John Harris - Resilience and Imagination - [Invest Like the Best, EP. 230]
What this covers
Patrick interviews John Harris, managing partner of Ruane Cunniff, whose Sequoia Fund runs a concentrated portfolio with a fifty-year record. The talk is a stock picker's account of method. Harris says the firm builds no DCFs or screens and only spreads historical numbers, because the numerical part is easy and the edge lies in exhaustive qualitative research. He says about ten investments, returning 5 to 100 times capital, produced most of the firm's results.
The middle of the conversation takes apart the asymptotic growth heuristic behind typical models, and ties it to the skew of power law returns and to investors' habit of imagining downside more easily than upside. Case studies fill out the picture: Walmart's flywheel, Wayfair's customer acquisition and logistics, United Health's hard-to-copy operations, Mark Leonard's early read on niche software, and Gilles Martin's at Eurofins Scientific on testing. Harris also covers the firm's biggest regret, putting only 1 percent of the fund into MasterCard, and argues that opportunity cost of omission outweighs capped losses.
The more contested turns concern the present. Harris suggests the market can still underrate very large digital businesses like Facebook and TSMC, even if 25-times returns are unlikely. He also warns that a generation of investors shaped by nearly free money should not play one note. He ends on temperament, betting that imagination over discipline has made more fortunes, and that investing is more about heart than mind.
Harris argues that durable investment returns come from owning a concentrated set of high-quality, long-duration businesses run by trustworthy people, because the future is unpredictable, returns are driven by rare non-linear winners, and fewer reinvestment decisions mean fewer chances to be wrong.
- Standard DCFs assume linear, asymptotically declining growth, which misses the rare accelerating businesses that drive most returns
- Quality reduces risk mainly because good people and cultures make future surprises tend to be good ones
- Owning great businesses for decades reduces the number of buy and sell decisions, and each sale is another chance to be wrong
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The best businesses run a flywheel where delighting users earns premium returns, which funds reinvestment into a better user proposition, producing more sales, profits, and investment, and building distance from competitors over time, as Walmart did over 40 years with scale, efficiency, and lower prices.
“there's a flywheel effect that happens where you delight your user. As a result, you're able to earn a premium return on your interaction with that user”
Investors should build positions in situations where accelerating or sustained high growth is possible and invest asymmetrically, so that if wrong they are not too wrong, but if right about accelerating growth they can be really, really right, which lets a portfolio perform well despite frequent errors.
“if I'm wrong I won't be too wrong. But if I'm right about that potential for accelerating growth, I can be really, really right.”
Investors find it easier to imagine what can go wrong than what can go right and struggle to conceptualize how right an outcome can be, so most investors guess better at downside than upside.
“It's way easier for people to think about what can go wrong than what can go right.”
To earn a premium return an investor must have a variant perception, a view different from the market's about a business's future, which is hard because the market is generally smart at assessing prospects.
“if you want to earn a premium return, I think it was Michael Steinhardt who coined the phrase, you have to have a variant perception.”
Niche software businesses are inherently sticky, face little competition, and serve important customer needs, giving them pricing power and profit potential that the broader market underappreciated.
“a lot of their realization and the insight was around pricing power and profit potential of businesses that are just super, super sticky, especially niche software businesses”
The most common heuristic investors apply when estimating long-term performance is an asymptotically declining growth rate, so a business growing 15% today is modeled at 12%, 11%, 10% and so on, with margins held flat or rising linearly, which makes the typical DCF very linear.
“the most common heuristic that I think people apply when they start trying to estimate the way a business will perform over the long-term is they assume some kind of asymptotically declining rate of growth”
Equity returns are highly skewed, with most of the return in any distribution explained by a small number of absolute top winners, and the scenarios that generate those winners would not appear in a standard DCF.
