
What this covers
This is a university lecture, number 29 in a history of philosophy series, in which a philosophy professor presents Francis Bacon and takes questions from students. The line of inquiry is what Bacon wanted knowledge for and how that purpose dictated his method. The lecture works from the claim that a method of knowing always tracks the supposed structure of its object. Plato's transcendent forms call for dialectic, Aristotle's immanent forms call for abstraction, and Bacon's denial of real forms calls for plain observation of particulars. It also separates Bacon's induction from Aristotle's, since the two share a name but not an object or a procedure.
The range is wide. The professor covers Bacon's three grades of ambition, the last being humanity's dominion over the universe, and his reading of the creation mandate in Genesis. Bacon wants to reconceive philosophy as handmaid of society rather than of theology. The lecture also treats his Idols of the Mind, including the idols of the marketplace (language) and of the theater, where Aristotle, Gilbert and superstitious philosophy are each faulted. Bacon's critique of deduction is placed in the problem of finding true premises, not in any flaw in logic. His rejection of the past is compared to the Reformation's sola scriptura.
Several turns are contentious or surprising. The professor argues that the "knowledge is power" dictum makes Bacon look like a forerunner of pragmatism, but that Dewey's evolutionary naturalism differs fundamentally from Bacon's theism. The lecture also suggests that Bacon separates religion from scientific content partly to shield scientists from persecution, as happened to Galileo, a causal claim flagged as contested. It ends by following his legacy through Scottish realism to Princeton Seminary and Charles Hodge. Student questions address the reliability of the senses and the effects of the Fall.
Francis Bacon inaugurates modern philosophy by reframing the purpose and method of knowledge away from medieval scholasticism toward empirical science aimed at instrumental power over nature, grounded in a theological mandate to steward creation rather than contemplate abstract forms.
- Bacon rejects scholastic metaphysics of forms and substitutes empirical induction designed to discover uniform natural processes and causal relations, enabling practical dominion over nature
- His motivation is explicitly theological—a reformed Protestant interpretation of the creation mandate in Genesis—making science instrumental to restoring human condition and advancing God's kingdom
- Bacon separates religious purpose from scientific content to insulate philosophy and science from religious persecution, establishing the modern presumption of objective, presuppositionless science
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Bacon does not attempt to integrate the content of science with religion (the way medieval philosophy did), but only connects religion to science through the purpose science serves—that is, religion motivates and directs scientific inquiry toward the creation mandate, but does not constrain scientific content.
“But notice that he doesn't see any [38:52] active relationship between philosophy and religion the way the medievals did. Theirs was a synthesis of the philosophical with the religious quest, of philosophy with theology. Not so Bacon. It certainly isn't an integration of science and religion. The only tangency of religion to science is in telling you why to do science. Why? Well, it has a lot of instrumental value. [39:24] It helps you to um uh go about that cultural mandate, uh to restore in part the human condition to what it might have been, and so forth. Uh so it's not the content of science that is related to religion. It's simply the purpose of science. You see.”
To achieve power over nature's processes, Bacon rejects medieval metaphysics of forms and real universals, instead pursuing an empirical science aimed at discovering 'forms' in a new sense: the uniform ways in which natural processes proceed due to physical forces operating in the material world.
“Because on the one hand, he has rejected [14:15] any metaphysic of forms. Uh that is to say he's not a realist in the medieval sense of real universals. He rejects any metaphysic of forms. If there are final causes, that is to say purposes involved in nature, well, we'll have to leave that to the theologians. It's not accessible by rational means, by empirical means. So, instead of a metaphysic of forms, [14:46] he's turning to an empirical science, an empirical science that aims to discover forms. And if you're not careful, you might read the second sense of forms as the same as the first sense of forms, which it is not. The second sense of form is just the uniform uniform way in which natural processes [15:18] natural processes proceed. Uh that is to say when A is routinely followed by B, you're getting that form of behavior in the natural processes. And he wants a method which can get at this kind of form.”
Bacon does not argue for the reality of physical bodies but rather criticizes superstitious philosophy (otherworldly contemplation of Neoplatonists) on the same grounds he criticizes Aristotle: his point of reference is always the creation mandate, which requires engagement with this world; his critique is dismissive rather than dialectical—he discards rather than refutes.
“Uh so, on the relativity thing, he he thinks he has some checks on that. I I don't know that he ever argues for the reality of physical bodies. Um Unless it be in relationship to uh what he calls superstitious philosophy. Uh where the sort of otherworldly contemplation of some of the [59:18] Neoplatonists. You see, would be the thing in question. Uh but his criticism of that is essentially the same as his criticism of Aristotle. Uh that it's a disgustingly effete kind of thing when you have a mandate to do something about this world. You see? So, he doesn't engage in what shall I say dialectical argument in reputation of Plato. [59:50] His point of reference is always the creation mandate. And from that point of reference he discards rather than refutes. You follow?”
