Ramtin Naimi - Building Abstract - [Invest Like the Best, EP.435]
What this covers
Ramtin Naimi, founder of Abstract Ventures, tells his own story for the first time here, a path that includes a hedge fund started out of high school and a bankruptcy at 24. The conversation opens in the art world, where he learned from mentors such as Michael Ovitz. He explains how collections get ranked by how they were acquired (a postman and librarian tops the list), how small galleries discover artists before mega galleries roughly quadruple prices, and why galleries reward collectors who refuse consolation prizes. Much of the access runs through relationships: a painting offered privately to two or three collectors between shows, and favor toward collectors on museum boards.
The venture half turns those lessons into practice. Naimi describes tracking 6,000 to 7,000 people whose profiles matched founders backed by tier-1 firms, building a frame of reference through some 30 pitch meetings a week, and judging founders by depth of understanding more than by idea. He argues that strong seed founders need commercial skill in fundraising, hiring, and selling unfinished products, and that companies die from local pivots while non-local ones can survive. He also lays out how Abstract runs a founder's raise as the single node, over a three-day window.
The most contested material concerns market structure. He says multi-stage firms, not dedicated funds, lead many breakout seed rounds, and that claims of proprietary deal flow are mostly self-deception. He sees timelines compressing as in 2021, with seven of his companies raising Series A rounds at 4 to 5 times his markup, and says AI valuations can't be judged for three or four years. He also covers LP selection, tender offers, and Jerry Yang's view of losing one's own money.
Naimi argues that venture and the art market are both power-law markets where early talent-spotting, relationship access, and a deep frame of reference drive returns, and that a seed fund can capture concentrated exposure to outliers by taking large relative ownership alongside multi-stage firms.
- Blue-chip galleries and top multi-stage VCs capture value by controlling access to the best talent, and smaller early-spotting firms feed them
- Seed funds that claim proprietary deal flow are mostly deluded, while multi-stage firms have better coverage and pricing power at seed
- Relative ownership beats absolute ownership: 5% of a small fund can equal far more look-through exposure than 15% of a large fund
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A ranking of art collections scores them by how they were obtained, and the highest-scoring collection belonged to a postman and librarian who bought Pollocks and Rothkos on modest salaries before their value was known, while billionaire collections score lower because money alone can buy iconic works.
“the collection that scored the highest was a wife and husband who were both government employees”
Rather than targeting an absolute ownership percentage, Naimi focuses on relative ownership: taking 5 percent of companies while a 1.5 billion dollar multi-stage fund takes 15 percent gives his 100 million fund about 5 times the look-through exposure despite one third of the ownership.
“What I focused on was ownership as a relative metric as opposed to an absolute metric.”
Multi-stage tier-1 venture firms are better positioned at seed than dedicated seed funds because they have more people and coverage, brand weight, and willingness to pay valuations seed funds cannot match, so future power-law companies are more likely to be seed-led by multi-stage firms.
“And that multi-stage tier-1 VC firms are better at seed investing than seed funds are.”
Seed-to-A, A-to-B, and B-to-C timelines are compressing again as in 2021, with seven of Naimi's companies raising Series A rounds within weeks at 4 to 5 times his seed markup, despite little fundamental progress, suggesting the industry is getting drunk on IRR.
“In the last six months, I think I've funded seven companies that have already raised Series A rounds within weeks of me leading their seed financings and at a 4-5x multiple”
Multi-stage firms led the seed rounds of many breakout companies, including Sequoia for Stripe, Airbnb, Dropbox and Nubank, Coatue for Instacart and DoorDash, Index for Robinhood and Figma, and Lightspeed for Snap, which shows that multi-stage firms do substantial seed investing.
“if you look at Sequoia, they led the seed round for Stripe, Airbnb, Dropbox and Nubank”
Seed funds claiming proprietary deal flow are mostly kidding themselves, because a two or three person firm cannot match the early-stage coverage of a multi-stage fund with 30 to 40 people.
“What became obvious to me was that seed funds that claimed they had proprietary deal flow were mostly kidding themselves.”
Whether high AI company valuations are justified cannot be known for three or four years, because growth rates like 20x year-over-year are unprecedented, though application-layer companies risk becoming obsolete when foundation models absorb their features.
“I don't think anybody will know if it's true for another three or four years.”
