
Unlocking the Secrets of Systematic Investing: Maximizing Your Wealth-Meb Faber
What this covers
This is a conversation hosted by ReSolve's Adam Butler and Rod Smead with Meb Faber, CIO of Cambria. It is assembled from several sessions, and one voice is never identified. The talk moves from why rules beat judgment to what is mispriced right now. Butler cites the Gotham Asset Management study from Joel Greenblatt's firm, in which investors who followed algorithmic signals automatically did far better than those allowed to override them, and the overriders lost money. He ties this to "algorithm aversion." Faber adds the practical side: trend systems lose repeatedly in choppy markets, which tempts people to quit just before a big trade. He argues for pre-committing to how you will respond to a 20%, 40% or 80% fall.
The middle of the discussion is about portfolio construction. Butler points out that a 50/50 stock-bond mix gets 80-90% of its Volatility from equities, so it is not balanced in any real sense. Smead draws on the Dimson-Marsh-Staunton data to call Diversification a hedge against ignorance. Faber cites countries that suffered 80-90% Drawdowns or were wiped out. He also argues that the US is the least internationally diversified developed market in terms of revenue. Managed futures are presented as the main diversifier, and the AQR "Match Made in Heaven" pairing with private equity is discussed.
The conversation then turns to the current market. Faber notes that 2023 was one of the worst years on record for the gap between equal-weight and cap-weight indices. Smead argues that holding seven mega-cap tech stocks is not diversification. Faber points to household equity allocation as a stronger predictor of returns than other indicators, and the speakers sharply disagree with forecasting. Smead says Wall Street and Fed forecasts have negative predictive value. He also says bonds have become useful again now that the zero-rate era has ended, after the long stretch of unusual bond markets that the publisher's description mentions.
Systematic, diversified investing that balances multiple asset classes and applies disciplined rules beats discretionary stock-picking because human psychology consistently undermines individual decision-making in markets.
- Academic evidence shows discretionary overlays on algorithmic signals degrade returns; the Gotham study found active decision-making investors underperformed automatic signal followers
- Investors fail at both selling winners (identity attachment, fear of missing upside) and holding losers (hope bias, capitulation after consecutive losses); rules remove emotional interference
- Current market concentration in US mega-cap tech at 10-15 year highs, combined with attractive valuations in value strategies, small caps, and international markets, creates an opportunity that systematic rebalancing captures but emotional investors ignore
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Trend-following systems generate losing trades in choppy/range-bound markets (buy, down, sell, up, repeat), and the human temptation is to abandon the system after several consecutive losses, even though the next signal could initiate a generational wealth-building trade.
“the third one which I think is probably the hardest of the three is you've had like and here's gold you've had like three four five six seven losing trades in a row where it's like going up you buy it it goes down you sell it you're going up you buy it going and you're just like chop chop chop and the next thing you know like you're like you know what I'm done I'm not taking this I'm done with this and then boom it goes to like 4,000 and you probably then buy it so it's you know it's uh those those are what's hard about it”
Algorithm aversion is a real psychological phenomenon where humans prefer to make their own decisions (even when those decisions degrade outcomes) rather than follow a system with demonstrated skill.
“algorithm aversion is a real thing but all the literature very very strongly and and confidently indicates that following rules makes sense”
Most investors think they're balanced, but when you do an x-ray statistical analysis of a 50/50 stock-bond portfolio, 80-90% of the daily, weekly, monthly, and yearly volatility is driven by stocks, not bonds, making it functionally unbalanced.
“if you hold a 5050 stock Bond portfolio and you sort of use an x-ray like a statistical x-ray to examine the amount of daily weekly monthly yearly um changes that are derived from the stock component versus the Box uh the bond component you'll see kind of 80 to 90% of it's driven by stocks right”
The percentage of household assets allocated to stocks can be tracked back to the 1950s and shows two major peaks (Nifty 50s and 2000 bubble), and when inverted, this chart correlates more highly with future returns than any other indicator, demonstrating that investor behavior (letting portfolios drift rather than rebalance) is the primary driver of valuation cycles.
“if you invert that chart it is like an absolute perfect future decomposition of returns like it has the highest uh correlation R squar whatever you want to call it to Future returns and all it is is that investors let their Investments float”
Brokerages fail to show investors their compound returns (including money in/money out), which would likely demonstrate that most retail investors are terrible at market timing, making systematic approaches essential.
