Scott Goodwin - Know The Names - [Invest Like the Best, EP.332]
What this covers
Patrick O'Shaughnessy talks with Scott Goodwin, co-founder of Diameter Capital Partners, a $13 billion credit firm he started in 2017 after running high yield trading at Citi and the global trading desk at Anchorage. Most of the conversation is a practitioner's account of how a credit shop works. Goodwin explains how credit analysis differs from equity work through liability-side analysis, and why he sees micro-cycles by sector rather than only the big events of 2008 and COVID. He also describes how Diameter applies Know the Names: daily name lists shared with banks, analyst hiring tests for depth, networking and speed, and no investment committee, just two complementary co-founders.
The range is wide. Goodwin traces how credit alpha has moved from document expertise to holding capacity in the financial crisis to liability structure today. He criticizes generalist distressed funds for anchoring on dollar price, citing Permian bonds sold at $70 that were covered at par. He argues that size dilutes a trading-driven strategy, and that Diameter's edge lies in selling longs before they fall.
The contested material is forecasting. He expects the biggest private credit winners, those with the most second-lien exposure, co-invest and leverage, to become the biggest losers. He calls commercial real estate a slow, hard-to-short distressed opportunity. He expects a drawn-out post-COVID cycle resembling 2002-2005, and he credits ECB bond buying with letting REITs issue at 1%. He also covers the 2007 LBO wave and the fall of Carvana.
Goodwin argues that credit investing's edge comes from knowing issuers deeply and acting within minutes at liquidity dislocations, because banks have retreated from intermediation and daily-liquidity fund structures force mispriced selling. He expects the 2020s to be a yield-driven shift from equity back to credit, with illiquidity now carrying a real cost.
- Banks no longer warehouse risk, so fast specialist capital captures alpha at inflection points
- Daily-liquidity vehicles create forced selling and intraday volatility that liability-matched investors can exploit
- Rates normalizing after the zero-rate era reprices illiquidity and returns capital to creditors
This asset isn't compiled yet
You're seeing its claims, ranked. Compile it to build the argument threads, weight them, and check each claim against your library — the full view.
Equity investors focus on the asset side of the balance sheet (how many widgets a company makes), while credit investors must also analyze the liability side: maturities, covenants, which assets can be sold or moved, and the 'unholy acts' creditors can do to or be done to by others.
“But then there's the liability side of the balance sheet, that the equity universe, frankly, misses a lot.”
Credit cycles are not just large macro events like 2002, 2007-08 and COVID; there are continuous micro-cycles in different sectors, such as the 2016 energy bust, driven by cyclical shocks or secular change like Amazon disrupting retailers.
“So for us, credit cycles aren't just '02, '07 and '08, and COVID. There are series of micro-cycles going on all the time in different sectors.”
Liability structures have led investors to believe illiquidity is better than liquidity, and asset classes that appear low-volatility through vol-washing will be exposed, with fees ultimately set by manager quality rather than product type.
“So the vol-washing Kieran talked about with you a couple of weeks ago needs to be exposed.”
Banks have stopped committing balance sheet capital to make markets, shifting from market-making to moving risk between accounts, so the speed and information advantage banks once had has disappeared, opening space for specialized liquidity providers.
“As they became less focused on risk and knowing the names... and more focused on just moving widgets around from one account to another”
Institutions avoided credit for years because the Fed stepped in on every sell-off, so there was no cost to illiquidity; now that the Fed is a headwind, illiquid assets carry a real cost, since investors cannot exit a venture or private equity fund down 20% or buy 7% IG bonds.
“There was no concept of a cost for getting illiquid. There was no stop-outs. Every time there was a sell-off, the fed would step in.”
Roughly 40% of high-yield issuance in 2007 was driven by LBOs, building a large amount of leverage quickly, so when the housing bust hit the economy, the LBO companies were not the root problem but were taken down by the macro shock.
“probably 40% of high-yield issuance was driven for LBOs in 2007. I don't think we've seen that number since then.”
Private credit returns have shown almost no volatility or dispersion, and the biggest winners were those using the most second-lien exposure, equity co-invest and leverage, which are likely to be the biggest losers over the next few years.
“you've had almost no vol in the returns, no dispersion. And the biggest winners have been the guys who had the most second lien”
When rates are zero and there is no yield, investors hunt for convexity and optionality in venture, private equity, private credit and growth stocks, inflating bubbles that the Fed inflates and then deflates.
