
Runaway Fiscal Spending Is Fueling The Everything Rally (Part 1/2) | Lyn Alden & Luke Gromen
What this covers
This is the first half of a two-part conversation hosted by Mike Ippolito on the On The Margin podcast, with Lyn Alden and Luke Gromen. The discussion starts from gold's break from real rates after early 2022, which Gromen links to the seizure of Russian FX reserves and the questions it raised about Treasuries as reserve assets. From there it works through what fiscal dominance means, how close the US is to it, and what policymakers can do about it. Alden defines it as a state where fiscal policy matters more than monetary policy and large debts limit a central bank's ability to raise rates. Gromen argues it is a spectrum rather than a switch, and that the US moves back and forth depending on the dollar.
The historical comparisons carry much of the argument. Alden contrasts the 1970s, when money creation came mostly from bank lending through the money multiplier and debt-to-GDP was around 30 percent, with the 1940s, when higher rates would have added more public interest expense than they removed private spending. Gromen revisits 1984–85, the dollar's peak and the Plaza Accord, and the "productivity miracles" of the 1980s. He argues none can be repeated: the US net international investment position is now deeply negative, and China is not a client state like Japan or Germany.
The contentious claims concern what happened in 2023. Gromen says the deficit roughly doubled without a recession after rate hikes, because a financialized economy's tax receipts depend on equity compensation and capital gains. Alden adds that this is why conventional austerity would set off a deflationary spiral. Gromen also describes how Treasury's drawdown of the Treasury General Account (TGA)) offset quantitative tightening (QT)), and he sketches a feedback loop in which liquidity weakens the dollar, lifts risk assets, and raises tax receipts. The closing segment turns to deglobalization and the idea of gold as a de facto BRICS reserve asset.
The US fiscal system has entered a phase of fiscal dominance where rising debt levels and constrained interest rate policy create structural pressure toward currency depreciation, asset price inflation, and eventual monetary expansion; policymakers now recognize this inevitability and will manage dollar weakness and liquidity supply rather than attempt conventional fiscal consolidation.
- 40 years of rising debt-to-GDP offset by falling interest rates has ended; sideways or rising rates now unsustainable with current debt levels
- Gold divergence from real rates since 2022 signals market recognition that US cannot sustain positive real rates with current debt load, mirroring emerging market fiscal crises
- Empirical proof in 2023: deficit doubled without recession when Fed raised rates, proving austerity/high-rates strategy backfires in financialized economy dependent on asset prices for tax revenue
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In the 1970s, most money creation came from bank lending (high money multiplier) rather than fiscal deficits, so the Fed could raise interest rates to slow money creation without creating fiscal crises because federal debt-to-GDP was only around 30 percent; by contrast, fiscal dominance in the 1940s came from large monetized fiscal deficits where the Fed and commercial banking system had to buy most Treasury bonds, so raising rates would have increased public sector interest expense faster than it reduced private sector spending.
“in the 7s most of the money creation was from Bank lending right so that was not in any way fiscal dominance even though we were running significant fiscal deficits that was the smaller component a lot of it was Bank lending so you had a very high money multiplier you had um kind of record sustained issuance of bank loans um large because you had Baby Boomers entering the home buying years uh for example the kind of peak credit formation years um and you had the surge in bank loans surge in in corporate bond issuance a lot of this is private sector driven um and when they wanted to slow that down because there's all this new money being created from from fraction Reserve lending by raising interest rates um they could they could obviously harm borrowers they could slow that process down pretty significantly and even though uh that did increase Federal interest expense because federal debt GDP was low like 30% it doesn't increase interest expense from the public side as fast as it slows down the private sector”
In late 1984 and early 1985, when true interest expense as a percent of federal receipts was as high as current levels, the dollar peaked at DXY 166 in September 1985; it then fell from 166 to 120 by the Plaza Accord signing in September and continued falling to around 85, cutting the dollar in half over a two-year period, which was a 'productivity miracle' that helped sustain the debt.
“when we say sort of productivity Miracles you kind of had in in succession because Lyn you raised a great point the last time the US gross interest expense as a percent of receipts was as high as it was now was in uh late 844 and an early 85 the dollar Peak dxy at 166 September somebody got a heads up because the dollar proceeded to go from 166 to like 120 by the time the plaza Accord was signed in September of that year then it continued to fall for another year and a half to around uh 85 so the dollar from its Spike highs got cut in half in about two-year period”
The seizure of Russian foreign exchange reserves in early 2022 initiated a divergence in the gold-to-real-rates relationship by raising questions about the safety of US Treasury bonds as foreign exchange reserves amid geopolitical tension.
