What's the Left's Vision for Foreign Policy After Trump?
What this covers
Matt Duss and Ezra Klein discuss the Democratic Party's fracture over foreign policy, with Gaza as the central rupture. Duss argues that the party faces a reckoning that runs deeper than tactical disagreement: the Biden administration's approach to Gaza constituted support for atrocities accompanied by deliberate disinformation, a breach demanding accountability from the officials involved. More broadly, he contends that American foreign policy has been organized around maintaining global primacy—a costly and unnecessary pursuit that drains resources from domestic concerns while failing to make Americans safer. The conversation moves between immediate policy disputes and the structural question of legitimacy: why citizens no longer trust institutions to serve their interests, and how foreign policy connects to that erosion of faith.
The discussion spans the mechanics of arms sales law, the engagement-for-leverage fallacy in alliance management, and the politics of trade and economic security. Duss argues that addressing elite impunity—the sense that powerful actors face no consequences—should anchor a rebuilt foreign policy, linking corruption abroad to the domestic perception of a rigged system. Klein presses on the tensions within progressive internationalism: how to reconcile solidarity with foreigners' equal dignity against the practical necessity of boundaries, and whether raising labor standards globally via trade leverage helps or harms developing economies. A recurring theme is process as restraint, and whether reclaiming Congressional war powers resolution authority can slow executive adventurism. The speakers register disagreement over neoliberalism's legacy and trade-offs, particularly the inflation caused by tariffs and post-pandemic supply shocks versus the wage and employment costs of unfettered trade.
Duss argues the Democratic Party needs a foreign-policy reckoning centered on Gaza and elite accountability, replacing a primacy-driven establishment posture with a values- and restraint-based foreign policy rooted in a domestic political consensus that addresses Americans' sense that the system is rigged.
- The Biden administration's Gaza policy was not a mere policy dispute but support for genocide accompanied by disinformation, requiring accountability for the officials who carried it out.
- American foreign policy has been driven by sustaining global primacy/hegemony, which is destructive, wasteful, and not actually necessary to keep Americans safe.
- A durable left internationalism must be rooted in addressing the working class's sense of lost control and a rigged system, treating foreign policy and domestic policy as connected.
U.S. should reorient to positive-sum internationalism rooted in moral principle and domestic political consensus benefiting working Americans.
- In every U.S. election since the end of the Cold War except 2004, the more antiwar candidate has won; while this doesn't prove they won because they were antiwar, it indicates a durable audience for a less militaristic vision of America's role, a lane Democrats abandoned and left open for Trump.
“every election since the end of the Cold War — starting with 1992, with the one exception of 2004 — the more antiwar candidate has won.”
- The right's critique of international rules is zero-sum—America should do whatever it wants and if it gets a good deal others must lose—while the left's is positive-sum, reflecting the original principle that countries, including the U.S., agree to be constrained by rules because that mutual restraint ultimately makes everyone safer.
“It's basically a zero-sum critique versus a positive-sum critique.”
- There are cases—humanitarian interventions, foreign aid, defending Ukraine—where foreign policy does not directly serve American communities but is morally right, and many Americans are receptive to a strong articulation of doing good even without a jobs-in-your-community payoff, as shown by steady support for Ukraine's defense despite Trump's opposite approach.
“there is something about the justice and the morality of helping a country defend itself from the aggression of a more powerful neighbor that Americans get”
- The deeper crisis is a legitimation crisis: people feel nickeled and dimed and exploited at every step and that the systems they live under do not represent their interests or deliver for them, which makes them susceptible to demagogues; any good foreign-policy ideas will fall apart unless rooted in a durable political consensus and a restored sense of common project.
“the crisis that we're in right now is a legitimation crisis. People just don't feel that the systems under which they live are representing their interests”
- Duss identifies as a left internationalist who believes Americans' security is bound up with the security and prosperity of others, but holds that a durable, solidaristic internationalism must be rooted in an American domestic political consensus that answers most Americans' primary interest in their own family and community.
“I see myself very much as a left internationalist, but I also recognize that to develop a durable and solidaristic internationalism, it has to be rooted in an American domestic political consensus.”
- The line between domestic and foreign policy is blurry: immigration, climate, and global trade all have major foreign-policy components, and a credible foreign policy must always be mindful of how it serves American communities even if not every speech makes that explicit.
“Trade was not over here and foreign policy over here. These things are deeply connected.”
- Trump is a symptom rather than the cause of the political crisis; his traction comes from the true claim that 'the system is rigged,' which Americans feel as a lack of control over their economic, political, and social lives and a sense of being exploited at every step, and this distrust attaches to foreign-policy failures like Iraq and the 2008 financial crisis.
