Elizabeth Zalman & Jerry Neumann - Founder vs Investor - [Invest Like the Best, EP.351]
What this covers
This episode of Invest Like the Best has Patrick talking with Elizabeth Zalman, a two-time founder who co-founded StrongDM, and Jerry Neumann, an early-stage investor and adjunct professor who was her seed investor. They co-wrote Founder vs Investor, and the conversation starts with the book's contentious reception. It then follows a company's life from seed documents through board meetings to IPO, looking at where the incentive misalignment shows up. Zalman speaks from the founder's side and Neumann from the investor's, and they sometimes disagree.
The range is practical. On governance, Zalman argues that valuation matters less than ownership structure and governance language, so founders should draft founder-friendly seed documents that get copied forward. Neumann explains why making the option pool post-money discourages investors from pushing for an oversized one. On the board of directors, he says its real remedy is to fire the CEO or cut their pay. At the earliest stage no one else will take the job, so the board's work is coaching. Zalman adds that VCs tend to vote as a block, and that the metrics that most reveal a company's problems are the ones founders hide.
Other threads include the founder-to-manager transition, which founders are rarely warned about, and why Neumann invests in people over products. They also cover how a moat has to be built before a company succeeds, and how founders turn risk-averse after product-market fit while investors keep pushing for risk. Neumann argues investors cannot honestly call themselves founder-friendly, and Patrick frames that friendliness as a feature of the option-value phase that fades once the outcome is clear. They also discuss what a founder's decision to sell stock signals to investors, and the moral weight of promises made before a contract is signed.
Zalman and Neumann argue that founder-investor friction is structural: founders pursue a romantic, long-horizon build while investors are paid to return capital, so the relationship works only when both sides state their real goals and expectations openly.
- The incentive conflict between founders' build-it motive and investors' return-capital mandate produces most friction
- Boards' only real remedy is hiring, firing, or paying the CEO, so board dynamics matter more than advisory promises
- Founders must transition from founder to operator/manager, and most are never told this
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Most startups do not have a moat when they start, and a durable advantage must be built before success, because once a company succeeds its competitors can observe and copy the product; the only moat one can bring at founding is value the founders already possess.
“If you show up without one of those things, then you won't have a moat to start, and you have to build a moat before you become successful”
Making the option pool post-money means founders and investors both bear dilution, which reduces the investor's incentive to push for an oversized pool that would have been shared against the founders if it were pre-money.
“so if the option pool is post-money, you're both getting diluted. All right. That means that the investor is not going to push for an oversized option pool”
Although a board does much more than hire and fire the CEO, the only real remedy a board has when a CEO ignores an approved budget is to fire the CEO or cut their pay, so that is the ultimate lever.
“the only recourse is to fire or to lower his pay or her pay and that's it. So even though that's not the only thing you do on a Board, in the end, that's the only remedy you have.”
The real value investors bring is pattern matching across many companies: they can show founders a dataset of comparable companies, what they tried, and where they succeeded or failed, which founders rarely get from boards.
“But here's the data set of 100 companies who look just like you, and here's what they tried and where they succeeded and failed”
After product-market fit, founders fear losing what they built and become risk-averse, while investors push them to keep taking risks because competitors will copy a successful product and take the growth if the company does not.
“as soon as you have a product that is successful that people want, your competitors can see that product, right? So you're going to have competition pretty quickly”
No venture investor has a large enough data set to say definitively what works, since even an investor with about 100 companies cannot separate what works from what does not, so advice is context-dependent.
“it's not a big enough data set for me to definitively say this is what works, and this is what doesn't and that's true of every VC.”
A founder must transition from creating an idea to operating and managing people, which requires people management, political skill, and nuanced control negotiations, and founders are rarely warned about this shift before they sign up.
“at some point, I need to transition from being a founder into being an operator and a manager. And they are two fundamentally different things, and nobody ever told me that”
Companies that build a new market from scratch can develop a moat because they learn things about the market that competitors cannot see even if they can copy the product.
“And they can see your product, but they can't see what you know.”
Founders should walk into board meetings with proposed solutions to problems, including alternatives they rejected, because board members are not able to solve problems with limited time and detail and will otherwise bring in someone who can.
“you walk in with solutions. The Board has hired you in a sense. They are invested in you to be the people who solve problems, not the people who come up with problems.”
Zalman says valuation matters less than governance language and ownership structure, and that founders should draft founder-friendly seed documents up front because those docs can be copied forward through the life of the company.
“I try to think about what are the ways in which I can make them as founder-friendly as humanly possible right upfront so that we've set the standard now.”
