Paul Enright - The Buy Side Primer - [Invest Like the Best, EP. 222]
What this covers
The conversation is a primer on professional investing, led by Paul Enright of the family office Krainos Capital. He spent over a decade at Viking Global running consumer and technology portfolios, and earlier worked on the sell-side at Morgan Stanley. He starts with the split between the buy-side and sell-side and the jobs on each. He then traces how the work has changed. Before Reg FD, analysts could send models to a company's CFO. Now filings and data are organized online, so the easier games of the late 1990s are gone.
From there he gets technical. A long-short fund runs two books, and the long-short spread is what the manager is really trying to produce. Leverage multiplies it, in both directions. He separates alpha from beta and sector luck, and contrasts platform and traditional long-short funds. He describes bottom-up portfolio construction, in which ideas are force-ranked against each other. He also notes that larger funds now hold shorts of 10 to 20 percent of a company, which pushes them toward inter-sector bets.
The later stretches are more opinionated. He argues that market structure matters more than business quality, and he reads the exit of well-funded entrants as a sign of a great business. He also covers big stock moves as narrative reclassification, citing Nokia and Facebook. Telecom deregulation and the unbundling of software run through his examples. The contested material concerns whether hedge funds are over-earning relative to the value they add, how passive flows and crowding could produce liquidity shocks, and whether Vanguard-style disruption could reach hedge funds. He closes on career advice, saying mentors matter more than brand, and on a mindset framework that builds on Carol Dweck's fixed versus growth distinction.
Enright argues the buy-side is a decision-making discipline built on digging, analysis, and conviction, and that its economics, risk management, and talent selection are shaped by leverage, market structure, and the fee model, so the sell-side and buy-side differ in what they reward.
- Long-short returns are a spread between two books, and leverage turns that spread into ROE, which amplifies the cost of a bad period.
- Good and great investing differ in the depth of digging and in the ability to synthesize and decide, not in access to information.
- Market structure (passive flows, reduced block liquidity, crowding) and the fee model shape both risk and who gets paid.
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The 1984 breakup of AT&T and the 1996 Telecom Act unbundled the telephone network into last mile, middle mile, and long haul layers, which caused deflation and built the infrastructure that the internet, the 2000 bubble, and today's businesses depend on.
“if you didn't have the 1996 Telecom Act, you don't have the 2000 internet bubble and you don't have all these amazing businesses that ride on top of that infrastructure.”
An analyst covering an industry that rises 100% can pick three average stocks and appear brilliant, when the performance is really sector luck; the analyst should measure whether they outperform peers within that sector.
“I picked the three average stocks in that industry and I'm up 100%. I think I'm the smartest person on the planet. But the reality is I'm just lucky”
Because a positive long-short spread can in principle be levered without limit, managers are tempted to keep adding leverage to lift ROE, yet a single negative-spread period under heavy leverage can wipe out equity, as a 12 percent drop does at 10-to-1 leverage on a home.
“mathematically, if you produce a positive, long-short spread, you can run with infinite leverage. And so that's how these folks get caught.”
A fund that does not constrain beta and factors may credit a manager for a biotech-style sector rally, so a 100 percent return from owning an up sector can look like skill, which is why performance should be benchmarked against an equal-weighted momentum or growth basket.
“I picked the three average stocks in that industry and I'm up 100%. I think I'm the smartest person on the planet. But the reality is I'm just lucky, because I cover Biotech.”
After removing market beta, sector beta, and factor exposures such as growth, momentum, value, and size, what remains is pure stock-picking alpha, and a manager should test their results against equal-weighted factor baskets to see how much alpha they actually added.
“if you can extract the market beta, the sector beta underlying factors... what's leftover is pure stock picking alpha”
Before Reg FD and stricter insider trading enforcement, strong contacts inside companies could tell investors whatever they wanted, and sell-side analysts would send their models to a company's CFO, which is no longer possible.
“I remember being on the sell-side back in 2000 and we would just send our model to the CFO of the company. You can't do that anymore.”
The buy-side has become more competitive because information is widely organized online, databases exist, and sophisticated tools are everywhere, so the easy 'games' of the late 1990s and early 2000s, when capital and arbitrage opportunities were abundant, largely disappeared.
“there were easier games to be found back then. People were figuring it out on the fly and there was capital flowing into the space”
Multi-manager platform (pod) models require neutrality to market beta, sector beta, and factors such as growth, momentum, value, and size, so a pod's residual is isolated stock-picking alpha, while traditional long-short managers keep intentional exposures.