“When there's no yield, people hunt for other ways to get convexity or optionality.”
The post-COVID credit cycle will be slow-moving like 2002-2005, built on excess in certain sectors driven by economic shifts and interest-rate changes, unlike COVID's A-to-Z move in one month.
“the post-COVID cycle that we're about to enter now is it's a slow-moving cycle, much more like the '02, '03, '04, '05”
Commercial real estate will be a large future distressed opportunity, but the shorting trade is limited because much exposure is in unshortable securities, and the cycle will be long and drawn out, so patience is warranted before buying.
“to me, as we talked about '02 '03 '04 being a longer cycle, this real estate cycle is going to be long and drawn out.”
Low rates pushed capital into tech, healthcare venture, private equity and private credit in search of convexity, and the Fed's inflation of these bubbles means the current wave is only beginning to deflate.
“But I think you go into bubbles and the Fed -- inflates and deflates them, and the one we're on the precipice of deflating right now”
Draghi's 'whatever it takes' and the ECB's corporate bond buying through the CSPP program distorted European corporate bond markets for years, letting REITs issue at 1%, and showed that intervention works in investment-grade credit, creating later distressed opportunities.
“whatever-it-takes intervention works in investment-grade and corporate bonds.”
Diameter's principle of know the names means having deep research on each credit ahead of time, because credit investors taking a total-return approach must anticipate where the ball is going and act within seconds or minutes at inflection points.
“It literally means, "Know the names." We're not kidding.”
De novo private credit opportunities offer first-lien debt at around 50 percent loan-to-value and 11 to 12 percent yields, but the industry has seen poor lending in recent years that will need to be shaken out in private credit, venture and private equity.
“You're talking about first-lien debt, 50% loan-to-value, 11%, 12%.”
Investors should evaluate GPs on whether their alpha source is evergreen or a trade, because distressed is a trade while the consistent arbitrage in credit comes from liability structure and backward-looking investors, and managers who drift out of their lane are the wrong bet.
“Stay in your lane. If you've invested in someone to do credit and they're doing Chinese equities, you've probably invested in the wrong guy.”
Credit alpha has shifted over time: early distressed alpha came from knowing the documents better than others, which is now gone; during the GFC alpha came from liability structure, meaning who could hold the trade; today liability-structure alpha persists but is more widely distributed across private credit and insurance or pension capital.
“I think that alpha in terms of just understanding the docs better than other people or having the information is gone. If you fast-forward to the GFC, I think a lot of the alpha there was liability structure. Who could hold the trade?”
Generalist distressed funds heuristically buy the lowest dollar price bonds, which causes them to overlook sector-specific fundamentals, such as Permian bonds that were covered at par even with oil at $30-40 and were being sold at $70.
“They're heuristically saying, "I have to buy the lowest dollar price. That's what I've been trained to do."”
During the GFC, successful funds were those that could hold positions through drawdowns or had liquid enough investments to change their minds, since the trade from levered loans at 40 cents to par rewarded holding capacity.
“those that could hold the trade or had liquid enough investments that they could change their mind.”
By sharing a daily list of focused names with banks, Diameter ensured that banks would call first when those names sold off, making it the counterparty sought for block liquidity.
“So they know if they get a sell-off of anything on that list, they should call me.”
Diameter's analyst hiring cases were expanded from depth-only to three tests: depth (bring your best work), networking (research an unfamiliar name using your network within a week), and speed, because credit requires both deep sector knowledge and a broad network to understand narratives.
“Went from like 1 or 2 deep cases to 3 different cases. One to test depth, one to test networking, and one to test speed.”
Diameter's main portfolio differentiator is selling longs before they decline, and traders were required to trigger a conversation about shorting whenever a loved position's thesis changes, rather than exiting only on price targets or macro shifts.
“we sell things before they go down, that were long. When we make a mistake, we get out fast.”
If trading and speed create alpha, then size becomes a detractor at some scale, and many credit funds that grew large diluted their returns, which, combined with poor 2013-2019 credit fund performance, led institutions to avoid credit managers.
“And some funds are getting too big which really dilutes the alpha. If trading and speed create alpha, then size is almost naturally, at some scale, a detractor.”
