
What this covers
Ed Leamer, an economist at UCLA, joins Russ Roberts for an extended conversation on the economic effects of outsourcing and globalization on American workers and living standards. The discussion centers on whether fears of mass job displacement from overseas competition are justified, and whether gains from trade and technology are broadly shared or concentrated among a narrow elite. Leamer draws heavily on his critique of Thomas Friedman's "The World is Flat," arguing that the metaphor obscures how trade actually works in practice.
The conversation ranges across the mechanisms that constrain trade and the historical evidence on who actually competes in global markets. Leamer contends that proximity and trust—not just wage differences—govern where economic activity occurs, making most jobs far less contestable than popular accounts suggest. He argues that since 1980, China and India have primarily displaced middle-income countries like Brazil and Mexico, while the United States has largely benefited from their integration into global supply chains. The speakers also examine competing models of trade, the fuzziness of official trade statistics, and why the "great equalization" that many feared did not occur. A central tension runs through the discussion: whether 21st-century productivity gains will resemble the broadly shared prosperity of mid-20th-century manufacturing (the "Detroit model") or concentrate wealth among talented superstars in a winner-take-all economy (the "Hollywood model"). Leamer and Roberts also discuss education, occupational mobility, and whether the ladder of opportunity that historically allowed low-skilled workers to climb into the middle class through manufacturing jobs remains viable as that sector shrinks.
Leamer argues that fears of mass job loss from globalization and outsourcing are overstated because most work is governed by trust-based relationships and distinctiveness rather than price-based commodity markets, but warns the real risk is a 'winner-take-all' economy where technology rewards the talented few rather than broadly shared gains.
- Trade is constrained by gravity (proximity and trust), not just wage differentials, so jobs are far less 'contestable' than the 'flat world' metaphor implies
- China and India compete mainly with middle-income countries (Latin America), not with the US, so the US benefits from their integration
- The key danger is whether 21st-century productivity gains resemble Detroit (broadly shared) or Hollywood (concentrated among superstars)
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The Schumer-Roberts argument that factor mobility eliminates the gains from trade is wrong: every exchange still reveals a gain (a good moves from someone who values it less to someone who values it more), but factor mobility changes general equilibrium relative prices, and relative to those new prices some domestic individuals can be made worse off even though aggregate gains remain.
“the fact that there is in fact a mobility doesn't eliminate the fact that does eliminate to gain whatsoever it still is going to be gained from every exchange that occurs now what the... fact of mobility does however is it changes the supply and demand relationships general equilibrium relationships around the whole economy and it changes equilibrium relative prices and relative to those new equilibrium prices you may be worse off”
The gravity model—that trade between two points is proportional to the product of their GDPs divided by distance raised to a power (around 0.6 to 1)—fits surprisingly well and persists despite enormous reductions in transportation and communication costs, meaning most economic transactions still occur within a couple hundred miles.
“the economics gravity model is analogous meaning that the amount of transactions that occur between two points in space is proportional the product of the masses in this case measured by GDP s divided by not the square of the distance but the distance to raise to a lower power like 1 or 0.8 or 0.6”
The central worry is whether the 21st century resembles the 20th, when factory-floor productivity improvements benefited people at all income levels (Detroit), or whether productivity gains will differentially accrue to a few talented superstars (Hollywood)—and labor markets increasingly look more like Hollywood than Detroit.
“the question is whether the 21st century is going to be like the 20th century in which people at all levels of the income distribution benefited from the productivity improvements on the factory floor or are we going to have a different kind of society in which the productivity improvements differentially affect the talented individuals the way it is in Hollywood... what I worry about is the labor markets are increasingly looking like Hollywood labor markets and less and less like Detroit”
Official trade statistics reported to several decimal places are actually very fuzzy: the world runs a trade imbalance with itself (a global deficit, implying impossible 'missing trade'), and imports are scrutinized far more than exports because countries tax imports—illustrated by truckers throwing export declarations into a garbage can at the US-Canada border.
“numbers that I thought were correct to the three or four decimal points that they report them to turns out to be very very fuzzy indeed if you really understand how they're put together”
Outsourcing of intellectual services delivered over the internet is economically tantamount to having those foreign workers emigrate to the United States—it is a factor flow equivalent to the workers living in your own state and providing the services there.
“the way to think that about that is that's as if these folks had emigrated to the United States you know that's a that's a factor float is just tantamount to having them live in your own states provide the services here”
Technology and trade have very similar impacts, and whether their benefits are widely enjoyed depends on the ability of people to be flexible with their skills—because creative tasks inevitably become standardized, mechanized, or computerized over time, after which the work becomes footloose and wages are competed down.