“one of the best thing brokerages don't do is give investors a very clear compound return on their assets right like you log in your brokerage account it's never like here's your return including money in Money out right um they never do that and for good reasons because probably you'd be like God I'm that I'm this bad at this”
Investment bank and asset manager forecasts for next year's equity returns, bond yields, and earnings have negative predictability compared to the average, and this includes Fed economists whose quarter-ahead forecasts for fed funds rates (which the Fed directly controls) actually had negative prediction slope under Greenspan.
“the forecast for next year's Equity returns you know for the at the index level um you know if you compare it to just the average actually has negative predictability um the same for bond yields the same for earnings um they bring up this fed paper I guess Greenspan was fed chairman for a couple decades they have and the Federal Reserve Banks all the economists need to give their estimates of where they think fed funds rate's going to be one quarter from now and they studied the uh calibration of these economists making these quarter ahead forecasts for fed funds rates which the FED directly controls and discovered that over Greenspan's tenure that their forecasts actually had a negative prediction slope”
The Dimson-Marsh-Staunton yearbook showing very long-term returns to global equities and bonds in different regimes reveals the importance of diversification and 'deep risk,' demonstrating that diversification is a hedge against investor ignorance.
“the other thing that comes out of that as you sort of look at the longterm uh Global Equity risk premium how equities and bonds do in different regimes right regimes of high or low inflation Etc um is the importance of diversification and the you know a deep internalization of the concept of deep risk”
Many countries have experienced severe market declines (80-90% drawdowns) or complete wipeouts through equity or bond crises; Greeks, Brazilians, Russians, and others who put all their money in their home country learned harshly that global diversification is necessary.
“how many markets have straight up gone to zero whether it's through the equity whether it's through the bonds or essentially gone to zero and they went down 80 90% I mean the US had this in the Great Depression and so um you have this perspective and you come around with a profound takeway which to me is you want to diversify the heck out of your Investments... you ask the average Greek or Brazilian or Russian investor uh how smart was it to put all their money in their own country and they'd be like hell no are you crazy that was a terrible idea I should have Diversified globally”
High valuations pull future returns into today, while low valuations present potential returns waiting in the future—a counterintuitive concept that is emotionally difficult for investors to internalize.
“when you have high valuations you've pulled future returns into today and when you have lower valuations you have potential returns waiting for you in the future which is very counterintuitive and and emotionally very difficult for investors to handle”
The 'turkey trusting the turkey farmer' analogy illustrates how investors become complacent during long bull markets and trust strategies that have worked well, only to face catastrophic reversals when the market regime changes.
“you end up in that that cycle of the turkey trusting the the turkey farmer Thanksgiving does eventually come as we know and and often lasts for decades at a time”
Investors often need to pre-commit to a plan for handling losses and gains before they occur; knowing in advance what you'll do when something drops 20%, 40%, 60%, or 80% is essential for discipline.
“I think with people who if even if you are discretionary we talk a lot about this particularly with private Investments too I say you got to think through what's going to happen on the downside so if something goes down 20 40 60 80% like what do you plan on doing with this”
Systematic investing is superior to discretionary because it removes human psychology—investors cannot be counted on to buy when they're fearful of losses or sell when they've become emotionally attached to a winner.
“it's basically impossible unless you are um broken in some other ways psychologically to be able to completely dissociate your own um personhood from your decisions in markets and and most of the time what happens in markets is not perfectly aligned with your own belief system”
Diversification was designed to do well in different environments for different reasons, but if those diverse assets are not held in balance (roughly equal risk contribution), then the diversification benefits don't emerge and investors fail to get what they're paying for.
“diversification as being a combination of two things one is holding things that in the portfolio that are designed to to do well and do poorly in very different environments for different reasons that's diversity and the second component is balance”
A structural change in markets occurred where companies began buying back more stock; if investors ignore this buyback data, they're ignoring a key piece of information about how companies use cash, making dividend-only or other cash flow screens suboptimal.
“there was a very real structural change in markets where companies started buying back more stock and if you're a high yield investor a dividend investor or even just an investor across the market and you ignore that data you're ignoring a very key piece of information”
Managed Futures / Trend Following is the number one diversifier for most investors because it performs well when equities crash (negative correlation) and most Americans have zero real asset exposure (Real Estate, Commodities, TIPS, Farmland).