“If you run at a decentralized pod, you are really unable to run that strategy because you have to run market neutral, beta neutral, factor neutral.”
Market structure has shifted so that block trading desks at big banks have largely disappeared and much volume trades in dark pools and systems, with passive flows that reinforce trends and reverse them, creating a risk of systemic liquidity shocks when combined with high leverage and crowded positions.
“when the trend is good, the flows are passive and it feeds into the trend, and when the trend turns negative, the flows go negative.”
A long-short fund runs two books, and the difference between the long book's performance and the short book's performance is the long-short spread, an unlevered measure analogous to return on assets that is what the manager is actually trying to produce.
“the difference between the two is my 'Long-short Spread'. That is an unlevered definition.”
Before Reg FD and online SEC filing organization, research required printing SEC filings, inputting hard data line by line into Excel, and calling as many people as possible, while insiders could freely share information because insider trading norms were weaker.
“You had to print out SEC filings. You had to go line by line and input hard data into Excel cells.”
Hedge funds may be over-earning because fee structures scale with assets under management, and the active mutual fund industry shows that when alpha becomes expensive, disruption from Vanguard and passive flows occurs quickly.
“Management fees scale with size of AUM. So there are all sorts of reasons why hedge funds are arguably over-earning.”
Top talent migrated to hedge funds because fee structures are highly favorable and scale lets large managers earn enormous fees, while many managers are arguably over-earning relative to the value they add, since there is no clear quid pro quo for LPs.
“the fee structures is so favorable to the firms”
Software, once a great business, is being unbundled into separate layers, with Amazon offering one layer and letting others build on top, which pressures horizontal software and bundled incumbents like IBM and CA, while Oracle has diversified better.
“we're going to unbundle the stack and we're going to give you this layer, and then we're going to let everybody else build on top of it.”
Public information is widely available to anyone willing to dig, so the most durable informational edge is staying in one sector for a long time and accumulating knowledge, since cumulative expertise is what others cannot quickly replicate.
“the cumulation of knowledge is perhaps the last great informational edge, because everything else is out there if you're willing to do the work and dig”
A business is great when new well-funded competitors stop entering the market, since capital flowing out signals investors have given up; market structure with few protected players matters more than the individual company, and then the best operator should be held as long as possible.
“The market structure of where the business operates is usually more important than the business itself.”
Whether a business is good is usually hard to determine in isolation, and the market structure in which it operates matters more, so the best opportunities are fast-growing secular tailwinds inside industries with few protected players and no new entrants.
“The market structure of where the business operates is usually more important than the business itself.”
Large stock gains often come when the market's perception of a company shifts from one narrative bucket to another, such as Nokia being viewed as a hardware company with a software problem that could not recover, or Facebook being a desktop company with a mobile problem that it later fixed.
“Nokia was a hardware company with a software problem. Hardware companies have a hard time figuring out software problems.”
A business's quality is best judged by whether capital is flowing into or out of its space, since no well-funded new search company has appeared since 2005, and by the market structure of the industry, which matters more than the business itself.
“The market structure of where the business operates is usually more important than the business itself.”
In the first few years of a finance career, the quality of the mentor or portfolio manager matters more than the firm's brand or compensation, because mentors shape how you think about risk, analysis, and style, so who you work for matters more than where.
“the single most important thing I can think of in making that initial decision is who are you going to work for, not where are you going to work.”
Enright combines Carol Dweck's fixed versus growth mindset with a zero-sum versus abundance mindset to form a two-by-two framework, and he has chosen to live mostly in the abundance and growth quadrant, arguing that many zero-sum games are framed as zero-sum when they could be win-win.
“there are certain things that could be more win-win and don't have to be zero-sum, but they're framed as zero-sum.”
Analysts deeply immersed in one sector pitch in sector-specific jargon that obscures the underlying logic, so Enright learned to abstract each pitch into universal terms, and he argues that a portfolio manager who stops daily digging gains the distance needed for better judgment.
“when you are so close to an idea, you start to think about it solely in the lingo of the sector or the company that you're looking at.”
Good portfolio construction happens bottom-up: each analyst names their best ideas, is pushed until only the top few remain, and then all ideas are aggregated and force-ranked against each other to size positions.
