Will England - A Primer on Multi-Strategy Hedge Funds - [Invest Like the Best, EP.342]
What this covers
Will England, CEO and co-CIO of Walleye Capital, a Minnesota-based multi-strategy fund managing around $5 billion, gives a primer on how firms in the mold of Millennium and Citadel are put together. He starts with the economics: the pass-through cost structure that replaces a flat 2-and-20, and how leverage is set by targeting fund volatility of roughly 5% to 7% rather than a return. That volatility target is meant to produce a Sharpe ratio near 3. He also separates scale that hurts a strategy, through market impact and transaction costs, from scale that helps a company, through better and cheaper infrastructure.
The middle of the conversation moves through the investing itself. England argues for like-for-like relative-value calls within a sector over factor timing. He calls stock picking a game-theory problem, since similarly trained investors crowd into the same positions. He describes the centered book, in which a machine aggregates positions across PMs, and says PMs resent being copied. On quant work he claims the half-life of strategies shrinks as Sharpe rises, and that edge comes from many small judgment calls rather than unique data. He also contends that consistent alpha across hundreds of strategies refutes the efficient market hypothesis.
The most contested turns concern people and stress. England puts the pool of capable PMs at hundreds to low thousands and thinks the space is crowded. He stresses hiring for intellectual honesty and winning talent through respect rather than fear. He also recounts the GameStop squeeze, where Reddit and Twitter feeds went into the risk system and the firm held positions after checking its actual exposure. The episode closes on culture, Walleye's origins, and why he chose Minnesota.
Will England argues that the multi-manager 'pod' hedge fund model works only when a firm builds world-class operating infrastructure, risk systems, and a culture that retains scarce talent, because the return stream is a leveraged sum of small relative-value edges whose cost structure is passed through to investors.
- A 15% net return is built from roughly 3% gross returns on gross market value, times about 10 turns of leverage, with about half the gross return consumed by fixed costs and PM payouts
- Operating scale, not just manager count, is the real barrier to entry, because technology, risk, and back-office costs only make sense when spread across many PMs
- The pool of PMs who can succeed is finite, so firms must compete on respect, culture, and hands-on support, not just capital and tools
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Because one only needs to be right about 55% of the time, the difference between 55% and 57% accuracy is enormous in practice, so the way to earn alpha is to make many small bets and add them up as many times as possible.
“you only need to be right 55% of the time. The difference between 55% and 57% of the time is huge.”
Stock-picking is a game theory problem because the best-trained investors from the same schools think alike, so if everyone holds similar positions and exits simultaneously, the crowded trade can collapse and sink the whole firm.
“if everyone is positioned the same way and they all move their feet at the same time, it's like you run from one side of the boat to the other, well, everyone's screwed.”
Humans are not good at timing when value or growth factors will switch, so a stock picker should isolate like-for-like relative value calls within a sector, where the law of large numbers works in their favor, rather than making macro factor bets.
“Humans just aren't very good at that. That's really a macro call. The law of large numbers is not in your favor.”
Once a firm grows above roughly 150 people, it loses the ability to track faces and rely on informal nonverbal communication, so culture must be institutionalized through rituals and communication cadence, as elite military and some sports teams do.
“once you get above 150 people, this magical barrier in human cognition and you lose the ability to keep track of more 150 faces.”
The multi-manager hedge fund is a pass-through model in which investors trust the manager to pass essentially all business costs through to them in exchange for very high-quality risk-adjusted returns, rather than paying a flat 2-and-20 regardless of performance.
“The technical term is a pass-through multi-manager. ... investors are putting the trust in you as the investment manager, to pass through essentially all the costs of the business in order to generate very high-quality risk-adjusted returns.”
Risk policies should be built to withstand extreme market events, so when the risk team sees managers losing money because of others' panic and confirms no impairment, the right move is to hold rather than cut, and this paid off as the market rebounded quickly.
“if the answer is no, and you see that you have some strategies losing money because very clearly there's people across the street that are freaking out, then the best thing to do is to say, we're not in a position where we're impaired.”
The core concept of the multi-manager model is to build a pure alpha vehicle by combining many uncorrelated relative-value strategies (long/short stock picking, fundamental and quantitative, macro, and volatility trading), so that avoiding correlated time series produces a smoother, higher Sharpe return stream.