The structure of methodology (method of knowing) is always correlated with the structure of the object of knowledge: if forms are transcendent (Platonic), one uses dialectic to access them; if forms are immanent in particulars (Aristotelian), one uses abstractive induction; if there are no real forms (Baconian), one uses simple empirical methods on particulars.
“Uh so, the way of knowing, the method is correlated, is appropriate to the object of knowledge. Which is what we'd expect. [54:39] That's the way it was in Plato. If forms are in some transcendent realm then you have in your knowledge to get a handle on the transcendent. And it won't help you to study empirical cases. So, you engage in dialectic to detach from the particular and wrestle with the abstract. If if forms are immanent within particulars then you try and get them out. And so Aristotle's method of abstractive induction. [55:11] If there are no real forms and you're just studying particulars well, simple empirical methods will do it. Bacon. Okay.”
Both Aristotle and Bacon call their method 'induction' and both claim induction is the way to know forms, but they are discussing different objects of knowledge and using different methods—Aristotle's induction is through intuitive abstraction of medieval forms; Bacon's is systematic empirical observation of material causal regularities.
“Yet, the interesting thing is that while Aristotle called that process induction [19:00] by induction we know the forms. Bacon also calls the process induction. By induction we know the forms. But, since induction of forms in the first sense, Aristotle's sense induction through intuitive abstraction is inaccurate, insufficient, imprecise he wants obviously another kind of inductive method in dealing with forms [19:31] in the second sense. So, watch the vocabulary. I think it's part of his literary craft. And he is really a Renaissance literary figure. But, it's part of his literary craft, you see that speaks of forms. Induction is the method of knowing the forms, which is Aristotelian language, but it's [20:02] not Aristotelian concepts. He's changing. A changing the objects of knowledge. And changing the methods of knowing.”
Bacon advocates for a utopian ideal characteristic of the Renaissance, specifically a scientific utopia brought about by applying scientific knowledge of nature's processes to the transformation of human conditions, which he identifies with the kingdom of God.
“Um it's very evident that while as he puts it, "Knowledge is power." And that's his famous dictum. "Knowledge is power." He wants that power controlled uh by an appropriate ethic... he writes about a scientific utopia that he was dreaming of. A utopia, that is to say, that is brought in by applying scientific knowledge, knowledge of nature's processes to the transformation of conditions. And it is that transformed society for which he sees everyone working, which he speaks of as the kingdom of heaven, the kingdom of God.”
Bacon's influence through Scottish realism shaped American evangelical theology significantly, transmitted particularly through Princeton Seminary via John Witherspoon, making Charles Hodge (the classic Presbyterian theologian of the 1860s) approach theology on a Baconian basis, arguing for God's existence and human freedom from scientific facts.
“the influence of it came particularly to this country at Princeton through Witherspoon when he came to be [25:48] president of Princeton College. So that Princeton College, Princeton Seminary, the two, became the conduit into American thought of Scottish realism. The classic Presbyterian theologian of the 1860s, Charles Hodge, really approaches his whole theology on a Baconian basis. Taking it that science tells us the realities, and on that basis we can argue the existence of God. [26:19] You see? And human freedom and responsibility. Et cetera, et cetera.”
Medieval philosophy conceived of philosophy as the handmaid of theology (ancilla theologiae), serving theological tasks, whereas Bacon reconceives philosophy as the handmaid of society, working for the good of the human condition and transformation of the world.
“The medievals conceived of philosophy [6:47] as ancilla theologiae. Uh that is to say, as the servant ancillary to, servant of theology. Philosophy serving theological tasks. Um what Bacon does is to see philosophy not as uh the ancilla, the servant of theology uh but of society. [7:19] Um working for the good of the human condition. You'll see. Um trying to change the world in which we live.”
Bacon's emphasis on objective, purely empirical, presuppositionless science—science that is the same for all people regardless of religion or worldview—transmits to the Enlightenment most forcefully through Scottish realism in the 18th century.
“And this emphasis is what he transmits to the Enlightenment that comes out most forcibly, most influentially in the Scottish realism [23:40] of the next century, the 18th century. In which connection reference is constantly made both in people like Thomas Reid, the Scottish realist, we'll meet him later on, and in recent writings about Scottish realism because that's been going through a revival of interest over the last 10 years.”
Scottish realism came to believe that modern science provided a firm foundation of common knowledge on which a culture could develop its own philosophical and theological superstructure, leading to the development of scientific apologetics and philosophical theology.
“Objective empirical science telling us as it tells anybody about the realities of nature. Okay? Now, the the result in that Scottish realist tradition was that it came to be believed that [25:15] modern science gave us a firm foundation of common knowledge on the basis of which a culture can develop its its own superstructure on the basis of which there can be developed philosophical theology, apologetics, and so on and so forth.”