“the biggest number one diversifier uh is this trend fing manage Futures component and to me the evidence is you cannot argue you uh with evidence on this being an absolutely fantastic diversifier”
AQR published 'A Match Made in Heaven' showing that pairing Private Equity (functionally small-cap value with leverage) with Managed Futures creates an ideal hedge: both are long volatility strategies, so they complement each other—when one struggles in calm markets, the other performs in crisis.
“the paper I'm going to guide the listeners to uh was called a match made in heaven where um aqr was talking about pairing private equity which if you're a public market investor is basically small cap value uh with a little leverage either on your balance sheet of the stocks or actually the portfolio leverage same difference um matched with manage Futures”
The US has the least amount of revenue from outside its shores of any developed market country, yet investors cite US diversification as the reason to stay domestic, when in fact the US is the least internationally diversified of developed markets.
“the US for example being of the developed Market countries the country with the least amount of revenue from uh X Out outside of its Shores from International which is usually the reason people give her you're Diversified in the US which is actually the least of all the countries”
Markets often fail to align with investors' belief systems and feelings, making discretionary decisions informed by belief/feeling counterproductive.
“most of the time what happens in markets is not perfectly aligned with your own belief system and and how you're feeling Etc um and therefore making decisions informed by that are counterproductive”
Any attempt by humans to impose discretion on an algorithm that has demonstrable skill degrades results; the literature very strongly and confidently indicates that following rules makes sense.
“any attempt by a human to impose their own discretion on an algorithm that has demonstrable skill only degrade raes the results right so um you know these are really hard people to take right there's algorithm aversion is a real thing but all the literature very very strongly and and confidently indicates that following rules makes sense”
The Joel Greenblatt Gotham Asset Management study compared algorithmic signals that were followed automatically versus those that investors could use their own discretion on; automated followers dramatically outperformed discretionary ones, and discretionary followers actually underperformed the market with negative returns.
“Joel greenblat performed which we've we've highlighted a few times so what was yeah so Gotham he ran Gotham Asset Management he ran or he wrote the book the little book that beats the market and Gotham also ran separate accounts and sent signals about the stocks that investors should buy or sell and a result as a result they were able to to study the outcomes for investors that just handed over the money and allowed their algorithm to do all the buying and selling for them versus those that received the signals and then used their own discretion... those who followed the um signals automatically by just handing over the money to Gotham and letting them run the the accounts dramatically outperform the market and dramatically outperform those who impose their own discretion those who impose discretion not only underperform the market but also have negative returns”
The US dollar outperformance since 2009 was so dominant that it appears as a giant 'Mount Everest' on JP Morgan's mountain range chart of foreign vs US outperformance, with only a 'baby tiny little sand hill' representing foreign outperformance, and there is uncertainty about whether this trend will continue.
“the old JP Morgan Guide to the markets which I love they have one chart that's like a mountain range and it shows when it's flipping between foreign and us outperformance and they finally declared the US outperformance is over and there's this baby tiny little Sand Hill next to Mount Everest which is the giant us performance since 2009”
Tech companies in the U.S. have been engaging in aggressive share compensation in this cycle; avoiding serial diluters and instead targeting companies that are 'cannibals' (in Charlie Munger's term) that buy back shares is a thoughtful investment approach.
“certainly my neighbors here in LA and up in San Fran the tech space has been just absolutely going nuts with share compensation this past cycle uh and so avoiding those serial diluters um and and aiming for the cannibals as the late Charlie Munger would have said I think is a is a pretty uh thoughtful way to go about it”
The risk-free rate environment changed from late 2008 to early 2022 (essentially zero) to today where yields are attractive, meaning bonds now provide meaningful diversification value that they couldn't during the QE era, and this is a major structural shift in portfolio allocation frameworks.
“portfolios seem to resemble this zero rate environment allocation and we are not in that that zero rate environment anymore you know late 2008 to you know early 2022 you had basically a a time frame where the risk-free rate was incredibly low and so the option to invest in bonds or fixed income securities in order to buffer an equity portfolio in times of of growth shocks was less appealing but that's not where we are today there are yields out there that are somewhat attractive”
2023 was either the second or third worst year on record for the spread between equal-weight and cap-weight returns in the S&P 500, Russell indices, and growth/value splits going back 30-40 years, comparable only to the worst periods like the 1990s dot-com bubble.