“returns are not linear, like most of the return in any equity distribution are explained by the absolute top winners”
Although giants like Facebook and TSMC are unlikely to return 25 times money, the market can still underestimate the quality, growth, and profit potential of very large businesses, especially those in digital, human-capital-based economies that scale faster and more profitably.
“the market can still underestimate the quality, growth potential, and ultimately profit potential of a big business, just like it can a small business.”
Today's dominant generation of investors has seen successful patterns repeat against a backdrop of essentially free money, so the conditions behind those patterns could extend another decade or reverse, and investors should not play one note.
“that has operated from beginning to end against a backdrop of essentially free money.”
A central purpose of owning durable businesses is to minimize the number of predictions and decisions required, so the firm buys one to three stocks a year rather than fifteen, and each sale creates another opportunity to be wrong when the money must be reinvested.
“Instead of buying 15 stocks every year, maybe only have to buy one or two or three.”
The firm's biggest regrets involve things it did not do or sold too soon rather than losses on investments made, because losses on a stock are capped at the capital invested, while the opportunity cost of missing a 5 to 12 times winner is far larger.
“All of them are the things we either didn't do or the businesses that we sold too soon. ... You can only lose what you put in.”
The firm's single biggest mistake was not buying more MasterCard after its failed-trading IPO, when it put only 1 percent of the Sequoia Fund into the stock, which it estimates returned over 100 times its money and would have been far larger with a larger position.
“we put 1% of Sequoia fund into MasterCard. And I think we probably made over a hundred times our money on that investment.”
Screening financial numbers on paper is the easy part that many people can do, while the hard work is exhaustive qualitative research to test whether what looks good on paper is actually as good as it looks, and the closer one looks the less attractive most situations become.
“the numerical part of what we do is the easy part looking at a bunch of numbers on a sheet of paper”
Mark Leonard of Constellation Software recognized, about 15 to 20 years ago, that niche software businesses with sticky products and little competition were far better than average, and a small group including Vista Equity and Thoma Bravo shared that view and could pay more than others thought reasonable.
“a small community of people who figured out, call it 15, 20 years ago, just how great a business software was.”
Gilles Martin of Eurofins Scientific understood earlier than others that testing and measurement businesses could be excellent, buying demand aggressively, because testing has scale and rack density economics, low cost relative to the product's value, and reputational pricing power.
“Gilles understood probably earlier than anybody in the world just how good testing and measurement businesses could be.”
Typical DCF models assume growth declines asymptotically from today's rate (e.g., 15% falling toward 3%) with flat or linear margins, which fails to capture the non-linear trajectories that actually occur, so investors who rely on them underestimate businesses that sustain or accelerate growth.
“the world is not linear, it never works the way you draw it up in a DCF. Everybody knows that. And yet nobody seems to assume it because it's just scary.”
Over fifty years, the firm found that people run and build businesses, so with the right people and culture the inevitable surprises tend to be good, while with the wrong people they tend to be bad, and much of perceived business quality reduces to people and culture.
“if you're with the right people and the right teams and the right cultures, the surprises, the inevitable surprises, tend to be good ones.”
Businesses that invest heavily in hard-to-copy operations, such as United Health's network, scale, data, and systems, earn competitive advantage because the capital and expertise required make the differentiated user experience very difficult to replicate.
“we like businesses that are hard, that require a lot of capital or a lot of expertise in order to provide a differentiated user experience, because hard is hard to copy.”
Harris bets there have been more investing fortunes made from imagination than from discipline; discipline is a basic requirement that avoids patently stupid actions, but beyond that threshold an open mind and imagination compensate better.
“more investing fortunes made from imagination than there have from discipline. You need a basic level of discipline to do what we do well.”
Ruane Cunniff does not build DCFs or screens and rarely builds forward-looking models; Harris only spreads historical numbers to understand what drives a business's profits, because the numerical part is easy and not where the edge lies.
