What this covers

Russ Roberts interviews economist Scott Sumner on the economics and history of protectionist policy. The conversation examines why industrial policy and tariffs persistently fail despite their intuitive appeal, tracing the failure to fundamental misunderstandings of trade theory and a pattern of exaggerated threat assessments. Sumner argues that job losses widely attributed to imports actually stem from automation and regional economic shifts, that recurring expert predictions of foreign economic dominance have been wrong for decades, and that the budget deficit—not trade—is America's genuine unsustainable problem. The real barriers to prosperity, he contends, are not imports but domestic regulations that remain in place even as the U.S. faces calls for protective measures.

The discussion moves through several distinct domains. It covers trade theory, comparing trade to automation as both instances of getting more output from fewer inputs, and why popular opposition to trade alongside support for technology reveals confusion about their equivalence. Historically, it traces mercantilist thought back centuries, reviews the recurrent pattern of false alarms—the Cold War missile gap, predictions of Soviet or Japanese dominance, recent sanctions overconfidence—and uses East Asian and Latin American development to show that protectionist policies underperformed open ones. On geopolitics, Sumner argues that U.S. strengths (energy self-sufficiency, financial system dominance, reliable allies) are underestimated while threats from China and Russia are overstated. The economics gets granular on trade deficits, budget deficits, and savings/investment imbalance, showing how populist economics contradicts itself. Throughout, the pair illustrate seen versus unseen costs, zero-sum versus positive-sum thinking, and the role of xenophobia in trade attitudes—some points Roberts contests gently, keeping the exchange grounded in disagreement rather than consensus.

Sharpest takeaway

Sumner argues that industrial policy and protectionism almost always disappoint because they rest on misunderstandings of trade theory and exaggerated national-security fears, while the U.S.'s real economic and geopolitical strengths are routinely underestimated and its genuine problem—an unsustainable budget deficit—is ignored.

  • Protectionist 'common sense' misreads job losses that are actually caused by automation and regional shifts, not trade
  • National-security and foreign-threat arguments for intervention have a long track record of being exaggerated (Soviet missile gap, Japan, Russia sanctions)
  • Many goals industrial policy claims to pursue would be better served by deregulation, and the truly unsustainable issue is the post-2016 budget deficit

The argument · threads7 threads · 40 claims
0.74

Protectionist arguments misdiagnose trade deficits as trade problems when they actually reflect macroeconomic savings-investment imbalances.

5 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Vulgar mercantilism describes advocates of protectionist trade policies whose arguments reflect a lack of understanding of basic trade theory: they acknowledge Ricardian comparative advantage but claim real-world factors refute it, when in fact those factors do not, and then propose policies (like tariffs) that fail to solve problems like trade deficits, which actually reflect macroeconomic variables like savings/investment imbalances.

    “I would define this as people who advocate generally protectionist trade policies for reasons that reflect a lack of understanding of basic trade theory.”

  • Budget deficits contribute to the trade deficit because, under the savings/investment imbalance view, government deficits are negative saving; this exposes the inconsistency of populist economics, which tries to cure a trade deficit with tariffs when the trade deficit is partly driven by a budget deficit that itself reflects populist policies.

    “there's a good argument that budget deficits also contribute to the trade deficit. So, if economists believe the trade deficit is due to a savings/investment imbalance--and that deficits are negative saving.”

  • The argument against international trade is exactly the same as the argument against automation—both are simply ways to get more output from fewer inputs, and both destroy some jobs while creating greater overall prosperity; the fact that many Americans oppose trade but support technological progress indicates they don't understand that the two are the same phenomenon.

    “The argument against international trade is exactly the same as the argument against automation.”

  • Most U.S. manufacturing and mining job losses are caused by productivity improvements (automation) and regional shifts rather than international trade; West Virginia coal jobs declined because of productivity gains and a shift to Western strip mining (the U.S. exports coal), and Michigan auto jobs declined due to new factories in southern states and productivity gains—so these losses would have occurred even without trade.

    “even without international trade, the improvement in productivity in auto manufacturing and the big shift in auto factories to the south would have cost a lot of jobs in any case. It's primarily a regional problem, not an international trade problem.”

  • If trade surpluses were the key to economic success, Germany—which runs a huge trade surplus but whose economy is struggling—should be the envy of the world rather than the United States, which The Economist recently declared the envy of the world; this contradicts the mercantilist assumption that surpluses indicate strength.

    “Germany has a huge trade surplus. So, if trade was really the problem, why isn't Germany the envy of the world, not the United States, in terms of economic performance?”

0.66

Trade skepticism tracks unconscious ethnic bias and xenophobia rather than sound economic reasoning or legitimate national interest.

3 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Public hostility toward international trade is partly driven by natural xenophobia and cultural bias, because interstate trade flows within the U.S. (e.g., jobs moving from Michigan to Tennessee) are not viewed with the same suspicion as imports from foreign countries, and even among foreigners suspicion varies by ethnicity (e.g., more suspicion of Japanese than Canadian cars).