“2023 2023 is either the second worst year ever or the third worst year for all three of those um going back for the last 30 30 40 years”
Diversifying in US tech mega-cap stocks is not true diversification because if they falter, they drag the entire index down; the concentration of returns in 7 mega-cap stocks means the success of the market depends on the success of a tiny number of companies.
“it requires a leap of faith that investors haven't needed to make previously right where I mean typically if you own an index you genuinely do own I mean there's a it's a a Paro IND in um distribution of market caps where you know definitely large caps um dominate small caps to a greater degree than you'd expect if the weights were kind of normally distributed but it's taken on a whole new level I know we saw something kind of like this um back in the 60s but I you know I think this is a whole new level and it requires investors to have this massive leap of faith about the prospects for these high price to sales high PE Tech growth stocks because if they falter they drag the entire index down with them”
Share issuance is one of the worst places to invest as a stock investor; consistently issuing companies underperform and cause dilution, yet many dividend-focused strategies ignore this data, making them suboptimal compared to shareholder yield approaches.
“share issuance is one of the absolute worst places you can hang out if you're a stock investor is a company that's consistently issuing shares uh and you're getting diluted it's one of the worst ways to invest”
Jerry Parker (famous trend-following manager) observes that people are hopeful with losses (wanting to hold) and fearful with gains (wanting to lock in profits), the exact opposite of what systematic trend following requires.
“Jerry Parker's got a great quote that I'll probably Mas her he's like people are hopeful with losses and fearful with gains where like they want to book these big wins but Trend folling and other ideas like you and this is one of the reasons that a lot of times private investing is at least helpful because you can't sell it”
Many investors don't rebalance to target allocations; instead, they let portfolios float, which means when stocks rise in price, their equity allocation naturally increases and bond allocation decreases as a percentage—they become less balanced over time by drift rather than active decision-making.
“I think the vast majority of investors don't rebalance to Target I think they kind of let their portfolios float so if you look at one of my favorite charts what uh the uh ponus Jesse Livermore said was the best stock market indicator ever... the percentage of um assets allocated to stocks and households”
Ken French argues that investors drawing inferences from 1, 3, 5, or even 10 years of asset class or strategy performance data are 'crazy' because time horizons that short are dominated by noise, not signal.
“Ken French of the famous French F pairing quote where he's like investors always ask... the French quote was he's like people are crazy to draw inferences for asset classes and strategies on one three five even 10 years of data”
Money market yields of 5% represent a 'retiree lottery' for the first time in 20 years, and we're seeing an acceleration of flows into money market funds, but this has not yet caused competitive drawdowns from mega-cap weight U.S. equities.
“people see this almost as like winning the retiree Lottery all of a sudden where they're like oh my God 5% yields I haven't had this in 20 years”
Apple's current market cap equals the entire US stock market's market cap in 1990, illustrating the scale and concentration of modern mega-cap wealth.
“Apple's market cap today is the same market cap as the entire stock market in 1990”
The irony of deep historical knowledge and understanding of regime shifts is that it has made those who embrace diversification look foolish over the past decade, not vindicated—the Triumph of the Ostriches over the Triumph of the Optimists.
“all the lessons that you learn the more you know about deep history and the importance of and deep risk and the importance of diversification the irony is the Dumber you've looked over the last decade or so right like the more you know that dmer you look I always say it's not the Triumph of the optimists so much as it's the Triumph of the ostriches”
Most companies in the U.S. stock market have approximately 2% dividend yield; screening for shareholder yield typically produces high single-digit to low double-digit yields, meaning high-quality shareholder-friendly companies offer massive yield spreads relative to the median.
“most companies in the US stock market's 2% dividend yield so if you think you're getting a 2% net yield versus high single digit low double digit that is a massive spread”
Diversification is extremely difficult to implement because it doesn't pay to do the prudent thing based on long-term risk understanding; investors will always chase current winners, and the prudent path produces worse short-term returns.
“I don't know what the right what the right solution is you know um because it's it just doesn't pay to do The Prudent thing based on um a long-term understanding of that of that kind of risk and the importance of diversification right you know everyone's G to always chase the H Dot”
International investing has not worked for Americans specifically in the past 10-15 years, but this is a biased single-country perspective; for the other 44 countries globally, international diversification has worked splendidly as their domestic equities underperformed.