When a founder sells stock during an IPO or a round, investors should ask what the founder knows that they do not, since the founder's decision to sell or hold carries information about the company's prospects.
“There's always an information asymmetry, right? So if the founder is like, "Oh, I really want to sell a bunch of stock in this race." My question is always, "Well, gosh, what do they know that I don't know?"”
Contracts define the boundaries of a deal, but the full agreement includes pre-investment conversations about company direction and the investor's promises, which are morally binding even when not written down.
“contracts are great fences, they keep you from going past the bounds of where you're supposed to go, right? You agree on the bounds of things, but that's not the whole agreement.”
Venture capital has little formal training, so successful investors often arrive without prior experience, and some top-performing firms were founded by people who were not previously venture capitalists, suggesting that financial success can occur without management skill.
“there's usually no training. The people who are successful often just pop into it”
The metrics that most reveal a company's real problems also make founders fear for their jobs, so founders tend to hide them, and this fear pushes founders into defensive behavior during board meetings.
“But those metrics are the ones that actually make me fearful about my job.”
Investors are most useful as outside voices reminding founders of revenue targets, as Jerry did with a whiteboard exercise showing a company was eighteen months behind on salesperson hiring, which the founder's majority-controlled board had never provided.
“he sat me and my co-founder down and did an exercise on the whiteboard about what revenue targets we need to hit and work backwards, and we were 18 months behind in hiring salespeople.”
Rapid growth makes companies messy: most aggressive hires fail, communication breaks down as headcount triples, and founders feel pressure to hide internal mess from investors who would blame them for it.
“most of those hires are going to fail. And guess what, the company is tripling in size and nobody is talking anymore”
At the early stage, a board member typically cannot fire the founder because no one else will take the job, so the realistic role is to train the founder to run proper board meetings and push them toward the actions needed to build the company.
“I can't fire the founder. I mean, never had Board control, but I couldn't fire the founder even if I wanted to because nobody is going to take that job.”
VCs talk constantly with one another and tend to vote as a block against founders because their future deal flow depends on each other, so founders are often disadvantaged in board decisions.
“the founder is always at a disadvantage in a Board meeting or with investors on their cap table because they're always talking behind their back”
A great board meeting combines detailed, honest debate on ambiguous decisions, respect and research from all participants, and investor pattern-matching across many prior companies, so everyone leaves seeing reality more clearly.
“We end up seeing reality each of us more clearly than when we started the meeting and seeing reality clearly is productive when you're building a business.”
Founders start companies from a romantic, build-it impulse, while investors' job is to return capital to their own investors; these two orientations are fundamentally at odds and produce the core friction in the relationship.
“those two things, one is hyperpragmatic and one is truly romantic at its heart, they come in and they conflict.”
Founders tell investors they want to build a billion-dollar business to secure funding, even when it is not true, because they want the money to close the deal, and the relationship would be healthier with a frank discussion of what each side wants.
“Every founder will say to Jerry, "Oh, I want to build a $1 billion business." It's come out of my mouth. It's a flat out lie.”
Investors cannot honestly call themselves founder-friendly because their job is to make the company succeed, and while investors can become personally attached to founders, that attachment is irrational and should not be advertised as a plus.
“I think it's intellectually dishonest to say you're founder-friendly and tout that as some sort of plus for the founder. I don't think that's the job.”
Neumann invests in people rather than ideas or products, since the product that exists at the seed stage is unlikely to be what the company sells in five or ten years, so he cares most about the founder's drive and long-run vision.
“I'm investing in you, right? I'm not investing in your product.”
A VC who only hears problems and cannot influence the founder becomes powerless, because the investor is not present daily and the founder will eventually stop listening, so VCs must communicate in ways founders can absorb and act on.
“He wasn't on the Board. He couldn't do anything else. You need to be able to tell people things in a way that they can digest and believe and act on.”
Jerry believes the predictor of a founder's success is raw drive rather than raw talent, so he knew Liz would find a good idea eventually because she would not rest until she built a successful company.
“I think it's raw drive. I knew that she needed to come up with a good idea just because of who she is”
Founder friendliness is a feature of the option-value phase of a company, when outcomes are uncertain, and it fades once the company either clearly succeeds or clearly fails, because investors then need the company's returns or simply want their time back.
“that founder friendliness all happens in the option value phase of a company.”
Drive to win is one of the most important traits founders need, but if it is too strong and not balanced by countervailing forces that encourage reasonable behavior, it can become destructive.
