Terrorism, Israel, and Dreams of Peace (with Haviv Rettig Gur)
What this covers
Haviv Rettig Gur, an Israeli journalist, joins Russ Roberts to trace how Israeli public opinion shifted rightward over three decades, arguing the cause was not ideology but lived experience. The conversation reconstructs the political and military history of Israeli withdrawals from Lebanon and Gaza, and the Palestinian responses to them. Gur's core claim: Israeli Jews abandoned leftist peace strategies after observing that unilateral retreats produced not quiet but intensified attacks modeled on Algeria's anticolonial insurgency—a pattern that shattered the Israeli left's foundational assumption that territorial concessions could buy security.
The argument unfolds through the mechanics of the Algeria Paradigm and how it failed against Israel precisely where it succeeded against France. Gur details how the FLN developed a Cost-Imposition Strategy: make occupation so costly that the occupier withdraws, but deliberately inflict suffering far beyond the rational threshold, provoking maximum cruelty to exhaust the colonizer morally and politically. The Second Intifada deployed this logic with 140 suicide bombings at the height of peace negotiations, shattering Israeli faith; Ehud Olmert's subsequent withdrawals and the 2005 Gaza disengagement were rebranded as strategic retreats for Israeli interest, not peace gestures. Where the analysis turns distinctive is its explanation for why the strategy fails for Israel: Israelis have no homeland to retreat to, unlike the French retreating to Europe. The discussion also addresses the gap between American and Israeli Jewish consciousness—how the security history of Jews in the 20th century created two fundamentally different civilizations—and closes with assessment of deterrence, the vacuum problem after withdrawal, and whether separation remains possible.
Gur argues that Israeli Jewish opinion shifted right not from stupidity or malice but from lived experience: each unilateral withdrawal (Lebanon 2000, Gaza 2005) was answered with terror modeled on the anticolonial 'Algeria paradigm,' destroying the left's belief that withdrawal buys peace—and this strategy fails against Israelis because, unlike the French, they have no homeland to retreat to.
- The Second Intifada's 140 suicide bombings during peak peace negotiations shattered Israeli faith that withdrawal yields quiet, collapsing the left rather than the right
- Palestinian elites consciously modeled their strategy on Algeria's FLN, seeking to impose costs of x+300 and provoke enemy cruelty to force collapse
- The Algeria strategy fails against Israel because Israelis have no 'France' to return to—surviving Jews are largely those with no other refuge
The FLN anticolonial strategy imposes extreme costs to exhaust the colonizer's moral and financial will, deliberately provoking cruelty to trigger internal collapse.
- In FLN logic, when a colonizer signals accommodation it is interpreted as caving from internal vulnerability, so you triple down on attacks; thus the Second Intifada was the Palestinian elite, raised on Algeria, reading Oslo and the withdrawals led by Israel's most decorated soldiers as the power structure caving—making the height of peace the moment to destroy it with 140 suicide bombings.
“What is Oslo, if not signals from within the power structure that the power structure is caving? And, what does the FLN do when the power structure caves? It doubles down on its attacks”
- October 7 was Hamas arguing it had not sufficiently sacrificed on the altar of Algeria, deliberately engineering Gaza's destruction through 500 kilometers of tunnels built to protect fighters not civilians, so that Israel's military response would inflict catastrophic Palestinian civilian pain that empties Israelis of purpose—exactly the cost-imposition and cruelty-provocation logic the FLN used on France.
“October 7 was Hamas arguing, essentially... that the problem so far is that we haven't sufficiently sacrificed on the altar of Algeria.”
- The FLN's anticolonial strategy holds that a colonizer values a territory at X and will leave if you impose a cost of X+1, but since you owe freedom to your children rather than politeness to the colonizer, you actually impose X+300; this guarantees horrific brutality and crucially aims to goad the colonizer into cruelty, since the colonizer's own moral, political, and financial exhaustion causes collapse from within, not military defeat.
“You exact a cost that's x+1. And, if the cost is x+1, they leave. But of course... The cost you try to exact is x+300.”
- Olmert's Convergence Plan to withdraw from the West Bank required first restoring deterrence in Gaza and Lebanon, because the West Bank is an order of magnitude more dangerous as the highland overlooking Israel's nine-mile-wide core—a withdrawal gone wrong there could shut the main airport with a shoulder-fired mortar and would have to be violently reversed—so he launched the Second Lebanon War to prove deterrence could be restored.
“Olmert has to show that he can restore deterrence in Gaza and Lebanon in order to be able to pull out of the West Bank.”
- The PLO was established in 1964—three years before any Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza—based explicitly on the idea that just as the Algerians kicked out the French using anticolonial methods, Palestinians could kick out the Israelis, showing the strategy was not a response to occupation but a conscious imitation of the FLN.
“when the PLO is established in 1964, the PLO is established three years before there's an Israeli occupation in the West Bank in Gaza. It's not established to push back the Israeli occupation.”
This strategy cannot work against Israel because Israelis have no metropole to retreat to and many are refugees from Arab lands, so they cannot be forced to leave.