“you had the seizure of Russian FX reserves in early 22 and I think that kind of started uh the Divergence where all of a sudden uh it began to raise uh some question about uh the safety of US Treasury bonds as FX reserves uh as the global geopolitical situation gets more touchy”
Fiscal dominance exists when fiscal policy matters significantly more than monetary policy in shaping economic outcomes and constraining central bank independence, because large public debt burdens reduce the central bank's ability to raise interest rates without triggering fiscal crises.
“the short answer is it's when fiscal matters a lot more than po monetary policy and it shapes what what they can do with monetary policy basically monetary policy becomes uh they're less independent less able to control what they want to do because the fiscal side is is such an ongoing issue for them”
In Q3 2023, the long-term Treasury market crashed 20 percent and the dollar strengthened, which are the classic markers of fiscal dominance crisis; if policymakers 'stand aside' and let this process continue unmanaged, it would persist and worsen.
“and we're going to get what we got in 3 q23 which was dollar up everything else down you know the long Bond crashed 20% the third quarter um and if they are willing to stand aside that's what'll continue”
By September 2023, serious economists published articles in major newspapers (Wall Street Journal, New York Times, Washington Post) expressing shock that the deficit doubled without a recession or rise in unemployment, indicating that the empirical falsification of conventional policy occurred very recently.
“by September of 2023 it was fascinating the end of the US fiscal year there was a series of articles in sort of the the newspapers of record in America The Wall Street Journal the New York Times The Washington Post in their economic section of you very serious economists saying whoa we've never seen this before the deficit just nearly doubled without a recession without a rise in unemployment what happened here and something must be really wrong”
In 1984-85, when US net international investment position was positive 3 percent of GDP, the dollar spiked to 166 on the DXY, and the Plaza Accord subsequently coordinated currency appreciation by Japan and Germany, forcing them into decades of lost economic growth; but this dynamic cannot repeat today because the US net international investment position is negative 70 percent of GDP, meaning there is no capital available to repatriate to support the dollar.
“in 1984 the US net International Investment position was positive 3% of GDP in other words we owned more of foreigners overseas more foreigners assets overseas than they owned here so there was massive amounts of capital to repatriate as the dollar Rose and as rates Rose when we when this white paper of Imperial dollar cycle 2.0 was released uh the US net International Investment position was negative 70% of GDP in other words foreigners owned 18 trillion more net of our assets than we owned theirs night and day difference versus the 80s but everyone's saying well we'll just do what we did in the 80s and in terms of getting out of this we'll just pull the capital back here there D the negative 70% of GDP means there is no net capital to pull back here you strengthen the dollar and foreigners have borrowed a bunch of dollars guess what they're going to do sell dollar assets and in particular treasuries to repatriate Dollars to service their dollar debt”
In Q3 2022, when Treasury Secretary Yellen visited the IMF in Washington where the dollar was a major discussion topic, the Treasury began dramatically running down the Treasury General Account (TGA) from October 2022 through Q1 2023, injecting net dollar liquidity into the system that offset Fed quantitative tightening and signaled to the gold market that the US would prioritize Treasury market functioning over maintaining currency strength.
“in 3 q22 when Yellen went to the IMF in Washington uh in o oober uh they had their semiannual meetings uh Bloomberg talked about that the dollar was a big topic of conversation the strong dollar if you remember the dollar was around 114 at the time we had just had a 10-year treasury auction with I if I remember right a three three or four basis point tail it it was the latest in a series of ugly treasury auctions markets were not doing well uh and coming out of that meeting uh we saw Yellen begin to run the treasury general account down from October 22 into the first quarter 23 dramatically all more than offsetting um the QT that Powell was doing basically injecting net dollar liquidity”
For 40 years, rising US debt-to-GDP ratios were offset by falling interest rates, but with rates now at zero, if rates remain sideways or rise, the debt-to-GDP ratio no longer has an offsetting interest rate tailwind, creating an unsustainable fiscal dynamic.
“we've had 40 Years of rising debt to GDP but it's been offset by 40 Years of falling interest rates until we hit zero and so if we just go you know sideways now let alone up but if we just go sideways then we don't we no longer have that offset of interest rates compared to the debt”
Non-financialized economies can gradually de-financialize through austerity to reduce debt without tanking their economies, and non-financialized economies with high public debt can use austerity to lower debt levels; but the US combines a highly financialized economy structure with high public debt, making it impossible to use conventional austerity without triggering the deflationary spiral that worsens the fiscal problem.