Bacon's overall purpose, grounded in reformed Protestant theology, is to recover the human race's fulfillment of the creation mandate given in Genesis—to replenish, subdue, and exercise dominion over nature—which sin has distracted humanity from accomplishing.
“His overall purpose is very apparent in his writings and in much of the secondary literature about Bacon uh but it frequently does not come out [3:04] in the one chapter treatments that you get in textbooks like Stumps. Uh it is, however, particularly interesting if we're uh trying to trace the shift of worldviews from medieval to modern times. Uh inasmuch as Bacon uh while um every bit as genuinely uh Christian as the medievals [3:36] um comes at the whole undertaking in a markedly different way. Uh Bacon's mother uh was a Puritan of reformed theological persuasion. And there are echoes of that in Bacon's thinking and in his overall purpose. He makes repeated reference uh to the so-called cultural mandate [4:11] uh in the opening chapters of Genesis. Uh the mandate given to Adam and Eve to replenish, subdue, exercise dominion, steward ship, so forth. And he complains uh that uh the human race, far from fulfilling that mandate, is dis- detracted from it.”
Bacon distinguishes three grades of ambition in mankind: desire to extend personal power in one's native country (vulgar and degenerate); desire to extend a nation's power and dominion (corporate egoism with more dignity but no less covetousness); and desire to establish and extend humanity's power and dominion over the universe (wholesome and noble), which constitutes his core motivating ambition.
“It will not be amiss to distinguish three kinds as it were grades of [11:03] ambition in mankind. The first is of those who desire to extend their own power in their native country. Now, that's the self-interested kind. Which kind is vulgar and degenerate. So, he's no ethical egoist. The second is of those who labor to extend the power of their country and its dominion among men. [11:33] Now, this certainly has more dignity though no less covetousness. It's corporate egoism. Interesting for a writer in the age of Elizabeth if you know English history. You see. But, if a man endeavor to establish and extend the power and dominion of the human race itself over the universe his ambition, if ambition it may be called, is without doubt both more wholesome thing and more noble than the [12:04] other two.”
Bacon does not pursue knowledge for its own sake or truth as the path to contemplation of God, as medieval philosophers did; instead, he sees knowledge as purely instrumental in value—aimed at power over nature and the implementation of the creation mandate for the sake of the kingdom of God.
“He's not after truth for its own sake. Understanding [21:04] for its own sake. He doesn't see the road to truth as the ladder to the contemplation of God as the medievals did. He does not see the road to truth as the way to the contemplation of God. Contemplating the forms, rising to the contemplation of the form of all forms, [21:35] the good. You see? No, that's not his hierarchy of being. It's not his worldview. He sees God as creator. But our responsibility in nature is this creation mandate to dominion for the sake of the kingdom of God.”
A student (Dan) asks whether Bacon addresses Platonic and ancient doubts about the reliability of sensory perception and the reality of nature due to its changeability; Bacon addresses the relativity of sense perception by proposing that his methods minimize this relativity through multiplication of instances and repeatability of scientific observation.
“Did Bacon feel at all obligated to answer the doubts that Plato and some of the other past philosophers had about the reality of nature because of the um the change changeability of it and the ways they said senses deceived them? [58:17] Um He feels obligated to answer concerning the relativity of sense perception. And his response there is that his methods are geared to minimizing that relativity by multiplying the instances on the basis of which our general knowledge is achieved. If you're not sure if this one is illusory or relative, then you take another look in another case. The repeatability of scientific observations [58:47] is crucial. You see?”
The idols of the theater consist of imaginative thinking mistaken for reality, including three kinds of defective philosophy: sophistical philosophy (exemplified by Aristotle's hastily abstracted principles), empirical philosophy (exemplified by Gilbert's primitive magnetic studies with insufficient empirical rigor), and superstitious philosophy (philosophy mixed with mystical religion, exemplified by Pythagoras and Plato).
“The idols of the theater, uh yeah, that's where our games of make-believe take on a reality and a life of their own. So that's where our imaginative thinking is taken to be real. And so the theater has to do with um yes, philosophy, science, [35:45] and so forth. And he distinguishes three kinds of philosophy, the sophistical, the so-called empirical, and the superstitious. And the way he's using the terms, not just two, but all three of them are to be regretted. The sophistical philosophy, his example [36:17] there is Aristotle. And it's there he makes those uncomplimentary remarks about Aristotle's kind of induction. You see? Where hastily abstracted principles um destroy the possibility of assured conclusions from syllogistic reasoning. Uh empirical philosophy refers to some of the science of the day, where there is too little careful observation, [36:48] too little close examination, too little empirical work going on. And he has in mind there uh the um the work of Gilbert, who did some primitive sorts of work uh having to do with magnetism, the loadstone, and so forth. Superstitious philosophy is philosophy mixed with religion. [37:18] Philosophy mixed with religion. And there he has in mind people like Pythagoras and Plato, who give a religious aura um to to what they're doing so that their philosophy leads to some kind of mystical religion.”