“Core concept of the multi-manager model is to say this should be a pure alpha vehicle. And the way to get that is by putting together multiple different types of essentially relative value strategies”
Markets are not efficient but are nearly efficient, and the existence of consistent alpha across hundreds of strategies at multi-manager firms refutes the efficient market hypothesis; alpha is real but extremely hard to capture.
“Markets are not efficient. They're closely efficient, they're nearly efficient, but they're definitely not efficient.”
Quant equity strategies are not found through unique data, since most data has existed since the 1970s and the same elite technical talent is competing, so differentiation comes from many small judgment calls in combining signals, machine learning choices, and portfolio optimization trade-offs.
“what differentiates people is how you're putting together everything into the soup as one. That's a bunch of small decisions that are much more akin to artist-making”
Once a platform reaches critical mass, a centralized book can aggregate positions across many PMs to identify interesting signals, and at many firms 30% to 50% of equity long/short exposure sits in such centered books.
“Again, 30%, 40%, 50% of exposure in an equity long/short program in a multi-manager model can be in the centered books”
A centered book (alpha capture portfolio) uses a machine to aggregate positions across many PMs in a sector, and once a firm reaches critical mass, this cross-manager signal can be used to choose a best-picks portfolio, but simply copying what PMs do is resented because PMs are not compensated for it.
“a machine can essentially take an automated eye, look across what positions that PMs are having the trades that they're making”
The half-life of a quant strategy is inversely related to its Sharpe ratio: very high Sharpe strategies approximate pure arbitrage and get arbitraged away quickly, sometimes within a year, while trend-following strategies with around 0.8 Sharpe can persist for decades.
“the higher the Sharpe ratio, the closer it is to a pure arbitrage. And at some point, capital is going to flow in and close that arbitrage.”
The most important trait to hire for is intellectual honesty: a PM must understand whether past returns came from skill and process that will repeat, rather than a favorable market call, because the firm underwrites the go-forward process rather than the past.
“intellectual honesty is the biggest one... we're not underwriting the past, we're underwriting on a go-forward basis”
Being able to hold leverage through a storm requires having a view of the potential range of outcomes beforehand, so risk policy should be built to withstand extreme market events rather than pulling back when conditions get dicey.
“You kind of need to prepare for that storm ahead of the fact”
During the GameStop stress the right response was to check whether the firm's strategies were actually exposed to the meme factor and, if not, hold positions, because triangulated situational intelligence beats panic and rumor.
“if the answer is no, and you see that you have some strategies losing money because very clearly there's people across the street that are freaking out, then the best thing to do is to say, we're not in a position where we're impaired.”
Top PMs care deeply about whether they respect the firm and its leaders, and many do not want to be motivated by fear, so cultures built on respect and hands-on senior involvement can win talent even in a strictly performance-based environment.
“They don't want to be motivated by fear or they've already been burned out”
Hiring returns to experience follow a U-curve: very senior PMs trained before modern regulation like Reg FD in the 1980s, 1990s, or early 2000s may lack the modern tools and gray-box methods needed to succeed.
“If anything past a certain point, there's a U-curve where you have almost too experienced people”
PMs judge risk limits less by how tight they are than by whether they feel fair, and a reasonable conversation before cutting a manager in a drawdown is valued, even though the firm does not allow unlimited losses.
“what PMs want to feel is that it's just that, that they are actually fair.”
Scale must be split into strategy scale, where bigger positions hurt through market impact, nimbleness loss, and transaction costs that cannot be engineered away, and company scale, where operating infrastructure gets better and cheaper as the firm grows.
“So let's separate scale into strategy scale versus company scale.”
Above the individual manager level, the core task is a risk management exercise: balancing correlated return streams because the 'optimal' answer of equal risk per uncorrelated stream breaks down when correlations shift.
“The optimal solution to that would just be to give each one the same amount of risk. In practice, they're not uncorrelated and the correlations move around a lot”
Strategies that were supposed to be uncorrelated can suddenly become correlated, such as a biotech manager moving with a European consumer stock manager, which may reveal an unmodeled factor or flows-driven market dynamics that the baseline risk model missed.
“You can have a biotech manager, all of a sudden, become correlated to someone trading European consumer stocks. Why is that? That could be something in the markets, and it could be flows driven.”
Drawdown limits are used to automate the decision to cut a losing PM or position, because humans are psychologically biased to keep a failing idea rather than admit error, though firms still need a fair conversation for rare cases where the path matters.
“Obviously, the hardest piece in risk allocation... is when they actually call it quits because there's a human psychological bias”
A proprietary trading firm where all partners own the capital conveys intellectual honesty, because if gross return on capital is not very high, the firm is quickly dead, which pressures consistent performance.