“international investing for Americans has not worked for the past 10-15 years because for the other 44 out of 45 countries it's worked splendidly if you look at past 10 to 15 years because you diversifi globally so one sample size out of 45 is not a good batting average”
A behavioral 'hack' for getting investors to allocate to unfamiliar strategies (like managed futures) is to frame it in a way that provides psychological comfort or 'hide' it within a more familiar structure, which Faber calls 'cloaking'—making it palatable rather than confronting investor objections directly.
“advisors um I often describe or talk about allocating to certain asset classes or funds um where it gives them comfort in you know like look you you got a bunch of clients last thing they want to see is a bunch of stocks or funds where it's like I'm investing in China or turkey or Russia right like emerging market fund may give you a little cover for that because it invests in a lot of them or maybe globally Diversified is even better so it's like almost like you're kind of hiding it and managed future is the return stack one of the nice things I this is probably not your marketing angle but I like it is you're kind of hiding the manage Futures component”
Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger's stock picks are accessible and investors know they're better at stock picking than they are themselves, yet only 30% of poll respondents said they'd rather own their picks versus the S&P 500, showing a cognitive disconnect.
“I did a fun poll last night on Twitter... I said okay investors um this is a riff on an old one I did which is I was like do you think you're a better investor do you think you're a better stock picker than Warren and Charlie and everyone's like no they're way better and then I was like next was like do you own Berkshire or replicate their stock picks and everyone's like no of course not I said well do you see the disconnect here”
People struggle with three specific types of systematic selling decisions: 1) selling winners because identity becomes tied to the position, 2) holding through market crashes when emotion says 'worse is coming,' and 3) continuing to trade after consecutive losses feel unbearable (capitulation).
“three stances one you've been in an amazing investment forever your identity is tied to it I mean and for me like I remember um real estate being the first one re to roll over in 2007 I think and being like ah I don't want to sell this like like ah now now the part's over like come on I don't want to sell it ditto on the upside is often when like markets are down and I my predisposition is to be like in a pair Market be like oh this is going to get much worse and then getting that Buy Signal and be like ah you know this doesn't feel like this is over yet and then the third one which I think is probably the hardest of the three is you've had like and here's gold you've had like three four five six seven losing trades in a row”
Price-to-book as a value metric has been declared 'garbage' repeatedly when it underperforms, but then reliably comes roaring back with great years, illustrating that the key is being on the 'right side of the valuation universe' rather than obsessing over decimal precision.
“I Garner a fair amount of humor though from like you know when when people will look at the various ones and they'll be like you know what price to book is a garbage statist statistic now uh you know for various reasons and here's why it's changed over the years and then sure enough Price to Book will come raging back and have a great year”
Bonds down 20-50% receives almost no media attention compared to equivalent equity declines because investors mentally bucket bonds differently as 'safe,' not realizing this supposed safety asset has experienced capital losses comparable to or worse than many equity drawdowns.
“people don't really think in terms of um bonds is actually even having Capital losses right like they I don't even think they think bonds can lose money and if you look at tweets I have about it people like well yeah but I'll get i'll get paid back at par”
Forecasting should be less about making point predictions and more about mentally drilling down to think through ranges of outcomes—if investors expect 17% returns and get 5%, the psychological impact is severe, whereas if they prepare for multiple scenarios, the outcome is more manageable.
“I think it's useful to still think through less from like will we get this right and more trying to drill down to most investors the range of craziness of what can happen right is it like here's a forecast at least mentally think about what it's like if the stock market does 3% for a decade because as we know in relationships in life and work the worst thing can happen is your expectations are here and they don't meet reality right like you know um it it's where the the main mental meltdowns happen”
People want to be told there's a guru who can divine the future, and this desire is similar across diet, supplements, and investing; unfortunately many people market toward this desire rather than helping investors think through actual scenarios.
“people want to be told that there's a guru who knows can Divine the future it's the same with diet and supplements it's the same with all sorts of other areas people want to know want to be told what to do um and unfortunately in the investing world uh you know a lot of people um Market towards that desire of certainty”
The US long bond is on the verge of being down three years in a row for the first time in 100 years (second time ever), with the first occurrence in the late 1970s and early 1980s, making this an extremely rare event for large asset classes.