- When America passed quota laws in 1921 and 1924 and other nations followed, Jews became undeportable; the Nazis wanted to be rid of Jews by deportation but could not because no one would take them, so they killed them—meaning the world's immigration laws effectively corralled the Jews into the gas chambers, and even after the Holocaust the quotas were never lifted, leaving the last quarter-million displaced persons all Jews.
“these immigration laws corralled the Jews into the gas chambers.”
- The Algeria strategy must fail against Israel because Israelis are unlike the French in the specific characteristics needed for it to work: above all they have no France to retreat to, and many descend from Jews expelled from the Arab world—including the Jews the FLN itself expelled from Algeria—so there is no Metropole and no alternative homeland, meaning the cruelty-provocation strategy destroys Palestine rather than Israel.
“the biggest way that the Israelis are unlike the French, is that they have no France-- There's no France to go back to.”
- There is no prosperous future for Palestinians except integration into the Israeli economy, because no other economy nearby is worth integrating into; cut off from Israel they would at best become a Somalia even in their own state, so the drive to murder Israelis sacrifices the only viable path to prosperity.
“there is no prosperous future for Palestinians except integration into the Israeli economy. There's simply no other economy around they could integrate into that would be worth integrating into.”
- When a power is removed in today's Middle East, the vacuum is filled not by liberal democrats but by extremists—Hezbollah after Israel left Lebanon, Hamas after Israel left Gaza, ISIS after the US left Iraq—a direct line that makes unilateral withdrawal predictably dangerous regardless of intent.
“when there's a vacuum of power in the Middle East today, going through the crisis it's going through, who fills it? Not Jeffersonian Democrats”
Israelis experience defensive capability and costly sacrifice not as exhaustion but as redemption, the fulfillment of Jewish survival after centuries of vulnerability.
- For Israelis, living on their sword and fighting endlessly is not the bad scenario but redemption, because Jews stopped dying when they gained the right their ancestors never had to defend themselves; Israel did not make Jews invincible, it made their blood very costly, so that what the West perceives as Israel's tragic predicament feels to Israelis like the good news.
“living on our sword is redemption. We stopped dying when we started having the great and profound right that our ancestors never had”
- In American Jewish understanding, Zionist is one ideological option among many flavors of Jewishness, but in Israeli understanding—formed by living through the 20th century—Zionist simply means survived, because nearly every other Jew in the Eastern Hemisphere is dead and Israel was the only refuge available, making anti-Zionism either genocidal, historically ignorant, or a wish that the Jews had been given other options.
“in the United States, Zionist is a word that is believed to convey a kind of ideological option... But, what is the Israeli understanding... Zionist just literally means survived.”
- There are today two Jewish civilizations—the English-speaking and the Hebrew-speaking—because in the 20th century you either learned Hebrew, learned English, or died; the gap between how the West sees Israel and how Israelis see themselves is rooted in this split between the American Jew, for whom liberalism's promise came astonishingly true, and the Israeli Jew, who is the mirror image: the Jew the world's quota laws shut out.
“We have, today, two Jewish civilizations, and they're basically the two Jews who survived the 20th century--the English-speaking Jew and the Hebrew-speaking Jew. In the 20th century, you either learned Hebrew, learned English, or died.”
- The single best correlation for which way Israelis vote is religious observance—the more religious, the more likely to be on the right—and the Israeli left-right divide is overwhelmingly about how to treat the Palestinians rather than economics, with the left being the capitalists in Tel Aviv and parts of the right being ultra-Orthodox who live off the state.
“The single best correlation for which way you voted was religious observance.”
Israeli public opinion rests on the belief that any territorial withdrawal will be exploited to attack Israeli civilians, making security the core political dividing line.
- Polls show 80% of Israeli Jews oppose a Palestinian state, but when asked if they'd support one that was safe, around 60% say yes—and when asked whether it will ever be safe, 80% say no; this captures the core Israeli position that they would accept separation but believe every withdrawal will be turned into the murder of their children.
“you say, 'Should there be a Palestinian state?'--huge numbers of Israeli Jews say no... And then you say, 'Well, what if it were safe?' And then, suddenly 60% say, 'Sure.' And then, you say to them, 'Will it ever be safe?' 80% say, 'No.'”
- The Second Lebanon War failed in the Israeli civilian experience because despite Olmert smashing Lebanon, Israelis experienced unstoppable rocket fire, mass displacement, and Hezbollah boasting 'nothing you do will stop the missile fire'—convincing the public that the enemy is undeterrable, which collapsed support for a West Bank withdrawal specifically on the left that had desperately wanted it, not the right.
“the Israeli public came to believe them. They're undeterrable, Israelis believe. You cannot deter Hamas. You cannot deter Hezbollah... And therefore you cannot pull out of the West Bank.”
- Israeli voter turnout averaged about 80% for 40 years, never dropping below 77% even through wars and triple-digit inflation, then collapsed 17 points to 62% in 2001 and never recovered—signaling not a procedural quirk but a shattering of Israeli faith that politics has answers, caused by the inexplicable Second Intifada.
