Joey Levin - Building an Anti-Conglomerate - [Invest Like the Best, EP. 264]
What this covers
Patrick interviews IAC CEO Joey Levin, who joined the company in 2003 and became CEO in 2015, after Barry Diller built it. The talk is mostly case studies in how a company that builds businesses operates. It covers what Forever Timeline Ownership does to incentives, why a spinoff should recover at least its tax basis, and why IAC won't centralize marketing, sales, or technology. Levin also describes how he gets to know a new business, how incubation works, and which vertical markets attract IAC, mainly those where change is already underway.
The examples are specific. About.com was bought for synergies with Ask.com. Those arrived, but profit fell from 60 million to losses of about 20 million a year once Google favored vertical information. Neil Vogel's team then split it into brands like Very Well and Spruce, which became Dotdash. Match.com struggled with mobile because app stores took 30 percent of revenue, while Tinder was built mobile-native in a separate incubator. Service Magic, bought in 2004, grew into Angi. Brand changes carry a hidden cost, since the old URL is forgotten and traffic falls to near zero.
The later sections turn to marketing, capital, and people. Levin holds that product quality and paid acquisition are complements, a contested claim, and that the best marketers ask what must change to make a channel profitable. He lists IAC's full capital toolkit, and says deals turn on the qualitative thesis more than on a 10 to 30 percent price difference. He argues companies replace leaders too late, and says he often reverses himself while writing a note defending a position. He closes with a contested forecast that web3 will transform ticketing, fan clubs, and brand interaction for a decade.
Levin argues IAC succeeds as an anti-conglomerate because it holds businesses on a forever timeline, spins mature ones off to shareholders, and keeps operating leaders accountable rather than centralizing functions for cost savings, while the winning move in each market is to make the product convenient enough that one answer replaces a list of choices.
- Forever-timeline ownership and spinoffs avoid the in-period and out-period incentive distortions of finite capital, and businesses that stay under an umbrella too long optimize for the parent and atrophy
- Centralization is rejected because cost savings are finite while revenue upside is infinite, and centralizing removes leader accountability and flexibility
- Winning products shift from showing many options to delivering the one that works, and capital and CAC decisions are judged on whether the qualitative future bet is right
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When a brand changes online, its URL becomes forgotten and traffic drops to near zero until the business rebuilds it over time, which makes brand transitions especially costly.
“this happens when you change a brand online, your URL becomes forgotten for a period, or you go to an unknown URL, and so you have no traffic”
IAC uses the whole capital toolkit, including issuing public stock, issuing subsidiary stock, using a private subsidiary as currency to buy Angie's List, convertible securities with a premium, buybacks paired with issuance, and debt that travels with spun-off companies.
“we used that currency to buy Angie's List, meaning we merged Home Advisor into Angie's List and ended up with 87% of that company”
Web3 and crypto will follow earlier web and mobile phases, where consumers stop asking whether a product is web or mobile, and the fact that a unique digital item can exist is a transformative innovation that will change ticketing, fan clubs, and brand interaction for at least a decade.
“The big innovation that happened, and that will be an innovation for years and years, decades, at least a decade, is that a unique digital thing can exist.”
Customer acquisition spending is not a sign of a bad business, since a better product makes distribution easier, and acquisition accelerates a good product; IAC's position is that product quality and paid acquisition are complements.
“customer acquisition is something that only bad businesses spend money on. If your product is good enough, then you don't need any customer acquisition costs. ... I never believed that.”
The best marketers do not just push spend until a channel hits a wall; they ask what must change in the product, supply, or pricing for a channel to become profitable, and they narrow markets, like roofers rather than plumbers in Indianapolis, when a channel does not work.
“The best have a very different approach. What they say is, this channel needs to make sense for us as an acquisition... Well, what do we change about the product?”
Levin often reverses his own position while writing a note to the group defending a solution, because organizing the reasoning on paper reveals flaws, and he considers this ability to change one's mind an important trait for helping an organization move forward.
“a significant portion of the time I sit down and I start to write that note to the group explaining why it's the right answer, and by the time I get to the end, I've reversed my position completely.”
Businesses kept under a parent umbrella for too long stop being optimized for their own success and start optimizing for the parent's other goals, then atrophy, which IAC observed from its own and others' experience.
“you see businesses stay under the umbrella for too long, and they start to no longer be optimized for their own success. They optimize for other things and then atrophy in that context.”