    “there's probably also sort of a little bit of natural xenophobia--that is, distrust of foreigners--involved, because typically trade within the United States, between states, is not viewed with the same sort of suspicion”

  • Hostility toward trade tracks unconscious ethnic bias rather than economic reality: Germany ran huge surpluses but drew no anger, Japanese Americans (not German Americans) were interned in WWII, and today China rather than Russia (which actually invaded Ukraine) is framed as the real national security threat—patterns suggesting attitudes toward trade are linked to which foreigners are perceived as 'sinister.'

    “go back to World War II. We put Japanese Americans into camps, but not German Americans. The Japanese Americans were viewed as more sinister.”

  • The public often holds a common-sense view of how markets work that is simply inaccurate (as with price gouging), and trade theory is especially counterintuitive because the direct effect of imports costing some domestic jobs is visible while the full two-sided nature of trade—that every trade gives and receives—is not.

    “trade theory is very counterintuitive. You can see the direct effect of imports... But people aren't really looking at the big picture of what international trade is about. Every trade is two-sided.”

0.57

Unsustainable budget deficits and protectionist turn toward economic nationalism risk gradual decline resembling dysfunctional banana-republic regimes.

8 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Deficit reduction is politically intractable because when polled the public says the deficit is bad and should be eliminated, but when polled on every specific method—raising taxes, cutting defense, cutting Social Security or Medicare—they reject each one, defaulting to cutting tiny items like foreign aid or eliminating 'waste,' reflecting a Hollywood view that a brave reformer could fix everything when in fact the public likes the programs driving the deficit.

    “When you poll the public on the deficit, they say, 'Absolutely, the budget deficit is bad, get rid of it.' But, if you poll them on every single possible way you could do that... they don't have any answers other than, like: Cut foreign aid--which is a tiny percentage of the budget--or eliminate waste.”

  • An unsustainable budget deficit will likely not produce a sudden 2008-style crisis but will show up gradually as negative economic performance resolved in one of two ways: sharply raising taxes (a drag on the economy) or raising the inflation rate to inflate away the debt—though this reckoning could be a long way off, possibly another decade with nothing noticeable happening.

    “Either in the future we'd have to sharply raise taxes, which would be a drag on the economy. Or, we would raise the inflation rate to inflate away the debt.”

  • Decades of false 'boy who cried wolf' warnings about deficits caused both the public and economists to tune out just as the problem became real: starting around 2016, even though the economy was booming and the U.S. was not at war, budget deficits grew larger instead of falling as they normally do during expansions, putting national debt as a share of GDP on track to rise sharply—a red flag most economists missed.

    “even though the economy was booming and we were not at war, the budget deficits started getting much bigger after 2016. This was a red flag that most economists did not notice.”

  • The U.S. is moving somewhat in a banana-republic direction—meaning a long-dysfunctional economy like Argentina's—through two characteristics typical of such regimes: an excessively reckless fiscal policy and protectionism; though in absolute level the U.S. remains the number-one economy, these political and policymaking trends are worrying.

    “we're moving a little bit in a banana-republic direction in the United States--politically and economically”

  • People conflate unemployment caused by the business cycle with unemployment caused by trade; the China Shock paper studied 1990–2007 when overall U.S. unemployment was low, but the high unemployment people associate with the China shock actually came after the severe 2008 recession and slow recovery, which Sumner attributes to monetary policy mistakes rather than trade.

    “we went into a situation where we did have an overall unemployment problem, I would argue due to monetary policy mistakes, not due to international trade.”

  • China's very large population is declining rapidly and will probably fall by more than half during the 21st century based on current birth rates, such that a hundred years from now Pakistan and Nigeria may each have more people than China—undercutting fears based on China's demographic size.

    “it's also declining rapidly. It'll probably fall more than in half during the 21st century. More than in half. A hundred years from now, it's very possible that Pakistan and Nigeria will have each more people than China.”

  • South Korea, often cited as a mercantilist success story, actually ran a trade deficit almost every year from 1960 to 1997—precisely its double-digit high-growth years—contradicting the claim that export promotion and import suppression drove its success.

    “South Korea ran a trade deficit almost every year from 1960 to 1997. Those were South Korea's high-growth years, their double digit growth years.”

  • China often undermines itself: its government is very prickly about criticism and will impose trade sanctions on countries that criticize it (as with Australia, which refused to abandon its free-speech policy and saw China eventually back off), and this thin-skinned behavior creates a perception that China is more of a threat than it really is.

    “China is often its own worst enemy. They're very prickly about criticism. So, they sometimes will put trade sanctions on a country that criticizes the Chinese government.”

0.56

Expert predictions about foreign economic threats systematically prove exaggerated, warranting skepticism toward current alarmism about China.

4 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Confident expert predictions early in the Ukraine war—that comprehensive Western sanctions would devastate Russia's economy and that Russia's natural gas shutoff would devastate Europe—both proved completely wrong, because the Russian economy did fine and Europe found substitutes, illustrating that claims about wartime vulnerability to being cut off should be treated with great caution.

    “Both predictions turned out to be completely wrong. The Russian economy has done fine, and the European economy got through those winters, finding substitutes for Russian natural gas.”