Diameter's hedge fund and drawdown fund have no investment committee; the two co-founders make decisions together, and their complementary backgrounds in research, restructuring and law versus trading and risk allow fast decisions once both agree.
“And our process for our hedge fund and our drawdown fund doesn't have an investment committee. Jon and I make all the decisions.”
Diameter's private credit expansion is designed not to cannibalize existing strategies, is synergistic by deepening sponsor relationships and names, and is defensive because banks are losing share to private lenders and sponsors now demand private solutions alongside public ones.
“Is it an offensive or defensive move? I think in the case of private credit, it's both for us.”
Banks no longer provide liquidity to the market and instead intermediate it, so funds that stay in the market daily, through new issue, shorting and CLO businesses, get called first by banks when large sales or inflection events occur.
“Because the banks aren't sitting there providing -- liquidity anymore. They're intermediating in the middle.”
For hedge funds and dislocation funds, the right measure is the liquidity-adjusted return, not just risk-adjusted return, because investors are rarely paid enough to hold illiquid assets with capital that must remain liquid.
“we're not just focused on what is the best risk-adjusted return, we're also... thinking about what's the best liquidity-adjusted return”
Credit is a carry-based asset class, but Diameter approaches it with a total-return mentality, which requires seeing where the ball is going rather than just collecting coupons.
“We're approaching credit not from a "get my coupon" mentality. We're approaching it from a total return mentality.”
Most credit investors are rules-based, with daily liabilities and duration or rating mandates, and because a large share of credit money sits in daily-redeemable mutual funds, ETFs and CLOs, they are forced to sell into dislocations.
“Most credit investors are rules-based. They have to buy this duration of bond or this rating of bond or this sector of bond. Most have daily liabilities.”
The first wave of a credit sell-off features zero dispersion and high correlation because holders sell whatever they can, which creates opportunities to buy fundamentally sound names that get dragged down and short the weak ones.
“the beginning sell-off in credit is 0 dispersion, high correlation. People are selling what they can sell.”
Deeply distressed bonds trading at 5-15 cents can be strong buys when issuers have enough cash runway to cover interest, because commodity volatility means prices can recover to par, as happened in energy in 2016 and COVID and copper names.
“If they have enough runway that they can last 12 to 24 months, you're supposed to take a shot on that debt.”
Liability-structure alpha still exists, but is now distributed to private credit funds with matched leverage and duration, and to insurance and pension capital holding CLO equity, while daily-liquidity ETFs and mutual funds create intraday and intra-month volatility because their assets do not match their liabilities.
“There's still a lot of money in daily-liquidity ETF, mutual fund. That creates a lot of the intraday and intra-month volatility in credit”
At Anchorage, the short book grew so large that it became a private-equity-style index proxy with sector overlays; a $300 million position that was liquid in 2012 should be only $50-60 million now, showing that size destroys the ability to change one's mind.
“Our short book is private equity-style. It's becoming an index proxy with sector overlays, because we're too big to change our mind if we're wrong.”
Diameter's analysts keep sector research live every day, including watching adjacent names such as AT&T and Verizon for telecom distressed credits, so the firm does not start research only after an event and can respond within minutes.
“we don't want to be just starting our research then.”
Regulation and yield-curve pressure are pushing banks to offload credit risk through credit risk transfer trades, letting Diameter take junior slices alongside banks for returns in the teens to 20%, and this regulatory-driven opportunity will grow as Basel III or IV tighten.
“We're taking a junior slice alongside them, and we're getting paid teens to 20% returns”
In March 2020, after a call from BofA's head of loan trading about a $1 billion mutual fund outflow, Diameter bid $500 million of loans at around 80, roughly 10% below the prior day's high-80s price, of which $350 million was software loans, responding within about five minutes.
“So we bid that firm for $500 million of loans, of which $350 million was software loans.”
The de novo private credit opportunity is attractive: first-lien senior secured loans at roughly 50% loan-to-value yielding 11-12%, with a middle-market focus because larger private credit funds have moved upmarket.
“You're talking about first-lien debt, 50% loan-to-value, 11%, 12%.”
AI could disrupt low-margin, paper-pushing software and business services over five years, so credits in clearly disrupted industries trading at 50-100 spread over par may be obvious shorts, and AI could bring credit puts as close to the money as equity puts if the business is terminal.
“AI has the potential for some of these shorts to put the credit put as close to money as the equity put if it's terminal for the business.”
