Darren Farber - The Business of Defense - [Invest Like the Best, EP.417]
What this covers
Darren Farber, managing partner of Albion River and a former Pentagon adviser, explains to the host how the defense economy works and how an investor should read it. His investing approach centers on finding a One-of-One Supplier, a pattern he traces to Monopsony Logic: with a single government customer, suppliers have no reason to build redundant capacity. He covers the budget mechanics behind this, including appropriations by "color of money," why embedded multi-year programs resist displacement, and why cost-plus contracts, only about 15 percent of contract volume, exist at all.
The conversation then widens to strategy. Farber argues the U.S. can no longer fight two near-peer wars at once, and he casts the Chinese military's lack of joint-war experience as a weakness, a case of Joint Warfare Asymmetry. On Taiwan, he imagines an armed population turning a takeover into a Taliban-style insurgency, and he describes AUKUS as making Australia the new jump-off point in place of Guam. Ukraine, for him, shows old and new technology coexisting: WWII-style artillery and mines alongside cheap autonomous systems. Among his more contested forecasts, laser-based enrichment could put Fissile Material within reach of a well-funded non-state actor.
On reform, he defends the primes as well-run businesses whose incentives need changing, and he wants proven systems like HIMARS produced in volume. He argues for the Responsible Party Model, citing Admiral Rickover's decades of ownership of the nuclear Navy against the Joint Strike Fighter's many leaders. He also describes how a commercial-first provision helped Palantir displace a costlier Army program.
Farber argues that U.S. defense advantage now depends on fast commercial adaptation, aligned capital incentives, and clearly assigned 'responsible parties' for programs, because mass production and legacy procurement cannot match China's stockpiles or the pace of drone and AI warfare.
- Commercial off-the-shelf technology adapted quickly beats bespoke military development, as with the Palantir and iPhone-based examples
- China's stockpile and naval construction scale makes a conventional-mass race unwinnable, so the U.S. must win through technology and capital markets
- Procurement reform requires long-tenured responsible parties and better incentives, since current rotation and budget structures delay delivery and deter new entrants
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Defense markets are monopsonies with one customer and many suppliers, so suppliers rationally match the government's limited demand and do not build redundant capacity, which produces many natural one-of-one suppliers.
“the defense market is the opposite of a monopoly. It's a monopsony. It's one customer, many suppliers.”
Defense spending is largely allocated in advance because Congress appropriates funds by color of money such as O&M and RDT&E, so a new entrant cannot quickly take market share from programs already embedded in multi-year contracts, though genuinely new requirements offer a faster path.
“So when you set up the budget, it's largely allocated. You know who's going to get the money.”
New defense businesses have an advantage only when the requirement is new, because displacing an existing program requires enormous capital to argue the Pentagon's requirement is wrong, and displacement takes far longer than 24 months.
“if the requirement is new, there's no incumbency advantage. You don't have to dislodge an existing program”
War is always a combination of old and new technology, never entirely one or the other, so Ukraine's WWII-style artillery, small-caliber munitions, bicycle bombs, and mines show that legacy systems remain essential.
“It's never all new and it's never all old.”
Prime contractors manage costs in a public-markets style, quarter by quarter, and negotiators on the government side knew Farber's margins and technology precisely, making deals brutal and making primes reluctant to take multi-quarter bets without government participation.
“They really can't take this multi-quarter bet without the government showing up.”
Laser-based enrichment could let a well-capitalized non-state actor make fissile material without centrifuges, so technological progress is eroding the historical monopoly of nation-states on nuclear weapons.
“the ability for people to make fissile material now with lasers, and they don't require centrifuges, and a non-state actor can actually build a nuclear capability.”
Cost-plus contracts account for only about 15 percent of Department contract volume, though closer to 30 percent of budget dollars because programs in low-rate initial production are still in that phase, and the supermajority of contract volume is lowest-price technically acceptable.
