Jay Hoag - Calibrating Market Adoption - [Invest Like the Best, EP. 244]
What this covers
The conversation starts with Hoag's formative years: a mentor who told him he would be useless until he had lost money on a recommendation, and the batting-average view of investing that followed. It then turns to how TCV came about. The whole venture industry raised under $2 billion in 1991, and TCV's first fund in 1995 was $100 million, a size the founders assumed would stay small. In 1990 only 31 public technology companies were worth more than $1 billion. Hoag contrasts that with technology holding nine of the ten most valuable companies by the end of 2020, and he argues the big tech firms' best days are not behind them.
Much of the range comes through company stories. Reed Hastings invested forward into streaming while Netflix was still thriving on DVDs, and TCV's structured financing in spring 2001 helped Netflix survive the post-bubble winter. Peloton was rejected repeatedly because John Foley wanted to own the entire stack. Hoag also compares Facebook's execution with Twitter's, and describes the Desert of Disillusionment most great companies pass through. The Five Criteria Framework puts a slightly crazy visionary CEO in fifth place, and Hoag admits the line between genius and crazy is hard to judge in advance.
The more contested claims concern Crossover Investing, where he says private and public experience improve each other, and the lower Loss Ratio of backing growth-stage companies once technology risk is gone. He also forecasts that pandemic-driven adoption is permanent and that the next fintech generation (Nubank, Revolut, Trade Republic) will list with long runways.
Hoag argues TCV's track record comes from calibrating market adoption in growth-stage, crossover investments, backing visionary but slightly crazy founders, and holding long-term conviction through near-term losses and volatility.
- Growth-stage investing after technology risk is eliminated lowers loss rates while still capturing large winners
- Visionary founders see futures others cannot, so their ideas look crazy and are underpriced at the start
- Private-market experience and public-market patience reinforce each other, so crossover investing is an edge
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Rich Barton's insight was that data locked in verticals like travel could be unlocked for consumers as compute power grew, so Expedia moved mainframe-based travel-agent search onto Windows NT servers and made it available on the web, a huge unlock for the industry.
“they put that search power onto a NT server, Windows NT for the non-historians, and made it available via a website.”
Investors act as pattern recognizers, so a contrarian concept like Peloton's home fitness gets dismissed because the road is littered with failed home-fitness companies, even though contrarian ideas can hold the keys to success.
“Investors like to be pattern recognizers and sift through, 'Ah, this reminds me of XYZ.'”
Investors should stay balanced: avoid getting carried away in great times, support CEOs in tough times, and ask hard questions professionally, since differentiation comes from partnership during downturns rather than cheerleading when things go well.
“It's super easy to be a cheerleader when everything's going well.”
Almost all great companies go through a desert of disillusionment where private or public investors decide they are no longer worthy of holding, as Facebook did at its IPO when the world shifted to mobile, so long-term investors should stay with the vision.
“almost all great companies go through a desert of disillusionment, where private investors, or public investors, decide that they're not worthy of sticking with.”
Clarity of a company's north star is critically important because it lets every decision be tested against one goal, and focus, as Netflix practiced, prevents distraction by advertising or portal-style expansions, though pivots and forward investment can still be justified.
“I think clarity of north star for a company is critically important.”
The venture industry raised under $2 billion in 1991, TCV's first fund in 1995 was $100 million, and in 1990 only 31 public technology companies had market caps above $1 billion, so the scale of technology investing has changed by several orders of magnitude.
“the entire venture industry in 1991, raised under $2 billion”
A mentor told Hoag he would be of no value until he had lost money on a recommendation, and Hoag came to see this as valuable because investing requires taking many swings and is a batting-average business rather than one where you are always right.
“it is a batting average business. It's not a situation where you are always going to be right”
Being a private investor makes TCV a better public investor and vice versa, because the private side yields detailed trend information unavailable to public investors and the public side shapes private decisions, so the firm should not be bucketed as either.
“by being a private investor, it made us better public market investors. And then being a public market investor, it makes us better private investor.”
TCV invests in growth stage after technology risk has been eliminated, so its focus is calibrating market adoption, which should carry lower risk and a lower loss ratio, even though winners return smaller multiples than early-stage bets.