“it's actually the first year in 100 100 years where the US long Bond will be knock on wood we'll see what the year ends down three years in a row it's actually the second time ever it's down three in a row the the first time was late 70s early 80s”
The historical path to systematic investing for most investors is losing money doing discretionary investing in the late 1990s/early 2000s (Faber's experience), which forces a recognition that non-systematic approaches are 'unworkable'.
“the usual route that people arrive at systematic is the vast majority is they lose a bunch of money doing a bunch of dumb stuff when that was my my route certainly late 90s early 2000s and it says this is just unworkable”
In emerging market strategies, several of the Mag Seven stocks are the largest holdings, but they appear in very different forms—for example, a semiconductor stock as a five-bagger this year—demonstrating that sector opportunities differ dramatically by geography and that assuming uniform sector risk across geographies is myopic.
“a lot of the mag 7 um in our foreign and Emerging Market strategies uh are largest holding and Emerging Market strategies like a five bagger this year but it's a semiconductor stock and so whereas value type of strategies tilt away from a lot of tech in the US it's actually one of the largest Holdings in Emerging Markets”
Shareholder yield (combining dividend yield with net share buybacks and avoiding share issuance) has historically outperformed any purely dividend-based investing strategy going back decades, with no decade on record where higher dividend-only strategies beat shareholder yield strategies.
“I think there's even a decade where the higher dividend yielders outperform the shareholder yield companies because the shareholder yield it it's all well and good that it's buying the companies that are doing BuyBacks and cash distributions but it's also avoiding the ones that are doing share issuance”
Even 10-20% allocations to managed futures are too small to move the needle on diversification, but they are the maximum that investors will typically tolerate due to tracking error concerns and comfort with familiar equities.
“most people even if they get to 10 20% uh they feel like that's a ton but it at even in that point I think it moves the needle so I think when even when you think of diversication and balance so many people think they're balanced and last year wasn't that long ago one of the worst years ever for 6040 that was last year”
People are biased to sell out of private equity positions early when they double or achieve strong returns, depriving themselves of the life-changing upside that 50-100 baggers represent; often 95% of the return comes after the double.
“every five 10 bagger or even 50 100 bagger was once a double you know and people... I've invested in some startup companies where I watch the uh unfortunately in some cases these are spvs where a Syndicate lead has control over the Reigns and they'll have a big return and they'll sell out on a secondary and I say look that's not really your job to decide when you want to I mean in my opinion to sell this out like you're supposed to distribute this when it goes public or m&a and so but they want to book some compensation they want to book some carry they want to take their gain but um in very recent example I had this happen where uh 95% of the return you know it would have um it would have been a 10x from where they sold it right”
The VIX went from 23 to 12 in 2023 and markets are up, yet most investors still hear daily media narratives about 'uncertain times and high volatility markets,' demonstrating a cognitive mismatch between media narratives and actual market conditions.
“most investors um and I'll get the exact specifics wrong I said you know due to these low volatility markets most inest in investors are happy and complacent you know because what most people see what you hear every day on CNBC and Bloomberg is you know in these uncertain times and these high volatility markets and then they give a prognostication I go but that's not true I was like the vix went from like 23 to like 12 this year markets are up everyone's fat and happy”
If investors started with a blank slate today and allocated from scratch, they would rarely construct the same portfolio they currently hold; most portfolios contain legacy positions that have become 'clutter' and should be discarded using a Marie Kondo approach.
“thinking in terms of your portfolio by starting with a blank piece of paper like pull out a blank piece of paper write down what you would love to see your portfolio if you had a cash balance you're allocating for the first time today and it's almost never what you hold these Legacy funds... the analogy we give is going into your garage uh for those with that don't have a garage going into your closet and say all right if I didn't if my closet was Bare if my garage was Bare would I go out tomorrow and buy all of these things again and the answer is no chance right”
Most institutions and VCs don't pair private equity portfolios with managed futures, despite it being the ideal hedge, representing a massive gap in practice relative to what the research shows is optimal.
“I don't even know how many institutions do this where they pair the Venture Capital portfolio and private Equity with a big huge manage Futures Trend falling chunk and they should”
Resolve's flagship allocation is 50% in Trend/Managed Futures, which is substantially higher than most institutions use (typically 10-20%), and even 10-20% moves the needle, though size is critical to capturing diversification benefits.