Bacon's systematic critique of all major philosophical traditions (scholasticism, Platonism, empiricism) constitutes a thorough repudiation of the past, analogous to the Protestant Reformation's 'sola scriptura' (scripture alone) principle, as Bacon wants to go back to the empirical facts alone.
“I mentioned on Friday uh the resurgence of skepticism in the Renaissance. A skepticism about past philosophy, skepticism due to a variety of factors, the rediscovery of Sextus Empiricus, the breakdown of the medieval synthesis, the epistemological vacuum left with the Protestant [38:20] Reformation, so forth. Well, here is Bacon, you see, reenacting that skepticism with regards to past philosophy. Wanting to make a fresh start. Just as the reformers went back to scriptura sola, scripture alone, so Bacon wants to go back to the empirical facts alone. You see?”
The idols of the marketplace arise from the way language and linguistic idiom instill philosophical beliefs that may be entirely erroneous—for instance, the assumption that a noun denotes a thing or substance leads people to grant substantive reality to everything denoted by a noun, a confusion that led metaphysicians like Plato astray.
“the idols of the marketplace, well, of course, in the 17th century [34:11] town, village, that's where everybody met on market day. That's where all the gossip went on. That's where the language took shape. Uh the language which conveys all sorts of ideas whether or not intended and whether or not known. And in that regard, what he's doing is saying that that the idiom of the language has a way of instilling philosophical [34:42] beliefs that may be totally erroneous. If we take it for instance that a noun stands for a thing, an entity, a substance, then we're going to give substantive reality to everything that is denoted by a noun. And think of where that sort of thing led people like Plato in their metaphysics. You see?”
Francis Bacon may initially appear to be a stepping stone toward pragmatism (especially given his 'knowledge is power' dictum), but this appearance is misleading; while Dewey claims Bacon's dictum, their worldviews are fundamentally different: Bacon is a Christian theist seeing knowledge as serving a divine mandate for God's kingdom; Dewey is an evolutionary naturalist seeing experimental thinking as resolving survival-threatening problem situations.
“Was Francis Bacon a stepping stone for pragmatism to come in? Um it's tempting to say that um and I confess when I first read Bacon, that's what I used to say. But the more I've read Bacon the less I think so. [55:41] Um Perhaps because I I'm too aware of pragmatism at the other end of the spectrum. Um Uh if you're talking of Dewey's pragmatism for instance uh you'll find when um we get talking about Dewey second semester, you'll be reading Dewey's book Reconstruction in Philosophy and then I think it's the first or second chapter, he talks about Bacon. And he claims Bacon's dictum, "Knowledge is power." as his own. [56:12] And so it's very tempting to identify the two. But the worldviews involved are totally different. You see? Uh Bacon is a Christian theist. Thinking of a divine mandate uh for knowledge that can uh serve certain purposes in relationship to God's kingdom. Uh Dewey is a thoroughgoing evolutionary naturalist. Who sees um experimental uh thinking [56:43] as the way to uh resolve problem situations which threaten survival.”
Galileo suffered persecution from those who wanted to integrate the content of science with religion; in Bacon's England (Elizabethan and Stuart era), there was a history of religious persecution due to Catholic-Protestant conflict, which incentivized Bacon to separate religion from science to insulate philosophers and scientists from religious persecution.
“Well, I mentioned Galileo. You see, Galileo suffered [39:54] from those who wanted to integrate the content of science with religion. That's what got him into trouble. You see. And in the England of Bacon's day and Elizabethan England, there had been a history of religious persecution. You're familiar with that religious history at all? The Protestant Reformation hit really at the time of um Henry the VIII.”
Bacon's critique of deductive reasoning does not reject the logical validity of syllogisms or the laws of logic, but rather identifies the real problem: finding true premises from which to begin deductive reasoning.
“Um let me add this footnote that in criticizing deductive reasoning uh he has little appreciation for what syllogisms uh can establish. Uh the problem is not with the process of inference involved in syllogisms. [17:23] Uh the problem is not with the laws of logic. He's too wise for that. The problem is finding premises.”
Dewey extends experimental thinking to ethics, whereas Bacon does not; Bacon's ethical framework appeals to 'right reason'—prudence influenced by classical conceptions and Renaissance Platonism—rather than extending his experimental methodology to moral questions.
“Yeah. Um Uh Dewey extends his experimental thinking to ethics. Bacon? Well, hardly. Hardly. Um he talks of right reason. Uh but it seems to be a prudence that's [57:13] very much influenced by classical conceptions. The Renaissance influence is still there. And he apparently was quite influenced in some of that by the resurgence of Platonism in England.”
Bacon criticizes scholastic philosophy as sterile and one of the main perpetrators of distraction from the cultural mandate because scholastic disputes contribute nothing to enriching human life or transforming society through knowledge.