“when a technology risk has been eliminated, and what we're really trying to do is calibrate market adoption. That inherently should be a lower risk approach.”
A base requirement for a crossover firm is sufficient presence, brand, fund size, or team to see enough deal flow to pick winners and avoid losers, since deciding on a small reference set is suboptimal.
“you're making decisions on a small reference set, that sort of table stakes.”
In 1990 there were only 31 publicly traded technology companies with market caps above $1 billion and 13 more valued between $500 million and $1 billion, with few in software, showing how small the public technology landscape was.
“there were only 31 publicly traded technology companies that had north of a billion dollars in market gap”
Among the 10 most valuable companies in the world, technology held one spot in 2005, three in 2010, and nine at the end of 2020, with combined market cap rising from $300 billion to $9.5 trillion, and Hoag argues the big tech companies' best days are not behind them.
“I look back 2005 of the 10 most valuable companies in the world, one was technology. In 2010, it was three. At the end of last year, it was nine.”
The pandemic forced accelerated adoption of technology in areas like video conferencing, payments, digital signing, and real estate, and these trends that might have taken years have become permanent, enlarging the market size for leading companies in those segments.
“I think those changes are permanent and it means the size of the price has gotten ever bigger for those segments”
Technology historically produced a small number of enormous winners and many losers, and in the last 10 to 15 years it has produced a small number of absolutely enormous winners plus a set of companies that did well, so portfolio construction should reflect that.
“in the last 10, 15 years, it's really been about a small number of absolutely enormous winners”
The current generation of fintech companies such as Nubank, WorldRemit, Revolut, and Trade Republic is growing dramatically and competing with established financial services firms that are not delighting customers, and the next generation will come public with long runways.
“the old line are not delighting their consumers”
In 1991 the entire venture capital industry raised under $2 billion, and TCV's first fund in 1995 was $100 million, which the founders assumed would stay small permanently, a assumption they were badly wrong about.
“the entire venture industry in 1991, raised under $2 billion”
Reed Hastings saw while Netflix was succeeding with DVDs that DVDs would taper off, and he invested forward into streaming when it was unclear whether download or streaming would win, an insight no one else in the market shared.
“as a visionary, he's able to see a future world where DVDs will start to taper off. That was in nobody's consciousness.”
The fifth criterion is an exceptional visionary CEO who is probably a little crazy, who hires great team members, plays for the long term rather than the short term, and lets the executive team execute hard.
“is this an exceptional visionary CEO who probably is a little crazy?”
Visionary entrepreneurs like Brian Chesky and Reed Hastings succeeded by seeing futures others could not, such as Airbnb's stranger-hosting model, which looked illogical at the time, and Netflix's shift from DVDs to streaming, which was in nobody's consciousness.
“as a visionary, he's able to see a future world where DVDs will start to taper off. That was in nobody's consciousness.”
The line between visionary genius and batshit crazy is not always clear, so the fifth criterion is an exceptional visionary CEO who is somewhat crazy, which Hoag says is hard to know ahead of time but is key to outcomes.
“the line between visionary genius and batshit crazy is not always clear.”
If an idea seems too logical, it may not be the exceptional opportunity, but ideas that seem somewhat crazy can be tested against trend lines in compute cost, storage cost, and consumer behavior, and these have often produced the greatest opportunities.
“if they're too logical, that may not be the exceptional opportunity, but if there's somewhat crazy and you can poke around a little bit to see if it makes sense.”
Peloton was rejected repeatedly because John Foley wanted to control the entire ecosystem, including devices, studio content, instructors, stores, software, and delivery fleet, a model that seemed too costly and complex at the time, though it created a magical consumer experience.
“He wanted to control the entire ecosystem.”
In spring 2001, when there was almost no capital for consumer e-commerce, TCV stepped in to provide a structured financing that helped Netflix reach cash-flow breakeven and survive the post-bubble nuclear winter, which later proved a strong investment.
“There was not a penny available in the world, much less millions of dollars for a consumer facing eCommerce company in the spring of 2001.”
A crazy-seeming idea is worth investigating when trend lines in cost of compute, cost of storage, and consumer behavior indicate the vision will play out over the next one to ten years, even if the offering is not yet visible.