“Cost Plus by contract volume is only 15% of the department. It's about 30% of the budget now”
The U.S. has over-indexed on a near-peer threat such as China and neglects non-state threats, because laser-based isotope separation may let a well-capitalized non-state actor build a small tactical nuclear weapon without centrifuges.
“I worry about the ability for people to make fissile material now with lasers, and they don't require centrifuges”
The U.S. can no longer fight two near-peer wars at once because massing, the quantity of production needed to win, is insufficient, and China has built stockpiles and naval construction capacity that would take decades to match, so the U.S. must win through technology.
“China has built a stockpile of conventional weapons that would take us decades of production in order to build. They have 250 times our naval capability in construction today.”
The Chinese military has never fought a joint war and suffers from low trust up and down its chain of command and corruption concerns, which makes integrated joint operations hard, whereas the U.S. benefits from Goldwater-Nichols-mandated joint assignments.
“The Chinese have never fought a joint war. They have these branches of services”
Before the Berlin Wall fell, about two-thirds of the world's scientists worked on defense problems, and the post-Cold War merger of defense businesses and the release of that talent helped spawn the Internet and biotech revolutions.
“before the wall fell, two-thirds of the world's scientists worked in defense.”
Admiral Rickover, who created the nuclear Navy, served as a long-tenured program owner for decades without wearing a uniform in the usual way, and the nuclear Navy's record of no reactor incidents shows the value of a responsible party with an eight-year job.
“We've never had an incident in our nuclear Navy, running reactors that move with tons of kinetic stuff around it, all over the world.”
Defense reform requires designating a single responsible party with long tenure who owns both the fame and blame for a program, because the current 24-month rotation means no one sees programs through and the Joint Strike Fighter had many leaders.
“the big change that should happen, should be the responsible party who gets to own all the fame and the blame for an activity in order to move it forward.”
If Taiwan's population is armed with long rifles, a Chinese takeover would become an insurgency conducted by small groups in mountainous terrain, which is far harder to win than conventional warfare, and the Taliban's experience against the U.S. is the analogy.
“if every adult had a long rifle, I don't know how the Chinese would take over that island. But it wouldn't be warfare like you and I are thinking of.”
If betting defense venture dollars, one should go to the largest rounds and balance sheets almost separate from technology, because large firms survive downturns and create a ballooning effect that supports the biggest check writers.
“if I'm betting defense venture dollars, I'm going to the largest rounds, the largest raises, the largest balance sheet, almost separate from the technology.”
The G20 countries outside the U.S. enjoyed a large peace dividend, with free education and largely free healthcare, which the American taxpayer effectively financed by protecting the free world at enormous expense.
“outside of the United States in the G19, education is largely free and healthcare is largely free. And you can do that when you don't have to protect the free world.”
Under the AUKUS partnership, Australia becomes the new jump-off point for a China conflict because Guam lacks sufficient standoff distance given Chinese missile stockpiles, so allies must build capacity and maintain U.S. submarine assets.
“it's clear that that's the bugout point for a war with China. It's not going to be Guam.”
The major defense primes are well-run businesses, and changing their incentive structure rather than blaming management is the key to change in defense.
“But these are actually very well-run businesses and if we work to change the incentives for these companies”
The Department of Defense does best when it lets dual-use commercial technology advance and then adapts and pulls it in internally, rather than trying to develop technology exclusively for defense when an adjacent commercial development exists.
“the department does best when it lets dual-use commercial technology advance so it can adapt it and pull it in internally”
Cost-plus contracts were created because businesses would leave the defense ecosystem when asked to take on balance-sheet risk for pushing the limits of engineering, so the government compensates them to stay in the effort.
“Historically you had businesses that would leave the ecosystem because they're like, This is too tough. I don't want to take the risk on balance sheet.”
The best hope for kinetic warfare is a symmetrical technology race resembling a new Cold War, where mutually assured destruction and rough parity deter escalation, because a party far ahead would face a dangerous temptation to flex.
“My hope is that if we can develop symmetrical capabilities over time, and if one person pulls out too far ahead, then there will be this enormous temptation to flex.”