“the particular kind of sins that he blames and the particular redemptive hope that he has is tied very much to philosophy. That is to say, he regards the scholastics as some of the main perpetrators [5:45] of the crime of distracting the human race from the cultural mandate. For the reason that the scholastic disputes help us not at all in enriching human life, in transforming society through human knowledge, and so forth.”
Bacon explicitly states that 'knowledge is power,' and while this power must be controlled by appropriate ethics grounded in 'true religion and right reason,' he does not have a metaphysical basis for ethics from scholastic natural law tradition.
“And um it's very evident that while as he puts it, "Knowledge is power." And that's his famous dictum. "Knowledge is power." He wants that power controlled uh by an appropriate ethic. And uh without the natural law ethic rooted in the scholastic tradition you see, he doesn't have a metaphysical [9:25] basis for an ethic. And so the ethic has to be one that comes from, in his words "True religion and right reason."”
Aristotle solved the problem of first principles through intuitive abstraction—the claim that the mind can intuitively abstract the form of a species from cumulative experience of many instances—but Bacon rejects this process as improperly and hastily abstracted, rendering it inaccurate and insufficient.
“Aristotle poses the problem of an [17:54] infinite regress of first principles or of a circular argument about first principles. And finally comes down to the notion that we are able intuitively to abstract the first principle, the form of the species from the experience that we have cumulatively of all species. Now, it's that process of intuitive abstraction which Bacon does not like. He he talks in in one place of [18:27] improperly and hastily abstracted concepts that render syllogistic reasoning useless. Uh Aris- Aristotle's abstraction of forms from species. You see. Uh he has little respect for it.”
A student (David) asks about Bacon's view on the Fall and how it affected the laws of nature; Bacon regards the Fall as a historical event and human sinfulness as total (extending into all areas of human activity), but he does not discuss whether the Fall affected natural laws; instead, he focuses on human disengagement from nature and how this has left things run wild.
“What was his view view on the fall? His view on the fall and how the fall affected the Well, I suspect it was rather like yours. Let's say it was a bad thing. He regards the [1:00:24] the story of the fall as historical. He regards human sinfulness in much the way that any reformed thinker would as total in the sense that it extends into all areas of human activity. Total depravity doesn't mean that everything we do is bad or wrong all the time. You're talking about like uh did he think of the fall somehow affected the the laws of nature? And how we get them [1:00:55] triple science? He doesn't discuss that possibility. What he does do is to talk about the way in which human disengagement has left things run wild. So, he focuses on the effects on human kind and through human kind on nature.”
Three key themes characterize Bacon's philosophy: (1) his conception of induction as the method for knowing empirical forms; (2) knowledge as power in relationship to dominion over nature via the creation mandate; and (3) the assumption that scientific knowledge can be entirely objective, realist about scientific truths without being metaphysically realist about universals.
“There are really just two or three key themes associated with Bacon that we need to get a hold of. One certainly is his conception of induction. The second is that knowledge is power in [22:37] relationship to power over nature, creation mandate. But the third is the assumption that this kind of scientific knowledge can be entirely objective. The idea that scientific knowledge can be entirely objective. [23:08] The idea that science tells us about reality. Not realism about universals, but realism about scientific knowledge.”
The idols of the tribe, which Bacon rejects, consist of allegedly innate knowledge and the notion that there exists some knowledge rooted in uniformities of human nature that can be accessed through natural intuition.
“The idols of the tribe have to do with the influence, unconscious influences perhaps, of the human mind. [30:31] Especially in regards to what we take to be first principles, but which are inadequately secured. Here is the notion that there is some knowledge that is rooted in the uniformities of human nature. Um innate, native, like natural law. And these idols of the tribe he rejects. [31:04] There is no innate knowledge. There is no inference to first principles from what we know of human nature.”
Knowledge of causal relationships (discovering that C is causally related to X) enables the exercise of power over the phenomenon X by manipulating the causal factor C—this is the practical implementation of 'knowledge is power' and the basis for technological dominion over nature.
“And but notice uh how what you discover that A is causally related to X enables you to exercise power over A in producing X. You see. And consequently, the power over nature. Very, very simple.”
The history of modern philosophy can be schematized as the intersection of two lines of thought: the British empiricist tradition extending inductive scientific methods into all areas of inquiry, and the continental rationalist tradition extending deductive mathematical methods, originating in Descartes.
“the history of modern philosophy uh can be schematized in terms of the intersection of two lines of thought. On the one hand, in British philosophy [1:26] an empiricist tradition and on the other hand, in continental a rationalist tradition. These two traditions representing uh the extension into all areas of inquiry of um the inductive methods [1:57] of science uh that uh were being proposed and on the other hand, the deductive uh mathematical type of method which um Descartes is going to propose.”