“The problem is if drive to win is too strong or if there's no countervailing force to make you do reasonable things, then it can be destructive.”
Investors often view a founder who hires many people and fires most of them as demonstrating a bias toward action, so framing the firings well is the key to getting investor credit rather than blame.
“I think investors have a bias towards action, at least the ones I know, right? So if you're like, "That person wasn't doing good, I fired them." They'll be like, "Okay. Well, you should have told us first, but good job."”
Successful fundraising depends on storytelling: founders must tell a compelling but truthful story about what could happen, and VCs must also tell stories to persuade founders and their own partners.
“In a way, VCs have to be storytellers as well. Here's a story about how your company becomes successful.”
Founders should talk through problems with individual investors before the board meeting, since raising an unresolved problem in front of the group creates dynamics that make it hard to get useful advice.
“Not if you've talked to me about it before the board meeting, right? You talked about this, right? You call up one of the investors before”
A common investor tactic is that the final contract does not reflect what the term sheet said, since contracts are much longer and can contain terms that were never agreed to, leading to lengthy disputes.
“For me, it's actually when the contract doesn't say what the term sheet said.”
Many early-stage founders, especially in open source, have not studied predecessors such as HashiCorp and have not modeled how they might monetize, so they fail to consider alternative go-to-market paths.
“they haven't done any research on their predecessors, especially in the open-source community.”
Neumann sees secondary sales as a red flag, acceptable for modest personal needs but not for taking so much money off the table that founders stop worrying; he compares it to an earnout structure that is big enough to reassure but not so big as to remove concern.
“Well, big enough that they don't worry, but not so big that they don't worry.”
Board blocs are pre-arranged: investors discuss decisions at breakfast or other off-meeting settings before the board session, so when they vote together they have already decided, as in the Twitter board firing its CEO.
“The reason they all vote as a block is because they've talked about it beforehand.”
Neumann was fired from a company he co-founded, but he was later asked to consult and invest by other investors, showing that a failed company or firing does not end a founder's career.
“literally two weeks later, one of the investors in the company, not somebody was on the board, but one of the other investors called me”
A VC partner may sit on around ten boards and a founder company is one among many, so founders are not the priority until the company matters to the fund, at which point the investor's pressure intensifies.
“You're one in a hundred, right? In a fund and the partner is sitting on how many Boards? 10.”
Founders also misbehave: some lie during due diligence about revenue or headcount, and some negotiate with acquirers to get money despite not repaying preferences, and VCs often avoid calling this out because it feels like punching down.
“I have known founders to lie during due diligence. Let me just flat out lie about revenue, about how many people they hired”
Founders often walk into board meetings focused on keeping their jobs and fighting investors, when the meeting's purpose should be supporting the company, and the founder is only one part of that effort rather than the central thing.
“my job is to keep my job, which it literally is and to fight against the investors.”
Founders should not expect investors to solve their problems, because investors lack daily detail and the founder's own solutions are usually better, and if the founder appears unable to fix problems, the board will look for someone who can.
“if they think you can't solve your own problems, they're going to find somebody who can.”
Early-stage investors could do much better preparing founders for the next stage of their company, because boards run more smoothly when the investor has already coached the founder through board dynamics.
“a lot of venture investors, especially early stage ones could do a better job preparing founders for the next stage”
Liz wants a board member to tell her bluntly when her board meetings are going badly, because a founder who cannot take a hard truth will not last, while Jerry argues that anyone can learn to be good enough to run a company and that boards often act to replace founders with their own people.
“I'm not good enough to run the company if I can't hear a hard truth like that”
Founders should pitch the 10-year change they want the world to see and the vision they want investors to buy into, rather than presenting what they have today or a small product feature such as a ChatGPT overlay.
“tell me what you want the world to look like in 10 years that makes a difference that's actually meaningful because I want to buy into the vision.”
Elizabeth believes board meetings cannot easily be structured as company updates without descending into ego, advice, or unrequested commentary, while Jerry argues that investors need enough depth to judge the CEO, so the meeting must be more than a short governance update.
“I don't know that there is a way to structure a Board meeting such that it's about an update on the company, and it doesn't descend into ego or advice”
An investor who asked a founder to write out the hypotheses that must be true for the company to become big, covering pricing and market, changed how the team thought about going to market, even though the firm declined to invest.
“This firm said no ultimately but it actually changed the way that we were thinking about going to market.”
Founders should fight for co-sell rights in the very first set of investment documents because most VCs do not tell founders about them, and they allow founders to sell some stock while retaining interest in the company's outcome.