When IAC spins off a business it tries to recover at least its tax basis, usually tax-free, so the capital can be recycled, and the shareholders then fund the business with pure incremental profit.
“when we are spinning something out, we try to at least get our basis back ... we get that tax free so that we can essentially recycle the capital.”
IAC avoids centralizing functions like marketing, sales, or technology because centralizing removes accountability and flexibility from the business leader, and cost savings from shared functions are finite while the revenue upside each leader can capture is infinite.
“the cost side of a business, by definition, is finite. Each business that has it knows that's finite. The revenue side is infinite for all those businesses.”
IAC embraces change partly by challenging its own businesses, backing direct competitors to its own bets when it believes a category will work, and preferring to disrupt itself rather than wait to be disrupted by someone else.
“We'd rather, of course, disrupt ourselves, then have somebody else disrupt us, and that's also central to the philosophy.”
IAC invests where the future is already obvious rather than trying to see around corners, and the test is whether the new product is clearly meaningfully better than the incumbent, even though the winning company is unknown in advance.
“It's where the future is obvious. It's not so much seeing around corners. When you see what the new product looks like relative to the incumbent product, you know that the new product is going to be meaningful.”
Early search, such as Google returning billions of results, was powerful but practically useless for end users, and even a short list of ten or three results is less helpful than a single trustworthy answer.
“a billion results is obviously useless. It speaks to the power of the platform, but it's obviously practically useless for the end user.”
Match.com struggled to move into mobile because app store distribution took 30 percent of revenue, creating resistance, while Tinder was built mobile-native in a separate IAC incubator and never built a desktop product.
“for Match to go into the app store was to give up 30% of revenue to Apple, or to Android at the time. There was, for good reason, a lot of resistance to that.”
After horizontal About.com strategies failed three times, Neil Vogel's team broke the brand into new vertical brands, such as Very Well for health and Spruce for home, and moved content into them, creating a sharp V-shaped dip before growth resumed as Dotdash.
“we have to break it up because we tried every version of horizontal, and horizontal doesn't work and we have to go vertical.”
Multiple brands should exist only when each brand serves a distinct demographic that requires different positioning despite similar content and supply; otherwise, the company should consolidate spending behind one brand, since a second brand needs a clear reason to exist beyond shelf space.
“This brand serves this demographic. This brand has similar content, similar supply, might have identical supply base, but serves a different demographic, so it needs to be positioned in a different way”
IAC's operating model is unusual because it invests on a forever timeline, whereas most capital is organized around a finite in-period and out-period, which distorts what people do in each phase; for IAC there is no out period, so a spun-off business must be doing well forever since shareholders receive it directly.
“Investing on a forever timeline is a very different structure than a lot of capital is organized. Most capital is organized with a finite thing.”
The main characteristic IAC looks for in a vertical market is a significant change underway or necessary in that category, with a preference for change already underway, since large sectors like healthcare can need change for a long time without progress.
“a good value catalyst usually is significant change underway, in that category, or significant change necessary. Although, I go certainly more towards underway, than necessary.”
IAC bought About.com expecting synergies with Ask.com and high executability, and the synergies were realized in the first year, but the company missed that the world, especially Google, wanted vertically focused information rather than horizontal sites, so profit collapsed from 60 million to losses of about 20 million a year.
“we crushed the synergies in the first year ... but we absolutely missed that the world, Google specifically, but the world did not want horizontally focused information sites. The world wanted vertically focused information.”
If you cannot profitably reach customers looking for plumbers in Indianapolis, you should ask what supply or product changes are needed, and if demand reachability is possible, the problem is solvable and scales when inverted.
“It can't be possible that we can't reach customers profitably who are looking for plumbers in Indianapolis. When you invert that, that is when it starts to really scale infinitely.”
IAC makes the qualitative strategic decision first and runs detailed financial models only after a strategy seems sound, because price differences of 10 to 30 percent rarely determine the outcome of deals compared with whether the future thesis is right.
“we're not running a model until we're pretty far along in the decision”
IAC often discovers it has entered a different category than intended, as Service Magic, bought in 2004 as part of CityGrid's local strategy, evolved into the Angie home-services business whose category is now the homeowner's journey rather than Yellow Pages local advertising.
“Sometimes we're very surprised by this. We think we're getting into one category and we end up with a new category.”
