
Karen Karniol-Tambour on Investing in a More Fragmented World
What this covers
This is an 11-minute conversation from the Milken Institute's 2026 Global Conference, in which Bridgewater Co-CIO Karen Karniol-Tambour is interviewed about what a more fragmented world means for investors. The conversation runs through two forces she treats as structural rather than cyclical: modern mercantilism, in which each country treats any dependency as something that could be weaponized, and the capex boom in AI infrastructure. She defines the first, contends that the old logic of producing in the cheapest place has permanently broken, and argues that the US-led habit of coordinating with allies during crises has given way to countries pursuing their own interests.
The range is wider than the investing frame suggests. She revisits the decade in which manufacturing shed about 10% of the population's jobs, with political consequences still felt, and forecasts that AI disruption will be larger and faster. On chips, she describes a silicon curtain in which China is cut off from advanced semiconductors and races to duplicate bottlenecks such as ASML UV machines. She also predicts that Europe will have no choice but to build its own defense and industrial base. She notes the US blocking Chinese cars even though, in her view, they are better than American ones, and says that the US has little choice but to pursue domestic rare earth production despite the cost.
The contentious turns are mostly about inflation and portfolios. She argues that sovereign spending on resilience is inflationary by definition, since duplicating capacity means doing the work twice. AI capex, because it buys chips and equipment from Taiwan and Korea rather than hiring large labor forces, props up headline growth without much employment, which she offers as one explanation for the gap between markets and lived experience. Her prescription is that portfolios are too concentrated in US equities and the dollar, too light in real assets, and too tied up in illiquids to stay agile. She suggests looking for opportunity within the emerging regional ecosystems.
The global economy is dominated by two structural forces—modern mercantilism driven by geopolitical fragmentation and massive AI infrastructure spending—that create persistent inflation in physical assets, misshapen employment patterns, and require investors to diversify across emerging regional ecosystems rather than concentrate in US equities.
- Countries now prioritize sovereign resilience and national champions over efficiency, making defense, infrastructure, and rare earths spending structural rather than cyclical
- AI capex is the primary driver of current US growth but is not employment-intensive, creating divergence between headline numbers and ground-level economic reality
- Investors are unprepared for this world because portfolios remain concentrated in US equities with minimal real asset exposure, vulnerable to physical inflation and geopolitical fragmentation
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The global economy is dominated by two massive forces that are not stopping: a new geopolitical paradigm of modern mercantilism and massive AI infrastructure spending.
“It's a very unique economy relative to what we've seen over many decades because it is basically being dominated by two massive forces that are not stopping. One is the very different geopolitical paradigm we're in. We've called it modern mercantilism, but it's very different than the world we were in, which was, you know, more efficiency, more integration.”
Manufacturing employment collapsed over 10 years as production moved to cheaper countries and automation increased, resulting in 10% of the population leaving manufacturing without massive widespread unemployment, but with severe political and social consequences still felt today.
“If you look at what happened to manufacturing, where over something like 10-ish years we took about 10% of the population and kind of got them out of manufacturing employment, partly going to poorer countries and partly being automated. So, a typical manufacturing employee is a lot more productive today than they used to be. That process, you could say it all ended up okay, right? You don't have like massive widespread unemployment because of it, but it was unbelievably disruptive. And you could argue that the political and social consequences of that are still with us today.”
China is experiencing a silicon curtain where it is being systematically blocked from importing advanced semiconductors and production equipment, so it is hell-bent on developing its own chips, memory production, and foundries to compete with ASML and other critical technologies.
“If you look at AI, the obvious, you know, kind of silicon curtain that's forming is that China's looking at this and saying so much is being done to kind of contain China, right? Limitations on what they can bring in, limitations on what they can import, that they're hell-bent on developing their own and making sure that they have kind of top-down um support to form their own competitors to whether it's chips or memory or foundries. Any one of these companies that they have limitations, ASML, UV machines, they're going to try to make their own.”
Whether you are optimistic or pessimistic about AI's ultimate benefits, the disruption along the way is a very big deal and has barely gotten started.
“So, whether you're optimistic or not about the ending spot, the disruption along the way is a very big deal, and that has barely gotten started.”
The current divergence between the market and the real economy is partially explained by an ongoing capex boom that is the largest of all time, which mechanically supports profits and growth but is not employment-intensive.
“The capex phase we're in the midst of it. I think it's a big part of answering the puzzle you're laying out, Stephanie, of how could it be that there's this divergence? Well, this is the biggest capex boom of all time. We know that massive capex booms support profits in this very mechanical way, right? Like, one side writes it in depreciation, one side writes it as profit, it can build on itself.”
ASML UV machines and semiconductor manufacturing equipment are critical bottlenecks that China is racing to duplicate because access restrictions create vulnerabilities.
“Any one of these companies that they have limitations, ASML, UV machines, they're going to try to make their own.”
