Kieran Goodwin - Imagination, Volatility, and the Pursuit of Alpha - [Invest Like the Best, EP.331]
What this covers
Kieran Goodwin ran trading at King Street Capital through the financial crisis and later founded Panning Capital. Here he talks with Patrick O'Shaughnessy about credit as a craft and about the present state of private credit. The private credit discussion starts with a specific data point: a Sharpe ratio of about 10 for a private credit index, reported by Jason Zweig and mocked by William Sharpe himself. From there Goodwin works through the mechanics of vol washing, including why bilateral loans are cumbersome to sell and why funds added bank leverage to reach 8-9% net returns.
The wider range is about how to think. On credit analysis, he separates ability to pay from willingness to pay, using subprime as the example. He also describes what good analysts check: whether EBITDA ties to cash flow, whether margins are sustainable, and how WorldCom flattered its margins by capitalizing operating costs. The line between hard and soft numbers is exposed once markets tighten. He frames lending as being short volatility, and says most institutions drift into that position because positive carry feels like steady income. In his telling, SVB's unexamined rate risk shows a failure of imagination.
The contentious turns are a forecast of higher defaults in middle-market direct lending and his view that buying far out-of-the-money options beats selling them. He also favors income share agreements over debt for financing talent, and says institutions over-allocated to drawdown funds. On his own career, he credits being on the right wave rather than being the best surfer, after starting in credit derivatives just before the late-1990s volatility surge.
Goodwin argues that private credit's smooth, low-volatility returns are largely a product of marking loans at par and short-term funding structures, so the asset class carries hidden liquidity and asset-liability risk that allocators and investors underprice.
- Private credit loans are marked at par and rarely trade, so reported volatility understates true risk (vol washing)
- Fund-level bank lines with covenants can force bilateral loan sales in a downturn, creating contagion
- Lack of imagination about tail outcomes, such as SVB's rate risk, is the root cause of volatility mispricing
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WorldCom inflated margins by capitalizing operating expenses, moving regular costs below the line as capital expenditures, so its EBITDA margin looked far better than AT&T's during the early 2000s fiber build-out.
“WorldCom was just taking regular expenses or operating expenses, they were putting them below the line as capital expenses”
Credit ultimately rests on belief about ability and willingness to pay, and during subprime, willingness to pay collapsed among homeowners who expected to stay in their houses regardless, so good behavior and reputation determine future borrowing costs.
“There's ability to pay and willingness to pay... The willingness to pay went way down.”
Credit risk depends on both ability to pay and willingness to pay, and the subprime episode showed willingness collapsing when borrowers who could pay chose to walk away from underwater homes, so creditworthiness goes beyond the numbers.
“There's ability to pay and willingness to pay. And we saw that during the subprime debacle is that if a creditor was like, you have the money and the debtor was like, well, I don't need to pay you because I'm not getting kicked out of the house.”
Private credit's reported 10 percent returns with no volatility are an illusion, because a loan's value is not marked to market, and the Cliffwater 10 Sharpe ratio that Jason Zweig reported was ridiculed by Sharpe himself.
“Cliffwater... put out on a fund a 10 Sharpe Ratio. He interviewed Professor Sharpe... Professor Sharpe was like, that's ridiculous.”
Because many direct loans are bilateral, with no public information, selling one requires sharing private borrower data with a third-party evaluator, making secondary sales cumbersome exactly when liquidity is needed.
“Many of these direct lending loans are bilateral in nature, meaning it's just the lender and the borrower. So there's no public information.”
AAA ratings are not guarantees, since AAA securities have defaulted, and mutual funds can gate redemptions when underlying bonds cannot trade, even though many investors believe they have one or two days of liquidity.
“have AAAs defaulted? Actually, yes, they have defaulted. Mutual funds, I never knew that a mutual fund could gate”
Borrowing short and investing long earns positive carry in most normal yield curves, but this is the road to hell, because when long-dated assets are marked down and short-term funding leaves, leveraged players like LTCM, MF Global, and SVB are forced to sell and fail.
“Well, the road to hell is paid with positive carry. So if you invest long and borrow short, usually there's positive carry.”
The best credit analysts understand cash flow, check whether EBITDA and cash flow tie out, question excessive footnotes, and test whether margins such as an 80 percent gross margin or 45 percent EBITDA margin are sustainable and backed by a moat.
“Why doesn't EBITDA and cash flow tie out? Why is this explanation taking 17 different footnotes to follow?”