Levin says it is very hard to identify a rule for winning incubations, since talent needs differ by phase and early talent is sometimes wrong for later phases, so the most consistent factor is the ability to keep adapting, looking for bigger opportunities, and changing the product or monetization as needed.
“some of our most successful businesses of all time where the very early talent spark was unequivocally the wrong talent for the next phase”
Companies consistently change leaders too late, and leaders often become overly focused on external market activity rather than the internal product, customers, and employees, which is an early warning sign that a leader is no longer right.
“we're always too late on making these changes. ... It is similar when some get overly obsessed with what's happening on the outside, as against what's happening on the inside”
Capital sourcing and allocation should be decided by situation rather than a fixed policy, with the full toolkit always available and the question of where to get capital asked alongside where to deploy it.
“the whole toolkit always has to be available for us and it gets the same capital allocation discussion. In that discussion we are thinking about, okay, where do we put it, but also where do we get it”
Tinder was built in an IAC incubator rather than inside Match, and building it outside the parent was helpful to its early success before it later moved into Match.
“Tinder was built in an incubator in IAC, not even an incubator in Match.”
Strong organizations make marketing create the inputs that product and supply need, and that direction can be changed organizationally by breaking the organization into small teams optimizing for conversion.
“is marketing just receiving inputs and then doing the best they can? Or, is marketing creating inputs and reversing that? You can organizationally change that direction.”
Levin argues that IAC businesses can execute change and hold leaders accountable much faster than public or private companies with boards, because groups tend toward groupthink and politeness and move slowly.
“There's a level of group think. There's a level of politeness. There's a level of things that just, by virtue of being a group, move much slower.”
IAC gathers top leaders each year and gives them experimental gifts, such as Bitcoin and NFTs, so they can learn what emerging assets are, on the theory that these technologies may transform some businesses though incumbents are less likely to transform than new competitors.
“I do think it's more likely, frankly, that there will be new things that we start, that compete with our businesses, that are more successful in experimenting with these things”
Angie's category evolved from the Yellow Pages list, to Angie's List with reviews, to HomeAdvisor matching up to three providers, to a current product where a homeowner describes a problem and gets a single fixed-price solution, which has produced the highest customer satisfaction IAC has seen by an order of magnitude.
“what is now the fastest growing solution is one where somebody says, here's what's wrong with my house. And we say, okay, it costs $250 to fix that.”
Large addressable markets are an important success factor for IAC investments, but there are exceptions, as Shopify grew out of a small snowboard shop project because its founder was exceptional and kept expanding.
“One for sure is large addressable markets. What are you going for? If you're going for something very small, then you can succeed, and then you'll be very small.”
Businesses whose leaders describe the exit and the valuation multiple from the first day usually signal a bad sign, because IAC is looking to build category-changing businesses forever, which requires a different founder personality.
“There are businesses, or business leaders or entrepreneurs ... who say from the get go, here's what we're going to do. Here's how we're going to exit. ... That usually is a bad sign, because they're coming in with a plan to get out.”
IAC's most successful mature businesses are spun off to shareholders rather than held indefinitely, meaning the parent gives them to its own shareholders who then own them directly, and the spinoff is treated as a response to readiness rather than an exit.
“We take our best and most successful businesses, and instead of saying, what many do, which is let's hold onto that business. We say, okay, it's ready, and we give it to our shareholders.”
IAC's weekly capital allocation discussions put every option on the table, including spinning off or re-buying businesses such as Angie, buybacks, acquisitions, and new starts, and no option is permanently ruled out.
“Capital allocation is the most important thing that we do. And it is every week we are sitting down and talking about that.”
Barry Diller's most distinctive influence on Levin is relentlessly raising the ambition bar, challenging teams who aim for a 100 million revenue or profit business as too small, and refusing to tolerate things that do not work.
“One is pushing me and others to always think bigger and more ambitious.”
No single rule predicts winners: some businesses with the earliest exceptional talent had the wrong talent for later phases, and large addressable markets matter but very small starts can grow into large companies.
“there's different talent at different phases, and it's not one thing that says the biggest winners are when we found some amazing human so early in their lives.”
IAC shut down its first incubator, Hatch Labs, after Tinder succeeded, treating Tinder as a one-in-a-million outcome that did not justify keeping the incubator running, and rebuilt the incubator only in recent years.
“Tinder came out of Hatch Labs. It was the dumbest thing anyone's ever done, or the smartest thing anyone's ever done, which is we shut down Hatch Labs after Tinder.”