“You start from the bottoms up, you get the best idea as you can from each analyst. You aggregate them all together and then you rank them amongst themselves.”
Two investors with identical information can reach opposite conclusions because synthesis is the decision: one may be stuck on a one-month negative, while another sees past it and models the second derivative of decelerating comps over several years.
“Two people can do the exact same digging, get the exact same information, analyze it the exact same way, but then synthesize it and focus on the most important thing differently.”
A strong signal for investing aptitude is the ability to succeed on repeated tests of learned knowledge, such as law school exams, where a candidate issues-spots unfamiliar fact patterns, starts with a conclusion, applies rules, and concludes, which mirrors investing.
“your job is to issue spot. And every issue you spot, you approach with the same formula. You start with the conclusion.”
Enright chose to shift from a zero-sum career that he had mastered but that cost him health and family time to a life focused on abundance and win-win situations, playing an infinite game of learning and building long-term relationships rather than finite zero-sum games.
“I just want to be playing a long game and be playing this more infinite game of investing and learning than a series of finite games.”
Long-short fund sizes grew from a few billion to 30 to 50 billion dollars, so a single fund's short position can now be 10 to 20 percent of a company, or even 15 percent of the float, whereas in 2005 a 2 percent short was meaningful and shorts were spread across many funds.
“Now, if you want to have a meaningful short, and you have a lot of capital, you could be short 10, 15, 20% of the company yourself.”
Pod shops constrain a manager's volatility, then add leverage to it so that even a modest return can justify a much higher payout ratio, meaning their risk comes from leverage rather than from taking directional market or factor risk.
“we're going to lower the vol that you can produce in your portfolio. Therefore, we can put higher leverage on it.”
Ted Seides argues the hedge fund model is not an asset class but a contractual arrangement, and Enright extends this to ask what hedge funds must deliver in return for their fees, since they are paid for absolute performance without specified obligations on how they run the fund or what risk they take.
“the hedge fund model is not an asset class. It's just a contractual arrangement.”
Large allocators like a $40 billion endowment want to write nine-figure checks to safe, consistent managers, so they accept paying somewhat higher fees, similar to 'no one gets fired for buying Cisco', which transfers a large amount of wealth to managers.
“no one gets fired for paying a little bit more fees than you want to to a safe, consistent, slightly underperforming large manager, and that just leaves a gigantic wealth transfer”
Large fundamental long-short funds cannot easily sustain intra-sector shorts because winners tend to be large caps and losers mid or small caps, so they shift to inter-sector bets such as being long software and internet and short retail, running gross leverage around 1.2 to 1.6 times.
“the winners are usually large caps and the losers are usually mid or small caps. And so if you have 15, 20, $30 billion, it's hard to be long the winner and short the loser in the same sector.”
Within finance, sell-side equity research is a cost center that generates no revenue, while bankers generate the money, and on the buy-side investment staff must generate the money directly, so candidates should choose based on whether they want to be revenue drivers or profit centers.
“on the sell side, equity research is a cost center. They're not really generating any money. The guys that make the money are the bankers.”
Law school training in issue spotting, which starts with a conclusion and applies rules to unfamiliar fact patterns, maps onto investing, where the job is finding facts that do not match the narrative and betting that the printed numbers are wrong.
“that's kind of what investing is. You're out there, you're issue spotting.”
The kindest act is one with no upside for the giver, and Enright's example is a PwC partner who advised him to sit at his desk for six months and not leave a job for what it is not, but for what the next thing is.
“Go to the next thing for what it is, or you will spend the rest of your career jumping around from thing to thing.”
Table-stakes digging means reading the last two 10-Qs and three 10-Ks and pulling a model, while great digging means reading footnotes, modeling currencies others skip, reading every annual report from the S-1 forward, tracking language changes and proxy compensation trends, and finding private competitors.
“You go back to the original S1 filing and you read every subsequent annual report from that point forward. And you sense the change in language.”
Whether someone has the tolerance for buy-side risk can only be known after they have actually done it, so it is not reliably predictable beforehand, though the skill can be developed over time.
“In some ways, you don't know whether you have the tolerance for it until you've actually done it.”
Enright claims he was a better portfolio manager of other people's ideas than an analyst of his own, because being separated from the digging gave him perspective, and he sees a split between people who want to do all the work and those who can decide on others' work.
“I was a better portfolio manager of other people's ideas than I was as an analyst of my own ideas.”