“if the different trend lines around cost to compute or cost of storage or consumer behavior will indicate that over the next 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10 years, the vision of the future will play out”
Facebook and Twitter addressed similar opportunities, but Facebook's superior execution took it from roughly $1.5 billion of revenue at TCV's 2010 investment to $86 billion last year and a trillion-dollar market cap, about 15 to 20 times Twitter's value, showing that execution is hard to see ahead of time yet decisive.
“There was superior execution of Facebook”
Common mistakes include assuming big tech's better days are behind it and treating a technology company's valuation above three physical counterparts as an anomaly, when growth prospects justify the premium.
“I personally think that it's nonsense.”
The largest public technology companies have the best business models on earth, with unbelievable engagement, unprecedented margins and cash-flow characteristics, and significant user growth ahead, so the view that their better days are behind them is nonsense.
“I personally think that it's nonsense. These are the best business models on the face of the Earth”
A strong consumer business has a unique value proposition combining value, convenience, and selection, as Netflix's DVD subscription did with unlimited rentals, mailed delivery, and near-complete catalog, and most companies only have one or two of the three.
“Is this company providing a three headed combination of value, convenience, and selection.”
Small numbers of incredible people can do vast amounts of work, so firms should surround themselves with stunning colleagues and invest heavily in technology tools, since the difference between great and good investors is an order of magnitude, not 30 percent.
“the difference between investors is not like, well, somebody's 30% better”
The gap between great and good investors is an order of magnitude, not a modest percentage like an engineer's 30 percent, because great investors have a unique magic beyond school, intelligence, or work ethic, so TCV seeks to attract, incent, and retain that magic.
“The difference, again, is an order of magnitude. There is something very unique about a great investor, it's not where they went to school”
Backing visionary founders means being willing to be thought an idiot for some period of time, since the biggest opportunities can come from being right in a contrarian way that others initially reject.
“you have to be willing to be thought of as an idiot for some period of time.”
TCV's role with visionary founders is to sit on the sidelines and applaud when the founder is performing, while providing a strategic sounding board, recruiting help, anticipation of future team needs, and partner introductions.
“by and large, I just sit on the sidelines and applaud.”
Private-market investing gives detailed information on trends, company and competitive dynamics that public investors often do not get, and TCV's knowledge across roughly 400 private companies should help identify future hundred-billion-dollar enterprises.
“The benefit of being a private market investor is often you get very detailed information on trends”
A long-term private-market view helps shut out public-market quarterly noise, so one can ask whether one would own a company at a given enterprise value over a five- or ten-year view, rather than reacting to a bad quarter.
“doesn't mean the vision changed, doesn't mean the strategies changed”
Founders should look for investors who share a vision of the long-term prize rather than those playing near-term momentum, and should not abandon long-term conviction for conventional risk-reducing approaches that minimize ultimate outcome.
“Look for investors who want to share a vision of what the long term prize might look like and are not just playing some near term momentum game.”
When TCV was raising its first fund, many investors wanted either a pure private or pure public fund and disliked the crossover structure, which made fundraising inefficient.
“people didn't like Crossover. They wanted it either a private fund or a public fund.”
A high talent-density culture may be tough on some people, but a firm that is not right for someone does not prevent that person from finding gainful employment elsewhere, and this approach took Hoag a while to fully adopt.
“just because your firm may not be right for everyone doesn't mean that they can't go find gainful employment elsewhere.”
Online community is enormously powerful because it keeps consumers coming back, locks them in, and turns them into organic promoters who tell friends, so companies like Strava and Peloton benefit from word-of-mouth growth.
“the power of online community is enormous... word of mouth can be an organic growth, can be enormous.”
TCV was founded on three tenets: technology would be huge over time because Moore's Law and great entrepreneurs yield big opportunities, growth-stage crossover investing is a great way to play it, and a long-term approach pays off in great growth vehicles.
“So the founding tenets of TCV were really three.”
A public investor must be willing to be wrong near-term and make sure to be right long-term, as TCV's pipe investment in Netflix in 2011, when the stock could drop 70 percent, shows.
“one of the things you also have to be willing to do is to be wrong near term. You just have to make sure you're right long term.”
Founders should not always assume capital will be available, even in the current robust fundraising environment, and should think through how to keep pursuing their vision if capital tightens, which may also mean choosing the right investor group.