Large private companies can stay in startup mode because liquidity arrives only through 1 to 5 percent tender offers, which is enough for a house down payment but not generational wealth, and early liquidity can kill productivity, as crypto showed.
“You can make an argument that excess liquidity early is a killer of productivity.”
In 2016 Naimi tracked about 6,000 to 7,000 people who matched the schools, degrees, employers, and roles of founders that tier-1 firms backed, and reached out whenever one changed their title to founder, because unfunded seed founders were easy to meet.
“So I started just tracking individuals that fit the bill on LinkedIn. It's probably, I don't know, six or seven thousand people that qualified.”
Strong seed founders need commercial ability across three verticals: fundraising ability, hiring (since hiring at seed is a sales task of persuading engineers earning around 400,000 dollars at Meta or Google to take a 150,000 dollar seed salary plus equity), and selling a product to design partners before it works well.
“Hiring in early stage startup companies is sales. 85% of the companies we finance are based in the Bay Area.”
Founders who treat every percent of equity as permanent, and who raise only what they need while selling as little as possible, tend to hire more selectively, fire faster before cliffs, and avoid bloated option pool refreshes, which improves outcomes for investors.
“they tend to maintain the highest bar of talent that they hire because they think about equity the same way”
Very few venture firms have more than one, two, or at most three individuals who can independently source and close hyper-competitive financings, which makes venture hard to scale as an asset class and makes LPs prefer exposure to a few elite GPs.
“very few venture capital firms have more than one, two and at the most three individuals that can independently go out and source and compete in close financings in the most competitive deals.”
Jerry Yang told Ramtin that losing his own money on a failed company is a badge of honor because it reflects true entrepreneurship, in contrast to venture investing where one risks other people's capital.
“you should wear that as an entrepreneurial badge of honor.”
Ramtin cares less about the specific idea than the founder's depth of understanding, and he tests this with questions, favoring founders who can give long, thoughtful answers, and he avoids saturated categories where three tier-1 firms have just funded a sector.
“Specific idea is less important to me. It's more about the founder's understanding of the idea.”
Galleries favor collectors who sit on major museum boards because they expect those collections to eventually flow into museums, so museum affiliation is a key status lever for accessing the best art.
“galleries are more inclined to give great paintings to people who are on the boards of the MoMA and the Met and the Whitney and the Guggenheim”
Companies die when founders make local pivots that keep the same core mental model and category, while founders who make non-local pivots into entirely different ideas can survive and ultimately succeed.
“I think the local pivot is what kills companies.”
Smaller galleries are usually the first to discover emerging artists, and the same ones repeatedly share artists with larger galleries; once an artist is picked up by a blue-chip mega gallery, prices can roughly quadruple, so buying early from discovery galleries is far cheaper.
“And then as soon as that happened, their prices basically quadruple.”
Founders should not share their fundraising target list with all existing investors because too many people with misaligned incentives leak information; instead, a single trusted node can run the process, keeping information tight and forcing VCs to build their own conviction faster.
“I will be the sole node.”
The LPs who did best back top managers at fund one, before they had a conventional track record, while less imaginative LPs prefer managers spun out of platform funds, whose past returns may not repeat because the access that generated them is not portable.
“And I think by and large those people have done dramatically better than the LPs who may be less imaginative and tend to only back managers who've spun out from other platforms.”
Galleries learn which collectors will settle for second-tier work, and a collector who accepts consolation prizes will keep receiving them, whereas one who only buys what they want is eventually offered the top works.
“if you're the guy they can give second-tier and third-tier work to, you will always be the guy they give second and third-tier work to.”
Abstract wins competitive seed deals by acting as the sole node for founders' fundraising, making introductions to top partners across tier-1 firms in a three-day window and collecting feedback daily, which limits information leakage and forces firms to build conviction independently.
“I will be the sole node.”
The most competitive time to buy is a primary show or fair like Basel, where a painting is shown to the whole collector base, so the best access comes from the single painting an artist offers privately to two or three trusted collectors between exhibitions, which requires consistent relationship maintenance with dealers.
“your odds are much higher when it's just shared with you and two or three other people”
Venture is the only asset class where a manager's historical results are somewhat indicative of future performance, so a firm with consistent results can forecast a long trajectory if it maintains its reputation.
“Venture is the only asset class where historical results is somewhat indicative of future performance.”