The idols of the cave, having to do with individual temperament and the personal atmosphere of one's own 'cave,' are non-scientific influences that Bacon wants to eliminate entirely, as individual psychological disposition affects philosophical orientation.
“The idols of the cave have to do with individual temperament. Individual temperament, that is to say [31:35] the um the personal atmosphere that you breathe in your own cave, which influences the direction of your thinking. Um this is something he wants to get rid of completely. Uh he would be quite surprised, I think, at the sort of thing that William James or Friedrich Nietzsche are going to say around 1900.”
J. Oliver Buswell, the third president of Wheaton College, was a Scottish realist who wrote extensively on Scottish realism and had considerable influence, and when the professor was an undergraduate at Wheaton, he was introduced to philosophy through Scottish realism, studied under someone who had studied under Buswell.
“And that influence very widespread here at Wheaton included. Let's see, J. Oliver Buswell, who was the third president. Um very definitely Scottish realist. Wrote he was philosopher, theologian, wrote extensively on Scottish realism, [26:51] and had quite an influence in that regard. When I was an undergraduate here, I was introduced to philosophy in terms of Scottish realism. Not because I studied under the third president. Though I studied under a man who had studied under the third president when he taught elsewhere after leaving Wheaton.”
Bacon identifies four kinds of idols (non-scientific influences in human thought that must be exorcised) that distort thinking: the idols of the tribe (unconscious influences rooted in uniformities of human nature), the idols of the cave (individual temperament and personal atmosphere), the idols of the marketplace (linguistic and semantic confusions), and the idols of the theater (imaginative and philosophical systems mistaken for reality).
“The criticism is addressed at the idols as he called them. Interesting religious metaphor again. These are the things that people take [29:30] uncritically like their gods. They are non-scientific influences in human thought. Non-scientific influences that have to be exorcised, cast out. And he identifies four kinds of idols, the idols of the [30:01] tribe, the idols of the cave, the idols of the marketplace, and the idols of the theater.”
Bacon's method of inductive logic involves systematic tabulation of observational findings: tables of presence (cases where the phenomenon occurs), tables of absence (cases where it does not occur), and tables of degrees (cases showing proportional variation), which correlate with John Stuart Mill's 19th-century methods of agreement, difference, and concomitant variation.
“And um what he does here is um uh to author what he calls certain [43:30] tables, ways of tabulating your findings, tabulating your observations. And you'll find that Stumpf talks about this. I think it's page 224. He talks of the table of presence, the table of absence, and the table of degrees. [44:00] Uh and if you're familiar with the inductive methods of John Stuart Mill in the 19th century, you'll realize that they correlate with these. John Stuart Mill called this the table of agreement, the table of difference, and the table or the method of concomitant variations. [44:35] And fundamentally the same.”
Bacon's method of inductive reasoning, through comparing cases of presence, absence, and degree, enables the discovery of causal relationships: if ABC precedes XYZ and ABC agrees with XYZ repeatedly, then there is likely a causal relation between them (table of agreement); if C is absent and X is absent while AB remains, then C and X are causally related (table of difference); if increasing C proportionally increases X, then causal connection is confirmed (table of degrees).
“If you are trying to find out what is the cause of a phenomenon X, and you find that um ABC proceeds factors X precedes factors X Y Z, and that something like it um occurs again and again, [45:12] um then you seem to you soon begin to suspect by virtue of the agreement that there is some causal relationship between C and X. Fair enough? And if you find on the other hand that uh while ABC is the [45:44] antecedent of XYZ, that uh where C is absent, then um um uh then X is absent, uh then from the difference, you again begin to suspect that there is a causal connection. And if you find that in um increasing the amount of C, you proportionately [46:17] increase the amount of X, okay, degrees, then once again, confirmation uh that there is there is causal connection.”
In Elizabethan and Stuart England, there was a long history of religious persecution: the Protestant Reformation under Henry VIII, then Catholic backlash under Mary I, then Protestant restoration under Elizabeth I, then the Stuart succession (James I and Charles I, a Catholic who was executed), creating persistent religious conflict and persecution.
“The Protestant Reformation hit really at the time of um Henry the VIII. [40:24] Who was something of a Luther scholar himself. Uh when he died, his daughter Mary um became um queen, an ardent Catholic. And the Catholic-Protestant struggle was on. Uh well, there was a gap in between when his son Edward, young guy, was king. Didn't last very long. Then Mary. Then Elizabeth, the [40:55] Protestant. And the tables are turned. You see. And after Elizabeth came the Stuarts, James I of Scotland, Catholic. Divine right of kings. You see. Then Charles I who lost his head over that. So forth.”
Bacon cites Democritus, the Greek atomist, most appreciatively as the philosopher whose mechanistic understanding of everything in terms of matter and motion aligns with his vision of empirical natural science.
