”
The US can produce food extremely cheaply yet many people still go hungry because the problem is distribution rather than production, and e-commerce and e-grocery could redirect waste and inefficiency toward people who need food.
“Really, what it comes down to is distribution, how are we getting food to the places that it needs to be for the people that need it?”
The best retailers are often founder-led and maniacal about first principles, and Walmart's four-wall store margins were healthy for its first 30 or 40 years even while the consolidated business did not generate cash, because management knew the profitability of each store to the penny.
“the four wall margins were really healthy and they were incredible merchandisers, but the business on a consolidated basis wasn't generating cash”
A Domino's franchise costs about 250,000 to 350,000 dollars to open, an average US store does about 1.1 to 1.2 million dollars in top-line sales and about 125,000 dollars in cash flow, so a store returns its investment in cash without debt, and with bank financing it yields a 30 percent-plus cash-on-cash return with a two-and-a-half to three-year payback.
“on a $300,000 investment, you're returning $125,000 without debt. So if you were to borrow from a bank... you're looking at a 30% plus cash on cash return or two and a half to three-year payback.”
Beyond Meat's IPO at 20 dollars a share, which quintupled over a month to a valuation near 10 billion dollars, generated media attention that increased consumer awareness and trial, effectively lowering customer acquisition costs through free media that followed the stock price.
“coming public at $20 a share, quintupling over the course of a month receives a lot of media attention. That media attention leads to more consumer awareness.”
China's micro-fulfillment centers, such as Miss Fresh, use small city sites with about 1,000 SKUs and high inventory turnover to fulfill local delivery at high velocity, an economic model that has not been tried much in the US, where real estate costs are much higher.
“they've got tiny little stores located throughout cities that are effectively micro FCs. One of them is called Miss Fresh”
New restaurant concepts can acquire customers inorganically through social media and apps and drive product trial without funding expensive store build-outs, because the store no longer needs to act as the company's billboard, and ghost kitchens let founders reinvest rent savings into better product.
“historically, the store itself has served as a billboard for the company. But if you can acquire customers online in an inorganic fashion, through online social media channels or digital apps”
Every Domino's store uses the same oven for all menu items and has a near-identical order flow, so all food completes cooking at the same time for dispatch, making the operation close to a system engineer's dream and easing the burden on employees.
“the preparation and cooking process for every menu item... actually uses the same oven. And based upon different points of entry, all the food products complete their cooking at the same time”
On a 20-dollar Domino's order, the 20 percent margin differential yields about 4 dollars to fund delivery, and a driver making four to six deliveries an hour at roughly 4 dollars each only has about 20 dollars of contribution per hour to cover labor and overhead.
“let's consider a $20 order of Domino's, two medium three-topping pizzas. 20% provides you with $4 to essentially fund that delivery cost”
Incumbents that capture technological change, using the second act concept Henry Ellenbogen describes, can become more dominant, and the pandemic combined with increasing returns to scale is making this shift more visible, as with cheaper rent for traffic-driving retailers and buy-online-pick-up-in-store pulling customers into higher-margin shopping events.
“Henry Ellenbogen of T. Rowe calls it second act. Management's ability to innovate in such a way where they can capture whatever technological innovation or disruption is facing their industry”
A franchisee should invest behind a healthy, growing brand, because as the system grows more money flows into the shared advertising pool, creating a loudest-voice effect that drives traffic and reinforces store profitability, while a decelerating system does the opposite, as Papa John's did after its founder's comments hurt franchisees.
“if you're investing behind a system that's decelerating, it's almost the opposite effect, as we spoke to about Papa John's. They went through a really rocky time where their founder made some comments that hurt the performance of the business”
Legacy companies that win are those whose management can innovate to capture the technological disruption facing their industry and turn it into greater dominance, a capability Henry Ellenbogen of T. Rowe calls a second act.
“Henry Ellenbogen of T. Rowe calls it second act.”
The pandemic forced restaurant owners to find new ways to monetize their existing store base, such as delivery, order-ahead, subscriptions, and dynamic pricing, even though Americans will keep eating out and restaurants are likely to return with strength because the country was historically over-stored on restaurants.
“what I think that COVID has done is it's forced restaurant owners to realize that they need to figure out other ways to monetize their store base”
Pizza starts with a gross margin of 80 percent or more because dough, cheese, and sauce are cheap, while a burger joint starts closer to 65 percent because protein is expensive, and that differential is what pays for Domino's delivery.