“if you have a financialized economy and you don't have a lot of public debt then you can gradually over time def financialized your economy uh on the other hand if you have um a you know non-f financialized economy but you have a lot of public debt um there's ways to do austerity to lower that debt level without really tanking your economy the problem is when you know the United States is a very financialized economy which for example means we have got very high wealth concentration and a lot of that wealth their income is tied to asset prices”
In the 1940s, when federal debt-to-GDP was over 100 percent, raising interest rates would have generated more interest expense on the public side than the reduction in private sector spending, creating a looking-glass effect where higher rates either have mixed effects or act as an outright accelerator of fiscal deficits through increased spending being someone else's income.
“when you go back to the 40s it was a very different environment because most of the money Creation in that era was not from Bank Landing it was not from corporate bond issuance it was from it was from large fiscal deficits um and so you had large monetized fiscal deficits the central bank and the commercial banking system had to buy most of the bonds um so you got that money multiplier effect but it was very iscal driven and the problem is when you have 100% at the GDP uh if you were to raise interest rates um the interest expense that you generate uh on the on the public side would be bigger than the amount of of reduction you have on the private sector side uh and so that's why that's why public debts matter because eventually if if debts get high enough you go through the looking class where higher rates no longer have that kind of firm decelerator aspect that they do in in kind of lower public debt environments and instead it's it's either more mixed or in some cases if it's if it's really in balanced it can be an outright accelerator where the additions to fiscal deficits which are stimulatory because all that interest expense all that spending is someone else's income uh that can overweight uh or or or overshadow what's happening in the private sector side”
The US is a highly financialized economy where wealth concentration is high and much of income is tied to asset prices (corporate equity compensation, capital gains), making it impossible to reduce deficits through austerity without triggering asset price collapse, which would further reduce tax receipts, creating a deflationary spiral that worsens rather than solves the fiscal problem.
“the problem is when you know the United States is a very financialized economy which for example means we have got very high wealth concentration and a lot of that wealth their income is tied to asset prices um either because of of of corporate uh compensation uh method methods or because capital gains taxes all these different all these different levers um are the US tax Bas is very tied to as a price is more so than you see in Europe or Japan or other countries uh China for example um and so that makes it so that if they were to try austerity like let's say they say look the entitlement system is unsustainable the military spending is unsustainable we're going to try to you know raise taxes or cut spending or do some sort of combination to pull the deficit down to you know 3% GDP or something the problem is that the way the US economy structured you'd very likely get weaker asset prices uh weaker corporate margins just overall kind of weaker asset prices therefore you'd get kind of a a a deceleration in US tax receipts and therefore the fiscal deficit would probably still be roughly as wide um that's a very hard kind of tail spin to pull out of”
The Plaza Accord of 1985 coordinated yen and mark appreciation against the dollar, but Japan and Germany were effectively militarily occupied US client states; China today is not a US client state and has explicitly studied what happened to Japan post-Plaza Accord, so there is virtually no chance China would agree to similar currency appreciation arrangements.
“and then you roll China in you know same thing a lot of people say well China's going to be the next Japan well to be blunt contrast the number of military bases the US had in Japan versus in China it was a whole bunch to zero the Japan was was effectively militarily occupied by the United States at the time we signed the Plaza Court it arguably still is to some degree same thing with Germany so we had client states at the plaza Accord that we were asking nicely to sign a deal with us to buy time neither China nor Russia in this case are client states um and and China saw what happened to Japan after the Plaza Court and there is like zero chance in my view and they've sort of said as much that they're going to engage in that same thing to sort of get us out of our problem”
The gold market's divergence from real rates starting in 2022 represents recognition that the US cannot sustain positive real rates given its debt load, and therefore the gold market is signaling that the US will support Treasury market functioning over currency strength, requiring increased gold holdings regardless of real rate direction.
“the United States cannot have its treasury market function with positive real rates in which and when push comes to shove they will support the treasury market over the currency I need to own more gold uh regardless of what real rates are doing”
In 2022-2023, when the Fed raised rates aggressively starting in March 2022, tax receipts fell despite unemployment remaining flat, proving that in a financialized economy, the deficit is driven by asset price dynamics rather than employment; specifically, the swing in deficit was driven by reduction in equity-based compensation and capital gains tax receipts paired with increased interest expense on the debt.