“the technology and trade are very similar their impacts and the real question is in terms of how widely enjoyed the benefits from these trade changes are going to be depends on the ability of people to be flexible with their skills”
The large volume of 'east-west' trade among similar high-income countries (US, Europe, Japan, Canada) with similar endowments is not explained by Ricardian comparative advantage but by Krugman-style models of economies of scale and product differentiation; north-south trade with unequal labor supplies is better explained by Heckscher-Ohlin models.
“we have a large number of models that are associated very much with Paul Krugman's name that deal with the economies of scale product differentiation the trade between what might be called east-west trade... is trade among countries with very similar per capita incomes... yet there's an immense amount of trade between these countries”
If technology made software essentially free, the specialized programmers lose their returns but the rest of society is immensely better off because resources are freed for other uses; counterbalancing the loss to producers is an enormous gain to everyone else, which unleashes resources for unforeseeable new activities—so the scare story omits the gain side.
“the rest of us are immensely better off because now we have very inexpensive software free in this extreme example... counterbalancing the loss to the software producers is this enormous gain to quote everyone else and that in turn is going to unleash resources to do other things we can't foresee right away”
The competitive 'do it cheaper and better' process that destroys jobs in transition is also the source of our standard of living, wealth, longevity, and health—so the fear that mundane tasks become competitive and low-paid is only half the story; the displacement is good even if tough on people during the transition.
“this competitive process is is as a glorious side which is it is what creates our standard of living it is what creates that process of do it cheaper and better... it's tough on people in the transition period obviously but it is the source of our standard of living or wealth our longevity our health and all the glorious and pleasant things that make life worth”
The 'flat world' metaphor is inappropriate because geography does not make every job globally contestable; instead it creates special relationships between buyers and sellers in the same neighborhood, which limits contestability.
“geography whether it's flat or otherwise doesn't create that kind of outcome it creates a special relationships between the buyers and sellers who have no in the same neighborhood and that limits the contestability so the metaphor first of all is inappropriate”
The agrarian-to-industrial transition (ending around 1970) raised everyone's incomes because factory compensation was about three times farm pay and each worker moved off the farm produced a burst of GDP, with innovations like the forklift and electric motor improving productivity in ways that benefited all skill levels—a broadly-shared pattern that may not recur in the post-industrial age.
“the compensation rates on the factory floor floor were about three times as high as they were on a farm every time I move the worker off the farm out of the factory floor we got a little burst of GDP as a consequence of that and in year after year we had these innovations like the forklift and electric motor... that improved the productivity but improved it in a way Americans in every level skill were benefiting”
Alan Blinder's claim that 30-40 million service jobs (including high-paying ones held by radiologists and mathematicians) are 'offshorable' lacks evidence: it relies on subjectively going through occupation descriptions and labeling each as a problem or not, rather than on elasticities measuring any causal connection between US wages and foreign wages, so the contestability he identifies is far more severe than reality.
“there's no evidence than that so the evidence would have to do with elasticity's between your wage rate and wage rate of some other worker... what he does is he feels free just go through the list of labor descriptions of these occupations and said well that that one's probably going to be a problem and this one's okay and then he adds up... I don't know any evidence that suggests that the contestability... is anywhere near Suvir as he identifies”
The persistence of distance in trade despite falling transport costs is best explained by trust: people want to do business with those they know, and confidence falls with distance—except for commodities whose value is transparent and inspectable, which are a small fraction of global trade.
“I think it comes back to and trust and understanding that you really want to do business with people that you know and the farther that you got away the less confidence you have in those in that business relationship now it doesn't matter for a commodity that can be inspected and whose values apparent and transparent but for there's very few commodities that are exchanged in global trade”
Countries that gained from the integration of China, Brazil, and Eastern Europe were those that had few footloose jobs or jettisoned them early and positioned their product mix to be cooperative/complementary rather than competitive with Chinese supply; the real problems China creates are for other countries still competing with China, not the US.
“the countries that have gained from that are those that had relatively few of these Footloose jobs or jettison them early and recognized that competition against the Chinese was a hopeless situation and and they positioned themselves... in a way that is not a not competitive with Chinese sources of supply”
Being geographically far from high-income markets strongly predicts low per capita income; the historical exceptions of New Zealand and Australia succeeded because their English language and English legal systems built a cultural-linguistic bridge enabling trust-based business relationships with high-wage markets.
“the countries that have had successful economic outcomes... they're all clustered together physically clustered together either in in Europe or in North America and the being far away is a very good predictor of low per capita incomes with a few exceptions”
If a previously US-monopolized intellectual service (e.g., software coding) becomes producible abroad due to better communications technology, global supply rises and the price falls, deteriorating the US terms of trade and making the US collectively worse off—but this depends on the activity being a commodity rather than a distinctive intellectual service, and only if the skill is genuinely scarce relative to global demand.