“pizza generally starts with an 80% plus gross margin. The cost of dough, cheese, and sauce are just not that high. As opposed to a burger, which is dealing with the expense of protein. That business is going to be starting at like a 65% gross margin.”
Because Domino's is a delivery business, it can use lower-cost real estate in locations off busy intersections and strip malls, which lowers occupancy cost and makes standalone stores more profitable.
“because Domino's is a delivery business, they can take lower-cost real estate as well. So they don't need to be at the busy intersection or in the strip mall”
For any business, the key returns-on-capital question is how much cash a single unit generates; once unit economics are proven, the business can be scaled infinitely.
“once you prove that out, you can go and scale that business infinitely.”
Dark stores and cloud kitchens are two versions of the same idea: lower rent costs are used to fund delivery and fulfillment, and the physical location becomes a cognitive reference for the customer rather than a high-traffic storefront.
“You lower your rent costs and you use the savings from those rent costs to fund other value-added services.”
Amazon inspired a class of high-quality, well-positioned companies that take on the day-one approach Jeff Bezos advocates, applying the principle that your margin is my opportunity, which forces companies that historically stayed in one layer to move up the value chain and invest behind their businesses.
“Amazon inspired a class of high quality, well-positioned companies to take on that day one approach that Jeff Bezos extols. It's the old, your margin is my opportunity.”
Given Marc Andreessen's thesis that software is eating the world, legacy industries' value chains have not been examined enough for the profit shifts that technology creates, and technology advances affect all businesses, from sleepy protein and fast food to early-stage nitrogen fixation and restaurant point-of-sale software.
“the world has probably come to accept Marc Andreessen's thesis that software is, in fact, eating the world. I think we probably don't spend enough time contemplating what the implications are for the value chains of these legacy industries”
Before the last five years, large CPG companies counted on about 2 percent inflation, about 2 percent GDP growth, and some pricing power to produce 4 to 6 percent top-line growth with high-teens to low-20s operating margins, but competition from upstart brands has since eroded those margins while incumbents' distribution scale remains hard to beat.
“companies could count on 2% inflation, 2% GDP growth, and a little bit of pricing power. So they were able to count on a 4 to 6%, top-line growth with really healthy margins.”
Domino's has become tech-forward by adapting across platform shifts from phone to internet to mobile, now taking 65 to 70 percent of orders through digital channels and enabling ordering via Alexa, Google Home, and iPhone.
“Today, 65 to 70% of their orders come through digital channels. So mobile or internet. ... You can order through Alexa, you can order through Google Home, you can order through your iPhone.”
Many quick-service restaurant brands have been taken private or spun off from larger enterprises, such as Yum! Brands from Pepsi and Dunkin' taken private by Bain, because the efficiency, productivity, scalability, and leverage of the private equity model fit these franchise businesses.
“It's interesting, all these QSR businesses have either been taken private or spun off of larger enterprises.”
Domino's should be understood as three businesses: a restaurant with a captive delivery arm (effectively the original ghost kitchen), a supply chain business that owns and distributes cheese, sauce, and dough, and a brand manager or franchisor.
“I like to take a step back and think about Domino's as really three businesses in one. It's a restaurant with a captive delivery arm.”
Cumulatively, US Domino's restaurant owners probably generate about $1 billion in EBITDA, which is worth roughly six to eight billion dollars on its own, showing that the franchise system creates more value than it captures.
“cumulatively, they probably do about a billion dollars in EBITDA. That's worth six or $8 billion alone.”
Typical burger and chicken QSR concepts such as McDonald's, Wingstop, Chick-fil-A, and Taco Bell produce cash-on-cash returns in the high teens to low twenties, Dunkin about 25 to 30 percent, and Wingstop at 40 to 50 percent is the only concept Fuss has seen with returns better than Domino's.
“The only thing I've actually seen that's better is a Wingstop... Their business model is quite similar, except the difference with Wingstop is they historically haven't had delivery”
Food delivery is a canonical disruption reorienting the value chain, as many aggregators, ghost kitchens, dark kitchens and incumbents compete to carve out a share of food-away-from-home profits.
“Today, food delivery is kind of a canonical example of the disruption that's reorienting a value chain.”
Chipotle was once owned by McDonald's, and McDonald's probably wishes it had kept it.
“Ironically was owned by McDonald's until back in the day. They probably wished they held on to that one today.”