During Hertz's 2020 distress, Diameter bought first-lien debt around 75-80 cents and then junior debt near 15 cents, betting that the used-car price spike from reopening China would make the junior claim the fulcrum, a convex option on used-car prices.
“So we bought the junior debt on that option. You have this convex option that used car prices are going to skyrocket.”
Some credit managers chose management fees and AUM growth over returns, which caused LPs to push back on credit hedge fund performance, and Diameter returned capital at end-2021 and may do so again to size for return.
“they chose management fees and growth of AUM over returns”
Speed of decision-making is a source of alpha in credit because banks no longer provide liquidity at inflection points, so specialists who know the names well can act within minutes and be paid for warehousing risk others must offload.
“having a process that allows for speed of decision-making is alpha. There's no doubt about it.”
In 2007, a levered counterparty, Selwood, reportedly running about 90-to-1 leverage on levered loans, was wiped out in about three days when the market fell for a few days, a lesson in how quickly gross leverage unwinds.
“they were gone in 3 days, basically.”
A co-portfolio-manager structure works when one partner is research-and-legal focused and the other trading, risk and portfolio-management focused, because combining research and trading enables fast decisions, even though LPs dislike co-PMs.
“So melding that together, that research and trading, for us really worked.”
Scott and Jon meet every Sunday from 7 to 9 a.m. to review the hedge fund and drawdown fund books together, a ritual that keeps them aligned on risk and lets the team see and challenge the week's focus, with research teams submitting weekly priorities Sunday at 4:30.
“So from 7 to 9 a.m. every Sunday, we're sitting there, going through the book”
Calling balls and strikes, a practice of transparent, direct feedback on every position, makes the team intellectually honest, though it is not suitable for every person or platform and is calibrated to individuals.
“But one thing it does do is it makes you be intellectually honest.”
Taking seed capital from an investor creates golden handcuffs that tie the manager to that partner and alter economics, and as asset management margins fall, seed economics take a larger share, making it harder to compete at certain scales.
“If you take it, they're like golden handcuffs, right? You're married to that person forever”
Indiscriminate liquidity provision, such as mean-reversion buying of anything that falls, will eventually blow up; liquidity provision done with real knowledge of underlying credits gives a better margin of safety and a decision in 10-15 minutes.
“Private liquidity as a mean reversion strategy, which some people have employed, eventually you're going to blow up”
Giving every team member senior-level points creates a culture where people root for their neighbors to succeed rather than treating compensation as zero-sum, which Diameter considers its top alignment principle.
“Everyone on the team have points that's at a senior level”
A new credit fund must raise enough capital at launch, around $1 billion for Diameter, so it does not spend early years fundraising and can be relevant to banks in block trades of $25-50 million, since small funds are not useful counterparties.
“So we had to raise $1 billion.”
Diameter's transparent 'calling balls and strikes' culture, where analysts and PMs openly challenge each other's positions, is not for every firm but makes the team intellectually honest, which is essential because the firm's anxiety about missing big shorts and longs drives it to correct mistakes quickly.
“But one thing it does do is it makes you be intellectually honest.”
In credit, imagination means reconstructing how a distressed company's capital structure and macro inputs interact through bankruptcy, and choosing which layer to own, rather than sizing a huge TAM as in equities.
“It's less about, "There's this huge TAM and delivery. How can I address it?"”
The most common cause of failure for new investment businesses is not raising enough capital to prosecute the strategy, so managers spend the first few years fundraising rather than investing.
“The thing I see cause the failure the most early on is you don't raise enough capital to prosecute your strategy and you spend more time fundraising than focusing on investing in the first few years.”
Pensions with a 7-8% return target that are fully funded after equity gains will rotate into long-dated investment-grade corporate bonds yielding 5.5-7%, defeasing liabilities and reducing their need for equity convexity, though such decisions take time.
“You can buy 30-year investment-grade corporate debt now yielding 5.5% to 7% depending on the credit quality.”
When allocating to GPs, non-negotiables include raising enough capital to run the strategy rather than fundraising constantly, staying in one's lane since a credit manager doing Chinese equities is the wrong bet, and having an evergreen, adaptable source of alpha.
“Stay in your lane. If you've invested in someone to do credit and they're doing Chinese equities, you've probably invested in the wrong guy.”