“voter turnout drops 17 points to 62%. Overnight. And, it has not yet recovered to the lowest it had ever been before.”
- The 2005 Gaza disengagement was immensely popular because the Israeli public believed the left had tried to end occupation with naive optimism and failed in rivers of blood, and now the right would do the same thing more responsibly—getting out for Israel's own interest while reserving the right to shoot anyone who crossed the border—rather than out of any belief in peace or reciprocity.
“The right was now going to do much more responsibly the same exact thing the left can't do because the left are a bunch of Pollyannas. That was the basic perception, and it was immensely popular.”
- The First Intifada (1987) was experienced by Israelis as a bottom-up grassroots moral cry against occupation that even surprised Palestinian leaders, forging a new peace-seeking Israeli left; the Second Intifada (2000) was the opposite—a planned, organized guerrilla campaign of 140 suicide bombings launched precisely when no Israeli soldiers were in Palestinian cities and peace was being handed over, which the left could never explain.
“In the Israeli Jewish experience, these were opposite events. These were opposite events.”
Suicide terrorism and mass violence require redemptive ideology and social investment to persuade perpetrators they serve a sacred cause, not desperation alone.
- Suicide terrorism is not a function of desperation—the poorest and most endangered people on earth do not produce it—but of redemptive ideology; it requires social capital, the investment of social networks and authority figures, to convince people they are saving the world by murdering other people's children, as when Hamas ran martyrdom classes in Gaza mosques.
“it's not a function of desperation. The poorest people on earth--the most desperate people on earth--people on earth facing genocide don't produce suicide terrorism. It is a function of redemption.”
- Iran has no rational interest in destroying Israel—no border, no stake in Palestinian or even Iranian rights—and seeks Israel's destruction only because of a vast restorationist redemptive religious vision, but for the first time in Jewish history the Jews can hurt them more than they can hurt the Jews.
“There is no reason that Iran would want to destroy Israel. It has no interest in Israel... The Iranian regime wants to destroy Israel because of some wack-a-doodle, insane, vast... restorationist redemptive religious vision.”
- The same Palestinians who tell pollsters they love and admire Hamas also say they hate it—hating it for destroying Gaza, theocratic tyranny, and stealing aid, while admiring it for giving them a profound story of religious dignity that explains their suffering, a story few alternatives in their political life provide.
“the same Palestinians who tell us they love and admire Hamas also tell us they hate Hamas”
Quote-mining texts for proof of racism or nazism misses the deep human logic driving actors' strategic decisions and what they actually believe about survival.
- Analysts who quote-mine Israeli or Palestinian sources—finding a Nazi-borrowing in Hamas's charter or a racist line in a Zionist text—conclude what they already believed and miss the deep, human story, because they take an abstract construct that fits one piece of reality and apply it universally.
“if you do hook onto that and assume that you've now understood the Palestinians, you'll miss the deep story, the rich story”
- There has never been a guerrilla force based in a supportive civilian population defeated by a standing army—not since Alexander the Great—yet Sharon's response to that strategic warning was that he wasn't claiming it was possible, only that Israel was going to do it anyway, which Operation Defensive Shield in 2002 effectively accomplished by rebuilding intelligence networks.
“there has never been a guerrilla army based in a supportive civilian population that was defeated by any standing army... not since Alexander the Great”
- Western political-intellectual elites too often lose the ability to distinguish between moral judgment and diagnostic explanation, treating Israelis as foolish or evil; in fact Israelis cannot reach peace because they know more than the Western critic, not less, and the same is true of Palestinians.
“It's a moral judgment masquerading as an explanation.”
American and Israeli Jewish civilizations diverged fundamentally because one found safety in liberalism while the other faced quota laws that funneled Jews toward catastrophe.
- American Jews consciously stopped teaching Jewish history about five generations ago because America felt like the end of Jewish history of pain, reducing the bloodiest century in Jewish history—1,300 pogroms, a quarter-million dead, the 20th century being the bloodiest even without the Holocaust—to Fiddler on the Roof in the American Jewish imagination.
“all of that history has been reduced essentially to Fiddler in the American Jewish imagination, because they consciously decided to stop teaching history--because history had ended because America was the answer.”
- Zionism was a broad sociological analysis of modernity, not mere nationalism; Herzl's final utopian novel Altneuland centers on the danger that Jews would become racist toward Arabs in their new mass society, and depicts Jews voting down an oppressive rabbi—making the avoidance of that racism the very thing that makes the vision utopian.
“the racism of the Jews is something Herzl worries about. And yet they shrink him down to this tiny little pathetic thing by quote-mining”
- Over the month preceding the recording, the Iranian regime was revealed to be much weaker than previously assumed, a turning point the Middle East will feel for decades though its full meaning is not yet clear.
“The Iranian regime over the last month has been revealed to be much weaker than we all thought it was. That is a turning point that the Middle East will feel for decades”