Darren Farber on Iran, China, and the Rise of Neoprimes - [Invest Like the Best, EP.474]
What this covers
Darren Farber, managing partner of Albion River and a former special advisor to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, returns for a conversation recorded in the middle of the Iranian contingency. He frames the present through Cold War doctrine: President Eisenhower's massive retaliation against Maxwell Taylor's flexible response, and the deterrence gap Taylor saw for small incursions. Farber argues the US needs both nuclear deterrence and conventional flexibility, or it is left with a stark binary choice.
The middle of the conversation is about ideology and regime durability. Farber draws on Ali Shariati to describe a hybrid of Marxism and martyrdom, which treats self-sacrifice as proof of winning and so resists cost-based deterrence. He applies the same logic to Hamas, and to Japan before Hirohito ended the war, a claim he presents with less certainty than the rest. Regime change, he says, needs an alternative power structure to defect to, not just popular discontent. He also describes Iranian elites moving money into London property while ordinary citizens face tiny ATM limits.
The remaining ground is China and the industrial base. Farber calls Xi Jinping's insecurity an opening for clandestine services, points to low trust and weak jointness in the military, and doubts China will invade Taiwan, partly because a KMT electoral win could deliver Beijing's goals. At home, he ties neoprime growth to multi-year procurement authority, with four or five continuing resolutions a year blocking new starts. He also compares the Manhattan Project's roughly 1 percent of GDP with what strategic investment now requires. Smaller digressions include a fabricated medical condition that a language model later repeated as fact, and his view that Israel under-invests in political messaging.
Farber argues that winning in Iran and against China is defined politically rather than territorially, that the US edge lies in its rivals' illegitimacy and in flexible power built on magazine depth, and that one-year appropriations and continuing resolutions are the binding constraint on the defense industrial base.
- Victory is measured by political objectives, such as whether the Strait of Hormuz reopens and whether Iran's ability to reconstitute its military and export network is degraded, not by territorial control.
- Authoritarian rivals like Iran and China are simultaneously strong in apparatus and weak in legitimacy, which creates US leverage through clandestine co-option.
- Continuing resolutions, one-year money, and the lack of multi-year authority prevent neoprime and magazine-depth investment from scaling.
This asset isn't compiled yet
You're seeing its claims, ranked. Compile it to build the argument threads, weight them, and check each claim against your library — the full view.
Eisenhower's doctrine of massive retaliation relied on nuclear deterrence to deter all aggression, while Taylor's flexible response used graduated proportional force; Taylor saw a deterrence gap because nuclear retaliation is not credible for small incursions, but both doctrines drift toward escalation.
“Eisenhower's theory was maximal deterrence — if you do anything, we're going to use the really special stuff. Taylor's was, we're going to use proportional force, and he viewed it as a deterrence gap”
Japan's martyrdom culture, institutionalized through kamikaze tactics, persisted until Emperor Hirohito broke the tie; had he ordered continuation, the population would have sacrificed itself, showing that fanatical cultures can only be stopped by an authority that ends the logic.
“It was only Emperor Hirohito that broke the tie. If he didn't break that tie, if he said continue — they would've sacrificed themselves.”
If the political objective of a military operation is not clearly defined and communicated, the operation loses political will, which in turn costs Congress, the budget, and ultimately the executive's ability to act.
“then you lose political will, and then you lose the ability to do it. You lose Congress, you lose the budget, you ultimately lose the executive.”
China's industrial capacity for producing munitions magazine depth is enormous, so the open question is whether that mass can overcome its institutional weakness.
“But their magazine depth industrially is so enormous, so the calculus becomes — can the magazine depth overcome their institutional weakness?”
The US averages four or five continuing resolutions a year, and CRs prohibit new starts, so new technology programs cannot begin when iteration speed is increasing, which prevents fielding current technology.
“We have on average four or five continuing resolutions a year. The peccadillo of CRs is no new starts are allowed.”
The US needs multi-year procurement authority across munitions and major programs, since one-year funding and the lack of assurance to manufacturers prevents the stockpiling required for projecting force.
“There are new efforts to create multi-year contracts for ordnance, which we've never done before.”
Weapons systems are only truly validated when used in actual combat, so theaters of war function as laboratories and the A-10 Warthog has survived repeated retirement attempts because it proved mission-capable in use.
“There's a part here where you only really know what's really good until you go to war with it. That's why the Warthog keeps on being reused.”
A fabricated medical condition posted on an academic website for about three months was later cited by a large language model as a real diagnosis, showing that AI models can absorb false facts from low-quality sources and that this becomes dangerous if models enter military decision loops.