Levered loans are opaque, with about 70% from private issuers, and they settle in a week to months rather than the days of stocks or bonds, which makes the market slow to adjust and reinforces the need for prior work.
“levered loan settlement process could take anywhere from a week to months.”
Companies that took on too much debt during COVID-era low rates, with low coupons and maturities in 2027-2029 and bonds trading at 60-70 cents, are not defaulting imminently but their creditors are effectively the equity, and value will eventually transfer to creditors.
“but the creditors are essentially the equity. And eventually, there's going to be that transfer of value back to the creditors.”
The 2010s were defined by private equity, shareholder returns, dividends and zero rates, which robbed lenders, pensioners and savers; the 2020s will be a transition back toward inflation, higher rates and return of capital to creditors, which makes credit investing attractive after a long gap since 2008.
“If I look at the 2010s, it's all about private equity, shareholders, return of capital, dividends, 0 rates.”
Short ideas have less competition than long ideas in credit, so catching a big short is easier if one gets it right, which is why misses on shorts matter more to Diameter.
“there's less people competing for that alpha, so it's easier to get if you can get it right.”
Large peer firms miss time-sensitive opportunities because a request passes from junior trader to senior trader to junior analyst to senior analyst to PM and then investment committee, taking up to four days, while Diameter decides in 10-15 minutes because it has done the work in advance.
“they get the junior trader, who might talk to the senior trader... when the PM's back on Thursday for investment committee, 4 days later”
From roughly 2013 to 2019, credit fund returns were poor because distressed funds bought coal, newspapers, shipping and energy bonds, and because the Fed backstopped every sell-off, so investors had no cost for illiquidity.
“The distressed funds are doing coal and newspapers and shipping and bad energy bonds. The returns are terrible.”
Early in his career, distressed alpha came from understanding legal documents and liability-side structures better than others, but that informational edge has largely been competed away by research and dedicated analysts.
“that alpha in terms of just understanding the docs better than other people or having the information is gone.”
In credit, where restructuring advisors and capital markets bankers surround every situation, a strong network is critical for understanding the narrative of a distressed company.
“having a strong network is critical. It's critical to understanding the narrative of a situation.”
Goodwin's view is that there are no bad bonds, only bad prices, though he concedes there might be bad bonds in office real estate because long-term occupancy is unknowable.
“I'd like to say there's no bad bonds, just bad prices.”
In the 2014 energy sell-off, Anchorage bought Permian credits at about $70 that were covered even at $30-40 oil and shorted Mississippi Lime and SandRidge credits near $50, a pair trade that made roughly 30 points on the long and 50 on the short.
“"Let's buy the Permian stuff at $70 and short this at $50." And that trade ended up making maybe 30 points on the long and 50 on the short.”
Credit investors think first about how much they can lose and whether principal and interest will be repaid, while equity investors think about how earnings or revenue could double or quadruple; this asymmetry in thinking is fundamental to the two disciplines.
“that difference of thinking about downside versus thinking about upside is very fundamental.”
Goodwin says that watching others make mistakes at Citi and in leverage episodes gave him lessons without his having to make them himself.
“watching other people make mistakes and learning from them versus having to make them myself.”
Scott's father rode the train daily with finance professionals including Tony James, John Macfarlane, Richard Shelton and Mike Clarke, and those four combined to teach a teenager how to think about investing, showing that early mentorship is critical in the business.
“So the four of them really combined to help me think through, as a young teenager, how I would get interested in that business.”
Working weekly with an outside coach from the start, who later joined as chief people officer, helped Diameter's co-founders manage their relationship and team, and was credited with preventing mistakes seen at prior firms.
“we've met with her every week since we started”
Diameter works only with both founders because the partnership is symbiotic: Goodwin's trading and risk skills complement Jonathan's research, restructuring and legal background, and they first considered a fund together in 2012 before Jonathan went to Centerbridge to learn the liability side.
“So I don't think Diameter works without both of us. And I don't think I'm successful without Jon, probably the other way around to the degree we are in terms of investing. It's a very symbiotic relationship.”
Scott is more motivated by failure than success, driven by an anxiety about missing big trades, which he traces to disappointments such as failing in baseball, being dumped and being passed over for promotion at Citi.
“I've always been much more motivated by failure than motivated by success”
Venture capital was a good trade that many investors now hold overweight after it stopped working, illustrating that trade-like strategies must be sized and exited rather than held as evergreen allocations.