Of roughly 1,000 seed deals in 2008 to 2011, a blanket equal-check portfolio including Uber would have returned about 3x, which implies seed deals were too cheap then and should have been roughly 3 to 5 times more expensive as a floor.
“So let's assume there were a thousand companies and Uber was in that bucket. And if you wrote an equal-sized check into every single one of those 1,000 companies, you would have gotten a 3,000x just on Uber.”
Venture fund IRR should be back-weighted and negative during the deployment period, so reported early IRRs of 30 to 40 percent within months of deployment indicate the J-curve is being skipped and signal over-optimism.
“Our funds are getting to 30 to 40% IRR within the first few months of initial deployment, which shouldn't be the case. It should be negative IRR at least during the deployment period.”
Once Abstract decides to invest, price rarely stops the deal until it becomes so egregious it is no longer a seed deal, because in an outlier business the passed-up deal may be the outlier, so the firm sometimes swallows a higher price to keep a company in the fund.
“venture is an outlier's business and you have no idea if the deal that you passed on due to price will be the outlier”
Institutions required venture firms to own about 15 percent of a company for the math to work, a framework unchanged for 25 years even as fund sizes grew 10 to 30 times, which made it hard for a small manager to raise institutional capital.
“institutions had this framework that venture capital firms needed to own 15% of a company in order for the math of a deal to work out”
In a new artist's exhibition of roughly 12 paintings, typically one is exceptional that everyone fights over, about two are strong, and the rest are filler produced to fill the show, so the highest quality works within an artist's body of work drive most of the appreciation.
“there's probably one that's incredible that everyone's going to be fighting over and two that are really good that most people will be happy with.”
Art that was iconic 20 years ago tends to become undervalued about 20 years later and then highly valued 30 to 40 years later, so out-of-favor work from 1990s and 2000s iconic bodies is a buying opportunity.
“Where things that were iconic 20 years ago tend to be undervalued 20 years later, then get very highly valued 30 to 40 years later.”
Partners with personal brands can win competitive deals even at lower-profile firms, and building a personal brand is complementary to good venture work; Naimi notes he hears his name several times a week but hears Abstract about once a month.
“Well, I hear the name Ramtin multiple times a week. I hear the name Abstract once a month.”
A founder with no money can bootstrap a venture firm if they demonstrate deal-finding skill, because platforms like AngelList supply dedicated capital to deals a credible investor brings, as Naimi's first deal raised 470,000 dollars within four hours.
“I refreshed it four hours later and there was $470,000 subscribed to the deal.”
Naimi sold about 20 percent of his management company to a consortium of founders of major platform funds with a sunset of about six or seven years, after which they lose economics on future fund carry, so he would not be owned in perpetuity.
“That deal had a timer on it because I didn't want to be owned by anybody in perpetuity. And that lapsed a couple years ago.”
A new investor with no capital could raise small SPV allocations of $25,000 to $500,000 on AngelList, earning 0 and 15 economics (AngelList getting 5% when it sourced the capital), and this allowed him to bootstrap a seed franchise without personal wealth.
“I'd use AngelList for that.”
The big four blue-chip galleries (Hauser & Wirth, Gagosian, David Zwirner, Pace) represent the most important living artists and estates, and because they control large institutional and private client bases, they can sustain or appreciate prices and manage both primary and secondary sales for those artists.
“they tend to be represented by the big four galleries: Hauser & Wirth, Gagosian, David Zwirner, Pace.”
Four to six top venture firms have exposure to nearly every power-law company and any generational company in a given vintage, and they tend to finance those companies earlier and earlier, mirroring how big galleries maintain relationships with early talent-spotting galleries.
“you have the 4, 5, 6 top venture capital firms in the world that tend to have exposure to every power law company, any generational company, any given vintage.”
At seed, coverage is critical because there is no market map and many companies lack websites, so there is little to screen in advance and investors must meet companies directly to surface them.
“I think at seed stage, coverage is absolutely key because there is no market map of everything that exists. Most of these companies don't even have websites yet.”
Founders with multiple term sheets have negotiating leverage that can reduce Series A dilution substantially, whereas without leverage they sell roughly 25 percent of their company to whoever offers terms; Abstract claims its companies have the lowest average Series A dilution and highest average Series A valuations.
“When you don't have leverage, you will sell 25% of your company at Series A to whoever gives you the terms that you want to work with.”