“Don't always assume that capital will be available, it might be, but think through if capital source is tightened in the future”
TCV's investing is a combination of science and art: data science and financial analysis provide a base, but judging consumer value proposition strength and envisioning how the product will evolve requires pattern-based judgment that scores cannot capture.
“we're still in a world where TCV's business and investing generally, is a combination of art plus science.”
Jay believes the venture industry talked too much about risk-reward when it should have focused on reward, since strong technology tailwinds have made it hard not to earn strong returns in technology.
“we should have probably just focused on reward since it's been pretty hard to not have strong returns in technology given the tailwinds”
TCV leverages experience from Netflix's subscription model to help later companies like Spotify and Peloton, sharing best practices and nuances that newcomers would miss, showing how cross-portfolio learning compounds.
“the Netflix experience led us to Spotify.”
As long as a company's strategic vision is rolling out as envisioned and its secular outlook is robust, there is no reason to rush to exit a position, as TCV's holdings in Expedia, Netflix, Peloton, and Spotify illustrate.
“As long as the strategic vision of the company is rolling out as envisioned, why would we be in a rush for the exit?”
Investor psychology can swing widely while fundamentals for the best companies typically move up and to the right, so the key question is which companies will join the largest group over the next ten years rather than how the last quarter went.
“Investor psychology can change a lot. It can be a scattergram. Not all that much changes on a quarterly basis”
Cloud gaming is still early but should dramatically increase the gaming audience by lowering device costs, moving from tens of millions of consoles and hundreds of millions of mobile devices to multiple billions of potential consumers within about five years.
“that too should dramatically increase the audience”
Near-term market noise, such as online travel disruption and COVID-accelerated subscriber businesses, does not change the long-term secular outlook, which favors technology companies over physical alternatives like theaters and health clubs.
“But it doesn't change the long term secular outlook, which is incredibly positive; you just have to work through that noise.”
Content is far from saturated: with billions of devices able to view and listen to content, and industry audiences growing from hundreds of thousands to billions over each technology generation, great content will still find an audience, and Netflix's roughly 200 million subscribers are a small fraction of the 4 billion-plus smartphones.
“I don't think there is any limit to the audience size.”
Near-term results are distorted by pandemic-driven pulls, such as subscriber businesses like Peloton and Netflix seeing accelerated demand while physical theaters and health clubs were hurt, so long-term secular outlook must be separated from monthly noise.
“there's all sorts of noise in the marketplace on a monthly and quarterly basis”
Growth-stage investing may not produce the same multiples on winners as early-stage investing, but with a lower loss ratio the overall portfolio mix works out well.
“You may not get the same multiples on the winners as early stage, but with a lower loss ratio, when you put that mix all together.”
The shift to cloud, multi-cloud, open source, and DevOps tools dramatically lowers compute and storage costs, enabling enterprises and small businesses to build next-generation applications, and this transition remains very early.
“the shift to cloud, the shift to multi-cloud, open source and all of the DevOps tools”
The third criterion is whether a business has a virtuous cycle or network effect that both accelerates growth and funds forward investment in competitive moats that sustain rapid growth.
“Is there a virtuous cycle to the business? Is there some network effect that will both allow the company to accelerate”
The internet bubble and bursting caused enormous FOMO and speed pressure, leading to mistakes, and some investments were knocked over, forcing TCV to downsize for a while.
“we had to downsize TCV for a while.”
TCV's original phrase 'dogs eating the dog food' means the same thing as today's product-market fit: the art of the firm is assessing whether a company is on a growth path to scale and to durable competitive moats.
“Dogs eating the dog food is a much less sophisticated term than product market fit, but it basically is effectively the same thing.”
The idea that value in technology was shifting from hardware to software was already well known in the 1980s, when software was called computer services and companies like ADP were the reference points, so it is not new.
“that's not exactly new news”
Netflix stock fell 15 to 20 percent after its IPO and stayed down for about six months, a historical fact that created an interesting entry point for long-term investors.
“Netflix' stock traded down 15 to 20% post IPO and stayed down for six months.”
When TCV started in 1995 the first song download took about 90 minutes, while Spotify now offers 40 million songs available on a handheld device in under a second, illustrating technology's progress and suggesting underestimation of visionary CEOs like Daniel Ek.