“everything bubble in 2021 we have alltime record tax receipts in April 2022 we have the deficit F to I think it was a trillion three or trillion four down from uh a peak in around 2020 2021 of about 3.1 trillion and you saw the Biden Administration and the economists around it saying look how good a job we've done the deficit has been normalized away we go and then the FED starts hiking rates aggressively in March of 2022 um and asset prices fall and we see the deficit blow back out tax receipts fall in uh April of 2023 despite the fact that unemployment basically never moved it basically never Rose um and it was all the swing Factor was almost all around two things in terms of the deficit it was the reduction of tax receipts associated with Equity based comp and capital gains asset based comp and capital gains and the rise in interest rates which were catching up on a leg”
Recent statements by Treasury Secretary Yellen, including that 'the economic orthodoxy of the last 40 years is over,' indicate that policymakers are explicitly repositioning policy away from the previous framework; while this may not matter immediately, it is similar to when the gold window was closed—it took 1-2 years for full effects to materialize.
“the reverse repo the when you see Yellen I don't think people have been paying nearly enough attention to what Yellen has been saying around these meetings with China um last week in the Wall Street Journal Janet Yellen who is in charge of the dollar basically came out and said the economic Orthodoxy of the last 40 years is over so the again does it matter this week next week no but in the same way that when we Clos the gold window it eventually mattered a great deal in the next year two years five years 10 years I think we're going through those motions”
Gold is being reserved as a de facto BRICS currency and alternative reserve asset to the US dollar as BRICS nations move away from dollar-denominated reserves due to geopolitical concerns.
“we've been seeing gold turning into an oil currency uh people been saying those bricks currency it's never going to show up what's this bricks currency how the bricks didn't do it again and if you look at what the bricks are reserving gold is the bricks currency de facto and so I think we're seeing um gold being re reserved uh as an oil currency as as the bricks currency”
Gold prices correlate closely with US fiscal deficits as a percentage of GDP over the period shown in the chart, with deficits rising during the global financial crisis, cooling between GFC and COVID, blowing out during COVID, then cooling in 2022 before re-accelerating, with gold breaking out again during deficit re-acceleration.
“if you chart gold price next to uh us fiscal deficits as a percentage of GDP um that actually matches somewhat closely over the timeline of this chart so you would have had really big deficits during the global financial crisis then they obviously cooled down a bit between that and and Co then they blew out in Co um and then um you know we had this lull in you know 2022 or so where the deficits cooled down and now they're re accelerating again and we see gold breaking out again”
As the true interest expense-to-receipts ratio nears 100 percent, predictable effects emerge: capital flows into emerging markets dry up, the dollar strengthens, EM currencies come under pressure, and emerging market central banks are forced to sell Treasury bonds to defend their currencies and finance account deficits that have shifted from surplus to deficit.
“the times we've been in the times we've been out get very um they're predictable and the way to get out of it's very predictable so uh as you near it you start to crowd out Global dollar borrowing markets the dollar starts to go up as the dollar starts to go up you start to see pressure in EM you start to see M's sell treasury bonds to try to raise dollars to defend their currencies uh to uh basically Finance their current accounts that are moving from surpluses to deficit”
Policymakers often use a binary, black-and-white definition of fiscal dominance (either fully in or fully out), but the reality is dynamic; fiscal dominance is not a switch but a spectrum where the US moves between states of more-or-less fiscal dominance depending on which policy levers are being pulled and what the dollar is doing.
“I think that's really the critical thing is is in my experience policy makers in Washington in particular a lot of the people that have have that are very focused on I think a very black and white definition of fiscal dominance either you're in or you're out um we're not to the point where we're all the way in and can't get out it's always and and it's it's always a question of of the different levers right”
A reliable early indicator of approaching fiscal dominance is when true interest expense (gross interest expense plus the current portion of off-balance-sheet liabilities like Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid) reaches 100 percent of federal tax receipts; at this point policymakers will be forced to print money to pay interest.
“one of the sort of um I guess cheat cheat or short you know short easy ways of looking at it that I look at for when we're getting to that point is this Dynamic of true interest expense as a percent of US federal tax receipts so true interest expense say okay what's the gross interest expense and then I add in the entitlement pay goes because that's just the current portion the interest portion of your off-balance sheet liabilities for for Social Security Medicare Medicaid Etc and when you graph that against receipts what you find is that as that number gets to 100% where basically you're going to have to print the money to pay the true interest that has been a very good gauge as sort of a cheat metric on when we are get into fiscal dominance”
The US exists in a state where it has one foot in fiscal dominance and one foot outside of it simultaneously, depending on what the dollar is doing; when the dollar is too strong, the US moves toward fiscal dominance and debt spiral dynamics, while when policymakers manage to weaken the dollar, the system can step back from the brink.