Early Abstract co-invested by introducing strong seed companies to multi-stage partners, which went 20 for 20 with a 15 percent to 5 percent split, but Ramtin then began leading rounds with multi-stage firms as co-leads to capture more ownership.
“I did that about 20 times perfectly. And what I mean by perfectly is 20 for 20. They got their 15, I got my five”
Ramtin looks for founders with strong commercial ability, including fundraising, hiring and selling a product to early design partners, and with strong technical shipping velocity, and he relies on technical co-founders and team members to vet engineering capability.
“I'm looking for a combination of very strong commercial ability and very strong technical ability.”
Auction houses charge 15 to 26 percent commissions but compete for estate collections by guaranteeing high sale prices and cutting commissions to about 13 percent, which has led some to net margins of only 2 or 3 percent or losses.
“And there's no shortage of stories where they guaranteed too high to compete with the other auction house and they ended up losing money or their net margin on it ended up being 2 or 3%.”
As venture markets become more efficient, seed prices have risen, so blanketing the market with seed deals at current prices would roughly break even, meaning investors must be better pickers than in earlier years.
“So now we're in a market where you actually need to be better at picking than you were historically.”
An artist's market can only absorb a certain volume of transactions depending on the breadth of their collector base; broadly appealing artists can clear 50 paintings per year at auction, while niche artists can sustain only 8 to 12 high-value transactions per year.
“Their markets can sustain 8 to 12 very high-value paintings transacting every year.”
Blue-chip galleries have near-zero cost of goods, earn a 50 percent primary commission, and then take 15 to 25 percent on secondary resales they steer back to themselves, so over multiple round trips they can earn more than the painting's original cost.
“Again, on multiple round trips of a painting, they probably made more money on the painting than initial cost of the painting.”
Discerning truly great work, whether an artist's masterpiece or a great company, is only possible after seeing many examples, because the reference set makes subtle differences in quality visible.
“You don't actually appreciate what is a great example until you've seen tons of examples.”
When multi-stage funds are present at a seed round, the price settles no lower than about 25 million dollars post-money and rarely higher than 50 million; above 50 million the deal usually becomes a Series A and no longer fits a seed fund.
“If there's multi-stage funds around the table, the deal will get done no lower than 25 and it'll probably get done no higher than 50.”
Abstract stress-tested how far to push multi-stage firms down on ownership in co-led seed rounds, finding roughly 10 percent is the floor they will accept, and that at 6 or 7 percent they walk away and wait for the Series A.
“And the number I settled on was about 10%. Pretty much every multi stage tier 1 VC firm will do a seed deal at 10% if they have to. If you push them down to six or seven, it's just not worth it.”
On AngelList, a first deal Ramtin posted for Rippling reached about 470,000 dollars in subscriptions within four hours with no capital sourced by him, and under the platform economics he kept 15 percent carry while AngelList took 5 percent on deals it sourced capital for.
“there was $470,000 subscribed to the deal”
Giving the top 100 private performers instant liquidity would likely leave about 92 of them not among top performers tomorrow, similar to Google's early employees where over 100 made more than 100 million dollars but most were never heard of again.
“If you give them all instant liquidity on their position tomorrow, 92 of them probably might not be your top performers tomorrow.”
Naimi asks whether, if a company succeeds, tier-one investors he knows would lead its follow-on round, because a saturated category with several tier-one A or B leads will attract follow-ons to competitors instead of new entrants.
“I do try to look 18 months in the future if this company does well, how many investors do I personally know they'll be interested in leading a follow-on round of financing for this company?”
The strongest founders have typically done impressive, special things before starting their company, so if a founder cannot show prior exceptional achievement or resilience, it is unlikely their first impressive act will be the current startup.
“The number one thing that I look to from founders is prove to me that you're exceptional.”
Paying above the target entry valuation means spending a portfolio slot on a single company, so Naimi must believe a company is roughly twice as attractive as another fund holding to justify using two bullets on one deal.
“You kind of need to convince yourself that you like it twice as much as another company in your fund because you're shooting two bullets on one deal.”
Abstract's founding thesis was to identify the companies most likely to become power law companies, defined as companies with a private market cap or exit above 5 billion dollars, and to back them at seed.