The sell-side does the digging and analysis and makes recommendations, but the buy-side requires having skin in the game and the constitution to act at points of extreme volatility, which is a different skill set that many analysts never develop.
“when you're on the sell-side, you do all the digging, you do a lot of analyzing and then you make recommendations. But actually having skin in the game and having the constitution to know how to act at points of extreme volatility, that's a very different skill-set.”
Decentralized pod platforms must run market-neutral, beta-neutral, and factor-neutral books to run very large capital, which forces them to strip out unintended exposures from fundamental trades and may push managers to change their style to suit the model.
“If you run at a decentralized pod, you are really unable to run that strategy because you have to run market neutral, beta neutral, factor neutral.”
A disciplined manager raises gross exposure when the odds favor a positive spread and pulls it back after a strong run when the risk of a negative spread rises, so that a bad spread does not threaten the firm.
“I'm going to pull my gross exposure back down. And therefore, if I produce a negative spread, it won't be something that could frankly cripple”
Analysts learn to pick securities by pitching them to a decision-maker, and the clarity from writing and defending the pitch, with instant feedback, is iterative learning similar to Jeff Bezos's memo-writing culture at Amazon.
“And in those pitches, you learn and gain confidence and clarity of thought. That's similar to the Jeff Bezos's view on writing.”
The best investment pitches have three elements: a narrative about how the market currently categorizes the company and how that appears in numbers and price, a conversion of that story into clear math, and the owned conviction to make the decision-maker believe it, since good stories with wishy-washy conviction fall flat.
“you have to have a narrative and be able to tell a story about where the world is currently placing the company that you're interested in.”
Great hedge funds treat investing as a series of one-year sprints rather than a long future bet, because a poor run of performance can cause loss of limited partners while capital is not locked up, and they continuously refresh talent so senior people leave and new people grow.
“it's a necessity to treat this as a series of one-year sprints. If you want to stay in this and you want to be great at it”
The buy-side has become far more sophisticated because investing education now includes formal stock-pitch training in business school, which did not exist when Enright started, so the easy inefficiencies of earlier eras have been arbitraged away.
“You can go to business school and you can learn the art of the stock pitch. That didn't exist back then.”
Long-short funds can be bucketed into three camps: platform pod models, established fundamental managers who have grown large, and newer managers who start as classic stock pickers and later spin out and grow into large funds through intra-sector and then inter-sector bets.
“there are three types. There's the platform model. And then there's the established manager model”
Hedge funds concentrate in TMT and consumer because they want to own the best businesses, and these sectors include tech, enterprise software, biotech and other sciences that may have decades of secular growth ahead, while big funds find it unrewarding to short within growth sectors.
“tech and consumer tech, enterprise tech specifically, are going to generate some of the best businesses, along with biotech”
Enright builds an industry view by first analyzing each company's income statement from revenue down, then comparing competitors, then reading experts such as Ben Thompson, and finally inverting the view to identify which company will win.
“So I start at the bottom. I get a framework for one. Then I go and I get a framework for another and then another, and then at some point now I've got an industry view.”
Congestion in dense wireless networks usually occurs at the connection from phone to tower and from tower to the internet backhaul, not at the tower itself, so backhaul and the on-ramp are where investment is needed, though it may not be a large investable theme.
“When you have five bars of service in a condensed crowded area, and your email's not going through, it's usually not because there's traffic at the tower.”
After Facebook rose 30 percent on earnings day in summer 2012 despite a miss, an analyst argued it was still a buy because the stock's required growth to justify the price was 70 percent, an insight captured in one sentence.
“the stock is up 30, but my numbers need to go up 70.”
Facebook's IPO struggles reflected a desktop company with a mobile problem, a classic innovator's dilemma in which its product could not adapt quickly enough to the mobile transition, and once it fixed the mobile product the narrative shifted.
“Facebook was a desktop company at the time with a mobile problem.”
Once someone starts down a sell-side path it is very difficult to pivot to the buy-side, and breaking into the buy-side is also difficult; Enright's own transition worked only because he was early, and it has become much harder as the industry matured.
“It's harder to do it now. It's become much more sophisticated.”
T-Mobile's 2.5 GHz spectrum gives it higher spectral efficiency than Verizon and AT&T, meaning it can add capacity with less capital expenditure, which creates room to offer better service during the 4G to 5G upgrade.
“they can spend less CapEx to get more capacity, which will give them the opportunity to offer better service.”