The front office has very pristine, exquisite weapon systems, but massing on the battlefield will increasingly come from inexpensive, permissive autonomous systems like those seen in Ukraine.
“some of the massing on the battlefield is going to be this very inexpensive, very permissive autonomous capability”
Proven systems like HIMARS and its munitions should be mass-produced by giving primes incentives to blow out production, since the cost of these systems falls as volume rises and the industrial base responds to incentives.
“Let's create a series of incentives for these primes with these industrial bases to blow out production. They'll respond to the incentives.”
A provision in the National Defense Appropriation Act required commercial off-the-shelf solutions to be tried first if they already exist, and this legislation was enormously helpful to Palantir, which was able to avoid cost-and-pricing visibility demands and displace a program the Army had funded at five times Palantir's budget.
“commercial off-the-shelf first, if it already exists.”
European aid to Ukraine was structured partly as a loan guarantee that expects repayment, while U.S. aid was given with no strings attached, and much of the European money also flowed back to the U.S. defense complex through purchases of American gear.
“the Europeans gave a loan guarantee. They expect to get paid back. We gave the money, no strings attached.”
Albion bought the nation's only maker of missile fuel and intermediate chemicals for a small fraction of its roughly 2 to 2.5 billion dollar Pentagon replacement cost, because the business was low-growth and carried contingent risk that the market underpriced.
“if the Pentagon's own number was between $2 and $2.5 billion, I'm saying to myself, I can buy it for a very small fraction of that value.”
Technology progress is removing humans from nuclear control loops and transferring nation-state-level weapons capability to small organizations, so a company of 100 people could eventually trigger a chain reaction toward catastrophe, and the physics of substrates must be governed.
“The worst is that the march of technology puts more and more power in fewer and fewer people's hands.”
Farber's investment strategy is to own businesses closest to the physical molecules and fundamental materials that will not change, so that he can supply both legacy primes and new entrants like Anduril without taking a position on which future technology wins.
“I want to get as close to the physics that won't change. That way, I'm not choosing sides.”
Darren's investing framework is elemental supply and demand: he seeks businesses with structural impediments to entry, where few suppliers exist and replacing them costs far more than the purchase price, and he prefers to be close to the physical molecule rather than picking technology winners.
“I want to get as close to the physics that won't change. That way, I'm not choosing sides.”
Defense investments carry an embedded option value because consumption spikes when the world becomes more dangerous, but this war option cannot be logically priced into a financial model, so sellers do not charge for it and buyers receive it as a free benefit.
“there's an embedded option value in this, in that if all of a sudden it gets more dangerous, consumption goes way up.”
Because the PLA lacks joint trust and institutional cohesion, China may be more inclined to hand command and control to AI to overcome that weakness, and the U.S. may be less inclined to change because its joint system already works.
“I could see a scenario where the Chinese hand over command and control to an AI, to overcome the institutional resistance”
The Pentagon's roughly 870 billion dollar budget can be understood as a front office of war fighting, which is lethality and force projection, and a back office called the business mission area, which covers everything else and has modernized far too slowly.
“There are two parts. There's the front office and the back office.”
Drone warfare is following the arc of flat-panel TVs: expensive early, then rapidly cheaper through low-cost manufacturing, so the low-cost producer becomes the leader and the drone hardware itself may not be a profit center, while software and shaped charges gain importance.
“I view a lot of what's happening in drone warfare as the arc of flat panel TVs.”
Original equipment manufacturers who hold type certificates, such as Boeing and Airbus, have a strong incentive to verticalize into the aftermarket when supply-chain margins become too large, as Boeing under Dennis Muilenburg attempted with Boeing Business Services and a 'partnering for success' supplier squeeze.
“Who owns the type certificate of these aircraft? It's the designers, it's the Boeings and the Airbuses, they own the design.”
If the physical substrates for nuclear capability exist in the system, enough technology will be available to build it, so governance must focus on controlling the physical molecules and inputs rather than only the designs.
“Because if the substrates exist in the system, there'll be enough technology in order to build the capability.”