Chicken production is almost definitionally a commodity, while local food distribution is a rich, near-oligopolistic business because of route density, though it is more capital intensive to scale and constrained by local markets.
“So if you think about chicken production, it's almost definitionally a commodity. If you think about food distribution on the local level, it's a very rich business, original oligopoly with the benefit of route density.”
A franchisee who owns real estate can do a sale-leaseback, buying the ground, building the structure, and leasing it back to a real estate investor, then reinvesting the cash proceeds into more stores.
“You can engage in something like a sale lease back where you buy the ground, build the structure and lease it back to a real estate investor and take the cash proceeds”
Because billions of people carry powerful computers in their pockets, businesses now know far more about their customers and can segment and customize offerings in ways not possible before, with profound implications for competition across food delivery, grocery, insurance, and entertainment.
“billions of people have super computers in their pockets today, which means that we know more about our customers than we ever have before.”
Dunkin' Brands was reportedly being acquired by Inspire Brands, a Roark Capital portfolio company that owns Arby's and Buffalo Wild Wings, and Domino's investors need to watch Inspire's build-out as a competitor that is hard to compete with as a family of brands.
“we learned that Dunkin' brands is looking to be acquired by Inspire Brands, which I actually think is something that if you're going to study Domino's, you need to be cognizant of what Inspire is building”
The average US Domino's franchisee operates six or seven stores generating about 150,000 dollars of EBITDA per store, roughly a million dollars for the system, showing how a former employee can become the owner of a multi-million-dollar business.
“the average franchisee in the US has six or seven stores doing about 150,000 in EBITDA per store, or a million dollars in their entire system.”
Because all franchisees contribute to a shared advertising pool, a franchise system can spend advertising dollars more efficiently and productively than a single operator, which strengthens brand reach and traffic.
“There are scale benefits in being a franchise system because all your franchisees contribute to the advertising pool.”
Most major US quick-service restaurant concepts are 90 to 95 percent franchised, and operators can maintain control despite franchising only when their unit economics are strong enough that outsourcing them would be unattractive.
“Most of the major US quick-service restaurant concepts are 90 to 95% franchise.”
Domino's started with two brothers and one restaurant in Ann Arbor, began franchising quickly, was family-owned from the 1960s until 1998 when most of the business was sold to Bain Capital, and has recently shifted to proving economics in company-operated units before franchising.
“The company was started by two brothers in Ann Arbor, where the company is still headquartered.”
Domino's has charged 7.99 dollars for a medium two-topping pizza for as long as anyone can remember, so as the system gains scale it passes those economics to customers through the same price rather than through higher prices.
“for a medium, large, two-topping pizza, they've charged 7.99 for as long as I can remember.”
Domino's is a restaurant system with about $15 billion in sales, roughly half in the US and half internationally, operating about 17,000 restaurants (around 6,000 in the US and 11,000 globally) and selling three and a half to four million pizzas a day.
“Domino's is a restaurant system that does $15 billion in sales, about half in the US, half internationally. They have 17,000 restaurants, around 6,000 in the US, 11,000 globally.”
The kindest thing anyone has done for Fuss was his parents' sacrifices that enabled his career, and his father, a physician who has kept working at the same hospital, is saving lives while Fuss allocates capital.
“It's clearly the sacrifices that my parents had made to get me the opportunity to do what I do today.”
Plant-based protein can plausibly capture a small but growing slice of the large US protein market, since markets are often right when things look irrational and the protein sector is large enough to support a growing niche.
“it's not unrealistic to think that you can carve out a small, but increasing portion of it that is plant-based.”
Domino's US same-store sales have grown about 3 to 6% in every year, supporting the franchisee economics.
“they're growing anywhere from call it three to 6% in every given year on a same-store sales basis.”
The DoorDash S-1 showed the company tracking toward roughly $3 billion in sales with about a 50 percent share of the market.
“If you look at the DoorDash S-1 that was recently filed, they're tracking towards $3 billion in sales and a 50% share.”
Large established international Domino's franchisors are public companies, such as Domino's Pizza Enterprises in Australia (about $6 billion market cap), Domino's London in the UK (about $2.5 billion), Alsea in Mexico (about $3 billion), and Jubilant Foods (about $4 billion).
“most of the large established ones are public companies. So you look at a Domino's Pizza Enterprises, which is the Australian franchisor, that's a $6 billion market cap company.”