Sovereign-level spending on defense, infrastructure, and rare earths driven by mercantilism is by definition inflationary because it prioritizes resilience over efficiency: if the most efficient place existed, countries would already be doing it there, so they must do double the work to be self-sufficient.
“That is spending that's not cyclical. It's coming from this view that the world is changing where you can't rely on your allies, where you have to maximize your own wealth and strength, so you need national champions and you need to worry about your own resilience. And by definition, that's very inflationary spending because instead of saying, 'Let's do things in the most efficient place,' you're saying, 'Well, I've got to be resilient on my own.' By definition, that's not the most efficient place. If it was, I would have done it there. I need to do a double do to make sure I'm resilient, I'm a fortress.”
Historically, when the world faced economic crises, the US coordinated internationally and worked with allies, but the current environment shows a fundamental shift where every country is pursuing its own interests without international coordination.
“Traditionally, when the world faces economic crises of sorts, the US is the global leader. Given how divided things are right now, if things were to get worse, do you see the US coordinating again and working together with our allies, or are we in a whole new landscape? I think we're clearly in a whole new landscape of everyone out for themselves.”
The integration-based paradigm of 'do things in the cheapest possible place' has permanently broken because countries now perceive integration as a weaponization risk that outweighs efficiency gains.
“The world has shifted to where the paradigm of let's just have integration and do things in the cheapest possible place is just not going to work without you feeling like you could be taken advantage of or that will be weaponized against you.”
Modern mercantilism means every country prioritizes maximizing its own wealth and strength and treats any vulnerability as a potential weaponization vector that must be defended against.
“It means that every country sees its role much more as needing to maximize wealth and strength of its own country and go after any choke points, any vulnerabilities, right? If there's anything to be learned from the mix of what's happened on trade, what's happened on Iran, is that whatever vulnerability you have as a country, it will be weaponized against you.”
The current economy is strong due to sustained non-demand-driven spending from mercantilism and AI capex, but this creates structural inflation particularly in physical assets because data centers, power, defense, and physical infrastructure have limited supply.
“It's an economy that has it's strong cuz you have a lot of spending that's not reliant on demand. It's going to kind of keep running. It's inflationary, particularly in physical world because you need to literally, you know, build out these data centers, you need power, you need defense, you need physical things and there's only a limited supply of how many of them they are.”
Current AI and infrastructure spending is not employment-intensive, creating a divergence where headline economic statistics look stronger than ground-level economic experience feels.
“It's a kind of misshapen economy because a lot of this spending is not necessarily that employment heavy. So, the headline numbers can look a lot better than it kind of feels like on the ground.”
If a private equity portfolio invested 5-7 years ago locked in holdings from an earlier industry regime, investors lose the agility to respond to AI disruption across industries, creating inflexibility in a time of rapid change.
“If your whole equity book is private equity was invested 5-7 years ago in whatever set of industries were done then, you just lose a lot of your agility to kind of respond to the time.”
In a high-inflation, volatile environment, volatility itself is not the problem—the problem is that most portfolios globally are unprepared for this specific environment because they lack real asset exposure and are concentrated in US equities.
“It's not volatility in and of itself it's a problem. It's the fact that portfolios are very similar across the world and not prepared for the particular set of circumstances of where the world is taking us. And so almost every portfolio you look at around the world is highly concentrated geographically, highly concentrated in US equities, and has very little exposure to real assets.”
AI disruption is likely to be bigger and faster than the manufacturing transition: it will displace more than 10% of the workforce and will occur in less than 10 years.
“And the one thing I think we know about AI adoption is it's very hard to believe that process won't be bigger and faster. It's very hard to believe that it'll take longer than 10 years and not less, that it'll be less than 10% of the workforce and not more.”
AI capex is not employment-intensive because it involves buying semiconductor chips and equipment from Taiwan and Korea rather than hiring large labor forces to build data centers.
“That boom is not very employment intensive because you are more or less, you know, buying magical boxes from Taiwan and buying some magical stuff from Korea. You're not employing lots and lots of people to build these data centers.”
Europe will be forced to become its own defense ecosystem with its own military and industrial base because of geopolitical fragmentation and will have no choice in this matter.
“This will become its own sort of ecosystem, Europe will be even more its own defense ecosystem, they'll have to be, they'll have no choice.”
Volatility creates opportunity and is beneficial if investors can be resilient to multiple directions outcomes, can take advantage of dislocations, and maintain agility to change positions.
“So, the volatility can be good if you can take advantage of it, if you can respond to it, and if you can be resilient to different directions that it could take you.”
The US is deliberately blocking Chinese cars from the market even though Chinese cars are better than US cars, creating a captive protected market for US automakers.
“Look at cars in the United States. We're just not letting in the Chinese cars that are just, you know, sort of better than US cars. That's going to be a car market that's kind of its own.”
Regional market pools are becoming captive markets protected by industrial policies, and investors should diversify across these pools rather than concentrate in one region.