“I believe the founders should put co-sell rights all the way into the very first set of documents, they possibly can and fight for the highest number possible.”
Most founders cannot articulate what they are building, and this inability to tell a compelling story is a major reason they fail in fundraising, since many fundraising difficulties are masking investors' lack of understanding of the company.
“most founders have zero idea how to communicate what they're building, and so that's where things blow up.”
Investors should ask pitching founders what the company looks like in five years, how they will keep people from copying them, and whether success undermines itself, because forcing this thinking before investment is when founders are most receptive.
“This is before you invest. All right, what is this going to look like in five years? How are you going to keep people from copying you?”
Board members should ask to see the metrics that management uses to run the business rather than vanity metrics that show progress, because investors would run the company the same way and need to see the real decision drivers.
“Let me look at what you're looking at to run the business, right? How are you running this business?”
Investors need the founder during the earliest stage because there is no company without them, but once the business shows a monetizable growth curve, the operational team can take over and the founder is no longer essential, although the founder still adds brand value.
“you can't fire the founder at the earliest stage because then there's no company”
Investors may treat messy churn, such as firing many failed hires, as a feature rather than a bug, provided the founder pitches it as decisive action, though Liz counters that executive search failures would still be blamed on the founder.
“investors have a bias towards action, at least the ones I know”
When a founder brings Jerry an acquisition offer he finds exciting, it usually means the founder is exhausted and wants to stop, so an acquisition is better than the founder giving up.
“the only time that when a founder tells me that they have potential acquisition offer where I feel excited about it is when I feel like that founder is done.”
Neumann sees public listing as the only good exit and tells founders to build a standalone company that could last 100 years, because companies built for acquisition have much lower odds of being acquired and the tech sector is often the case.
“to me, that's the only good exit. ... how do we build this company to be a stand-alone successful company that can last 100 years?”
Zalman argues that founders should be able to explain in one sentence what they are building and that investors should ask about the core product, while Neumann argues the product today is irrelevant to a decision about exit five or ten years out.
“You should be able to articulate in a sentence, what it is the thing that I am building.”
Zalman thinks frank, honest communication is the highest virtue in founder-investor relationships, while Neumann believes sometimes sugarcoating is needed to bring others along, and complete frankness does not work for everyone.
“I don't think that always being honest with the people you're in some sort of relationship with, business or otherwise, is the best strategy.”
Founders should ask investors to probe what the company is actually building using basic questions before diligence on market size or hiring, because founders feel frustrated by diligence rabbit holes that mask investors' failure to understand the core product.
“investors don't actually understand what the founder is building.”
Most venture capitalists rate other VCs as poor, as in 'ninety percent of VCs are idiots', which parallels the common driver overestimation effect in which everyone rates themselves above average.
“Everybody is below average except for them.”
Founders rarely negotiate investment terms, so investors have a large informational and experience advantage, and the standard venture line that terms are ordinary and fair is often used to discourage founders from scrutinizing them.
“investors is very large. So let's just talk about”
Syndicates let investors share risk and expand the number of companies they can back, but when money became easier to raise, funds began taking whole rounds alone, which reduced syndication opportunities.
“So if you're doing half the round, and you can then invest in twice as many companies, right? So you're sharing your pooling risk.”
A company whose main advantage is new technology has a weak moat, since technology is easy to copy once it is visible.
“So if you're a company with a new technology, that's what you hope will be your new moat, that's a hard thing to build a moat on, right? People -- it's easy to copy new technologies.”
The investor role and the board-member role are different but are frequently merged, especially in early-stage startups, so investors promise help as investors while their board meetings end up focused on governance rather than that help.
“There's the investor and then there's the Board of director, right? And those, I think, are two different roles that often -- frequently get co-mingled and conflated”
Zalman says a founder who cannot hear a blunt board message that the board has lost confidence will not last long, and she would prefer a board that tells her directly what it needs to change.
“I'm just not good enough to run the company if I can't hear a hard truth like that.”
Founders often believe they are the company's central figure, but investors fund the company, and the company's activity continues without any one founder, so founders must accept that the business exists beyond them.
“to me, it's crazy that founders think they're the show. The people are giving money to the company and yet somehow they're not the pop star”
Patrick argues that preferred equity means investors signed up for returns that can be the liquidation preference outcome, so there is nothing objectionable about a sale that returns their money without profit, while Neumann argues the founder's pre-investment promises also shaped expectations.
“isn't the nature of preferred equity, that's an outcome, which you are literally signing up for.”
Venture capital is judged by how much money people make, as the Midas List ranks dealmakers by earnings rather than by companies built, which makes the business odd for anyone who does not care about building companies.