“The lack of trust really does come down to this one line from Trump that others have used. And that is: The system is rigged.”
Pursuing global military primacy drives destructive, wasteful policy that Americans reject and foreign engagement cannot control.
- A central tension in U.S. foreign policy is that Americans want both to do good in the world and to retain control, but when engagement fails to control outcomes at acceptable cost (as in Iraq or Afghanistan), Americans become angry; this 'control' problem will persist as long as foreign policy is driven by sustaining American primacy.
“part of the tension between wanting to do good, wanting to have control and losing control — that's going to keep happening as long as we have this foreign policy that is driven by sustaining American primacy”
- The foreign-policy establishment keeps asking how to better sell continuing global military hegemony to Americans rather than hearing that Americans simply aren't into it because it is destructive, wasteful, increases inequality, and funnels money from the working class upward to a small unaccountable elite.
“Do we actually need all of this to keep us safe? How much are we spending on this? And to whom are the benefits really accruing?”
- The Biden administration's overriding focus was strategic competition with China—parking Russia to free attention for it and pursuing Saudi-Israel normalization partly to box China out of the Middle East—and what underlies this China obsession is an effort to sustain America's global primacy.
“the obsession with strategic competition with China, I do think what underlies that is an effort to sustain America's global primacy.”
- American primacy should not be a goal because it is not necessary to keep Americans safe, prosperous, and free; the aim should instead be an America that is powerful and influential and that conceives of its own safety as bound up with promoting safety and prosperity in other communities around the world.
“Is American primacy necessary to keep Americans safe, prosperous and free? And I don't think it is.”
Gaza requires Palestinian self-governance including tacit engagement with Hamas and settlement expansion must face real costs.
- The Democrats' position should be to end U.S. military aid to Israel because Israel is a wealthy country and there is no need for American taxpayers to subsidize its defense budget.
“I think, first of all, it's to end aid. Israel is a wealthy country. There's really no need for American taxpayers to continue to subsidize their defense budget.”
- The U.S. should create disincentives for Israeli expansion by declaring settlements illegal and imposing sanctions on officials who support and facilitate their growth; the Biden administration's sanctions on violent settlers were a good but minimal start that should be expanded to shift the dynamic by showing real costs.
“Let's state plainly that the settlements are illegal, that officials who support them and facilitate their growth should face consequences. They should face sanctions.”
- Gaza must be governed by Palestinians, which requires some tacit agreement with Hamas since it remains a relevant force; the disarmament of Hamas will never happen under occupation and can only conceivably happen under legitimate Palestinian self-governance.
“the disarmament of Hamas will never happen under a situation of occupation. It will only conceivably happen under a situation of legitimate Palestinian self-governance.”
- Anti-corruption should be central to foreign policy because Trump's true refrain that 'the system is rigged' resonates; concrete starting points include international efforts against kleptocracy, closing money-laundering channels (the U.S. and U.K. being major destinations, e.g. South Dakota trusts), and domestic campaign-finance reform, which together internationalize an anti-corruption agenda.
“international efforts against kleptocracy, closing down international money laundering, for which the United States is a main destination.”
- All things considered, Biden's response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine was a good one—it was reasonable to help Ukraine defend itself—though the administration should have been more willing to pursue talks with Putin along the way, while remaining doubtful Putin was ever interested in ending the war.
“personally, I think all things considered, his response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine was a good one.”
- The 'rules-based order' may have been a pre-rules-based order rather than a post-rules-based one; like Gandhi's quip that Western civilization would be a good idea, a genuine rules-based order is aspirational, and double standards and hypocrisies have grown so stark that the system has lost legitimacy and cannot be referenced unironically.
“we've gotten to a point where the double standards and the hypocrisies have gotten so stark that the system has just lost legitimacy.”
Biden administration violated existing law and deceived public on Israel's conduct in Gaza.
- The Biden administration ran what amounted to a campaign of disinformation on Gaza by repeatedly claiming it had 'not made an assessment' of Israeli violations of international humanitarian law, despite having far more visibility into Israeli operations than into Russia's, where it assessed war crimes within a month of the Ukraine invasion.
“The idea that they could not make a similar assessment of a military into whose operations the United States has vastly more visibility, I think, is just not credible.”
- The debate over conditioning arms sales to Israel is bizarre because the U.S. already has laws—the Leahy Law and Arms Export Control Act—that restrict arms sales to military units with proven human rights abuses; the real problem is that multiple administrations simply ignore these existing laws for certain countries like Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia.