“the thesis in which I started Abstract was trying to identify which companies have the highest likelihood of becoming power law companies”
After a failed startup and losses on a marketplace-lending exchange wiped out his net worth, Naimi filed Chapter 13 at 24, and he concluded that founders should raise other people's money rather than their own, since losing one's own capital is the harder lesson.
“the learning there is, if you're going to start a startup company, raise other people's money and do it instead of your own money.”
Naimi says that in 2016 he felt the need to be flexible on check size and likable to founders, because hard allocation constraints make it easy for founders to say no, while flexibility makes it hard to refuse.
“If you give founders hard constraints on an allocation you need or ownership target, you make it very easy for them to say no to you”
In hyper-competitive Series A bake-offs, Sequoia, Benchmark, and Andreessen Horowitz win most often, and when one of them makes an offer it usually wins unless it faces one of the other two, because their brand and board-director reputations outweigh the terms other firms offer.
“The firms who I think truly excel in winning hyper-competitive Series A rounds that I've seen from my experience over and over again tend to be Sequoia, Benchmark and Andreessen, even to this day.”
Twenty to twenty-five years ago entry-level art cost about 10,000 dollars and blue-chip contemporary work was in the low hundreds of thousands, galleries allowed holds and offers 20 to 25 percent below ask, but growing collector numbers and competition now make access to primary works far harder and more expensive.
“20 to 25 years ago, entry-level art was $10,000.”
Abstract's biggest missing piece is brand, because founders who come by referral do the work for the firm, while cold outreach requires far more manual favors; Naimi wants the firm name, not his own, to carry weight so the whole team can win deals.
“It would be brand. I think brand would trump anything else that the machine doesn't have today.”
In 94 percent of companies where Abstract overlaps with another fund in an LP's portfolio, the LP gets orders of magnitude more look-through ownership through Abstract than through the other fund, according to Ramtin.
“94% of the time, they have orders of magnitude more look through ownership to that company through our fund”
Paparazzi, a consumer social app that debuted at number one on the App Store and signed a term sheet with Benchmark, lost retention within six weeks, and its founder returned the cash because he believed any next pivot would still be consumer social.
“Within six weeks it became very obvious that there was no retention.”
Excluding Uber and Roblox, whose seed rounds were led by First Round Capital, it has been close to impossible to find power law companies whose seed round was led by a seed-stage firm, which is the basis for Abstract's original thesis.
“if you eliminate Uber and Roblox from the equation—whose seed rounds were led by First Round Capital—it's close to impossible to identify power law companies in which the seed round was led by a seed-stage venture capital firm.”
Naimi has learned he is better at identifying good founders than good markets, and so his seed investing emphasizes founder selection over sector theses.
“I've learned over time that investing in founders for me works a lot better than investing in markets. I'm better at identifying what a good founder is than what a good market is.”
At seed, the specific idea matters less than whether the founder has thought deeply about it, and novelty is judged by a fresh perspective, whereas founders in saturated categories often lack real conviction.
“It's more about the founder's understanding of the idea.”
Seed investing is momentum-driven, so the goal is a portfolio of about 60 high-momentum companies, expecting three to five to escape velocity and become outstanding companies.
“I want to build a portfolio of 60 high momentum companies, hope that three to five of them escape velocity and become amazing companies.”
Naimi takes roughly 18 to 30 pitch meetings per week, and believes that seeing many companies is the only way to build the frame of reference needed to spot standouts, even though this means occasionally missing companies.
“I probably take anywhere between 18 to 30 pitches per week.”
Saving 5 percent at the Series A, 3 percent at the Series B, and 2 percent at the Series C can add up to around 10 percent more ownership at exit, which on a 2 billion dollar exit is worth about 200 million dollars to the founder.
“If I can save you 5% at the A and 3% at the B and 2% at the C, these things tend to add up nicely.”
Abstract typically does three to four, sometimes five, founder meetings plus back-channel work before investing, and its firm structure lets it do in two to three days what other firms take two to three weeks to complete.
“We can do in two to three days.”
On AngelList deals where the platform sourced all the capital, the structure was 0 and 20 for LPs, with AngelList taking 5 percent and Naimi taking 15 percent carry, letting a young investor build a track record without raising a fund.
“If AngelList sources the capital, which in my case they did in every single deal, they get 5%, I get 15.”