“maybe venture was a really good trade and now people are stuck overweight it.”
Goodwin tries to pay forward the selfless support he received when he started Diameter by helping others build businesses.
“I try to do the same when people want to build businesses, and we've tried to help them.”
The greatest joy in investing for Scott comes when the trading, risk and research sides of the firm converge and the firm is ready for an event that then occurs.
“when the technical and the trading element, the risk element comes together with the research, and we feel like we're ready for an event, and then the event happens, it's amazing.”
Diameter tries to be as transparent externally with LPs as internally, and investors from day one can confirm the firm did what it said it would do: capital markets, long-short, distressed when interesting but not evergreen, hedge fund, drawdown fund and CLOs/CDOs, with private credit as the only new addition.
“if you ask the people who invested in us Day 1, if we followed what we said we were going to do, I think they would tell you it's pretty much what we said we were going to do.”
Early in his career Goodwin alienated people by being overly aggressive, and his EQ had to catch up with his trading ability, which he now manages by calibrating interactions based on coaching input.
“My EQ had to catch up with my trading ability.”
Diameter maintains a rolling three-to-five-year plan and must act as a chameleon, continually hiring strong people to prosecute complementary strategies, because if the firm waits, competitors will beat it to the next trade.
“We try to always have a 3- to 5-year plan.”
Scott's early interest in markets began with Bill James fantasy baseball at age 8 to 10, where he beat investors from Boston, and this led to mentorship from dads' train-riding finance professionals and a path to Duke and trading.
“So I sign up for Bill James fantasy baseball.”
Diameter's analysts studied software loans in 2019 on the thesis that in a recession the whole loan market would fall but software, being sticky, would be the most defensive sector, which informed the COVID purchase.
“software will be the most defensive place. It's stickier.”
Diameter's capacity is constrained by how much it can trade in capital markets and how much it can short, and opening a London office in 2022 expanded capacity that would otherwise have forced a shrink.
“the scalability issues are around capital markets and shorting.”
At Anchorage, Goodwin's team held many of the same shorts as the Anchorage investors in 2008 and then turned them into longs in 2009, illustrating his career pattern of finding shorts and then getting long the other side while following credits through the cycle.
“I had a lot of the same shorts as the Anchorage guys in '08, and we worked to turn them into longs in '09.”
Dan Allen and Tony Davis supported Diameter from day one even though it was not in their economic interest, and Scott's wife Kimberly gave up a career in publishing to build the business and family, and he says these selfless acts shape his own pay-it-forward approach.
“it wasn't necessarily in their best economic interest at the time”
Goodwin says he is motivated more by failure than success, driven by anxiety about missing big shorts and longs, which he links to career disappointments and to his mother's anxiety about missing social events.
“I've always been much more motivated by failure than motivated by success”
Goodwin's approach is to see cycles as long processes where patience is rewarded, and to avoid piling into an asset class until its distress is clearly visible.
“you can be patient”
Goodwin's early mentors from his father's train commute taught him different lessons: some emphasized learning from mistakes and integrity, others trading and pain trades, and their repeated exposure over time shaped his interest in markets.
“from certain people, it was about learning from your mistakes and integrity. From others, it was about trading and pain trades.”
John Macfarlane, who helped save Salomon with Warren Buffett and later ran Tudor, has been a leading mentor for Diameter on culture, compensation structure and alignment, and now sits on the firm's board.
“John Macfarlane, who probably I kept in touch with the best of that group is on our Board now, has really been a leading mentor for us in Diameter in terms of building the culture, the compensation structure, the alignment structure of the place.”
Seeder Dan Stern advised Diameter not to take a seed and to build the right liability structure for a distressed-heavy strategy, reasoning that the firm did not need it, and his advice came from someone who had finished seeding and could be candid.
“I credit Dan Stern for not taking the seed. He told us not to do it.”
Carvana's stock fell because its subprime finance business, which thrived when rates were zero and the total addressable market looked huge, was no longer earning as much as rates normalized, and the company was not strong at selling used cars.
“that's a finance company that was doing really well when rates were 0 and people believed in a huge TAM.”
Apollo bought a stake in Diameter in the prior year to help expand into Europe, and the European build-out has gone well but still needs more hiring to be fully built out.
“Apollo bought a stake in the business last year to help us expand into Europe.”