The Department of Defense assumed its own internal demand would produce the best solutions because it was the largest organization on earth, which blinded it to fast-moving commercial technology companies with trillion-dollar balance sheets.
“it always thought that its internal requirements would drive the best solution because it could bring so much demand.”
Many next-generation drones the U.S. introduced in Ukraine failed because the theater evolved faster than they could, while Ukrainians printed simple drones themselves, showing that a first-mover franchise on the bleeding edge is not secure.
“There are a lot of newfangled drones that we introduced in those theaters that were completely unsuccessful”
In Gaza, up-armored bulldozers and following tanks were among the most capable Israeli assets, and subterranean hiding and population embedding show that outmatched forces revert to insurgent tactics that require hybrid old and new methods.
“some of the most capable things the Israelis have in that theater are up-armored bulldozers, bulletproof bulldozers.”
Defense venture capital is aggregating into a few large firms with the biggest balance sheets, because capital aggregators can survive any cycle and can fund the industrial capacity that scale production requires, so smaller, less-capitalized firms will not survive regardless of their technology.
“if I'm betting defense venture dollars, I'm going to the largest rounds, the largest raises, the largest balance sheet, almost separate from the technology.”
TransDigm earns roughly 50 percent EBITDA margins on about 3 billion dollars of EBITDA by owning proprietary aftermarket parts, but this model is limited because customers resent it and large OEMs like Boeing will verticalize when supply-chain margins become too large.
“TransDigm probably has what, $3 billion of EBITDA, give or take right now, and it's 50% EBITDA margins.”
By reinvesting in a firearm accessories manufacturer that makes 100,000 magazines a day, Albion lowered prices, defended patents worldwide, and raised its share of Western military sales from 60 to 90 percent, which turned it into a sole-source annuity-like supplier.
“we went from 60% market share to 90% market share, and we verticalized the business.”
In a net-centric force, knocking out the network makes connected systems useless, as shown when a retired flag officer repeatedly won a war game by severing communications, so network denial will be the first fulcrum of a full-scale near-peer war.
“The most expensive war game in US history showed that if you knock out the network, everything turns into nothing.”
Drone swarm warfare is a false choice because even if one swarm wins the opening battle, controlling territory and people requires old-style ground forces, so future warfare will combine drones with legacy tools like tanks and bulldozers.
“The second you need to take over an environment with people? Well… Here comes the old stuff.”
Next-generation defense investing may produce heavy losses similar to the 1999–2000 telecom bubble, where the technology was directionally correct and important but the capital structures and deployment were poor, creating carnage for investors.
“I worry about capital leaving the system. I'm old enough that 99, 2000 is not an ancient memory for me.”
Private equity firms focused on the Pentagon's business mission area have aggregated about 100 billion dollars in AUM, but many pension funds and endowments avoid weapons-related investments, so the non-kinetic back office is easier to finance than the front office.
“there are private equity firms that focus on that complex that have aggregated 100 billion of AUM.”
Allies such as Europe are well positioned to build smaller systems like autonomous underwater vehicles and hypersonics, where per-unit development costs are lower and they can manage the full life cycle, while carriers and nuclear subs will remain U.S. responsibilities.
“smaller stuff like anything autonomous in the water, hypersonics, these kinds of things that have a new development tail where the per unit cost for development is lower.”
A former Secretary of Defense answered 'I don't know' when asked whether the U.S. has a moral obligation to defend Taiwan, which Farber reads as evidence that the bipartisan moral will to defend Taiwan is weak, and moral will ultimately drives military activity.
“his answer was, I don't know. And I was flabbergasted by it”
Beijing's most likely path to Taiwan is ambiguous coercion, including a false-flag incident, or co-opting the Taiwanese government with carrots and sticks so that a bullet is never fired and the island slowly degrades into Hong Kong-style subordination.
“And then there's one theory that's gaining more traction is that the Taiwanese government can be co-opted successfully, so a bullet doesn't need to be fired.”
Starlink was the unsung hero of the Ukrainian contingency, because without it Ukraine's communications and drone navigation would have failed, and it is a network the Russians cannot crack.