“so we're in this I thought uh Lynn making the point of of we're not all the way there yet but we're sort of dancing we have a foot inside both camps and there are time there have been times when we've been in one Camp entirely and the other Camp entirely and that is very much a function of what the dollar is doing when the Dollar's too strong we're going into fiscal dominance towards a debt spiral uh and we're going to get what we got in 3 q23 which was dollar up everything else down you know the long Bond crashed 20% the third quarter”
The 1980s had three major productivity miracles that allowed debt to become sustainable: the Plaza Accord dollar collapse (cutting the dollar in half), the Soviet Union collapse (dumping oil on markets and creating a deflationary commodity cycle), and China's integration into the global economy; today, geopolitical conditions make equivalents unlikely.
“uh depending on geopolitics it can change uh dep depending on fiscal austerity um kind of because right now we're kind of too far gone a little bit to to you know fiscal austerity will just make it worse but that that's the kind of thing and then you roll China in you know same thing a lot of people say well China's going to be the next Japan well to be blunt contrast the number of military bases the US had in Japan versus in China it was a whole bunch to zero and then you roll right into the collapse of the Soviet Union which is also massively deflationary as they are dumping oil into Global markets for a lot of the next decade uh in search of hard currency um we have essentially uh us puppet governments in Moscow for much of that decade obviously we do not have a US puet Government Moscow right now um that buys time that's a productivity miracle”
Policymakers now know (as of September 2023) that austerity and high-rates policies don't work in a financialized economy with high debt levels because they demonstrated this empirically in 2022-2023; therefore they will not attempt that strategy again, meaning the only path available is continued liquidity supply and dollar weakness.
“and so it's it's a lot of this is the common knowledge game right is is when do when do we know when do they know and then when do we know they know and so like like we knew this was going to happen but they didn't until September of last year and now we know that they know and if we know they know then they're not going to try they they know that can't work the whole high for longer austerity they've had the fear of God put in them they know what's going to happen if they try and so what's that that's a very powerful piece of knowledge as an investor because now you can step back and go oh we know they know they can't try it again so you need a productivity Miracle or else we're just going to stay on this tracks of like they will supply liquidity every time it's needed”
Unlike social media and cloud computing adoption, AI is a more energy-intensive and capital-intensive technology combining software plus hardware; this could create a reversal where white-collar services see productivity disinflation while energy and electrification metals see inflation pressure, creating a bifurcated inflation regime.
“I think it'll take time as well um but I would point out that un unlike social media and and kind of shift from you know Edge Computing to cloud computing this is more uh energy intensive technology it's more of that software plus Hardware combination and so you could have a situation where you know we we kind of like the the past while has been Goods disinflation but but service inflation right and that that's kind of the structural period we've been in you could get a reversal you could get disinflation in various kind of White Collar Services because we're getting so much more productive at them at the same time as we're not getting we're not really getting energy disinflation we're not really getting you know disinflation in kind of the the electrification metals for example um there could be that more physical cycle that happens”
Gold divergence from real rates is a signpost that the acute phase of the fiscal cycle has been reached, similar to what emerging market investors see repeatedly in currency crises; gold rising when real rates rise signals unsustainable debt loads that accelerate toward fiscal crises.
“when you start to look for things in the markets the markets will tell you when it's starting to matter so for example that chart we started with showing gold completely diverging from us real rates like that is a strange chart to a lot of Traders and investors in America you show that chart to an Emerging Market investor with a lot of experience it's like it's a chart they've seen over and over and over and over that's what happens when it starts and gold goes up when real rates go up in your country because a rise in real rates given your debt load makes your debt load mathematically unsustainable and accelerates you towards a fiscal crisis”
The AI productivity miracle must arrive at exactly the right speed to extend the fiscal sustainability timeline: if AI automation is too fast (taking 20 percent of white-collar jobs in three years), it would cause unemployment spikes and wage declines, worsening deficits through reduced tax receipts despite productivity gains; if AI arrives too slowly, it cannot offset debt dynamics; the narrow window is when productivity gains slightly exceed displacement costs.