Making marketing create product and sales inputs rather than just receive them requires an organization where everyone optimizes for the same metric, and this is easier to build from scratch than to transition in an existing company.
“is marketing just receiving inputs and then doing the best they can? Or, is marketing creating inputs and reversing that?”
It is very hard for an established institution to change itself dramatically, so it is easier to take learnings from one product and build a native product in the new medium or platform.
“I think that it's very hard for an institution to change itself dramatically. It is definitely easier to take the learnings that you have from the one product, and then apply it to something that builds a native”
Before online dating, finding a partner relied on happenstance or newspaper and magazine personals, a very large advertising category that offered no matching, which dynamic matching products then displaced.
“that was a very large category of advertising dollars in newspapers and magazines. So we said, okay, there's this static thing that doesn't do any matching”
IAC's NewCo incubator starts businesses with little capital, builds small amounts of product and marketing, and only adds capital when engagement passes a threshold, though Levin admits it is unclear whether this iterative approach beats giving teams a large pool of capital and more attempts.
“if the response on the marketing is above a certain threshold, and if the product resonates enough ... then we say, Okay, let's keep going. More capital”
IAC consolidated Angie's List and HomeAdvisor too slowly, and Barry Diller was right that the change should have come sooner, because the company could not articulate how a consumer would choose between the two brands while spending heavily on marketing, with HomeAdvisor brand awareness stuck despite a billion dollars of spending.
“where he was right in the end that we had moved too slowly to make this. He was pushing to make this change sooner, and I was resisting making this change.”
Organizations cannot solve issues unless they surface and challenge them, and this candor and transparency, learned from Barry Diller, is essential because unchallenged decisions can lead to the wrong answer.
“If you're not talking about what the issues are, you're not going to solve the issues.”
Voice user interfaces cannot present ten options, so they will push user interfaces broadly toward delivering one answer.
“The voice says, here's the answer. I think that'll be increasingly true of the way user interfaces work.”
IAC used stock to buy Ask Jeeves while buying back half the stock it issued, because the seller wanted stock but IAC did not want to dilute as much, and it has also used private subsidiary stock and public subsidiary currency for deals like Angie's List and Handy.
“we acquired Ask Jeeves. We did that for stock, but we also at the same time said we were going to buy back half the stock that we were issuing”
IAC recognized that travel would move online and acquired multiple competing travel brands (Expedia, Hotels.com, Hotwire), accepting that it did not know which would win.
“Is it Expedia that's going to win, or hotels.com that's going to win, or Hotwire? Well, we ended up with all three of those”
Tobi Lutke built Shopify for his snowboard shop without expecting to take over e-commerce, but his exceptional ability let the small starting point grow into a global platform.
“When Tobi built Shopify he was building something for his snowboard shop and did a great job with that.”
A large share of customer spending is concentrated in a few platforms, so successful businesses must master how those platforms work and be early on new platforms, and IAC's aggregated P&L included roughly a billion dollars of customer acquisition spending.
“staying ahead on Customer Acquisition Costs is a huge portion of, if you aggregated ISC's P&L, huge dollars spent; a billion dollars spent.”
IAC merged its private subsidiary HomeAdvisor into Angie's List, using private company currency to end up with 87 percent of the combined company, and later used public subsidiary currency to buy Handy.
“we used that currency to buy Angie's List, meaning we merged Home Advisor into Angie's List and ended up with 87% of that company”
Pursuing a very small market caps outcomes at small size, so a large addressable market paired with ambitious vision is an important success factor, though small focused starts can still scale when executed exceptionally well.
“If you're going for something very small, then you can succeed, and then you'll be very small.”
Evolution is important because a business needs many options, such as many hotels or flights, so that the one that best fits can be selected; the next convenience jump is then built within reality, not in an ideal form.
“you need all those hotels or all those flights or all those whatever in there to pick the one you couldn't otherwise get there.”
Levin suggests the debate over centralization and decentralization in Web3 is less important than whether successful players truly adopt Web3's stated principles, implying many do not.
“how much of the espouse principles of Web3 are actually being truly adopted by the successful players of Web3?”
Web3 and crypto will follow the pattern of web and mobile, where users stop asking which platform a product is on and simply use the product, such as Tinder or Uber.
“No one says anymore, Oh, is this a web product or is this a mobile product? It's just Tinder or it's Uber?”