“someone invented a phenomenon, or invented a medical condition, and left it out on an academic website posted for about three months, and then asked the large model, and it said, "You have this disease."”
The Soviet Union appeared strong up to the moment it collapsed, and Pentagon planning documents assessed its strength as high two weeks before the fall, so apparent strength is a poor predictor of regime durability.
“There were planning documents circulating at the Pentagon about how strong they were two weeks before they fell.”
Martyrdom-oriented cultures make regime change extremely hard, and regime change requires a defect-to alternative power structure, not just popular discontent, since even 85 to 90 percent support for change is insufficient without one.
“even if 85 or 90 percent want the regime to change, you need an alternative force structure to do it”
Modern precision munitions are highly accurate but lack the mass that WWII carpet bombing achieved, so the US must reintroduce mass and use targeting networks and signals intelligence software to lower the cost of precision.
“But look at the efficacy of the mass. It was super low. What we have now is highly precise, but we don't have the quantum of mass”
Prophylactic action against a rising adversary feels worse politically than reacting, because the threshold for action is never clearly set, whereas Pearl Harbor made the US decision to enter World War II crystal clear.
“The prophylactic always feels worse because the clarity of when to go wasn't decided for you.”
The pace of commercial technology change now directly sets the capabilities a military can field, because commercial supply chains let inexpensive products become military inputs faster than traditional defense development.
“The rate of technological change in the commercial world becomes this direct input into the capabilities that you can project for mass.”
China's military suffers from low trust due to repeated turnover of senior leadership, corruption among missile crews, and weak jointness, because fundamentally illegitimate power structures make officials distrust each other and cascade distrust into the military.
“They have turned over their senior military leadership three or four times in the last three years. That is not a high-trust environment.”
Xi Jinping's illegitimacy is a US strategic advantage because he cannot be sure who in his standing committee is loyal, and he may fear purges, so US clandestine services can exploit this uncertainty.
“Xi doesn't know who's on our side in his standing committee, or on his side. ... Our edge is that he is fundamentally illegitimate.”
China is unlikely to invade Taiwan militarily because terrain is hard and it would ostracize Beijing, and a KMT electoral win would let China achieve its goals through accommodation without firing a shot.
“I believe a bullet may never need to be fired in order for China to get what they want. That's the more likely outcome.”
A hybridization in parts of the Shia world, drawn from Ali Shariati, fuses Marxism with martyrdom and treats self-sacrifice as proof of winning, which makes the ideology resistant to conventional cost-based deterrence.
“a hybridization of Marxism and martyrdom together”
Iraq (Gulf War II) tried to remake the regional environment in US image rather than in US interest, while the current approach in Venezuela aims to reshape the environment in US interest by replacing the leadership, though the power structure has largely remained the same.
“Gulf War II — we tried to remake the environment in our image instead of remaking it in our interest.”
Winning in Iran without full regime change is hard because martyrdom ideology sustains regimes and the conflict is a clash of civilizations, but preventive action is politically unpopular despite the risk of inaction.
“The prophylactic always feels worse because the clarity of when to go wasn't decided for you.”
Hamas can be militarily crushed in Gaza and still see itself as winning, because its ideology counts willingness to accept mass destruction as success, which requires enormous quantities of hurt to achieve a political end.
“There are still elements of Hamas operating, but have they won? In their mind, in that Shariati form of Red Shi'ism, they're winning.”
Iranian elites have moved billions of dollars into London homes and villas and other Western European assets, while ordinary citizens face a seven-dollar ATM withdrawal limit after the second-largest bank failed about two months earlier, reflecting a mafia-style regime.
“the limit at the ATM is seven dollars. That's how much you can pull out. You had the second-largest bank fail about two months before this recent contingency.”
The Manhattan Project cost about 1 percent of GDP, and the US needs investment of a couple of hundred basis points of GDP in certain strategic areas, with a multi-year commitment to reach that level.
“The Manhattan Project was 1% of GDP. We're going to have to have our own couple of hundred bips of GDP levels of effort in these certain areas.”
A purely maximalist nuclear deterrence posture would eliminate the option to intervene in limited conflicts like Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, leaving only a stark binary choice, so the US needs both flexible conventional power and nuclear deterrence.
“It's fair to say you need both. If you took an exclusive maximalist view of Eisenhower, of having this nuclear deterrent, your only response is nuclear deterrence.”
Israel has not invested enough in political messaging, and its adversaries spend heavily on it because it works, so Israel should commit a larger share of its finite resources to positive propaganda as political worldview marketing.
“Israel has just not spent the calories on it. So the question is, should they? I believe the answer is yes.”