“it can't arrive too fast it can't arrive too slow and it can't arrive too fast in other words if AI shows up and over the next three years takes 20% of the white collar jobs like that's too fast you're going to have unemployment go up you're going to have wages drop and be by virtue of the debt the GDP and deficits being as high as they are you're going to blow out the deficit and that's going to make it worse uh they're going to need to reserve more of the debt and when I say reserve more of the debt fully Reserve it's it's they're going to have to go back to QE in some form or another”
When Fed and Treasury supply dollar liquidity to stabilize Treasury markets, the result is a weaker dollar, which then causes risk assets to turbocharge in performance, which raises tax receipts; rising tax receipts reduce Treasury issuance pressure, which weakens Yellen's deficit-driven liquidity injections, which weakens the dollar further, which then causes foreigners to buy more Treasuries instead of selling them.
“and then we get a weaker dollar we get a turbocharge in Risk assets uh we get a bump up in tax receipts on a lag as higher tax receipts come in from higher asset prices treasury issuance mitigates as that happens the issuance pressure from Yellen weakens uh as the dollar weakens the pressure from foreigners weakens and in fact they can turn around and actually buy more treasuries”
The train of fiscal dominance has 'nothing that can stop it' on its current track; the only levers available are factors that might slow it down (like productivity miracles or energy abundance) or accelerate it, but the underlying momentum cannot be stopped once the debt-to-GDP ratio is so high that interest rate constraints eliminate conventional monetary policy effectiveness.
“there's not much that can stop it is how I would describe it and around the margins you invest slightly differently depending on what's going to happen there um but I still think either way it favors structural money supply growth and then the question is does that go mainly to assd prices or mainly into consumer prices or some combination of both”
Treasury Secretary Yellen is absolutely aware of the fiscal dominance problem and that the way to manage it is to manage the dollar level; a weaker dollar reduces fiscal dominance because it allows inflation to persist, which enables the Fed to keep real rates negative for sustained periods without triggering capital flight.
“I think she's absolutely aware of the problem and think she's absolutely aware of the problem that the way to manage the problem is to manage the level of the dollar all equal the weaker the dollar gets the less fiscal dominance the us will have um and that's like it kind of goes back to you know a chart Lind showed a number of times she has a great chart to showing like once Deb the GDP gets as high you got to have negative real rates for a sustained period of time and how do you get tostain Negative real rates for a sustained period of time you get the dollar weak enough so inflation picks up and and then you kind of keep rates below that and that's how you stay out of fiscal dominance anytime the real rates get too high because dollar gets too high you're going to go right back to 3 q23”
If policymakers had allowed uninsured bank deposits to fail during the 2023 banking stress rather than bailing them out, the private sector credit shock would have generated immediate deflation and eliminated inflation instantly; instead, by softening the private sector blow while allowing fiscal expansion to continue, they chose a more inflationary path of fiscal dominance.
“if they're willing to stand aside and let these Banks not only fail but let all uninsured deposits go poof that would have a the gold would be closer to where it should be on that real rate chart that would be deflation defl we would have been out of inflation instantly now we might have touched off a bank spiral that's a separate discussion or a bank a bank crisis but that's a separate discussion”
Structural money supply growth is inevitable given debt levels, so the investment question shifts from 'will inflation occur' to 'where does the money supply growth go—mainly to asset prices or mainly to consumer prices, or some combination'—and this distribution depends on factors like energy abundance, technology productivity, and other supply-side shocks.
“but I still think either way it favors structural money supply growth and then the question is does that go mainly to assd prices or mainly into consumer prices or some combination of both and that's largely going to depend on things like like energy abundance Tech abundance you know productivity increases um but that either way investing is is fairly similar in those environments”
Stable coins represent a new channel for Treasury demand that governments might pursue, as stable coins over 99 percent dollar-denominated create a novel demand source for T-bills; in some countries like Egypt, stable coins have become the preferred currency settlement vehicle, creating bottom-up dollarization pressure that governments initially resisted but now see as supporting Treasury demand.
“stable coins are now a new source of treasuries that they can kind of just push out there you know from the top level countries are often trying to dollarize now around the margins whereas the the people are often not trying to dollarize you don't see you know if you go to the this the currency markets in Cairo it's dollars it's not Wan it's not you know Yen it's not everything else it's it's dollars um and so a these different countries you know stable coins have over 99% of the the market share uh like do is dollars not other currencies um and so that's that's basically a new source of demand for for t- bills”
The Treasury market has experienced repeated dysfunction events (approximately 5 times in 4.5 years: March 2020, 2019 repo crisis, 3Q 2022, 1Q 2023, and 3Q 2023), each requiring Fed and/or Treasury emergency liquidity provision, indicating the system is in an acute crisis phase rather than a stable state.
