The Struggle That Shaped the Middle East (with James Barr)
What this covers
Russ Roberts interviews historian James Barr on how the modern Middle East took shape in the aftermath of World War I and Ottoman collapse. The conversation traces the origin of today's regional instability to a single act of imperial cartography: the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement, a diagonal line drawn by Mark Sykes and François Georges-Picot to divide Ottoman territory between British and French interests. Barr contends that this arbitrary frontier—chosen to serve British strategic control of the route to India and French prestige—set in motion a century of conflict by ignoring ethnic, religious, and natural boundaries. The two discuss how Britain and France contradicted themselves repeatedly, making incompatible promises to Arabs and Jews while simultaneously undermining each other's mandates, and how the permeable border itself became a refuge for rebels fleeing whichever colonial power held the other side.
The episode moves through several turning points: Adolf Hitler's rise in 1933 and its effect on Jewish migration to Palestine; the 1936 Arab Revolt and the cycle of violence it triggered among Arabs, Jews, and British authorities; the discovery of oil around Mosul and its role in reshaping British priorities; the French decision to arm Zionist groups partly out of spite toward Britain after losing Syria and Lebanon; and the 1947 Exodus incident that finally convinced the United Nations Britain could no longer govern Palestine. Barr explains how colonial divide and rule tactics—such as France carving Syria into ethnically managed substates—deepened sectarian faultlines. The conversation also touches on the Rotten Log Model of Regime Collapse, using Bashir Assad's sudden fall as an example of how internally hollowed regimes can crumble once external support vanishes.
Barr argues that the modern Middle East—its borders and the conflicts within them—was largely manufactured by Anglo-French imperial rivalry following the Ottoman collapse, beginning with the arbitrary Sykes-Picot line, and that this artificial origin explains the region's persistent instability.
- The Sykes-Picot Agreement drew a diagonal line dividing the region to serve British strategic interests (protecting routes to India) and French prestige interests, not natural or ethnic boundaries
- Britain and France made contradictory promises (to Arabs and Jews) and continually undermined each other's mandates, including French support for Zionist groups to spite Britain
- Because the borders are permeable lines across open country, instability in one state spills rapidly into neighbors
European colonial powers used divide-and-rule tactics and arbitrary borders to suppress local nationalism and maintain control over mandated territories.
- After Britain forced de Gaulle to grant Lebanon and Syria independence, the French sought revenge by helping Zionist groups—initially the extreme Stern Gang and Irgun and later the broader Zionist movement—providing shelter in Lebanon and Syria and likely gun-running, using resistance-era smuggling networks to move weapons and Holocaust survivors to Palestine against British wishes.
“there was a connection between these Jewish terrorist groups--by which they meant the Stern Gang and Irgun--and the French. And the French were actually helping these groups.”
- The Sykes-Picot frontier functioned as a protective barrier for rebels, who hid out on whichever colonial power's side of the line they were safe from: Arab rebels fighting the French sheltered in British territory (Britain refusing extradition to avoid further unpopularity), and rebels fighting Britain in 1930s Palestine fundraised and bought weapons openly in French-controlled Damascus.
“the Arab rebels...were hiding out on the British side of the Sykes-Picot line...the frontier acts as this--it protects the rebels.”
- Facing local opposition to their mandate, the French cynically tried to divide and rule by carving Syria into substates (a Druze state, states of Damascus and Aleppo) and separating Lebanon to create a Christian bridgehead, exploiting fears of the Christian minority being dominated by the Sunni majority.
“to try and get 'round that they decided they would try to accentuate local differences in quite a cynical way. And, the way that they did that was to divide what is now Syria and Lebanon up into little substates.”
- After direct British rule in Iraq failed and provoked the 1920 uprising, Britain adopted a more hands-off approach by installing Faisal as a monarch in 1921 while British officers steered the government behind the throne, with Britain remaining the power behind the throne up to the 1950s despite nominal independence in 1932.
“they got Faisal...and they offered him the throne. They thought they would turn Iraq into a monarchy. And, in August 1921, Faisal is crowned in Baghdad.”
- Authoritarian regimes can appear solid and functioning while being completely hollowed out internally by corruption and competing interests, so that, like a rotten log that collapses when stepped on, they fall suddenly once external support is withdrawn—as with Assad's Syria when Iran and Russia stopped investing in keeping him in power.
“a dictatorship was a bit like a rotten log: When you go out for a walk and you see what looks like a tree stump and you stand on it and the whole thing collapses under your weight because it was already completely rotten.”
Britain and France divided the Ottoman Middle East through Sykes-Picot driven by imperial strategy, not local politics or natural geography.
- Despite being WWI allies, Britain and France harbored deep mutual suspicion, illustrated by a fort built on the North Downs south of London in the 1890s to resist a possible French invasion—only about 20 years before the alliance—which Picot exploited to pressure Britain into the Sykes-Picot deal.
“there is a fort on the North Downs...built in the 1890s in case there was a French invasion. So, we're not that far on from that, about 20 years after that fortress was built to resist the French in case they invaded.”
- By the end of WWI, oil—which had not been a factor in Sykes-Picot—became important as Britain realized there was oil around Mosul in northern Iraq, prompting British troops to advance and seize that area even after the armistice, leading Britain to want more direct control of Iraq and to honor Sykes-Picot to get French recognition of this fait accompli.