“the philosopher whom he cites most appreciatively in this regard is, as you might expect with the rise of mechanistic science Democritus, the Greek atomist. Everything understood in terms of matter and motion. Though in his own time, the most [16:22] significant scientist undoubtedly was of course Galileo who thought in similar Democratean kinds of terms.”
William James and Friedrich Nietzsche would later argue (around 1900) that temperament profoundly affects philosophical orientation—James claiming tender-minded vs. tough-minded dispositions yield different philosophies, and Nietzsche attributing philosophical differences to will-to-power dynamics operating differently in strong vs. weak wills.
“Uh he would be quite surprised, I think, at the sort of thing that William James or Friedrich Nietzsche are going to say around 1900. James who talks of the difference that it makes philosophically whether you're [32:06] a tender-minded or tough-minded. Because your psychological disposition affects the kind of philosophy you have. The tender-minded person is more likely to be philosophically um with an optimistic view of um nature. Uh the tough-minded person with a more deterministic, pessimistic view. So forth. Or Friedrich Nietzsche, who talked about the way in which the [32:37] will to power, the strong will does against the weak will, affect people's philosophical views.”
Nietzsche later develops a racial or folk psychology (volk psychology) to characterize the philosophical outlooks of different peoples (French, German, British) in terms of the temperament and mental characteristics of those peoples, reflecting will-to-power dynamics.
“So that on that basis what Nietzsche will do is to essentially bring to bear a racist psychology. Uh the volk psychology, a psychology of the race, psychology of the people. And will try to characterize the philosophical outlook look of the [33:08] French, the Germans, the British, etc. in terms of the mentality, the temperament of the people.”
A student (Kristen) asks about the etymology of 'tribe' and 'cave' in Bacon's doctrine of idols, noting that 'cave' echoes Plato's cave allegory; the professor confirms that the cave metaphor is indeed Platonic—humans are shut in their own caves, and emotional/temperamental influences are partly physically produced by the cave itself.
“I saw somebody over here, who was it? Kristen? Yes. Um I was just wondering where the names tribe came from, and I was wondering if cave was like An echo of Plato? Yes. Yeah, sure is. Very much so. We're shut in our own cave, you see. And inasmuch [33:41] as emotion, temperament seems in part to be physically produced, then the cave produces its own emotional temperament. Tribe, I suppose he's referring there to the whole human race, um its identity, so forth. Yeah. So so you're right in in suspecting that.”
A student (David) asks clarifying questions about the distinction between Bacon's and Aristotle's concepts of induction: Bacon's induction discovers empirical generalizations about causal relations (e.g., between C and X), while Aristotle's induction operated through intuitive abstraction of forms; both use the term 'induction' but for fundamentally different epistemological purposes.
“When you were discussing the difference between um Bacon's inductive method and Aristotle's concept of induction Yes. And you said that uh there was a new object of knowledge for Bacon. I'm not sure I didn't quite understand Yeah. Um okay. You remember I was playing here with induction as the method and the object of of knowledge as forms. Now, Aristotle has one kind of induction [54:08] in trying to gain knowledge of forms in his sense of the term. Uh Bacon has another sense of induction. Nice that it comes out as A and B, isn't it? Um in trying to gain knowledge of forms in his sense of the term. Uh so, the way of knowing, the method is correlated, is appropriate to the object of knowledge.”
When Bacon entered Cambridge as a student in 1577, Ockham's philosophical ideas were very much in favor, and scholastic methods were studied but in disfavor; 25 years earlier at Oxford, the writings of Duns Scotus had been publicly burned as repudiation of scholastic methods and disputes.
“When he was at Cambridge um Ockham was very much in vogue. In fact, and I may have that uh may have a date on that um Let's see. [52:32] Let's try. Yeah, when he went to Cambridge in 1577 as a student um Ockham was very much in favor. Scholastic methods were still studied but were in disfavor. Um 25 years before at Oxford the writings of Duns Scotus had been burned in public [53:03] in repudiation of scholastic methods and scholastic disputes. That's what they did when there was a theoretical shift taking place. They just burned it all, you know? Why clutter your library?”
Bacon has some favorable view of Ockham, and a historian of science named Crombie has argued that Bacon's tables of presence, absence, and degree were anticipated in similar form by William of Ockham, and that Bacon's ethical appeals to true religion and right reason are essentially the same as Ockham's appeals.
“What was his view of Ockham? Uh quite favorable. Um [50:27] I've tried to um to trace um in reading I've done, I've tried to trace any explicit references to Ockham. Um I don't think of any that I've found in his writings. But then he doesn't go around quoting a lot of people. Um uh Ockham's ideas, yes. Um a British historian of science with the [50:58] name of Crombie has tried to show uh that um uh these tables, these methods of Bacon were anticipated in very similar form by William of Ockham. And I remember I just pointed out that his appeal in matters of ethics was essentially the same appeal as Ockham.”