“we've seen like from a timing standpoint the gold market said as of 1 q22 if not 3 q22 we have reached the acute phase of the cycle that's what gold going up with Rising real rates means and urrs positive and Rising real rates we've seen repeated instances five times now in four in a little over uh four years four and a half years once the treasury market dysfunctions FedEd Andor treasury come in with dollar liquidity extremely quickly”
In Q3 2022, the Treasury ran down the TGA and weakened the dollar from 114 to about 98—an enormous move in a four-to-five month period—to keep the Treasury market functioning; then in fall of that year, Yellen shifted Treasury issuance strategy to accomplish the same dollar-weakening goal.
“we got we got a Tracker 3222 she runs down the TGA she weakens the dollar pretty dramatically I mean 114 to wherever it about 98 or something like that in the dollar that is an enormous move in a four or five month period of time uh to keep the treasury market functioning um fast forward to the fall of last year we saw her uh really November last year shift issuance to accomplish the same thing”
The concerns about debt and deficit escalation expressed in the 1980s and early 1990s (the Debt Clock in 1988-89, Ross Perot's 1992 presidential campaign) were premature and followed by 30 years of declining interest rates due to globalization, Soviet Union collapse, and China's economic integration, allowing debt-to-GDP to rise without fiscal crisis; this led to a false consensus that debts and deficits never matter.
“the famous uh you know Debt Clock went up in like what was it 1988 or 89 um and then Ross Pro ran the most successful independent presid presidential campaign in the early 90s largely based on debt and deficit uh that was kind of a main issue of his and so that was like Peak zeitgeist of that this matters and if you look at the chart of interest expense as percentage of GDP that was Peak interest expense because you know even though even though federal debt was still fairly low they had ultra high interest rates and therefore they had you know they they looked like they had a a spiral starting um now they had the fall of the Soviet Union they had the opening up of China to the world and then they had this kind of 30-year stretch of major globalization indust rates falling from double digits all the way down to basically zero”
Multiple economic indicators suggest fiscal dominance is building: the Conference Board leading indicator has been in recession territory for the longest period without an official recession, PMIs typically predict falling bond yields but instead bond yields have been rising, the Fed had to stop balance sheet reduction in 2019 during an economic expansion, and gold-real rates divergence all signal fiscal stress.
“we've had the longest period of the conference board leading indicator um being like in recession territory and yet not having a official declared recession um we've had you know uh pmis went down normally bond yields go down when that happens instead bond yields went up um and as Luke pointed out you know that chart you know gold and and real rates diverging um the fact that the Federal Reserve had to come in and stop reducing their balance sheet in 2019 while there's still in economic expansion um these are all kind of things that start happening”
De-globalization trends would create headwinds against the current system by removing disinflationary offsets and increasing interest rate pressure, accelerating fiscal dominance dynamics; without China labor, commodity abundance, and other deflationary forces, higher inflation would force higher bond yields unless controlled by policy intervention.
“if de globalization you know around the margins happens um that makes it increasingly hard for the current system to kind of be structured the way it is uh basically You'd expect all us being equal higher inflation because you don't have those disinflationary offsets um and therefore you'd expect higher bond yields unless they're controlled in some way”
New oil discoveries and energy exploration that increase commodity supply above baseline expectations can extend the fiscal timeline by creating disinflationary pressure that allows lower interest rates without triggering inflation expectations, buying time in the system.
“you could get a bank failure you could get um disorderly treasury markets you could get various things like that and then they they step in they you know they nqt they do SLR adjustments they do some sort of change and that accelerates some of these things um I think things that uh can extend end it would be things like um you know major new uh oil discoveries and exploration right so for example you know there there's been some new oil fields lately that's been promising um if you have just overall if you have just kind of more energy come to Market than than Baseline expectations are um that can kind of you know push away this issue”
Various policy levers including SLR (Supplemental Leverage Ratio) rules changes, regulatory adjustments for bank Treasury holdings, and stable coin infrastructure represent tools that policymakers can deploy to create Treasury demand from different sources without explicit QE announcements.