“Never do DCFs, don't do screenings. Because I think one thing I've learned, and I think as a firm we've learned, is that the numerical part of what we do is the easy part”
Wayfair acquired customers cheaply through thoughtful Google advertising, then used a wide selection to convert them, reinvested in logistics by moving from drop shipping to playing a role in goods movement, and thereby improved both buyer and seller sides of its marketplace.
“they realized that if you were thoughtful about the way you advertised on Google, basically you can acquire customers at low cost.”
Investing is more about heart than mind: many smart people with impressive resumes lack great records, and temperamental traits matter most, which can be trained and accentuated but must already be present to a degree.
“Investing is way more about the heart than the mind.”
Over 50 years, about 10 investments drove the vast majority of the firm's returns, all of which were great businesses run by great people bought at sensible prices, with outcomes of 5 to 100 times invested capital.
“there are probably 10 investments that have driven the vast majority of the returns, where we found a really great business run by really great people.”
Anyone who has invested capital for a significant period learns the world is not linear and never works the way a DCF draws it, yet investors still assume linear paths because facing genuine uncertainty about the future is scary.
“the world is not linear, it never works the way you draw it up in a DCF. Everybody knows that. And yet nobody seems to assume it because it's just scary.”
Doing homework means understanding a business from every angle as a long-term owner would, approaching the company like an acquisition rather than a stock trade, and talking to everyone who understands the business until returns diminish and the same answers recur.
“thinking about it the way a long-term business owner would think rather than a holder of a stock. Those are two very different mindsets.”
Thirty to fifty years ago simple quantitative formulas could produce strong results, but because observant people copy successful simple constructs, those formulas stop working and investors must appreciate the qualitative nuance behind the numbers.
“if simple constructs for success work they get copied and eventually paint by numbers doesn't work anymore”
In 2007 to 2008 the firm bought Porsche and shorted Volkswagen to hedge Porsche's stake, but a corporate control battle at Volkswagen sent the shorted shares up 10 times in a week, costing the firm a third of its investors' capital in five days and leaving the fund down 53 percent in 2008.
“those shares that we shorted went up 10 times in one week.”
The firm deliberately owns businesses across many industries, business models, and geographies to avoid being all-in on one trend, accepting that it will rarely be the best manager in any given year but expecting a resilient result over time.
“we are very unlikely to be your best single money manager in any given year, because there's always going to be the firm or the person that's all in”
Businesses that truly delight their users, especially in ways that are hard to replicate, inspire the confidence needed to hold them through 10 to 15 year drawdowns and to make bold assumptions that differ from the market.
“it's just a lot easier to live with businesses that delight their user.”
Fastenal's competitive advantage is culture and hustle rather than scale or patents, built through branch-based personal selling and customer service that founder Bob Kierlin cultivated, attracting people who work harder and compound over time.
“Fastenal's not so much a scale business as it's just a culture and a hustle business.”
Long-term forecasts 3 to 10 years out are very hard and grow less reliable with experience, so the main way quality reduces risk is by letting investors own businesses with long duration run by trusted people, which minimizes the number of predictions they must make.
“the longer I do this the less confident I get in my own ability to predict what the future holds. 10 years is just a really long time.”
A key pattern for successful investments is that the picture gets better the closer one looks, which is very rare; in most cases deeper diligence makes the situation less appealing, but when the picture improves, the firm's batting average in those cases is very high.
“I'd say one big pattern match for us for successful investments is when you look closer and closer and the picture actually looks better, that's very rare.”
Two businesses with similar numbers can be radically different enterprises with different trajectories depending on what they do and who runs them, so assuming qualitative equivalence between companies based on numbers alone is dangerous.
“Assuming qualitative equivalents in investing is a dangerous thing.”
Testing and measurement businesses such as LabCorp and Quest have mostly fixed-cost facilities where added volume lowers unit cost, and because tests are cheap relative to the product but critical, they carry pricing power and reputational advantage.