“You're getting these pools that are in different ways captive markets, protected by their own industrial policies. And so, for investors, that's a big shift and you don't want to be in only one of those pools. You want to be able to find the investable opportunities in these pockets that are kind of closing in on their own walls because of the world forcing that resilience, that its own market, and that fragmentation.”
Global portfolios are systematically unprepared for inflation because the companies they own are not backed by hard physical assets that are actually being demanded in the real world.
“So as you go through this world that is pressuring physical assets so much and where inflation becomes a relevant consideration again when it hasn't been there for very long, almost nobody has enough inflation protection because very few companies they own are actually backed by hard physical things that are what are being demanded in the real world.”
Excessive US equity and dollar concentration in global portfolios creates vulnerability in a fragmenting world because it leaves investors exposed to a single regional outcome.
“The second piece is that you're going into this much more fragmented world and being so US focused just gets people overly concentrated in the way things could play out. There is, you know, the US has such a high share of global market cap and there's just a desire to invest here and now folks are looking around saying, 'Wait a minute, I have so much exposure to the US, so much exposure to the dollar. Do I really not want to be more diversified in a world that is becoming more fragmented um because of these issues?'”
Different countries are setting up their own ecosystems that represent important investable opportunities, and investors should be looking for opportunities within these emerging regional blocs rather than assuming global integration.
“Different countries are setting up their own ecosystems, and these are important investable opportunities for people.”
In a fragmented world, the investment analysis framework shifts from 'Is this the most globally competitive company?' to 'Is this protected? Does it have top-down government support as a national champion with a captive market?'
“So, that becomes sort of its own ecosystem that you look at a company and instead of saying, is this the most globally competitive company or, you know, can Nvidia or TSMC do better? The better question is, well, are they protected? Do they have a top-down perspective to create a national champion that will create that captive market that will make sure that these companies are developing to kind of do their own thing.”
Volatility is manageable and can create opportunity if investors maintain agility, but the world has shifted so much into illiquids (private equity, illiquid alts) that the ability to change positions, be agile, and respond to changing circumstances has diminished.
“And so volatility in and of itself can be fine if you can use it as an opportunity. The other thing I would say about volatility is that the world has moved so much into illiquids that the ability to change your mind, to be agile, to respond to what's happening has just gone way down.”
The United States has limited choice but to pursue domestic rare earth production despite environmental costs and inefficiency because allowing China's monopoly creates a vulnerability that will be weaponized.
“If you're the United States, you could say, well, maybe it's a waste for us to do rare earths. Maybe we don't like the fact that it's a toxic process and we don't want to do it. Okay, well, that is being against the United States. The United States doesn't have a lot of choices but to say, you know, let's work and they can choose whether to do it more or less with allies.”
The market is currently euphoric because it's in the capex phase of the AI buildout, which is supporting growth, but this is a temporary state before productivity disruption hits.
“We're mostly living with a market that is euphoric because of the capex phase, which is supporting so much.”
Oil prices above $100 per barrel, which most people did not predict, create a new inflationary pressure that will likely raise consumer prices if sustained.
“Most people would not have predicted oil being over a hundred dollars, but here we are. And if it persists, then we're likely going to see inflationary impact, consumer prices are going to go up.”
AI infrastructure scaling laws continue to produce payoffs, making it rational for countries to pursue massive capex buildout despite the enormous capital and power requirements.
“And then you add to that what of course is the massive desire to build out AI infrastructure because scaling laws have continued to work. There's evidence that the bigger you go, the more you build out this infrastructure, the bigger models you can run, there'll actually be a payoff to that. So, it's worth doing and you get another huge source of spending.”
US growth is currently supported by AI capex, but AI adoption has not yet reached the point where it's hitting bottom-line macro statistics in employment or productivity.
“We're in the midst of this capex boom of AI, and that's what's dominating US growth today. If you look at US growth today, the big piece of it is it's being supported by AI capex. AI adoption has not yet gone to the point where it is, you know, kind of hitting the bottom line macro stats.”
Germany, which had not previously been a large borrower, now has fiscal room and the market is excited about Germany borrowing to finance domestic defense and infrastructure spending.
“If you kind of look at the spectrum, there's countries like Germany that hadn't previously been big borrowers. So, they have the room to be going out and borrowing, and that's why the market's excited to say, 'Wait a minute, these guys are actually going to borrow, they're going to do something, they're going to try to bring the capital back in.'”
Investors have exited emerging market exposures and commodity holdings, which is a structural error because these assets are actually backed by the hard physical things that the new environment demands.
“Um people have sort of come out of a lot of the type of emerging market exposures that are really backed by things, commodities aren't as popular. So this world that really benefits physical assets, people are not that prepared for.”
China has benefited significantly from mercantilist economic strategy and remains highly insulated during geopolitical conflicts like the Iran crisis because it pursued domestic resilience and self-sufficiency.
“You look at the way that China's thought this way for a long time, and that's clearly been very successful. Look how insulated they are during the Iran conflict. Everybody's going after the spending.”