“It's not a list of the people who've built the most successful companies. It's a list of who's made the most money.”
When Zalman stepped down as CEO and had to tell 100 employees, her head of recruiting came to her house with his rescue dog and held her hand during the Zoom speech so she would not be alone.
“he was sitting on the floor next to me with the dog holding my hand so that I didn't have to be alone.”
Founders constantly face exit decisions because every fundraise, term sheet, or offer is an opportunity to sell, and the pragmatic question is whether the valuation is right and whether the company can stand alone.
“every time a term sheet, a fund raise is actually an opportunity to exit. Is this valuation right?”
Jerry is more humanist than a pure market view implies, preferring to help founders continue running their companies through IPO because he values people succeeding, not just financial returns.
“I guess I'm more of a humanist than a market system would imply.”
Liz believes many people could find creative, less boring work at startups rather than big companies, because they would not have to risk stability to try new roles, and she wishes more people knew the startup career path existed.
“you should come and get a job as like a senior support engineer or a solutions architect at a start-up, and you would never be bored again”
Starting companies and working for oneself is one of the best ways for an individual to self-actualize, and Neumann wants to make founding a better career path for more people.
“I think it's the best way for any individual to self-actualize, right? So I really want more people to be able to do this.”
Working inside large companies can make people feel like cogs in a machine, and founding a company is an alternative for people who want more creative, less boring work, even without being a coder.
“They never let you forget that you're just a cog in the machine. And the last thing in my life I wanted to be was a cog”
The book was deliberately structured so that founder and investor each argue their side as convincingly as possible without reaching consensus, because real company relationships do not resolve into agreement.
“we write the book and we each tell our sides as convincingly as possible so that people can see what each side says”
The value a board member provides depends heavily on the individual: some well-known investors are not good board members, and some boards produce high-quality, honest debate where the group sees reality more clearly.
“some of the name investors, the people who are like, "Oh, that investor," They've been so successful, aren't always the best people or Board members.”
Venture capital is not the easiest way to make money, and people who enter it purely to get rich without caring about building businesses are in the wrong job, as shown by how few VCs appear on the Forbes 400.
“if all you care about is making money, it's a weird business to go into, venture capital, because it's not the easiest way to make money.”
Zalman once halted all product development because internal communication had broken down and did not tell investors, fearing they would blame her for the disruption, which illustrates how growth can make a company messy and hide problems from investors.
“There was once at one company where I paused all product development because we had stopped talking to each other”
Founders often let work become their entire identity and forget they have a life outside the company, and they should see therapy or otherwise recognize they are not required to work seven days a week to prove their value.
“founders especially, I think, speaking personally, forget that they have a personality outside of this and a life outside of it”
In one company with three cofounders, a $40 to $50 million acquisition offer would have paid out preferred investors and left the rest to founders, and the cofounders split over whether to take it because one wanted the money to stop working.
“one of us wanted to take the deal because they didn't care about getting a job again. They just cared about f*** you money”
Frank, direct conversations that resolve conflict are common in personal relationships but rare in business relationships between founders and investors, and Elizabeth values that candor in the minority of good VCs.
“Which happens in most relationships, I would think in my life, but just not in the business ones.”
Venture capitalists who reviewed the book in draft were very negative, saying Liz's perspective was untrue and that publishing it was harmful to the venture ecosystem, and a prominent investor urged Jerry to disassociate from it.
“they thought that saying it was harmful to the ecosystem”
The venture community almost never acknowledges the founder experience in good times or bad, which is why a VC openly writing that boards fire founders and that these things happen was so impactful.
“I think it tends to be zero acknowledgment of the founder experience”
Investors have changed valuations mid-deal, pulled term sheets days before closing, and given away equity to other funds late, all of which signal deal-breaking bad faith and create severe pressure on founders.
“there's valuations changed in the middle of the deal. Term sheets pulled three days before the close”
Jerry spent the first part of his career at big companies where employees were reminded they were cogs, so he now works for himself and would never return to a large company.
“They never let you forget that you're just a cog in the machine”
Zalman says she would skip college if she could do it again, because founding a company offered her the chance to explore ideas with talented people, and many startup roles do not require coding.
“If I had to do my life over again, I wouldn't have gone to college.”
Many founders today pitch small technology overlays, such as a ChatGPT or Copilot layer, rather than building transformative companies, and Jerry says he has seen about ten such pitches that do not change the world.
“Most founders are building some ChatGPT overlay, Copilot, on their list right now.”