“Starlink is the unsung hero of the Ukrainian contingency. For whatever you think about the proprietor, that contingency would have been lost already without Starlink.”
Militaries with less well-defined joint doctrine are more likely to hand control of operations to AI, while doctrinally rigid forces like U.S. fighter communities will resist giving up the controls, though human ingenuity to hack or trick systems should remain.
“someone who doesn't have well-defined joint doctrine is actually going to do much better with AI because they're more likely to just give it over to them.”
Aftermarket roll-ups like TransDigm become harder to run as they grow, and high profit pools attract competitors such as Loar, which went public at about 130 million dollars of EBITDA and traded around 50 times, because the playbook is easier on a smaller base.
“there's a general expectation that, on a smaller base, it's easier to run the TransDigm playbook over again.”
If China seeks to occupy Taiwan while preserving most of its population, the island's mountainous terrain and a potentially armed population would make an insurgency highly effective, and a blockade or siege could starve the island over time.
“I think it's a perfect setup for insurgency. We spent 20 years getting ground down”
The Ukrainian contingency is a love letter to the American defense industrial base because American-made systems like Javelin, HIMARS, and Patriot work well, and the bottleneck is production volume, which can be fixed by changing incentives for primes to scale output.
“the Ukrainian contingency is a love letter to the American defense industrial base, for all of its faults. When we make something, it works well.”
The short rotation system for military officers comes from a well-intentioned ideal of the well-rounded leader who does many jobs, like a corporate executive, but this conflicts with the need for long-tenured engineering program owners to build technological superiority.
“this came from the concept of, a well-rounded leader is going to do a lot of jobs.”
In Afghanistan, contracting officers paid for local goods with a triplicate paper form called the Standard Form 44, and Farber's team tried to replace it with handheld computing, but the first hardware was poor until a Marine built an iPhone app over a weekend that was far superior.
“A Marine builds an entire app over the weekend, he goes, Why don't we use this? Of course, it's so much better.”
Chinese military officers have repeatedly been jailed for corruption in procurement, such as ICBMs filled with water, because the PLA industrial complex lacks the profit incentive that drives American defense firms.
“Look at all the Chinese generals that have gone to jail over and over again, because they check the ICBMs and they're filled with water.”
Anduril's announcement of a million square-foot facility after a large raise shows that accumulating capital is a form of industrial power, because the ability to produce many units at scale determines outcomes when conflict escalates.
“after Anduril's latest raise, they announced a million square-foot facility. They're building industrial capacity.”
Defense primes such as Northrop Grumman are impressive because their executives know their business and their engineering talent is deep, and the reason startups should watch them is that primes can take multi-quarter bets only when government shares risk.
“They really can't take this multi-quarter bet without the government showing up.”
Given wide probability distributions in conflict, technological superiority is the best insurance policy, and surprise attacks are common enough that they should not be considered surprises, while planners underestimate how wrong their adversary models are.
“the best insurance policy to wrap around all this is technological superiority.”
Farber's firearm accessories business took share from European vendors, moving from 60 percent to 90 percent of the market by lowering price, verticalizing supply, and defending patents, and its product lasted 300,000 rounds versus 3,000 for the prior generation.
“we went from 60% market share to 90% market share, and we verticalized the business.”
Ukraine demonstrates that warfare is always a mix of old and new, and that the American defense industrial base performs well when it produces hardware, as shown by high demand for Javelins and HIMARS fed by production incentives.
“that war is always a combination of old and new... the Ukrainian contingency is a love letter to the American defense industrial base”
Because war outcomes are highly uncertain and surprise attacks are common, technological superiority is the best insurance against bad outcomes, and capital markets should be seen as a steward of the funding that supports it.
“the best insurance policy to wrap around all this is technological superiority.”
Defense markets cannot be captured in 24 months, and investors should expect pain on returns until major acquisition reform happens, because programs are multi-year and revenue depends on requirements and responsible-party changes.