“it could include things like SLR rules changes kind of you know Financial jargon that helps Banks hold more treasuries which is also basically what they did in the 1940s uh it wasn't just the FED monetizing all the treasuries it was other pools of capital including Banks and Banks you know because they have fractional Reserve you know policies that they can hold quite a bit of treasuries depending on regulations around them uh especially if those if those Treasures or shorter term um and so there there's all manner of things they can do even things like stable coins are now a new source of treasuries”
The pendulum has swung so far from the 1980s concerns that now prevailing consensus holds that debts and deficits don't really matter; however, the offset mechanism (declining interest rates) that validated this belief for 40 years is now exhausted with rates at zero, making the situation starting to matter again.
“I think the pendulum is swung so far that now people are in the mindset that debts and deficits don't really matter and it's starting to matter”
The fiscal crisis timeline can be extended or accelerated by several factors: a productivity miracle could delay the outcome, geopolitical shifts could change the trajectory, or fiscal austerity could worsen things by creating a deflationary shock without reducing debt-to-GDP due to the financialized structure of the US economy.
“it can always change depending on a productivity Miracle it can change depending on geopolitics it can change uh dep depending on fiscal austerity um kind of because right now we're kind of too far gone a little bit to to you know fiscal austerity will just make it worse because we haven't gotten that the GDP down”
Personal investor positioning should be structured to not require extreme accuracy about AI adoption speed and displacement rates, while monitoring AI as a secondary variable; the core positioning should favor structural money supply growth regardless of whether the output is asset price inflation or consumer price inflation.
“I try to structure in a way that that doesn't that doesn't dramatically affect my thesis or or my investments”
Treasury Secretary Yellen has performed effectively in managing a difficult situation by pushing Treasury issuance to the front end of the curve, using the reverse repo balance as a form of synthetic quantitative easing that she could deploy without requiring Fed permission, and managing the Treasury General Account (TGA) to control liquidity and dollar strength.
“in terms of do I think Yellen has done a great job managing a very difficult situation I do um I think she has uh and you you can you can see this you can see um when uh particularly last fall in terms of what she's done with uh pushing issuance to the front end uh making use of what of the balances in the reverse repo which was uh basically just a form of synthetic QE that she didn't need to ask power permission to do um and managing the TGA like I said in 3 q202”
The US is experiencing a phase where fiscal and monetary policy effects are of similar magnitudes, creating much more muted effects from monetary policy than in the 1970s when private debt was higher and public debt lower.
“and I think I think we're kind of experiencing that to a certain degree where we're not at the point where it completely overshadows it but the L um you know on similar magnitudes now and so you have a much uh more muted effect from monetary policy than you would have in the 70s compared to fiscal policy”
When Treasury market dysfunction reaches a critical threshold, the Fed and/or Treasury are forced to inject dollar liquidity to stabilize markets because they cannot and will not allow free markets to set borrowing rates for the US government given the magnitude of deficits and debt levels.
“and treasury selling leads to a net increase in treasury supplies above and beyond uh what we're getting from the combination of big deficits in the US uh from Yellen and then QT from Powell uh the treasury market gets gets dysfunctional once it gets dysfunctional enough we see fed and or treasury come in and Supply more dollar liquidity to calm the treasury market down because they do not and cannot allow with debt levels this High deficit levels this High the free market to set borrowing rates for the US government”
The US has not definitively entered fiscal dominance as a permanent state but has been 'flirting with it' since around 2019; various signposts of fiscal dominance are building rather than a single binary switch from normal to dominated.
“I don't think it's a matter like okay here like 2028 is like the you know date that we're going to enter fiscal dominance my view is basically ever since 2019 or so we've roughly been flirting with it we're that that's fiscal is now a bigger Factor than it normally is and we don't have that 40-year offset in in lower indust rates uh to offset that”
Even if AI provides a massive disinflationary force and holds down interest rates despite high money supply growth, the asset allocation preference remains the same: gold and Bitcoin are preferable to Treasury bonds because they preserve optionality regardless of whether the disinflationary scenario or inflation scenario materializes.
“if AI comes and just completely gives us this massive dis disinflationary force uh and just kind of holds down um you know they're able to have low industry rates despite fairly High money supply growth well then I still want to be in kind of the same assets that I'm in anyway which I'd rather I'd rather be in gold and Bitcoin than treasury bonds for example uh in that environment”
The magnitude and speed of the gold-to-real-rates divergence since 2022 is larger and faster than expected even by investors who were long gold and skeptical of long-duration Treasury valuations, suggesting a structural shift in reserve asset preferences.
“and if if if you would have asked me a few years ago um would have I expected a Divergence of this big I would say probably not and that that's from someone who's long gold and not long long duration treasuries um and yet I'm still surprised by the magnitude of Divergence and the kind of the speed of which this this um correlation broke down”