“our Flagship allocation the default uh allocation is half in Trend in manage Futures which I think is certainly more than anyone I know in the country um you know but most people even if they get to 10 20% uh they feel like that's a ton but it at even in that point I think it moves the needle”
Volatility (measured by VIX) declined from 23 to 12 in 2023, but this low-volatility environment doesn't prevent investors from being complacent and fat-happy, because they don't perceive the market as uncertain.
“the vix went from like 23 to like 12 this year markets are up everyone's fat and happy so I've always wanted to say that and they didn't give me any acknowledgement I was so uh so sad about that but um”
Tiger Global (famous venture capital fund) could have protected itself during the 2022 downturn by pairing its equity-heavy private equity portfolio with 50% managed futures, creating dry powder for secondary discounts while maintaining returns.
“tiger Global they should have put half their portfolio in managed Futures and they'd be fat and happy and on top of that you have more money when the valuations are low and all these secondary transactions are going off at 80% discount it's like win-win win win”
Return-stacking strategies layer diversifying assets on top of traditional beta (stocks/bonds) without requiring separate allocations, allowing investors to gain diversification benefits without the tracking error of separately allocated portfolios.
“we developed return stacked strategies and that's why if if listeners are looking at uh just take a look at return stack.com there's a bunch of portfolio Solutions there where you're stacking the diversifier on top of the beta that you know like and trust and have had it around for so many years so you get a little bit of your cake and eat it too”
One of Faber's contacts has generated 30% annualized returns for 20 years by concentrating in Dillards stock, illustrating that extreme conviction in cheap, unloved stocks can produce outsized returns.
“one of them has like a $300 million raia because they put all their money in Dillards or something and like has compounded at like 30% a year for like 20 years or something”
Shareholder yield strategies currently trade at their highest historical discount to the overall market across domestic, foreign, and emerging markets, representing an obvious opportunity in the current environment.
“it's excuse me I can't say one of the highest it is the highest over the past few months that it's ever been relative to the category in Broad Market um this is also true in foreign this is true in emerging”
The combination of small-cap value, shareholder yield, and low-correlation factors represents a pretty exciting setup for future returns relative to market-cap-weighted indices, based on the overlapping Venn diagram of underperformance.
“we've seen this because of a lot of the studies and charts that show that small caps have underperformed large caps and it's going back to like you know um close to record you know levels uh where small caps have done so poorly so I think the combination of all these sort of overlapping circles if you do the VIN diagram small cap value shareholder yield uh is setting up for a pretty um pretty exciting future on uh on as far as perspective returns”
Successful Cambria shareholder yield strategy has live track record of almost 11 years for domestic and just hit 10 years for foreign, providing sufficient real-time data to evaluate whether a strategy works.
“our our shareholder yield strategy the domestic is over 10 almost 11 years the foreign actually just hit a 10-year track last month um and the emerging will hit one here in the next year or two”
One investor has compounded returns at ~30% annualized for ~20 years with only $300 million AUM (through one specific concentrated position), yet most people wouldn't choose that investor over the S&P 500 despite knowing about this track record.
“I can't even remember which one's Todd which one's Ted but one of them has like a $300 million raia because they put all their money in Dillards or something and like has compounded at like 30% a year for like 20 years or something um anyway”
In a Twitter poll about whether to hold Ted/Todd/Warren's portfolio or the S&P 500 or DIY invest for the next 10 years, results were 43% SPY, 30% Ted/Todd/Warren, 27% DIY, even though Faber believes Ted/Todd/Warren have essentially zero chance of underperforming both alternatives.
“the answers were 43% said spy uh and then the other two were close Todd Ted Warren was 30% and DIY was 27%”
Half of the world's cashews are sold by Costco, making cashews the worst nut but strategically important for Costco's business.
“half of the world's cashews otherwise known as the worst nut are sold by Costco”
Costco sold gold bars at some point, and they sold out in approximately one hour, either as a PR stunt or representing real demand.
“they were selling gold bars on Costco if you guys remember I don't know if it's a PR stun or real but they sold out in like an hour”
Gold is making its fifth, sixth, or seventh rounded top before breaking out, hovering at or near all-time highs without decisively moving higher.
“gold is hang out at all-time highs doesn't seem like it really wants to make its move yet but uh it seems to be making a third fourth fifth sixth seventh top I don't know what's the record for most rounded tops before breaking out but it's right there it's trying to set it”