“there will be a lot of pain on the investing side of it, where the revenues won't show up until we do wholesale reform”
Legacy systems like the Patriot missile are cooperatively upgraded with manufacturers many times, so the current Patriot is very different from the 1991 version, and older platforms retain value through upgrades.
“It's not like the Patriot missile from '91 is the Patriot missile of today, and we've cooperatively upgraded it with the manufacturers a hundred times.”
A perfect storm of an executive tired of allied freeloading and a deficit that can no longer finance global protection in the same way is forcing the U.S. to demand that allies take responsibility for their own backyards.
“we've reached the guns and butter moment in terms of how big the deficit is.”
If allies do not pay into the security system, the U.S. has little obligation to keep honoring its commitments, and the current administration views this contractual compact as meaningful and therefore justified in pulling back.
“You're breaking the contract, so what's my general obligation to you?”
A Ukrainian drone was printed within its own theater of war for about 150 dollars, and Baltic defense ministers were not asking the U.S. for drone technology, showing that cheap local production is outpacing American export offerings.
“they weren't asking me for drone technology from America. I was at the National Security Council looking at a Ukrainian drone that was printed in their AOR”
The next generation of drones and weapons must carry individual inertial navigation and onboard situational awareness so they can operate when networks, GPS, and mesh connections are denied.
“the next iteration is these things actually have to be autonomous, and actually have inertial navigation”
Jim Simons of Renaissance Technologies worked at the Institute for Defense Analyses near the Pentagon, illustrating how common it was for top quantitative scientists to work on defense problems before the Cold War ended.
“Jim Simons at Renaissance worked at the Institute for Defense Analyses, which is just around the corner from the Pentagon.”
Northrop Grumman's business is remarkably impressive, and Lockheed is among the top five patent owners on earth, reflecting decades of accumulated engineering talent in the primes.
“Lockheed is like a top five patent owner on earth.”
A pink diamond mine that is running out and has no other source is impossibly expensive to replace, which Farber uses as the analogy for owning a business that is hard to substitute.
“There's no other source of pink diamonds. What is the cost of trying to find another resource of pink diamonds? Well, forget it.”
The Israelis used five F-35s to knock out nearly all of Iran's aerial defense, and detractors' critiques of the F-35's logistics and cost are unfair because the aircraft is a joint strike fighter replacing several legacy programs at under 110 million dollars per copy.
“What the Israelis did with five F-35s was pretty much knock out 100% of Iran's aerial defense.”
The Baltic states keep asking for more Javelin anti-tank missiles because they fear Russian tanks crossing their borders and seizing control, so demand for these fire-and-forget systems remains intense.
“Get me more Javelins. Can you get me more Javelins?”
Europe's defense capability is very limited, and its nuclear capability consists only of ICBMs, which are end-of-the-world weapons with no tactical options, so Europe has relied almost entirely on the U.S. for force projection.
“Their nuclear capability is limited to ICBMs, which is really end-of-the-world nuclear weaponry.”
Northrop Grumman has compounded at roughly 15 percent annually for 25 years through acquisitions and share buybacks, which makes it a notable case study in capital allocation.
“They've been compounding at 15% for 25 years.”
Lockheed Martin's CEO Jim Taiclet was previously CEO of American Tower, which grew from a 2 billion dollar market cap to about 100 billion during his tenure, roughly 50x in 10 years, showing he understands capital allocation.
“Jim was the CEO of American Tower. It had a $2 billion market cap. When he left, it was $100 billion. So 10 years, 50x.”
The U.S. Army's historical sidearms came from European manufacturers such as Beretta and Sig Sauer, illustrating that European vendors have long supplied American defense on a per-unit basis.
“all the sidearms for the U.S. Army historically were European guns. Beretta, Sig Sauer.”
Young Chinese entrepreneurs are as capitalistic as Americans, but there is no analogous track to build defense technology for the PLA, and they want to sell into the American market instead.
“Chinese entrepreneurs want to tap into the American market. They want to be able to sell their product.”