“prop meaning is all the partners own money, conveys intellectual honesty, where if you're not making a really high gross return on capital, you're dead very quickly.”
During the GameStop episode, the firm piped Reddit and Twitter feeds into its risk system and built tools to flag high short-interest stocks as the squeeze moved from one name to the next, a whack-a-mole process.
“we need to pipe that into our system real fast and pouring Twitter's feed into our system, building tools on top of that to identify.”
Because finance is full of hype and talented people choose among many firms, a realistic and intellectually honest pitch about strengths and weaknesses, combined with real competence, attracts high-caliber PMs more effectively than a polished culture story.
“because there is so much b******* in finance, if you're really high-caliber individual and you're selecting... they want to work with the intellectually honest person.”
In the multi-manager model the firm is not guaranteed a 2-and-20 regardless of performance; instead individual PMs are paid roughly 15% to 20% of their P&L, while fixed costs for analysts, technology and central teams are borne before that, so investors effectively get about half the gross return.
“And then individual PMs, depending on their tenure and their strategy, paying between 15% to 20% of the actual P&L.”
As capital floods a supply-constrained industry, a firm's differentiator shifts from providing capital, technology or flexibility to authentically adding value through culture and respect for PMs, analogous to how venture firms had to add real value beyond money.
“Because the capital is there to go after a finite supply of people, you really need to be thinking about what is your value add.”
Running a multi-manager platform is incredibly difficult because the firm must have both excellent individual managers and a world-class operating company, and the operational complexity of the business does not scale linearly with size but exponentially.
“The complexity doesn't scale linearly, it scales exponentially.”
Above the individual manager level, risk management is a continuous human-plus-machine process: automated systems flag lane violations in real time, while risk teams continually check whether supposedly uncorrelated strategies have become correlated because of an unmodeled factor.
“It's a living, breathing exercise of okay, we have different strategies that we didn't think we're going to be correlated, all of a sudden, they're becoming correlated. Why is that?”
Firms set leverage by targeting a volatility profile rather than a return target, backing into roughly 5% to 7% annualized fund volatility to deliver about a 3 Sharpe ratio and a 15% return, because return is hard to control directly but volatility can be measured from the P&L distribution.
“It's much easier to target a volatility profile than a return profile.”
The pool of people who can succeed as PMs is finite, probably in the hundreds to low thousands, because the PM job is psychologically toxic (being wrong nearly as often as right) and not everyone with a resume can handle it, so the multi-manager space is probably too crowded.
“So there is a finite pool of talent... It's probably more hundreds and thousands at some level.”
The kindest thing someone has done is for Antonio Gracias to support Will at Valor Equity Partners when he was failing in his first two months, offering modeling training and tools while requiring him to carry his own backpack, which later gave him experiences such as the SpaceX investment that shaped his career.
“we're going to help you. We're going to give you tools to support you. ... You still got to carry your own backpack.”
A firm should only build world-class technology and accounting if it can spread the fixed cost across dozens of users, otherwise the fixed-cost investment is too high, which makes the barrier to entry the presence of all non-investment functions at scale.
“I'm only going to build world-class technology, if I can build it for dozens and dozens of people because otherwise, the fixed cost investments are going to be too high.”
What looks like an idiosyncratic return may actually be exposure to a factor that is not in the firm's factor model, so the risk team must actively adjust for this rather than assume uncorrelated returns.
“it could be that there's a factor that's not actually in your factor model.”
It is unrealistic to believe quant investors will find something no one else has found, because elite-university talent has flooded quantitative finance since about 1990 with the same technical abilities.
“I think that's totally ridiculous to think that you really are going to find something that no one else has found”
Running a proper multi-manager is primarily a giant risk management exercise combined with recruiting people, and placing great people inside a great risk-managed system is what allows the platform to use high leverage and produce an attractive return profile.
“I can't underscore that enough of running a proper multi-manager, it's risk and people.”
A 15% net return can be built from 3% gross return on gross market value, times roughly 10 turns of leverage for a 30% gross return on capital, with fixed costs and PM payouts (15-20% of P&L) consuming about half, so investors net around 15%.
“So I make 3% on GMV, we're using 10 turns of leverage, that would be a 30% gross return on the actual AUM.”
The rumor that Citadel would cut its gross exposure in half during the GameStop squeeze was implausible, because such a move would depart from stated operating principles and could itself cause enormous market impact.