Far out-of-the-money options with payouts of 1,000x or more are often mispriced in the investor's favor, because the lognormal model fails for fat tails, so buying such options is preferable to selling them, which is silly.
“once you get beyond that 101, 201 realm, it becomes really inefficient... The log-normal curve doesn't work.”
A direct lending fund might raise $1 billion in equity and borrow another $1 billion from big banks such as Goldman Sachs, Citi, or JPMorgan, to make $2 billion of loans, with the bank line carrying covenants.
“I'm going to lever this fund 1:1. So if I have a $1 billion fund, I'm going to make $2 billion of loans.”
Alternative managers pitching to LPs need returns in at least the high single digits, since a 5-6% pitch gets no interest, so funds had to add leverage to reach 8-9% net returns on loans yielding around SOFR plus 550-600.
“If you're an alternative asset manager and you're coming to an LP and saying, I can give you 5%, 6%, no one cares. It's got to be like at least high single digits.”
Private credit funds borrow against their loan books through bank lines with covenants and marks set at par, so if defaults rise, banks cut the lines, forcing funds to sell loans in secondary markets, and that news spreads among banks and triggers a rapid repricing of all funds.
“their lines are going to get cut. And the leverage providers, the banks, the sell side, is going to say, you need to start paying us down this line.”
Private credit funds have an asset-liability mismatch because their long-dated, illiquid loans are financed by bank lines that can be called, forcing asset sales in a downturn, and the risk persists unless defaults stay low.
“their assets are long-dated loans and they do not match the financing lines that they have with the banks.”
Income share agreements are a good alternative to debt for financing talent, because a person gives up around 10 to 15 percent of future upside in exchange for resources, avoiding leverage in an economy that is over-levered.
“I'm a big fan of income-sharing agreements... It shouldn't be more than probably 10% or 15%.”
Loans made when borrowing costs were about 5.5 to 6 percent now carry roughly 11 percent rates, and with 7x leverage on a 12x purchase multiple, borrowers have little room for error, so defaults should rise.
“those are 11% interest loans... they were bought at 12x EBITDA, they put seven turns of leverage on it... there's a lot less room for error right now”
The most excess in private equity is in the middle-market direct lending space, particularly sub-$100 million EBITDA companies, so defaults there should exceed those in larger S&P-type companies.
“I would say there's probably more excess in private equity in the middle market space than anywhere else and the direct lenders.”
Adjusted or soft EBITDA numbers are tolerated in a good market, but in a tougher market everyone demands hard numbers, which is when the gap between the two is exposed.
“Hard numbers and soft numbers are much different... in a good market, soft is okay. But in a tougher market, everyone wants a hard number.”
Most people and institutions are naturally short volatility because positive carry from lending or holding assets feels like steady income, and lenders in particular want volatility-free assets since they gain nothing from upside but suffer from downside.
“Any time you're lending money, you're short vol.”
Investment success depends more on being on the right wave, meaning the right market regime and timing, than on being the best surfer, so Goodwin's career peak came from starting in credit derivatives just before the 1997 to 2002 volatility surge.
“I'm a big believer that it's more important to be on the right wave than necessarily be the best surfer. The wave is more important.”
People underestimate volatility because of a lack of imagination about how quickly things can go upside down, as the Silicon Valley Bank failure shows, where basic interest rate risk on $50 billion of 10-year notes went unquestioned by investors.
“The lack of imagination... I never thought that a financial institution would blow up because of interest rate risk. It's such a basic risk.”
Any time you lend money you are implicitly short volatility, because lenders want the borrower's asset value to stay stable and gain nothing from upside, so a 50 percent loan-to-value cushion protects against modest declines but gives no benefit from increases.
“Any time you're lending money, you're short vol... I don't really care if it goes up.”
Private credit appears to have no volatility because loans are not marked to market, not because the underlying asset value is stable; the difference between economic volatility and reported marks is what makes the asset class look artificially safe to allocators.
“There's no vol and like of course, there's vol. There's with anything. Your car leaves the lot and it's down 30%. There's volatility. It's just you're not marking it to market.”
Most private credit loan marks come from third-party valuation providers and stay at par almost all the time, which is part of how volatility is washed out of reported performance.
“Most of those marks are going to be par, all the time. That's part of the vol washing in a sense.”
Institutional portfolios like Yale's now have separate private credit, private equity, hedge fund, and infrastructure teams competing for allocation, because winning more assets is how staff advance toward the CIO role.