Capital markets are currently funding neoprime companies faster than the Pentagon and Congress can innovate, but capital markets are finite and need returns and exits, so sustained government multi-year commitments are needed.
“Right now the capital markets are working for these businesses, and they're able to outpace the innovation of the department and the Congress in order to move faster. But capital markets aren't unlimited.”
Freedom of speech in open societies allows adversaries to amplify disinformation and psychological operations through social media, so democracies may need to degrade some freedoms to protect themselves.
“So are we going to have to degrade a portion of our freedoms in order to protect ourselves?”
Dictatorships are enormously weak because they are illegitimate, untested, and face outlawed opposition, yet enormously strong because they control the state apparatus, and strategy must hold both truths at once.
“Dictators are enormously strong and enormously weak at the same time.”
The IRGC controls roughly half the Iranian economy and holds the guns, making it hard to replace, and co-opting it is complicated by the enormous overseas assets its elites have accumulated in Western Europe.
“The IRGC controls half of the economy, and they have all the guns.”
If adversaries can co-opt AI models that enter military decision loops by seeding false facts, those models could become Towers of Babel, so the foundation of facts they draw on becomes a national security vulnerability.
“Can you imagine if you can create a foundation of fact that is wrong for a model? I could see an alternative universe where the models become complete Towers of Babel.”
A weapon system's true quality is known only after it is used in actual conflict, so new defense companies (neoprimes) cannot be fully validated without a contingency environment, as shown by the Warthog's repeated reuse.
“There's a part here where you only really know what's really good until you go to war with it. That's why the Warthog keeps on being reused.”
Building magazine depth requires believing in flexible power, since a maximalist nuclear deterrence view would give no reason to invest in large stockpiles of conventional munitions.
“You wouldn't add magazine depth if you had the maximalist view of nuclear deterrent. You have magazine depth when you believe in the concept of flexible power.”
Dictatorships are forced to build magazine depth because survival depends on it, while democracies must balance profitability, duration, and congressional one-year funding, which slows munitions buildup.
“In a dictatorship, if you don't build magazine depth, and that's your job, you're dead.”
Overcoming the Iranian blockade of the Strait of Hormuz will require more magazine depth and an amphibious force on the shore, a major escalation where Taylor's and Eisenhower's theories begin to merge.
“We're going to need an amphibious force on the shore for sure. That is a major escalation, and that's where Taylor's theory and Eisenhower's theory begin to merge.”
Many Chinese standing committee members have relatives in the US with small businesses and freedom, creating a conduit for influence and a bug-out option that the US can exploit.
“every Chinese person in the standing committee has a relative somewhere in the United States, however many degrees removed, that owns a small business”
Winning in a theater like Iran is politically defined; if the Strait of Hormuz merely reopens, the outcome is judged against whether Iranian military capability is degraded and whether it can quickly reconstitute its oil-funded export network of terror.
“Winning is politically defined.”
The core challenge for democracies is how much moral rectitude they will sacrifice to reach a political goal when citizens do not feel an existential threat directly, which makes sustained costly campaigns against martyrdom ideologies hard to sustain.
“how much of our moral rectitude will we compromise in order to achieve the political goal if we don't feel the existential threat sitting here today in New York.”
Continuing resolutions and missing multi-year authority will kill defense industry, causing the loss of new companies that depend on steady procurement commitments.
“These continuing resolutions kill industry, and that is something I consistently worry about because we are going to lose these companies through CRs”
Having a pacing threat such as China is valuable because it forces the U.S. to stay serious about maintaining its military capabilities.
“I think having a pacing threat unto itself is valuable to make sure that we are serious about maintaining capabilities.”
Many newer defense companies have not yet fielded systems of record, and new products must be exercised and integrated into joint warfare doctrine before they can be relied on, so their limited use reflects integration requirements rather than poor performance.
“Just because I make a new widget doesn't mean I can ingest it so easily. We have to exercise it and impute it into this joint concept of warfare”
Degrading Iranian military capability is a real gain, but the Strait of Hormuz must reopen as an economic choke point for commerce to function, and the US must also prevent Iran from quickly rebuilding its oil-funded capacity.
“But the Strait of Hormuz as an economic choke point has to open back up in order for commerce to work.”
Within the roughly $1.5 trillion FY27 budget, a portion of the FFRDC research budget should be redirected toward industry, and the federated R&D funding should be coordinated so neoprimes can iterate and be tested in real exercises.
“The FFRDC budget — a portion needs to be repointed towards industry so we can encourage the iteration of these commercial developments”
Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood planned, over about 20 years, to co-opt American universities and teaching institutions to shift Western opinion, a plan Farber says was laid out in a single Philadelphia hotel meeting that the FBI recorded.