The Littoral Combat Ship is a genuine program failure that should be turned off, while Enterprise-class carriers costing about 11 billion dollars and taking very long to build need a better procurement paradigm rather than elimination.
“There are true failures, like the Littoral combat ship, and we should turn it off, and they're doing it.”
The minefield in Ukraine is now about twice the size of the state of Florida, showing how old technology such as landmines is central to modern conflict.
“The minefield in Ukraine is about twice the size of the state of Florida now.”
Defense spending is built on operational plans and inertia rather than fresh zero-based analysis, so it is hard to say how one would spend the 870 billion dollar budget from scratch, though the force structure must address non-linear threats, not only near-peer ones.
“We haven't come to grips with what we do or don't really need for next-generation warfare.”
Efforts like DOGE that cut inefficiency in the defense department happen roughly every 20 years, so claims that the current push is unprecedented are wrong, and such periodic reform is a necessary extinction event.
“And it happens in defense about every 20 years. So for people to say this is unprecedented, it's bunk.”
The Army created a program with five times Palantir's funding to build its own alternative and attempted to effectively turn off Palantir, which would have been costly and less effective.
“the army was creating a program with 5x the funding of Palantir to do it their own way.”
Intercepted Russian battlefield communications show Russian forces warning each other to be careful because American weapons are present, indicating that U.S. systems have a deterrent psychological effect.
“They have American stuff down there. Be careful, they have the American stuff.”
Farber's firm sold the missile fuel business probably too early after commercializing it for space launch and next-generation suppliers, reflecting a recurring habit of selling too early from one-of-one businesses.
“Ultimately, the value was recognized and we sold it, probably too early. We always sell too early, is my refrain.”
The narrative that government is inefficient has taken over Washington's zeitgeist in about six months, with both parties now agreeing, which Darren sees as a necessary reset that happens roughly every 20 years in defense.
“And it happens in defense about every 20 years... It's a necessary extinction event.”
If program roles remain short stints, the current system will crowd out new defense businesses from succeeding, which means acquisition and requirements reform must change before revenue from new entrants can show up.
“if it's a way station along the way, then the current system will crowd out the ability for these new businesses to be successful.”
The U.S. would commit to defending Taiwan if victory were a cakewalk, so the reluctance is driven by the expectation that a conventional win is too costly relative to China's stockpiled capability, not by a lack of values.
“If everyone believed that we had the ability to stop the PLA from crossing the Taiwanese Strait, it was a nothing burger for us, we'd do it.”
Large institutional limited partners likely have more defense venture general partner relationships than actual defense venture investments, because those GPs all flow back into the same few deals, which makes the investing landscape oversupplied with investment firms relative to attractive assets.
“I bet they have more GP relationships in defense venture than they actually have defense venture investments, because they're all flowing back into the same deal.”
The F-35 is now below 110 million dollars per copy, which is comparable to the roughly 85 million dollar cost of a Gulfstream 800, and it is a joint strike fighter that replaces many other programs.
“But we have it to sub-$110 million a copy.”
The long post-World War II period in which borders in the Western world did not change through force, roughly 80 years, is ending, and the current U.S. administration's transactional view of alliance obligations is a major driver of that decoupling.
“borders did not change in the Western world through force for the last 80 years and we're seeing that paradigm change”
The defense-tech stigma has collapsed; a decade ago Google employees protested Pentagon work, but now defense-focused companies attract strong capital and talent, which Farber views as good for the country.
“I remember protests in Mountain View at Google's campus, that they shouldn't be doing work for the Department of Defense. I feel like that is wholesale gone.”
Paul Brinkley, Farber's former boss at the Pentagon, was a rare bureaucrat who pushed to modernize the department regardless of disruption and later wrote a Wiley book about it, which Farber cites as a kindness.
“my former boss at the Pentagon, Paul Brinkley.”
Tom Pritzker believed in Darren Farber after he left the Pentagon with no MBA and no private equity experience, backing him to buy companies at a time when many others refused to fund him, which Farber considers the kindest professional act.
“And so when I started asking people for money, many people did not believe it.”