“the terms of trade deteriorates for us produced software in the US has made worse off as a consequence of that because a u.s. had two panoply position for using and selling software and suddenly the monopoly position dissipates”
From 1980 to 2000, despite the integration of India and China dumping large numbers of unskilled workers into global labor markets, the feared 'great equalization'—where US per capita GDP would collapse from over $20,000 toward the ~$5,100 global average—did not happen; instead high-income countries (US, Japan) and low-income countries (China, India) both grew substantially while middle-income countries (Brazil, Mexico) were left behind.
“the high-income countries particularly in earth States and Japan experienced very substantial income growth and the low income countries particularly China in India also experienced very substantial per capita income growth but it was the countries in the middle that were were left behind”
The 1980-2000 income data are evidence that China and India are not competing with the US and Japan but with Latin American countries (Brazil, Mexico), since they offer the globe the same mundane services in apparel, footwear, and textiles—and the US produces little that competes directly with China and India, so the US benefits enormously from their entry into the global economy.
“the Chinese and Indians are not competing with the u.s. and Japan but they're competing especially with Latin American countries of Brazil and Mexico... the United States doesn't have much an aware product produced here that is in competition with Chinese China in India and the result is that US benefits enormously”
Children should be equipped with the capacity to do creative functions rather than limited skills, because those with only mundane/codifiable skills will be forced to compete against both cheap foreign labor and computers—and computers carry out routinized tasks with accuracy and speed no human can match—condemning them to economic insecurity.
“what we want to do is give our kids that wherewithal to make sure that they can do the creative functions and... have the happy lives... but also the economic security that those functions are going to provide in the 21st century a period of time when there's going to be a lot of economic insecurity among those individuals can only carry out the code a fireboat mundane kinds of tasks”
In creative work, trust and the intangibles/unobservables observed in face-to-face work become much more important, whereas in mundane commodity-like tasks they matter less because you just want the output, not the relationship with the producer.
“if an employer employee relationship in in what we might call creative work trust and the intangibles and the unobservable z-- that you get to observe would you work face to face with someone those become much more important in what you call more mundane tasks they're like or a tomato they're less important you don't want the object you just want the output”
The historic ladder of opportunity for low-skilled immigrants ran through manufacturing (which paid roughly three times farm compensation and absorbed unskilled, non-English-speaking workers), but that manufacturing rung has shrunk from about 35% of jobs to roughly 11% due to trade and especially technology, raising the question of how low-education immigrants (e.g., Hispanic communities in Southern California) will climb economically.
“the ladder of opportunity in this country for economic improvement has always been through manufacturing... the problem that we have with Hispanic community here in Southern California is that that manufacturing rung on a ladder erupts - it just isn't there”
Job security from distinctiveness comes from quality competition rather than price competition: the goal of a worker is to convince the employer they have something special and distinctive, whereas a commodity market clears on price (you can't simply offer to do a job for a dollar less and win it).
“what might be called quality competition not price competition a market is about price competition so I wouldn't go to George Mason and say I'll do Russel Robert's job for a dollar lesson he'll do it that's the way market operates it clears with regard to prices but my job would be... convince the employer or the university that they have something special”
The worry that manufacturing's decline blocks upward mobility echoes the false alarm from 1900, when 40% of the workforce was on farms; that share collapsed to ~2% yet jobs emerged not just from manufacturing but mainly from an unforeseeable explosion of service jobs, so the underlying process of creativity will again generate new work.
“in 1900 when 40% of the American workforce was on the farm you could have said if it shrinks to two... oh my gosh where are the new jobs gonna come from well they came from manufacturing partially but they also they mainly came from an explosion of services jobs that were unforeseen unforeseeable and I send the same thing it's going to happen because that underlying process of creativity is what's going to drive it”
The computer can be either a 'forklift' or a 'microphone': a forklift raises productivity while equalizing it across individuals regardless of physical endowment, whereas a microphone differentially benefits the naturally talented by letting a single performer serve the whole global market, producing large income inequality (as in Hollywood).
“what a forklift does is it allows you and me and all of our listeners to lift the same amount no matter how strong they might be... so that's an innovation that creates higher wages but also equal wages among individuals a microphone is a very different kind of innovation because it differentially benefits the people with the natural talent”
Most labor is governed by relationships, not markets: a worker brings something distinctive that the employer recognizes, creating a long-term relationship, and relationships respond to competitive pressure totally differently from commodity markets—so a worker does not lose their job merely because someone offers to do it slightly cheaper, unlike a tomato sold on the internet.
“you normally are going to bring something special to the work place something special that the employer recognizes and that creates a relationship not a market and the way that relationships respond to competitor pressures is totally different from the way that markets respond”
Technologies like the microphone, broadcast, and the web not only raise the rewards to top talent but reduce the number of people doing a given task, freeing the displaced to do other productive things while everyone gets to enjoy the best performers (Pavarotti rather than a local singer)—so the inequality has enormous upsides and its downsides are largely social and cultural and not directly felt.