“The only challenge was it took 90 minutes.”
Of Jay's five consumer criteria, the value proposition and virtuous cycle are the easier ones to check, while engagement is somewhat assessable, and execution and the visionary CEO are hard to know ahead of time.
“I think of it as having five criteria. Some of which are hard to know ahead of time. The easy ones are”
During the bubble one limited partner with a direct investment effort was doing a deal a day, and Hoag observed that this pace led to stress and many mistakes.
“one of our LP's had a direct investment effort. They were doing a deal a day. That guy was stressed. Made all sorts of mistakes”
Hoag's own talk of stress and luck emphasizes that technology investing combines experience with a new, unique perspective that can come from anywhere in an organization, so great ideas from young team members must get a hearing.
“that new and unique perspective can come from anywhere within the organization.”
Blockchain and cryptocurrency are early days with phenomenal companies still to be built, but Hoag separates underlying technology from currency itself and does not claim blockchain has yet produced mature winners.
“I believe we are early days in that whole realm, and that there will be some phenomenal companies built.”
Hoag and Rick Kimball quit their jobs in 1994, took a 100 percent pay cut, and gave 188 presentations around the world to raise $100 million for TCV's first fund, with investors resisting its crossover structure.
“We gave 188 presentations around the globe to ultimately raise $100 million, TCV One.”
When a firm is surrounded by truly stunning colleagues, there is vibrancy, dialogue, debate, and good ideas regardless of age, title, or tenure, which makes it attractive to talent.
“when you're surrounded by truly stunning colleagues, there's a vibrancy, and a dialogue, and a debate and great ideas”
Crossover investing was first practiced by Dave Belin and Chet Sweeta at Citicorp, and Hoag believes it predates the claims some made that it was invented in the 1990s, having existed since the late 1960s.
“first practiced, at least to my knowledge, by two individuals at City Corp.”
The Dow Jones Industrial Average was 811 when Hoag started in July 1982 and is above 34,000 now, a roughly 40-fold rise that technology has outperformed dramatically.
“The Dow Jones Industrial average was 811. ... So at 34,000 plus, it's been a pretty good tailwind”
On its last quarterly call, Peloton reported about 20 workouts per subscription, which Hoag cited as evidence of a very engaged audience.
“on the last quarterly call, they talked about 20 workouts per subscription, that's a very engaged audience.”
Although focus has many benefits, there are no hard and fast rules, since some great pivots would have failed had the company stuck with its original path, so the only absolute is that there are no absolutes.
“there have been some great pivots where if all a company had done was stick with their current path, they might not be here.”
The most exciting part of technology investing is hearing a new pitch that offers a unique, incredible insight, since such pitches are unpredictable and continually renew the investor's learning.
“I always get excited about hearing a new pitch and literally just go, 'Oh, that just is unique, incredible insight,'”
The kindest things Jay recalls include his mother's warm home environment after school, a job at age 11, and a professor who got him interested in investing, which shaped his work ethic and career.
“my mom is the kindest person. Always provided a warm environment to come home from school in”
Tremendous engagement is the second criterion for consumer companies, illustrated by Netflix users averaging about two hours a day and Spotify premium users over an hour a day, since high engagement yields many business benefits.
“the average Netflix user is estimated to watch two hours per day. The average Spotify premium users over an hour a day.”
Hoag's mother provided a warm home environment to return to after school in a small Wisconsin town, and this support was critical in a non-technology setting.
“my mom is the kindest person. Always provided a warm environment to come home from school in”
Hoag's early career began by chance when, as a 1982 research analyst at Citicorp, he chose technology over paper, forest products, and publishing, and that luck shaped his formation as an investor.
“Well, luck played a huge role. And so that was one of the key early formations”
TCV's 2011 PIPE investment in Netflix, made when the stock could decline 70 percent with early streaming still unproven, was one of its more successful investments because it bet that shutting out noise would pay off.
“One of our more successful investments was a pipe investment we made in Netflix in 2011”
Early fundraising pitches used printed slides in a carousel, and during a May 1995 pitch to Hillman Group in Pittsburgh, the slides were loaded upside down, but the investor still gave TCV a chance.
“it was upside down. Somehow they looked through that and gave us a break.”