“We have laws on the books that condition aid to every country according to a set of principles. Whether it's the Leahy Law, whether it's the Arms Export Control Act”
- By mid-November after Oct. 7 it was clear the Gaza campaign was no longer self-defense but a series of atrocities, and the core misunderstanding in Washington is treating civilian casualties as a regrettable consequence of a just objective when in fact civilian suffering was part of the policy itself.
“they treat civilian suffering, civilian casualties, as if it's a regrettable consequence of an overall just objective. It is not. Civilian suffering is part of the policy”
Twenty years of asymmetric U.S. policy empowered Israeli expansion while disempowering Palestinian self-determination.
- For 20-plus years U.S. policy has empowered the worst actors in Israel and Palestine by placing all consequences and sticks on the weaker Palestinian side while imposing zero meaningful consequences on the more powerful Israeli side, giving Israel reasonable confidence to pursue de facto annexation and empowering Palestinian extremists who argue freedom only comes through the gun.
“all the consequences and disincentives and punishments and sticks, so to speak, have been focused on one side... the less powerful side, the Palestinians.”
- The Gaza policy traces primarily to Joe Biden's longstanding 'no daylight' conception of the U.S.-Israel relationship—where differences are aired privately while the U.S. stays in public lockstep—combined with overconfidence in his own judgment, which set guardrails within which staffers stopped arguing and merely shaped policy.
“He had a view of the U.S.-Israel relationship, about which he said many times, that there should be no daylight.”
- The Biden administration took steps that helped lead to Oct. 7 by buying into the Abraham Accords logic of sidelining the Palestinian issue and pursuing a U.S.-Saudi-Israel normalization aimed at preserving America as regional security guarantor and boxing out China, which contributed to Hamas's reasoning that drastic action was needed to put the Palestinian issue back on the global agenda.
“I don't think it's quite right to say just that he was responding to the events of Oct. 7. I think his administration had taken steps that led to Oct. 7.”
Elite impunity and systemic corruption justify personnel turnover and anti-corruption as central foreign-policy goal.
- The Iraq war set a bad precedent in that nobody who carried it out paid a price, which is why Duss hopes Gaza does not become 'like the Iraq war'—he wants actual consequences for the officials who carried out the Gaza policy.
“I don't think anybody really paid a price for the Iraq war, at least the officials who carried it out.”
- Elite impunity—the sense that the wealthy, powerful, and well-connected operate by a different set of rules and never pay a price—is at the core of the political crisis, reflecting political corruption, loss of control, and a rigged system; this justifies a full turnover of Democratic foreign-policy staff and barring senior officials who carried out the Gaza policy from future service.
“the wealthy, the powerful, the well-connected, the influential, don't pay a price. They operate according to a different set of rules than the rest of us.”
- A candidate's position on Gaza has become a litmus test that signals broader credibility and trustworthiness; Kamala Harris's hedged 'too many civilians have died' language convinced no one, while Zohran Mamdani's standing firm under fire on principles he didn't even raise added to his credibility even with voters who don't prioritize the issue.
“I do think your position on Gaza is becoming a litmus test. It really does go to credibility, the way someone chooses to talk about this.”
Influence through military support to allies is illusory; conditioning aid or pressure actually shifts outcomes.
- The argument that staying engaged with and supportive of an ally's war preserves influence over its conduct is discredited; the Yemen case showed Obama officials later admitted that supporting the Saudi/Emirati war gave no meaningful influence and merely affirmed a terrible war, and some of those same officials now make the identical argument for Gaza.
“They said in that letter that was a mistake. We were not able to have meaningful influence, and in fact, what we did was just give affirmation to a terrible war.”
- The Israeli security echelon believes that without U.S. support Israel could not continue its operations, which undercuts the claim that pressuring Israel is futile because it could simply proceed alone.
“we have enough Israeli security officials... saying: Listen, without U.S. support, we simply could not continue.”
U.S. must coexist with China through cooperation and accept limits on its ability to set global rules.
- The U.S. must coexist with China and find areas of cooperation, competition, and conflict, but defining the overall relationship as competition will eventually lead to conflict; there is little evidence China seeks to supplant the U.S., and since the U.S. cannot impose its will on China, Washington must accept it does not get to set rules China simply follows.
“the problem with defining the relationship as competition is one that eventually will lead to conflict.”
- Jake Sullivan's foreign policy for the middle class correctly broke with the neoliberal 'rising tide lifts all boats' assumption, but it offered two paths: investing in a genuinely more equitable global trade order that empowers workers including in China (positive-sum), or treating trade as another weapon in strategic competition with China (zero-sum); the Biden administration wrongly chose the latter.
“we now see trade as yet another weapon in a toolbox to assert America in this competition. I think that was the wrong choice. I think we need to go with Option A.”