In his senior year and early hedge fund period, Naimi made a few hundred thousand dollars trading out-of-the-money options against triple-leveraged banking ETFs during the financial crisis, then suffered drawdowns including a 51 percent loss in August 2011, showing how luck and missing risk management can look like skill.
“I got very fortunate through a combination of lucking out with volatility and not understanding risk management”
Deals Abstract leads have dramatically outperformed deals where it co-invests, and Abstract now leads roughly 80 to 90 percent of its portfolio, reportedly achieving the highest seed-to-tier-one Series A graduation rate among seed funds.
“the highest graduation rate of any seed fund from seed to series A to a tier one fund is us by a pretty wide margin.”
Abstract's portfolio model targets owning 8 to 10 percent of about 60 seed companies and maintaining around 10 percent in the best 10 through Series B, and because the sub-20 million average entry valuation became impossible, the firm now targets sub-30 million.
“Maybe my average entry valuation today I want to maintain is sub-$30 million.”
Naimi's network expansion began when Cyan Bannister introduced him to Kevin Hartz, and from there Hartz introduced him to Chris Dixon, Keith Rabois, Mark Andreessen, and Michael Ovitz, which led to the consortium that financed his management company within three weeks.
“all roads from my network ultimately actually lead back to Kevin Hartz.”
In his first 10 months of seed investing from August 2016 to June 2017, Naimi made 47 deals including Rippling and Solana, and Rippling and Solana combined exceed 100 billion dollars in market cap, with 2 hectocorns, 1 decacorn, and 8 or 9 unicorns from that set.
“But within the first 47 companies that I'd funded, Rippling and Solana have combined market caps of north of $100 billion.”
Ramtin's 2014 exchange for liquidity in marketplace-lending loans was built after the sector had peaked; within 14 months the sector had collapsed, with Lending Club down 85% from its peak IPO price, wiping out his net worth.
“Lending Club had plummeted 85% from its peak IPO price.”
Publicly announced seed deal counts overstate the sample because about 80% of companies get announced, so the 1,000-deal count from 2008-2011 carries survivorship bias that must be considered.
“So there's some survivorship bias there.”
Founders should evaluate Series A lead partners by who will be the best board director over the next decade rather than only the price, because the density of high-quality board members with storied reputations at a few top firms outweighs what most other firms offer.
“you really should be optimizing for who's going to be the best board director to have on this journey with you for the next 10 years.”
Naimi's mother prioritized living in the best neighborhoods over having a bigger house, reasoning that exposure to what is possible matters more than being a big fish in a small pond, which gave him friends whose parents ran major companies.
“she thought being exposed to what is possible is better than to have a nice house or a big house in a place where you're a big fish in a little pond.”
Ramtin argues there is no relevant background for venture capital, so the advice he got to start a company rather than join a firm is poor advice to give anyone, since founders should start their own companies or not start one at all.
“I think that's terrible advice to give anybody. You should never advise anybody to start a company.”
Hedge fund feedback loops are too tight, so managers can convince themselves they are good or bad investors too quickly, and hedge funds in default tend to have shorter lives than legacy private equity or venture firms because public-market outperformance is hard to sustain.
“I agree the feedback loops in hedge funds are too tight.”
Naimi's brother sold a vertical SaaS business for under 30 million dollars after bootstrapping it with under 600,000 dollars and two employees, and Naimi argues that immigrant upbringing instilled a drive that both siblings applied to building companies.
“He bootstrapped a vertical SaaS business that he just recently sold for a little less than 30 million bucks.”
Ramtin's early AngelList-based success ran through a network that eventually led to a management company deal, which he argues required a trusted network built through Kevin Hartz and a chain of introductions to bring institutional LPs.
“all roads from my network ultimately actually lead back to Kevin Hartz.”
After a failed startup left him with debt, Ramtin filed Chapter 13, a five-year restructuring rather than debt forgiveness, and cleared the debt within about two years, after which he joined a small venture firm.
“ended up being chapter 13, which is not a write-off of debt, but a restructuring for five years”
Collectors should personally maintain relationships with galleries, auction houses, and artists rather than relying only on advisors, because advisors are useful but the collector must do most of the work to access the best art.
“you're better off doing the majority of the work yourself”
Naimi only buys art he and his wife want to hang in their home, and believes buying art purely as an investment to store it in storage is wrong even when it is a good asset.
“we don't feel right about the concept of just buying art for the purpose of putting it in storage.”