“the British, having been pretty pro-Arab...then start thinking about oil...they advanced and took over what is now northern Iraq, the area around Mosul”
- Because the main Sykes-Picot border is a permeable diagonal line cutting across open country rather than a natural feature, instability spreads easily across it—as when the post-2003 Iraq insurgency crossed into Syria the following decade—a pattern present from the moment the border was first drawn.
“that's why that then became an issue in Syria in the following decade...the trouble didn't stay on one side of the frontier for very long: it crossed over.”
- The Sykes-Picot Agreement divided the Middle East along an arbitrary diagonal line (from the E of Acre to the last K in Kirkuk), giving France the north and Britain the south, driven primarily by a British strategic concept of maintaining a belt of British-controlled territory across the region to protect the approaches to India.
“Sykes says, 'I would like to draw a line from the E of Acre to the last K in Kirkuk.'”
Britain's inability to enforce its Palestine mandate, exposed by the 1947 Exodus incident, forced decolonization and partition plans across the region.
- The Peel Commission's proposed partition, communicated through a map at the back of its report showing which areas would be Arab or Jewish, created a new wave of trouble because many people found themselves slated to live in the area they did not want to be in, restarting and worsening the violence the following year.
“that created a whole new world of trouble because lots of people found themselves living in the area they didn't want to be in. And so, the violence restarted again the following year”
- The 1947 Exodus incident—where Britain forced Holocaust-survivor refugees off a ship and sent them back toward Hamburg while UN commissioners watched on the quayside—was the pivotal moment when it became obvious to the United Nations that Britain had neither the right nor the capability to continue running Palestine, leading to the November 1947 partition plan.
“if you were to try and date the moment at which Britain loses the argument to a point, I think I would choose that point in time, because it becomes absolutely obvious to the United Nations that there's no possible way that Britain can claim...a right, but a duty or a capability of running Palestine”
- Despite the League of Nations being Woodrow Wilson's pet idea promoting self-determination, the US Senate refused to approve American participation, so the US retreated into isolationism, leaving the League controlled by Britain and France who awarded themselves mandates and treated them effectively as extensions of empire.
“The United States retreats into isolationism again after the First World War. And that gives the British and the French a fairly free hand.”
- The city of Homs is the crucial strategic point in Syria because just to its west lies a gap in the coastal hills providing the easiest access from the Mediterranean inland; for thousands of years armies have passed through there, so whoever controls Homs effectively controls the route to Damascus, which is why Barr knew the regime was finished once HTS reached it.
“just to the west of Homs, you have a gap in the hills that run all the way down the east coast of the Mediterranean. So, it's the easiest access point to the sea. And so, for thousands of years, armies have been going through there.”
Arab nationalism and identity developed organically from Ottoman decline and Turkish policies, then became a powerful force during the Arab Revolt.
- T.E. Lawrence loathed Mark Sykes, considering him a total amateur, and was vehemently anti-French and pro-Arab; his eagerness to take the Arabs into territory Sykes had conceded to Picot was driven partly by his opposition to the Sykes-Picot deal.
“the undercurrent of all this is that Lawrence hates Sykes. He thinks he's a total amateur...he's also quite pro-Arab.”
- Arab nationalism developed from the late 19th century onward within the Ottoman Empire, driven partly by increasing Turkish ideology making Arabs feel like second-class citizens and partly by broader factors like rising literacy, with secret societies among Arab officers seeking greater autonomy; the Arab Revolt then galvanized this into a powerful groundswell for autonomy by the war's end.
“Arab nationalism had been growing in the Ottoman Empire, partly because of this increasing Turkish ideology...but also much, much broader things like just simple literacy”
- British 'Easterners' believed the Ottomans were the 'Sick Man of Europe' and would be easy to knock out of the war, leading to the plan to attack Gallipoli on the Dardanelles to seize Constantinople, open a new southern front, and force Germany to disperse its efforts—a premise of easy victory that prematurely triggered discussion of how to divide the Ottoman Empire.
“the prevailing view by the beginning of the 20th century was that the Ottomans were the 'Sick man of Europe.'...the British view...was that the Ottomans would be easy to knock out of the war.”
Jewish immigration to Palestine accelerated dramatically after 1933 due to Nazi persecution and global immigration restrictions, reshaping Palestinian demography.
- Before the end of WWI, the modern Middle Eastern states (Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq) did not exist; the central Middle East was ruled by the Ottoman Empire from Istanbul as part of a multi-ethnic empire, and these nations were created in the aftermath of Ottoman collapse.
“the Ottomans ruled--at the beginning of the First World War, they still ruled the central Middle East. So, by that I'm thinking of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Palestine, and going down the sort of edges of the Arabian Peninsula.”
- The Balfour Declaration was motivated partly by an antisemitic assumption that Jewish people were highly influential in world finance; Britain hoped a pro-Zionist declaration would secure the loyalty of Jews worldwide and help raise war finance, particularly given that anti-Semitic Russia struggled to raise money from Jewish financiers in New York.
“Behind this, there's this kind of concept of the Jewish people are very, very influential in world finance, frankly. That is lurking underneath the Balfour Declaration.”
- Jewish immigration to Palestine was modest and sometimes negative before 1933 (with net emigration in some late-1920s years due to harsh conditions), but the rise of Hitler in 1933, combined with tightening immigration restrictions elsewhere including the US, drove a sixfold increase in the Jewish population from roughly 60,000 (10%) in 1918 to 384,000 (28%) by 1936.
“the rise of Hitler changed everything in 1933; and people who realized what that meant and had the money to be able to leave, often ended up in Palestine”