Following Michael Mauboussin, the two basic investing skills are security selection and portfolio construction, which includes sizing positions, and both must be learned through a progression from pitching ideas to managing capital.
“Michael Mauboussin has been influential to me, and he points out there are two basic ones. There's security selection, and then there's portfolio construction or sizing of positions.”
A well-run fund rests on four pillars: a replicable culture of stock selection with quality ideas, disciplined portfolio sizing, strong internal relationships covering talent recruitment and compensation, and careful management of external counterparties.
“There's the culture of stock selection, how you teach that, how it's replicable, and the quality of your ideas. If you don't have quality ideas, you will die.”
Heavy options issuance and shrinking share counts signal how a company treats shareholders, and an analyst should check whether the balance sheet is efficient relative to the business type.
“these guys are a huge options issuer or shares are shrinking. What does the balance sheet look like?”
Enright grew up with a fixed mindset, believing he was simply good or bad at certain subjects, and changed after reading Carol Dweck and Josh Waitzkin, realizing that people can grow, which he wishes he had learned sooner.
“I've been thinking about this all wrong... you can grow”
Under Reg FD, if a company discloses material information to one person it must disclose it to everyone, typically through an 8-K filing, and the recipient of non-public information cannot trade on it.
“If you're a company and you disclose any information to one person, you have to disclose it to everybody.”
Net exposure equals the long book minus the short book, so a 50 percent long and 50 percent short portfolio has zero beta exposure, while gross exposure is the sum, so 150 long plus 100 short is 250 percent gross and 50 percent net.
“50 minus the 50 is zero. That's my net exposure.”
The largest technology companies, such as Google, Amazon, and Microsoft, have historically avoided direct competition with each other, which is unusual in Silicon Valley history, and Enright is worried most when one big tech company encroaches on a neighbor's territory.
“the biggest tech companies didn't really compete with each other. And that's unique in the history of tech.”
In an environment with large amounts of capital, a mediocre manager can survive for a long period, since alternatives for capital are plentiful, so the risk to great firms is complacency rather than failure.
“I think the enemy of great is good in that context.”
Enright is more worried about the aging U.S. electric grid, with above-ground wires on 50-year-old poles, than about internet infrastructure, which is largely well built and upgradable through electronics rather than new digging.
“I'm more worried about the electric grid than I am worried about the internet.”
When a portfolio manager first carries significant exposure, the experience is somatic, with a constantly triggered fight-or-flight response, paranoia about being wrong, and living and dying by every tick, which can become crazy if it consumes the person.
“And you have this sense of paranoia when you first put on exposure, and you live and die by every tick on the screen.”
The sell-side sits between companies that need capital and investors who have it, earning fees by convincing corporates to issue debt, equity, or derivatives and matching pools of capital such as pensions, endowments, and family offices to where it is needed.
“And then you have the sell-side who sits in the middle and tries to figure out ways to convince corporates to issue debt/equity/derivatives, whatever it may be.”
Managing buy-side emotional strain requires developing habits, rituals, and tools that pull the investor away from the screen, so they can focus on the work and zoom out periodically, especially during volatility.
“you have to develop habits and rituals and tools to stay away from the screen to get yourself back”
A portfolio stays concentrated within sectors even as a manager adds sectors, so covering two sectors with two longs and three to four shorts each naturally broadens the book while keeping it concentrated.
“It was always concentrated within each sector, but it became a little bit bigger over time.”
Large established long-short funds typically run gross exposure of about 1.2 to 1.6 times capital and higher net exposure than pure neutral funds, because lower leverage lets them afford more directional net exposure.
“those funds are more likely to run with Gross Exposure that sits in that 1.2 to 1.6 times leverage”
Investing in Uber late, while capital flooded into copycat ride-sharing and food delivery companies, showed that heavy capital inflows mean competition will persist for a long time, even though that does not necessarily make the business bad.
“It just means it's going to be Uber competitive for a really long period of time”
Enright worries that the most important investment opportunities are emerging in life sciences, where he lacks deep expertise, and that as the world moves in that direction he may fall behind, which is easier to address without client capital.
“a lot of those businesses will come in the life sciences sector and I'm not an expert there.”
Enright is not overly concerned about valuation, believes many great businesses can be owned for a long time even at current prices, and holds the view that if you are not selling them at these levels, you are effectively buying them.
“My philosophy is if you're not selling them here, you're buying them here.”