“Also, the potential market impact of that would be enormous.”
During the GameStop week, a rumor that Citadel was halving its gross book was not credible, because a forced market-wide exit would contradict the firm's stated principles and would carry enormous market impact, so Walleye ignored the panic and held its positions.
“Citadel was taking down, telling, their books to cut in half. And I was like, there's no f****** way they're doing that.”
During the January 2021 GameStop squeeze, many multi-manager firms panicked over rumors that short-selling would become impossible and that Citadel was cutting its book in half, but Walleye held because it could map its exposure in real time to the new meme-stock factor.
“if the answer is no, and you see that you have some strategies losing money because very clearly there's people across the street that are freaking out, then the best thing to do is to say, we're not in a position where we're impaired.”
Technology and risk systems are essential to multi-manager operations because with five to seven turns of leverage, a firm is like a controlled nuclear reaction; without strong systems to contain it, the firm can blow up, and firms have historically done so.
“The exercise that we're running, it's like a nuclear reaction. You got to keep it controlled.”
Scale matters for attracting talent because under pass-through economics, a manager running a small book cannot offer top PMs meaningful economics, while larger book sizes and a pass-through structure (rather than a flat 2-and-20 on the whole firm) make the platform attractive.
“As you get bigger, you can offer the best people... larger book sizes, economics in our industry become very important.”
Asset management is a relative talent game rather than an absolute one, so the goal is to beat other elite firms, and intense rivalry among the largest firms like Millennium and Citadel is a major driver of excellence.
“it's a relative talent game. And there's only a small number of firms. It's extremely competitive.”
PMs resist centered-book copying because their ideas are used without compensation, and the efficient route of routing positions to the center without carry creates tension, so Walleye chose to let PMs participate in the economics.
“oftentimes, they're copied and then the PMs are not actually compensated for that. So there's this notion of why you're stealing my IP.”
Building a multi-manager firm from scratch is a bad idea, which is why growth should happen bit by bit; several groups that tried have not succeeded.
“I think it's insane to try to start one of these businesses from scratch. There's a few groups that have tried. The results of that have not been great.”
Firms should not raise as much capital as possible, because growing too fast before the platform is properly built can betray investor trust, and the pace of capital absorption is as important as the amount.
“It's inaccurate to just assume just to raise as much money as possible.”
Equity long/short PMs are given a defined universe of about 40 to 100 stocks, with guardrails on concentration and liquidity, because the edge comes from idiosyncratic like-for-like stock comparisons rather than macro or factor timing that humans cannot reliably call.
“someone is going to have their universe 50, 60, 70 stocks, some firms is as low as 40, other places it could be as high as 100.”
Walleye's shift to a multi-manager model was driven by existential survival after structural changes eroded its options market-making profits, and many firms that looked like it simply died rather than transforming.
“We didn't do this to raise capital, we didn't do this because it was fattish, we did to the f***** survive.”
Hands-on senior leaders who personally resolve PM technical and operational issues signal that PMs are valued, and this responsiveness is a meaningful recruiting advantage over larger institutions where PMs can feel like mercenaries.
“you're showing PMs really that they're important and they care. It's not just about hiring PMs, but you're really building teams of investors.”
Performance culture should be built on the principle that how you do anything is how you do everything, meaning small details and excellence in daily habits such as sweeping the shed carry over into high-performance work, and this philosophy comes from the All Blacks.
“I love the line, how you do anything is how you do everything.”
A multi-manager should play to its strengths and expand carefully, because expanding too quickly into unfamiliar strategies like fixed income macro can cause a firm to lose money in diversified ways.
“if you expand too quickly, then you just lose money in diversified ways.”
At the $100 million stage with about $30 million of fixed expenses and $20 to $40 million of variable expenses, the partners would lose money unless the firm earned at least a 50% gross return on capital every year, which enforces intellectual honesty.
“if we weren't making at least a 50% gross return on capital every single year, actually, the investors, the partners were losing money.”
In a multi-manager equity long/short program, 30% to 50% of exposure can sit in centered books, which makes sense economically but requires managing the human dynamics with PMs.
“30%, 40%, 50% of exposure in an equity long/short program in a multi-manager model can be in the centered books”
The largest multi-manager firms may be vulnerable on the individual PM experience, because they focus on what the firm can model and provide but may not address whether PMs want to be part of a community, rather than being mercenaries in remote offices.