“all of those individuals are competing to get more assets in the portfolio because that's how they ascend and maybe become the CIO.”
Institutions over-allocated to drawdown funds because quick early returns from a few winners pushed them to raise allocations, and capital then got drawn faster than expected, which will trigger a pullback where most returns came from one of 15 managers.
“They were getting capital back to them so quickly on wins. They're like, oh, let's make a bigger allocation.”
Informational edges such as knowing bankruptcy process and bankers generated alpha in distressed investing, but the edge dissipated as people moved between firms and services like Reorg Research flattened the playing field.
“But then like Reorg research comes out, which that's just completely flattened the playing field.”
Income share agreements have not scaled because they were first tried on coding school cohorts rather than top 1 percent talent where an outlier could return 100x, and investors have not yet seen the required tail outcome, so the first deals were not great.
“I think it's best first tried on like whatever the field is, the top 1% talent, where you have the chance to have an outlier that really outperforms.”
Some of the best investors have low EQ with respect to relating to others, showing a strong sense of independence and calm that resists influence, which can make them poor team members who do not give feedback, like Soros selling everything when his back hurt.
“There's definitely exceptions. Some of the investors that I have met that don't necessarily have high EQs with respect to relating to others.”
What looks like an overnight success is typically a decade of learning a craft, plus unique insights, plus a seat with real leverage, plus a confluence event, so luck is a meaningful component and the success can arrive very quickly.
“Overnight successes are 10 years in the making... you get in a seat where you have real leverage... there's definitely some luck involved”
Real alpha comes from having time and permanent capital, as Buffett's advantage demonstrated, because a patient capital base can hold through periods that force short-horizon investors to sell.
“I do believe there's alpha in time. And I believe there's alpha in the permanence of your capital. Going back to Buffet, his big advantages, he had time and permanence of capital.”
A practical way to stretch imagination is to explore what everyone believes and why it is true, asking whether assumed narratives about ratings, deposits, or managers hold, as in the Byron Katie style of inquiry.
“So I do think like exploring what does everyone believe and why is that true?”
Alpha persists in time horizon and permanence of capital, the advantages Warren Buffett exploited, and in being early to understand new technology, although any specific technology edge eventually fades.
“I do believe there's alpha in time. And I believe there's alpha in the permanence of your capital. Going back to Buffet”
Investors should explicitly examine widely held narratives, such as the belief that AAA ratings never default or that deposits are always safe, because assumed narratives make the tail risks behind them invisible until they happen.
“So I do think like exploring what does everyone believe and why is that true?”
Investors should ask where alpha comes from in a leveraged strategy, such as time, informational edge, or liquidity, because alpha from an asset-liability mismatch can persist for a long time and then reverse, so it must be separated from mismatch-driven returns.
“Where is the alpha coming from? And is it a time alpha? Is it an informational edge? Is it liquidity?”
Credit investors must constantly ask what can change to remove their equity cushion, because a loan with 50% loan-to-value becomes equity-like if asset values fall, and debt is forever while ratings agencies lag and private credit has no ratings at all.
“So you just always have to be paranoid as a credit investor, what can change?”
Goodwin's worst trade was buying WorldCom bonds at about 80 cents in 2002, believing an undrawn $500 million revolver guaranteed repayment, and the only way to lose was fraud, which occurred, so the lesson is to identify exactly what can kill a position.
“The only way you could get crushed was fraud... And what happened? Fraud. Fraud happened. So I got crushed.”
Borrowers cannot pay much more than about 15 percent interest, so a company that can afford 15 percent is a good enough business that it should raise equity instead of debt.
“You can't pay 15%. It just doesn't work for almost any company. If you can pay 15%, you don't need debt in a sense.”
Banks are willing to lend to private credit funds at roughly LIBOR plus 250-300 because they sit at the top of the stack of diversified first-lien loans, while the fund earns LIBOR plus 550-600 on the underlying loans, and this spread works because banks were paying almost zero on deposits.
“if I lend at LIBOR plus 250, 300, that's a pretty good deal for me because I'm top of the stack of a first lien position anyway with diversity.”
Successful sports organizations, such as the Steelers scouting historically Black colleges and Billy Beane's analytics approach, find alpha by experimenting beyond the obvious, and investment firms should do likewise by pushing limits and experimenting.
“why were the Pittsburgh Stealers a dominant franchise? Well, they were the first ones to really scout historically black colleges.”