“what you get with the microphone which you get with broadcast what you get with the web is you get I'd rather hear Pavarotti than you... there are fewer people doing this thing and their rewards are enormous... it means that those other folks are freed up now to do something else productive and they get to enjoy Pavarotti”
Only a limited set of 'footloose' jobs—those that can effectively be posted on the internet for global bidding—are genuinely contestable; these are concentrated in low-value manufacturing (apparel, textiles, footwear, consumer electronics), and as you move up the value chain in manufacturing the share of footloose functions diminishes greatly.
“there are some lose jobs especially in manufacturing that can in effect be posted on the internet and how workers from around the globe bid to do those functions that those jobs are are not that many there there are many in the apparel sector and in consumer electronics in textiles footwear but as you go up the value chain and manufacturing the extent of the footloose functions diminishes very greatly”
X-rays will not be routinely read in India because you want them read by someone you know and trust, and crucially because your lawyer wants the reader to be within the reach of the US legal system—you want to be able to shake hands and probe questions face-to-face to gauge the reader's level of confidence rather than relying on an email.
“the thing about x-rays is that you don't want to have your x-rays read by somebody that you don't know and trust and and furthermore your lawyer doesn't want to have it read by somebody who is outside the reach of the US legal system”
The division of labor and the factory system exist not primarily for economies of scale but to keep expensive human capital (knowledge) and physical capital operating for long hours rather than sitting idle; when a single worker switches tasks, the capital and knowledge for the other tasks sits idle, so specialization minimizes the cost of idle capital.
“it's not really economies of scale it's keeping a camp operating for long hours during the day that's essential... when I'm making the shaft the human capital for making the head is sitting idle... so what the division of labor really is about its its keeping the human capital of knowledge operating for long hours during the day that's really the reason that we have the factory system”
Inequality is acceptable from a welfare standpoint as long as everyone is getting richer; what would be alarming is gains going to a small handful at the expense of others—and since superstars like Pavarotti or a top football coach must make many people happy to earn their money, some of those gains are necessarily shared.
“I'm not worried if some people get fantastically rich as long as everyone else is getting richer as well I think what would be alarming would be if the gains go to a small handful at the expense of others”
The development strategy for distant poor countries should be to build a cultural-linguistic bridge to high-wage markets—sending kids to school in the US to learn English and culture and bringing US kids into their colleges—because business linkages essential for growth flow from these cultural-linguistic linkages.
“the messages I think for these developing countries that are far away is an essential thing to do is to build a is build a cultural linguistic bridge to the high wage marketplaces and that means to send your kids to school in the United States so that they can understand English... and from the cultural linguistic linkages will come the business linkages which are essential for economic growth”
Our ability to assimilate immigrants is fundamentally different now than 100 years ago because the Endicott Johnson-style manufacturing employer that absorbed non-English-speaking arrivals no longer exists.
“our ability image to assimilate these immigrants is just fundamentally different now than it was 100 years ago when you had the Endicott Johnson shoe company”
Worries about a declining middle class are partly overstated because they leave out fringe benefits, which have become increasingly important and grown dramatically, and because income inequality data are imperfect.
“I'm a bit of a skeptic because of the imperfection of the data a lot of times we talk about worries of the middle class we're leaving out fringe benefits which have become increasingly important and growing dramatically”
The market has driven ever more specialized activities (e.g., general-purpose lawyers replaced by highly specialized ones) precisely so that specialized knowledge can be deployed for long hours rather than sitting idle when switching between different kinds of tasks.
“the legal system instead are you riding rails and and contracts and do litigation as you might have 100 years ago a general purpose lawyer and we now have highly specialized lawyers so that their knowledge is deployed... for long hours during the day rather than letting it sit idle”
Educational attainment is at an all-time high and continues to grow, so immigrant children today are unlikely to stop at high school like their predecessors and will go on to college, which could substitute for the lost manufacturing ladder.
“educational attainments of an all-time high continues to grow... a high school degree used to be a ticket to a middle class job it's not anymore because most people don't stop there a lot of people go on to college... those immigrant children are not going to stop at high school like their immigrant predecessors”
We probably care less about face-to-face trust in today's world for commodity-like goods—you can get a beautiful $10 shirt made by a stranger far away and reserve liking and pleasant interactions for close colleagues and family—but the trust factor still plays an important and hard-to-pin-down role in many transactions.
“I can get a really beautiful shirt for $10 made by someone who may be a glorious person or maybe an awful person who lives very very far away from me and I saved my my liking and pleasanter actions for my colleague around the corner and my kids”
Most of those low-value manufacturing jobs have already left the United States.
“militia game most of those jobs have already left the United States”