Accusations that Bacon's emphasis on human dominion over nature gave license to modern exploitation of the environment are unfounded because they misread Bacon out of context; Bacon explicitly conceives dominion as stewardship appropriate to the kingdom of God, not exploitative domination.
“You may well have come across literature or heard it said that this Baconian emphasis really gave license to modern science [12:39] to exploit nature to dominate resources and the environment for our own pleasure and good. So, that sometimes the environmental problems of our day are blamed on Francis Bacon. You see. Now, frankly, I think that's um accusing Bacon without looking at the context from which he's thinking. Uh because it's very apparent as you [13:11] read Bacon at length that he's not thinking of it as domination but as stewardship in a way appropriate to the kingdom of God. Uh so, um it's very significantly different thing. That's not to say that the Baconian influence didn't give people license, but it wasn't Bacon. It was uh the way Bacon was read out of context.”
Bacon's work is philosophically significant in two ways: (1) as foundational to modern philosophy of science (philosophical thinking about the nature of science itself), and (2) as a clear marker of the shift in worldviews from medieval to modern, with Ockham marking the end of the old worldview and Bacon marking the beginning of the new.
“Um on the other hand um Bacon's work is of real philosophical significance in two ways. One in terms of the beginnings of [49:56] modern philosophy of science. That is to say philosophical thinking about the nature of science. Okay? And second in terms of the shift of worldviews that's taking place. Where he clearly marks a transition as Ockham was the end of the old, Bacon is the beginning of the new. Comes through very clearly.”
Bacon's inductive method, while foundational to modern empirical science, is very simple and limited compared to modern scientific method, lacking any notion of hypothesis formation as a guide to experimentation, conceptual models, paradigms, and paradigm shifts—it represents only the beginning of modern empirical scientific methods.
“Very limited in terms of modern scientific method. There's no notion of the role of a hypothesis. Role of a hypothesis in suggesting experimentation. No notion of the conceptual model, paradigms and paradigm shifts as we talk of it nowadays. Nothing of that. Experimental methods very simple, very uncomplicated. But it's the beginning of modern empirical scientific methods. Francis Bacon.”
Bacon's involvement in British politics was extensive—he was offered lesser offices under Elizabeth I but achieved high political office under James I, including serving as Chancellor of England, making him not only a philosopher but also a significant political figure.
“Uh he was Chancellor of England, I'm told, under Elizabeth. Under James I. Yes, he he he tried and connived to get [48:19] high political office under Elizabeth, only got lesser offices, but under James I, he had more fortune.”
In Bacon's time, science and philosophy were not distinguished as separate disciplines; the sciences achieved independent institutional status only relatively recently, which is why the highest degree in all disciplines is the Doctor of Philosophy.
“Um Uh so, an interest- very interesting figure, very fascinating. And you say, philosophically, doesn't seem to be doing much philosophy. Interested in science. Yeah, and I think um uh two comments about that. One is that in those days, people didn't um [48:52] uh think of them as being any different. Uh that is to say, the sciences have achieved independent status only relatively recently. Uh which is why people in any discipline are apt to um work for Doctor of Philosophy degrees.”
Bacon prefers Democritus to all the philosophers he critiques, because Democritus's mechanistic materialism—explaining everything in terms of matter and motion—aligns with Bacon's vision of empirical natural science.
“And he much prefers Democritus. Now you see when you look at that array of criticism, [37:49] um you you you can see how thorough is his repudiation of the past.”
Scottish realism is currently less distinctively influential among American evangelicals generally, but has undergone a revival of interest in contemporary American epistemology more broadly, particularly in professional philosophy.
“Now, I think it is much less influential distinctively among evangelicals unless you go to Asbury College and Seminary where it is the dominating philosophical mood. The revival of Scottish realism is more in contemporary American epistemology, interestingly. Much more widespread than it used to be.”
The professor is uncertain whether Bacon is a nominalist or conceptualist regarding universals; while Bacon does not deal with abstract ideas in his empirical methodology, he does not seem to deny theologians the privilege of dealing with abstract ideas, suggesting he is more likely a conceptualist than a nominalist.
“uh Ockham's ideas, yes. Um a British historian of science with the [50:58] name of Crombie has tried to show uh that um uh these tables, these methods of Bacon were anticipated in very similar form by William of Ockham. And I remember I just pointed out that his appeal in matters of ethics was essentially the same appeal as Ockham. Now, the thing I'm not clear about with Bacon um is whether he is an Ockhamist [51:31] in regarding universals. That is to say, is he a Thomist, nominalist, or is he a conceptualist? Uh certainly he does not deal with any abstract ideas. But he doesn't seem to want to deny theologians the privilege of dealing with abstract ideas. You see? Now, if he was a nominalist, he would deny it was possible even for theologians to deal with abstract ideas. [52:01] So, I'm inclined to think that he's more the conceptualist. But he's still very much influenced by Ockham.”