Institutional allocators favor strategies with steady returns, so a private credit allocator reporting 80 to 90 basis points a month looks far better in quarterly meetings than a volatile long-short equity allocator, even with comparable returns.
“Every month, it's 80, 90 basis points, checks in the mail. That's like a pretty powerful position in the last few years.”
Private credit grew from about $250 billion in 2010 to $1.4 trillion and will keep growing, but a consolidation and shakeout is likely, with bigger players benefiting as smaller managers are blown out, as happened in other alternative asset classes.
“It's gone from $250 billion in 2010 to $1.4 trillion... there's going to be a consolidation and it's going to be a shakeout.”
In building an investment firm leader, allocate more points to EQ than IQ, especially humility, knowing when to defer and hiring people smarter than you while helping them reach their potential, because the coaching and managing aspect matters most.
“I think it's more EQ than IQ... there has to be like a humble aspect of the EQ”
Investing is more an infinite game than a goal-driven one, because alpha cannot be set as a daily target, and goals like scale or market share can lead managers to lend at the top of the cycle to companies with weak numbers.
“I was more of the mindset, it was like more The Infinite Game... That's where I think goals can get in the way a bit.”
If one or two funds stumble, other banks will quickly learn about it and start re-evaluating their worst performers, so a problem that looked contained can turn into widespread concern very fast.
“If one of these or two of these situations happen, all the other banks will know this is happening”
Goodwin's peak advantage came from starting in credit derivatives in 1995 when almost no one understood the product, and then trading through the 1997-2002 crisis period, where high credit and equity volatility gave him an edge because he knew the origin of nearly every trade.
“I started in credit derivatives in 1995, almost by default... So then the market picked up as soon as the Asian crisis happened”
Combining a derivatives and optionality background with Fran Biondi's deep-value distress approach gave Goodwin and King Street a sliver of advantage, seeing markets from two angles, which led them to correctly predict that subprime, CRE, and LBO debt would blow up and cause contagion.
“He had deep value, the intersection when those two circles, kind of intersected that sliver, we felt like we had a big advantage”
Synergy in relationships is a form of optionality: the right combination of people and organizations, with complementary rather than identical talents, creates mismatches that produce outsized outcomes, as the Jamal Murray and Nikola Jokić pairing does in basketball.
“The right combinations of people and organizations, I'm a huge believer in synergy when it comes to relationships and that's optionality to me in a sense.”
When capital pauses, bigger firms with more resources and deeper relationships should lean in on the cleanup trade, since they can buy distressed credit at fat-pitch prices the market needs to clear.
“the bigger firms that have more resources and probably deeper relationships are going to see like this cleanup trade is a pretty fat pitch.”
Venture capital has the lowest barrier to entry among alternative asset managers because it does not require SEC registration, prime brokerage, or bank relationships, so two people can raise a $13 million fund, leading to hundreds of small firms that will consolidate.
“You just don't need the SEC registration and prime brokerage and the bank relationships, and it's much easier to set up two people”
Many depositors, including young founders with millions from a Series A, do not understand that FDIC insurance covers only $250,000 and that they become unsecured creditors of their bank, so they make an unexamined bet on bank safety.
“how many people actually understood the FDIC insurance? I don't want to be like, oh, I mean, $250,000 a lot of money.”
A financial adviser given a client who just won $1 billion should recommend putting a portion into T-bills to earn carry, which is a form of short volatility exposure to the federal government rolling its debt.
“You'd be like, well, you should take X percentage of it and put it in T-bills. You have carry.”
Banks that once earned spread on near-zero-cost deposits now face more competitive deposit pricing, so lending to private credit funds at SOFR-linked spreads of about 250 to 300 basis points over LIBOR may no longer be as attractive a business.
“their deposit base is probably getting a little more competitive as well. So it's like is this loan that they're making as good a business in a sense?”
Defaults in private credit are rising, but the full stress of higher interest has not yet appeared in reported results because the rate increase happened so quickly that loan payments and reported figures have not fully caught up.
“So I think going forward, you're seeing a lot more stress on these companies, you're going to have more defaults.”
Private credit grew into a large asset class because near-zero rates created a search for yield, and Fed/OCC rules barred banks from lending to companies above 6x EBITDA, so private equity sponsors turned to private credit for debt financing.
“rates went 0. So there was a search for yield that benefited spread product... banks could not lend to companies greater than 6x EBITDA. So with private equity looking for debt to finance capital structures, private credit was a solution in a sense.”