“They don't just want to be a mercenary sitting in some random a** office in Dubai or Spain”
A traditional investment firm has three layers: picking investments (alpha signals), portfolio construction (balancing positions), and building the business (capital raising, hiring, office), and in a multi-manager firm the third layer is magnified enormously.
“You've got your alpha for your signals if you're quantiative. You've got #2 portfolio construction... And then #3 is building the business.”
The multi-manager model works because many small relative-value edges across hundreds of managers, each earning 2% to 3% on exposure, add up, but the difficulty is the execution, not the concept, which is easy to articulate.
“It's very easy to articulate why that makes sense.”
Individual relative-value strategies are collectively targeting about 2% to 3% return on gross market value, so a $10 billion balance sheet across 50 equity long/short managers would aim for a couple hundred million dollars of P&L.
“collectively the individual strategies are really looking to make 2% to 3% return on GMV.”
Trend-following strategies, which go long or short based on moving average crossovers, have existed since the 1970s with a Sharpe ratio around 0.8 for good managers, and can persist because they are not heavily arbitraged.
“Trend followers have been around since the '70s and generated decent uncorrelated returns for quite a while. ... If you're a good trend follower, it's like 0.8 Sharpe.”
Taking care of one's physical health is part of performance because the connection between mind, body, and physical readiness determines energy and the ability to perform under pressure.
“people don't stress enough the connection -- ... between your mind and body and how you're physically primed to the machine”
James J. Hill, one of the lesser-known robber barons, built a railroad network and left a train station still standing in Wayzata, Minnesota, illustrating how individual personal force changed the physical landscape of the country.
“there's still a train station there built by James J. Hill. He's one of the lesser-known robber barons”
With a target of low-to-mid double-digit annual returns, a 10% or 15% drawdown is not acceptable, so leverage must be chosen within a distribution of outcomes that keeps drawdowns tolerable.
“having a 10% drawdown, 15% drawdown, is not particularly good.”
Firms screen PMs for being high-maintenance through reputation and reference networks, because the industry is small and past behavior follows people, and the real test is working together once the initial interview 'romance' has faded.
“Interviews are easy to fake, but it's a small world where someone's been before usually follows them around.”
Will admires Ed Thorp, a pioneer of quantitative investing, as an example of holistic success across business and personal life, and he believes learning from the personality types of successful people matters more than copying any single individual.
“I'd study -- I'd say the personality type as opposed to one individual personality.”
Being based in Minnesota gives the firm a distinct cultural identity that differentiates it from New York and London-based peers, and the firm uses its Minnesota roots and prop-trading past as part of its recruiting story.
“we can tell a story of our Minnesota roots, of our prop shorting roots, of realism in all of the partners.”
A firm should not hire a high-maintenance performer even if they promise large profits, because such people always cost more than they earn in disruption, and the firm's no-high-maintenance tenet came from a founding partner.
“Well, you know what, that's never the case. So that's actually really been a core tenet of the firm.”
When a rumor conflicts with well-reasoned intuition, a manager should be disagreeable and back their own judgment, ignoring panicking peers when the rumor makes no sense.
“there's an element of just being disagreeable and backing your own intellectual intuition.”
Individual strategies at a multi-manager platform function like products in a company, so the CIO allocates capital across strategies as a business portfolio decision rather than making individual security calls.
“the individual strategies are, to use a normal company analogy. They're like individual products.”
Walleye began in 2005 as a proprietary options market maker in a Minnesota warehouse, and it survived the financial crisis and an existential period around 2011-2012 by transitioning from a single-strategy prop firm into a multi-manager platform.
“we were started in 2005 as a proprietary options market making business.”
Walleye has grown rapidly as a percentage, turning away capital, and the internal debate is about pacing growth correctly, which the speaker says is common among well-funded startups in a bubble.
“We've also turned down a lot of capital. But the conversations that we have internally are, how do you get that pace right?”
Walleye built its centered book program so PMs participate in its economics, which costs more than pure cost-efficient copying, because the firm values transparency and PM buy-in over the lowest-cost structure.
“we wanted to be transparent to the PMs and have them participate in the economics, which I think is important.”
Being given responsibility at a young age and being allowed to fail in a high-stakes environment built Will's capacity to lead, and he believes the firm's survival-era culture of learning by doing has similar value for young people.
“there's a youth element to that as well because I personally was given a lot of responsibility at a young age.”
Will identifies more as a systems builder than as an investor, because his role is designing processes and evaluating strategies as products, and he delegates individual stock and macro calls to domain experts.