Booking.com reportedly scaled search marketing by dividing into tiny three-person teams all optimizing for the same conversion metric, and transitioning an existing organization to this is very hard, though accountability can be moved.
“They divided into tiny teams, three-person teams, to go after this, where everyone was optimizing for the same thing, conversion.”
IAC shifted from presenting consolidated earnings to owning its identity as a multi-business company, communicating capital allocation and a sum-of-the-parts view to shareholders, and the director test shows most directors could not state aggregate earnings per share.
“We should own the fact that we're a multi-business business. And we should lean into that.”
Over Levin's tenure as CEO, IAC shifted from trying to present itself as a consolidated company to openly owning its identity as a multi-business company that is valued on a sum-of-the-parts basis, with its first shareholder letter articulating this.
“We should own the fact that we're a multi-business business. And we should lean into that.”
Jack Welch, while an advisor to IAC, became a close friend and mentor who brought Levin into welcoming settings at personal cost to his own brand and capital, which Levin considers the kindest thing anyone has done for him.
“he held my hand in a way and brought me with him to a bunch of people and to a bunch of things”
Convenience for the customer, enabled by technology, is a better frame than technology itself, and what counts as an obvious future is whatever makes things more convenient for the customer.
“Is it more convenient for the customer? Is that maybe the right summation instead of technology focused?”
IAC's spinoff philosophy was not a top-down plan: Expedia was spun off because it was right for Expedia at the time, and only after several spinoffs did IAC recognize a repeatable model and decide to continue it.
“Expedia was the first. And when we spun Expedia, it was the right decision for Expedia at that time. But there was not a decision, which is, let's start doing this as a model.”
Kindness is best defined as giving up one's own social capital to benefit someone else, which Patrick illustrates with a cousin who introduced him to his future wife and best man.
“I love the sacrifice and the spending of capital, the social capital to benefit somebody else. It's a beautiful thing”
Levin finds his greatest personal joy in seeing shareholders and employees succeed, which he says gives him more satisfaction than his own financial gains.
“absolutely the things that bring me the most personal joy is when the people around us are doing well, are succeeding.”
Levin argues that although it is better to lose less money, losing 270 million is not much better than losing 300 million, and paying 30 million more for a good investment is not the decisive factor, but a wrong qualitative thesis is.
“it doesn't feel much better to lose 270 million than it feels to lose 300 million dollars.”
Monetization timing is a strategic choice: sometimes you should not monetize early, but sometimes it is essential because you must control your own destiny to keep innovating.
“There are times to do it. There are times not to do it. There are times that it's absolutely essential, because you have to control your own destiny to be able to continue to innovate.”
IAC owns about 85 percent of Angi and has publicly said it considered spinning it off and then decided against it, while still reviewing whether to spin it off or buy it back in.
“IAC owns 85%, the public owns 15%. At one point said publicly, we were thinking about spinning it, and then we decided not to.”
Nearly every startup pitch deck now centers on lifetime value to customer acquisition cost, reflecting how central acquisition economics have become.
“every pitch deck you see on every company is LTV to CAC, Lifetime Value to Customer Acquisition Costs”
Levin attributes his rise from junior employee to CEO to luck, speaking candidly, acting like an owner, forming a point of view and being willing to push on it, and being the most prepared person on each deal.
“I always tried to be the most prepared person on something. If we were looking at a deal, I wanted to make sure I know as much as could be known about that company”
IAC gave top leaders Bitcoin at roughly $10,000 without first buying it, leaving the company effectively naked short and exposed to rising liabilities until it bought the coins around $15,000.
“it turned out we were naked short Bitcoin because we hadn't bought them yet. So the liability just kept going up and we had no idea where it was going to stop.”
IAC's addiction medication venture Oar, founded by Jonathan Hunt Glassman, began in one state with ugly packaging to test demand, then moved to better packaging and more states after people appreciated the product.
“We started in one state, we built the product, we started shipping the product. We shipped it in ugly boxes with terrible packaging”
Expedia was spun off from IAC in 2004 or 2005, around when Levin joined IAC in 2003 as a junior employee.
“We spun off Expedia in 2004, or 2005, '04 or '05, I'm suddenly forgetting. I joined IAC in 2003”
The Meredith acquisition was disastrously wrong, moving IAC from looking like a hero to a zero very quickly.
“And then we just did this acquisition Meredith that was absolutely disastrously wrong. We went from hero to zero on that one very, very quickly.”
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