“The cost of testing your typical product, especially a pharmaceutical product relative to the cost of the actual product is very low. But the importance of the test is very high.”
Only occasionally, after enough homework, can an investor find a business whose growth will not follow the declining curve, and such bets are bold and hard for the human psyche to make, but investors open to accelerating scenarios can build portfolios that do well.
“Every once in a while, not always by any stretch, but every once in a while you can find a business where you can have confidence that actually the growth is not going to follow that asymptomatically declining curve”
Some businesses are so good that they do not need exceptional people or culture, and MasterCard is the firm's biggest example, since its leadership varied across generations yet it was still one of the best businesses ever invented.
“there are some businesses that are so good, you don't need really special people.”
Owning a concentrated group of high-quality businesses run by high-quality people, bought under a common-sense valuation framework and improved each year, makes a good outcome very likely regardless of which macro scenario unfolds.
“the odds of getting a good result are really, really high, come what may.”
Trend-driven winners such as Phelps Dodge, Cleveland-Cliffs, and Mittal Steel in the mid-2000s, driven by the emerging market super cycle, were forgotten, showing that today's winning sectors like cloud software may also fade.
“if you had filled your portfolio with Phelps Dodge and Cleveland-Cliffs and Mittal Steel, and nobody remembers that stuff anymore.”
Holding TJX for about 20 years, Fastenal for about 15, and Google for about 10 has been central to the firm's results, showing that long ownership of great businesses captures rare compounding.
“Owning businesses like a TJX for, I think we own TJX from beginning to end for 20 years. Fastenal is a business... we owned for probably like something on the order of 15 years. Google, as you pointed out, 10 years.”
Michael Steinhardt advised Harris early in his career to marry the right person, arguing that most other life mistakes can be recovered from if that decision is right, and Harris extends it to choosing the right parents and family support.
“Just marry the right girl. He said, You can pretty much screw everything else up in life if you get that one decision right.”
Physical capital imposes a dampener on non-linearity, whereas in purely digital businesses the absence of physical constraints allows even more non-linear outcomes, which is consistent with what has happened.
“physical is like a dampener on non-linearity and that in the absence of the physical constraints, you could get even more nonlinear outcomes.”
Harris believes there will always be a place for active management in equities, because even though opportunity has become more episodic and less idiosyncratic, the alpha available is still more than enough for firms like Ruane, Cunniff to keep outperforming.
“there still is and always will be a place for active management in the equity markets.”
In a competitive capitalist economy where everyone improves every year, investors must keep getting better at diligence by finding new information sources, cultivating human sources, using alternative datasets, widening their circle of competence, and broadening geographic reach.
“in a competitive world the one thing I'm certain of is you need to get better every year because somebody else is.”
The kindest thing anyone has done for Harris is provide unconditional love from his parents and wife, creating a home base where no matter what happens in the world, someone loves him, which he tries to pass on to his children.
“truly unconditional love and the knowledge that no matter what happens in the big real world”
Investment opportunity has become more episodic and less idiosyncratic over time, but it peaked a few years ago and is now more idiosyncratic and less correlated than two or three years earlier.
“it's a more idiosyncratic market and a less correlated market today than it was I'd say two or three years ago”
When a drawdown occurs in an opportunity-rich environment, investors should mentally compartmentalize the loss and focus on the abundant opportunities ahead, because the drawdown becomes a memory within a few years if they capitalize.
“you need to just mentally compartmentalize the fact that you were down whatever you were down.”
Harris wishes the firm had put its fund entirely into cloud software five years ago, which would have made it look like a genius, showing the appeal of concentrated bets in hindsight.
“I wish we had just filled the fund with cloud software five years ago. We would look like complete geniuses.”
The fund fell about 53 percent in 2008, its first full year, and Harris now regards the episode as receded into the background because the opportunity-rich period that followed made the loss a memory.
“We ended up in 2008 down 53%, I think. It was our first full year of operating the fund.”