Big galleries compete for top artists the way VCs compete for deals, offering better commission splits, such as 60-40 or 70-30 instead of 50-50, and signing bonuses like a million dollars upfront, although artists still move between galleries despite contracts.
“The courting process is the same. We'll do a better commission split with you.”
West Elm used progressive incentive bonuses that grew exponentially with sale size and were not clawed back on returns, so an employee who upsold accessories like coffee tables and rugs earned far more than hourly pay.
“unlike commissions, incentives were not rolled back when things were returned.”
Larry Gagosian started as an outsider with no pedigree and was dismissed for years before becoming a leader, and Naimi believes the path for Abstract is consistency, reputation, and great results over a long career, though Silicon Valley has been friendlier to him than the art world was to Gagosian.
“he was a total outsider with no relevant pedigree and he was kind of just dismissed his first few years or first decade”
Ramtin entered venture by cold-emailing VCs, angels, and founders and then fully immersing himself in the ecosystem, because keeping one foot in hedge funds and one foot out was not enough to build a venture career.
“I can't be one foot in, one foot out. I need to just immerse myself into this entirely.”
Ramtin organizes his collection into three generational buckets of living artists, those two generations older, one generation older, and his own generation aged 28 to 38, so he can track who is important at each stage of a career.
“I break them down by generation”
Identifying a great company is easier than identifying an artist who will stand the test of time, because venture has tangible fundamentals to examine and a clear price-setting mechanism through fundraising and term sheets, whereas art lacks a comparable pricing process.
“It's a lot easier to identify what is going to be a great company than who is going to be an artist that stands the test of time.”
Companies whose founders hold a high bar for talent often stay remarkably small relative to their achievements, because elite talent acts as a multiplier on efficiency.
“So I truly do believe incredibly high quality talent has like a multiplier effect on company efficiency.”
For technical founders, the key trait is shipping velocity, the ability to ship a product in six weeks or six months, which matters more than being a great engineer that other engineers want to work for.
“But what I look for on that side is shipping velocity.”
Mega venture funds of 5 to 12 billion dollars need places to write 500 million to 1 billion dollar checks, and there are probably only a dozen or 15 such companies, which shows that venture can scale because the largest private companies still outpace public comps.
“you probably have about a dozen, maybe 15 places you can write checks that large in venture capital today.”
Unfunded seed-stage founders are among the easiest people in the world to get a meeting with, even for an unknown investor, because they are seeking capital and any interested investor is welcome.
“that an unfunded seed-stage founder might be the easiest person in the world to get a meeting with”
Large galleries now represent 75 to 80 artists, up from 10 to 15 historically, and smaller galleries represent 25 to 30, so each primary show offers fewer works to more demand.
“Historically these galleries would represent 10, 15 artists. Now the bigger galleries are representing 75 to 80 artists.”
Ramtin's single hardest workday, unloading four UPS trucks alone at West Elm after colleagues called in sick, taught him to value hard work, and he argues that working hard and smart are both necessary and that those who avoid hard work do not advance far.
“I do think there is a concept of working hard and smart. I do think you have to do both.”
Abstract holds a 30-minute daily standing meeting where the team reviews every company they met that day, because the volume of companies makes it easy to forget which were interesting and to ensure other team members see relevant deals.
“We have a 30 minute meeting at least once a day to just catch up on every company people have met with that day.”
Naimi identified an unmet demand gap by financing extravagant sweet 16 parties for classmates whose parents would not throw them, charging a cover charge and netting about 2,000 dollars per weekend from two to three parties a month.
“And I saw a hole in the market there.”
Arjan Schutte giving Ramtin a job at Core Innovation Capital when he was flat broke was the kindest business act he received, because without that job he might not have entered venture at all.
“that guy giving me a job when no one else in the world would have at that point”
Naimi named Abstract because the word means existing in concept but not reality, which mirrors seed companies, and because a name starting with A would appear at the top of alphabetized databases like Crunchbase.
“And I realized if my firm started with an A, it would be at the top of the list on everything.”
Critics describe Abstract as heat seekers and signal chasers, a fair description for its early years when it followed tier-one firms into deals, but Naimi argues the firm has become the signal itself, and that its current seed deal volume is about 14 net new seed deals per year.
“I think we invest in 14 net new seed deals per year, which is a little over one deal per month.”