“Definitely the latter, definitely the latter.”
Only four or five firms, such as Citadel, Millennium, Point72 and Balyasny, have the scale, track record, and competence to fully capture the benefits of the multi-manager model, because it requires excellent individual managers plus a world-class operating company.
“Realistically, there's only four or five that have sufficient scale, sufficient track records, competency to be able to, again, take advantage of the full benefits”
Shortly after Will joined Valor Equity Partners in Chicago in 2010, the firm led an investment in SpaceX, an experience Will says was crucial to his later career.
“About 3 months after that, they were leading an investment in this rocket company called SpaceX that I never heard of.”
A firm cannot win on culture alone, because candidates want both a good culture and genuine competency, and a story about treating people well only works if the firm is actually excellent.
“You can't just tell a great story about, we're great people. ... You need to be really f****** good.”
The robber barons, such as James J. Hill, are admirable for their personal force of will in reshaping the country, even though they pushed boundaries, and their core drive to make an impact remains applicable to modern company builders.
“the core concept of someone who decides I'm literally going to go and have an impact, still very applicable today.”
Risk sheets for long/short PMs act as guardrails that limit single-position concentration, keep PMs within their sector universe, and require awareness of liquidity so they can exit positions when needed.
“Don't be too concentrated in a single position. So if something surprising happens, you're not punching the face.”
For people working day to day in finance, purpose matters because the business takes money from rich institutions to make more money, so people must find meaning in excellence for its own sake.
“as humans, you need to find purpose in doing that.”
Walleye's sweet spot for hiring is mid-career people who have spent time at large institutions and now want a different path, often for structural or environmental reasons.
“Our sweet spot is people that are typically in their mid-career where they've spent time at large institutions.”
Walleye's firm-level leverage has stayed relatively stable at roughly 500% to 600% over the years, because the firm scales by adding capacity bit by bit while keeping volatility constant.
“For us, it's been 500% to 600% over the years, and that's reasonably stable.”
Fees per unit of exposure are analogous to a stand-alone stock picker's 2-and-20, but leverage magnifies the total fee load, which the speaker argues is justified by the risk-management benefits of combining many strategies.
“We would actually look in the fees per unit of exposure, it is analogous to your stand-alone tiger style investor that's charging 2 and 20. It's just because of the leverage that gets magnified a bit.”
The multi-manager space is probably too crowded right now because capital flows into what works, and that inflow is exhausting a finite supply of skilled PMs.
“if anything, probably the multi-manager space, in my opinion, is a bit too crowded at the moment”
Over the past few years the biggest multi-manager firms have roughly doubled, and money has flowed to institutions with a credible shot, including blank-check style platforms, making the space crowded.
“The biggest firms have effectively doubled in the past few years to just scale that boggles my mind”
Pure options market makers such as Citadel Securities and Susquehanna are the last remaining ones, and many firms that looked like Walleye died after the old magic money machine faded around 2011 and 2012.
“Citadel Securities and Susquehanna really are the only pure options market makers left.”
Brazilian jiu-jitsu style rolling teaches input-output discipline because a less talented but stubborn athlete can improve quickly with the right inputs, which parallels how firms build performance through disciplined processes.
“you can get pretty darn good on very little talent and just being incredibly pig-headed.”
Ken Griffin of Citadel is a brilliant operator who keeps pushing to his limits, and Will describes his drive as a gift that proves pushing past satisfaction is possible at the top of the industry.
“I think Ken Griffin is truly brilliant. It's like if Michael Jordan was still playing basketball.”
Some hiring traits sound cliche but matter because you feel them in person; the firm weighs intellectual honesty, process-based returns and respect for people above pure numbers.
“And some of these are going to sound cliché, but they really matter and you feel them.”
Walleye runs about 100 managers while Millennium runs roughly 300, which makes both large and a complex management exercise.
“In our case, it's about 100.”
Walleye now has about 300 people with New York as its largest presence, while still maintaining its Minnesota warehouse, and it brought the whole firm to Minnesota once a year.
“At this point, New York is our largest presence, so about 300 people now.”
Walleye's current allocation is roughly 25% to 30% volatility trading, about 40% long/short equity, about 20% quant, with the balance in capital markets and a small fixed-income macro sleeve, reflecting its origins as a volatility specialist.
“that number is still at this point 25% or so, 25% to 30% is related to volatility trading. We do a lot in long-short equity. So that would be another 40% or so.”