  • Over the past several decades, a recurring pattern shows that confident expert predictions about foreign threats prove exaggerated: the 1950s missile gap with Russia, predictions the Soviet Union would surpass the U.S. economically (echoed in Samuelson's textbook), and 1980s hysteria about Japan surpassing America all proved wrong, suggesting deep skepticism is warranted toward current China-threat claims.

    “over the course of my life, I've seen many, many claims made about foreign threats and risks associated with foreign policy that in retrospect proved exaggerated.”

  • Sanctions are routinely evaded through transshipment: German exports ostensibly cut off from Russia flow instead to Central Asian republics like Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, whose trade in industrial machinery with Russia skyrocketed after 2022, and advanced computer chips supposedly denied to China remain cheap and abundant in Chinese wholesale markets.

    “German exports go to--I don't know--Kazakhstan or Kyrgyzstan. And then you look at the trade accounts for these central Asian republics, and their trade with Russia skyrocketed after 2022”

  • Despite the perception that China wants to dominate the world, there is little evidence for it: beyond the genuine and major threat to Taiwan, China historically has not been an expansionary power given its size (unlike Russia), the contested South China Sea islands are mostly uninhabited (the largest controlled by Taiwan), and China's per capita GDP is only about Mexico's level and likely to remain well below U.S. levels.

    “beyond Taiwan, I actually don't think China is a particularly expansionist power.”

0.53

Neoliberal globalization era delivered unprecedented poverty reduction and outperformed protectionist alternatives like Latin American import substitution.

3 pointscentrality 4/5
  • The neoliberal-globalization era of roughly the 1980s through 2010 produced by far the biggest reduction in global poverty in human history, but in the last decade much of the world has swung away from neoliberalism toward economic nationalism, abandoning lessons learned from the failed interventionist policies of the 1960s-70s.

    “We saw that, by far, the biggest reduction in global poverty ever during this neoliberal era”

  • East Asia, which relied on open economies and international trade, surged ahead of Latin America, which relied on import substitution (a classic industrial policy of erecting trade barriers to build domestic industry); although Latin America was richer for a while after WWII, by the 1990s East Asia clearly outperformed it, helping discredit industrial policy and boost the prestige of the neoliberal globalization model.

    “East Asia--which was relying more on international trade, was surging ahead of Latin America, which relied on import substitution.”

  • A cross-sectional comparison of countries supports neoliberalism better than U.S. time-series data does: while U.S. growth in the neoliberal era was slightly lower than the 1960s, countries that adopted more aggressive market reforms (China, India, Eastern Europe, Israel) typically did better than those that stayed with statist models.

    “the countries that moved strongly towards neoliberalism did better when you compare to countries that stayed with a more statist model.”

0.53

United States possesses overwhelming geopolitical advantages in energy, finance, technology, and allied networks that dwarf vulnerabilities from trade.

3 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Tearing up the free-market model in the name of national security may actually make the United States weaker in the long run, because in the very long run a country's geopolitical strength is linked to the strength of its economy.

    “in the very long run, your ability to have strength in a geopolitical sense is linked to the strength of your economy.”

  • Because U.S. industrial growth oriented toward computers and high technology, the U.S. completely dominates the cutting edge of high tech—reflected in its 60% share of world stock market capitalization despite being only 20-25% of world GDP—which is a major foreign policy strength for futuristic AI-era conflicts, making the ability to make tanks far less important than staying at the forefront of artificial intelligence.

    “I believe the U.S. stock market capitalization is 60% of the entire world. We're only like 20, 25% of world GDP, but we're 60% of stock market capitalization. Why is that? Basically, the answer is very simple: our high-tech industries.”

  • The United States is by far in the strongest geopolitical position of any country because it is nearly self-sufficient in energy and food, dominates the global financial system (able to cut countries off from money flows), and has reliable industrial allies (South Korea and Japan for chips, Canada, Europe), whereas adversaries like China and Russia have few reliable friends (North Korea, Belarus)—making U.S. vulnerability far smaller than commonly perceived.

    “the United States is by far in the strongest position of any country in terms of foreign policy risks.”

0.35

Free-market reforms like deregulation and immigration would better address structural problems than industrial policy or protectionism.

2 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Proponents of industrial policy almost never advocate deregulation, yet many of the problems they claim to worry about would be better addressed by free-market reforms—repealing Davis-Bacon and the Jones Act, joining the Asian free-trade zone, accepting more high-skilled immigrants, and eliminating residential zoning laws (which would lower coastal housing costs that devastate blue-collar living standards and create blue-collar construction jobs)—rather than by more regulation that tends to make the country poorer.

    “why isn't the industrial policy to eliminate residential zoning laws? Because the living standard of blue collar workers in places like California is devastated by the high housing prices.”

  • While modest industrial policy (like subsidizing some chip-making factories) may occasionally be justified, such arguments should be very strictly limited because there are very few cases where resources are so essential that a free market cannot supply them; expansive industrial policy that makes the economy much more interventionist abuses the foreign-policy rationale and ignores America's true geopolitical strength.

    “these arguments should be very strictly limited. There are probably very few cases where there's resources that are so essential that we can't rely on a free market.”