Talented people entering capital markets should go where change is taking place, such as blockchain for settlement and counterparty risk in payments, and AI for credit, rather than choosing a career based on whether the field is good now.
“I think you have to go in wide open and be like, where is the change going to take place in the capital markets?”
Blockchain could help solve the 40-50-year-old rails of global payments and the settlement and counterparty risk present in listed and over-the-counter markets, though this will not happen tomorrow.
“the global payment system is built on 40, 50-year-old rails. And settlement risk and counterparty risk is real in every kind of -- whether it's a listed market or over-the-counter market, where the blockchain can solve that problem as well.”
NBA and NFL staffs have grown because competition is so fierce that teams seek advantages in a game within the game, such as Belichick's left-footed punter, and the same logic applies to investment firms that must keep pushing limits to find an edge.
“the game within the game... how do you get an advantage?”
Goodwin doubts there is still alpha in quarter-to-quarter long-short equity investing, believing informational edge there has faded over time, unlike alpha from time horizon and permanent capital.
“I don't really understand how going quarter-to-quarter, is there any alpha anymore? I think there was, alpha, at some point.”
During zero-rate periods retirees seeking income bought investment-grade and crossover bond funds as effective money-market substitutes, which exposed them to liquidity risk they did not understand.
“You were getting 0 in a money market fund as a retiree like I need some income. So you'd buy an investment-grade fund or crossover fund and that was effectively your money market fund.”
Wall Street lenders financing positions through warehousing lines have a very good track record of getting repaid, with Credit Suisse as the notable exception.
“Wall Street lenders have a very good track record. outside of the Credit Suisse situation”
The kindest thing anyone has done for Goodwin was his middle-class parents' unconditional support and belief in him and his siblings, with the message to do whatever it takes, even though economics was never part of their conversations.
“They did that with my brother and sister and they just always had belief in us. That unconditional support is the kindest thing.”
Even when funds are blown out, institutional allocators in private credit would likely recover around 70 cents on the dollar rather than zero, unlike venture where a fund can return nothing, so the disappointment will be significant but not catastrophic.
“I could get $0.70 on the dollar back. It's not going to be 0 like you could in venture.”
Watching a market grow from its origin, so that you understand why every trade happens, creates a sense of calm and no surprises, though it did not protect Goodwin from 2008 being far worse than he expected.
“Starting in a market and seeing it grow up... you get like a sense of calm almost. Nothing surprising.”
Assets like Bitcoin and Tesla offered returns of 10,000 times or 50 to 100 times for early holders, which illustrates the value of long volatility lottery-style payoffs that are mispriced in the market.
“Bitcoin, it was public for many years where you could be up 10,000 times your money”
Stan Druckenmiller said that in past recessions he could buy the two-year note because the Fed would cut rates, but that this time is different, illustrating that investing is an unsolvable puzzle with no magic formula.
“I knew the Fed was going to have to cut rates, and I would just buy the two-year note. I can't do that this time. This time is different.”
Ken Griffin takes nothing for granted, and his imagination let him build a securities business that dominated equity trading and options and made about $7 billion in a year, something Goldman Sachs insiders considered silly.
“he takes nothing for granted. He made no assumptions... make $7 billion in a year doing it”
Bitcoin maximalists' argument depends on the world being over-leveraged in debt, and if all debt-to-GDP were zero or dollars backed by gold, their case would be far weaker, so the appeal is rooted in debt.
“If we had 0% debt to GDP, the Bitcoin maximalist wouldn't really have a great argument.”
There is alpha in understanding new technologies such as biotech, AI, or blockchain early, but any given new theme eventually stops persisting, so the edge must keep being renewed by finding the next new thing.
“I think there's alpha in understanding new technology, whether it's biotech or AI or blockchain, but then you always have to find a new thing, doesn't persist.”
Bank lending to funds is hitting a natural limit, with the Fed report citing a couple hundred billion dollars, because private credit fundraising keeps expanding and every new fund needs leverage.
“So there's a natural limit of that, which I think is -- the Fed report, I think it was about a couple of hundred billion dollars.”
Young students often did not understand what they signed up for in ISAs or student loans, which is an education gap that slows adoption of income share agreements.
“Maybe like the 18, 19, 20-year-olds didn't really understand what they were signing up for. Not that they understand what they're signing up for when they're taking student loans.”