“The design to co-opt American universities can be traced to a single hotel room in Philadelphia by the FBI, listening with laser microphones.”
The U.S. is creating multi-year contracts for ordnance, a practice it has never used before, to change the acquisition architecture and build magazine depth.
“There are new efforts to create multi-year contracts for ordnance, which we've never done before. We really need it.”
Presidents have declared or functionally created military contingencies without congressional consent since Truman, and the partisan response depends on which side of the aisle is acting.
“Presidents have declared or functionally created contingencies without the consent of Congress since Truman.”
The US gridlock is intentional: unlike parliamentary systems, where the ceremonial upper house has little power and the majority party controls the prime minister, the US has a separately elected executive and a longer-term Senate, which protects against mass-hysteria shifts toward fascism but slows response.
“Parliamentary democracies are more susceptible to being overtaken in these mass hysteria moments into things like fascism”
Products that become permissive and inexpensive in commercial markets, like drones, have enormously valuable military applications because the low cost of losing one makes them attractive for asymmetric war.
“things that become permissive and inexpensive in a commercial world have these enormously valuable inputs into fighting asymmetric war.”
The U.S. entered World War II only after Pearl Harbor, not because of Germany, and in hindsight preventive action against the adversary's accumulating power would have been better.
“We ultimately entered World War II because the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor.”
Kevin Rudd argues Xi is a risk-taker who views completing the takeover of Taiwan as the apex of his life's achievement, so the CCP takeover is incomplete until Taiwan falls.
“He said that Xi's a risk-taker. If you've gotten to a certain age and you view it as the apotheosis of your life's achievement”
Conventional precision systems such as Tomahawk missiles and HIMARS are not nuclear weapons, and they allow enforcement of smaller infringements without invoking the nuclear threshold.
“A Tomahawk missile is not a nuclear weapon. HIMARS is not a nuclear weapon.”
U.S. intelligence recruitment against China is built through daily incremental work, with case officers recruiting through Chinese officials' relatives who run successful small businesses in the U.S. and live freely, making the system persuasive to insiders.
“every Chinese person in the standing committee has a relative somewhere in the United States, however many degrees removed, that owns a small business”
Designing weapons as joint catalog programs across services, such as the joint strike fighter, gives manufacturers a reasonable expectation of continued orders, which supports investment even under one-year funding.
“So the manufacturer has a reasonable expectation that you're going to keep on ordering, even if it's one year.”
The Israeli campaign in Gaza demonstrates that defeating a militarily inferior adversary with a martyrdom ethos may require leveling the territory, and Netanyahu may need a final ground-war leg despite uncertain Knesset support.
“In order to win it, look how far they've had to go.”
Democratic legitimacy gives the US a moral advantage over authoritarian rivals, but it also means mobilization must satisfy profitability and duration constraints that authoritarian regimes avoid.
“the overarching architecture is we are fundamentally legitimate, and these guys are not legitimate.”
The United States is the bug-out point for the world, and even Chinese standing committee members worried about falling out of favor have plans to get to America, which is a source of strategic advantage.
“We can't forget what makes us special and that we are the bug-out point for the world. Even for the people in the standing committee that are worried if they're on the outs, they have a plan to get here.”
There is a growing body of evidence that Ayatollah Khamenei martyred himself by remaining above ground to be targeted, as a solution to illness, unclear succession, and infighting, after killing tens of thousands of his own people.
“There is a growing body of evidence that suggests that Ayatollah Khamenei martyred himself.”
Historian Frank Dikötter argues China is not a superpower merely because of its size, since illegitimacy, tensions within the party plenum, and the disappearance of its top military officer make it fragile.
“Dikötter is a well-regarded historian on China, and has a theory on how China is not a superpower just by virtue of how illegitimate and how weak it is”
The Red Shia martyrdom ideology is incompatible with modernity and with preserving humanity, and if it gained nuclear capability the threat would be existential, so this is a clash of civilizations.
“I would argue the Red Shia martyrdom cult, the fanaticism, is incompatible with humanity preserving itself.”
Winning against fanaticism at the limit, as in World War II, has required extreme measures such as the Dresden firebombing, which forces democracies to question their moral fiber.
“The bombing of Dresden — there was this horror that we would firebomb a city and kill 30,000 people under the premise that they have to know that they lost.”
If China overtook Taiwan militarily, neighbors with historical grievances, notably Japan, would likely face the next pressure, which explains Japan's push for stronger defense under its current prime minister.
“If Taiwan is overtaken in a military exercise, is there any doubt that these other countries that have real historical beefs will be next?”
A foreign ambassador observed that Democrats are obsessed with process and Republicans with outcome, and the best result comes from combining the two orientations.
“Democrats are obsessed with process, and Republicans are obsessed with outcome.”
Democrats emphasize process and Republicans emphasize outcome, and combining both orientations should produce the optimal policy result, though the current contingency lacks conventional process such as UN Security Council action.
“Democrats are obsessed with process, and Republicans are obsessed with outcome.”
The history of peacetime mobilization in democracies is mixed or poor, so reproducing the rapid World War II industrial mobilization described in Freedom's Forge requires institutional change now.
“The history of peacetime mobilizations in democratic societies is mixed or bad.”
High trust inside a military comes from esprit de corps and belief in the mission's legitimacy, and this is one of the U.S. military's enormous strengths relative to adversaries.
“High trust comes through esprit de corps and believing in the mission and legitimacy of what you're doing. That is one of our enormous strengths.”
US recruitment, retention, and training of clandestine assets had degraded after a series of asset losses but has since been rebuilt in a meaningful way through sustained daily infiltration work.
“Our ability to recruit, retain, and train had really degraded, and we had lost a lot of capability through a series of assets that were caught, but we have rebuilt that in a very meaningful way.”
Congress should create billets that insulate non-negotiable national priorities from political influence, so the consensus items that all agree on, such as core munitions, are not subject to annual fights.
“we need to create billets that lessen the political influence over the things that we all agree on as a country are non-negotiable.”
China's Communist Party is an illegitimate dictatorship whose monopoly on power will eventually collapse, and Farber believes this will happen within our lifetime, perhaps in a Taiwan-like transition.
“I believe in our lifetime China will fall. I believe in our lifetime Iran will fall.”
The Chinese constitutional framework is fundamentally corrupt because it guarantees a permanent monopoly of power, and while the timeline for its fall is uncertain, a monopoly this illegitimate eventually falls.
“Their constitution, their concept of a constitution, is fundamentally corrupt. That monopoly of power saying that these people are going to permanently be in charge — you know it to be wrong.”
The U.S. must fill its deterrence gap faster to stop small incursions on the margins, especially against Southeast Asian treaty partners like the Philippines, whose bilateral agreements are being violated now.
“We need to go faster for the purposes of filling the deterrence gap, so we can stop small incursions on the margins”
Recent US contingencies skipped conventional process such as UN Security Council resolutions and diplomacy, so the outcome must justify the lack of process, as Iraq showed when outcomes did not follow.
“But obviously, if it's devoid of the outcome, what was the purpose of it? Think of the Iraq contingency.”
A Ukrainian drone evolved through roughly 50 iterations over about three years, because producers can build and iterate capability through commercial supply chains in a garage setting.
“The evolution of a Ukrainian drone from three years ago to today is unbelievable. There's 50 iterations.”
Congress should allocate more budget for live testing of new technologies, but without letting war-testing become the driver of conflict, so that the Pentagon exercises equipment in controlled but realistic ways.
“Obviously, you don't want the tail to wag the dog for the purposes of just exercising the equipment. So we need to allocate a more meaningful amount to try.”
Gulf Arab states have a much stronger will to fight than the rest of the world, with the UAE leaving OPEC and pledging to project force with its own forces, while most other nations are watching.
“The amazing thing is the Gulf Arab states have a much stronger will to fight. UAE has left OPEC.”
Adversaries with a 20-year plan outlast opponents who think in seven-year cycles, and the Philadelphia-era influence campaign succeeded because its designers were committed to seeing it through.
“These guys had a 20-year plan, and it totally worked.”
The US military is the most capable fighting force in history, but as a government body it suffers from one-year appropriations, shifting leadership, and bureaucracy that make it suboptimal.
“it gets one-year money from Congress. You have deck chairs that constantly change.”
Conventional wisdom holds that America can withstand more economic pain than its adversary, even as US inflation is high and the strait is functionally closed.
“You have high inflation, but the conventional wisdom is that America can withstand less pain than the counterparty.”
Several former members of Congress have recently traveled to Venezuela for business trips, which Farber finds surprising given the recent change in the environment.
“I know a whole series of members of Congress that just went to Venezuela for a trip — former members of Congress.”
The current administration is moving the goalposts on what winning means in the popular vernacular.
“This administration is moving the goalposts in the popular vernacular of what winning means.”
Palantir's Shyam Sankar wrote a book, Mobilize, that addresses the same core issue of increasing magazine depth, though he did not use that term.
“I talked to Shyam from Palantir about this. He had just come out with his book — I think it was called Mobilize”